Preface

Globalization and Violence

The first set of volumes in the ‘Central Currents in Globalization’ series takes a particularly pressing manifestation of human relations – violence – and explores its changing nature in relation to the various processes of globalization. It is organized across the four volumes beginning with the historically-deep practice of empire-building Volume 1, *Globalizing Empires*: old and New. Imperial extension contributed to the processes of globalization to the extent that states sought to claim military and political control over extended reaches of territories – other places and peoples – that they imagined in terms of a ‘world-space’. This was the case whether we talk of the Roman Empire in the first century or the British Empire in the nineteenth century, even though they are very different polities. The first volume covers the theme of empire right through to contemporary debates about globalization and *Pax Americana*. Volume 2, *Colonial and Postcolonial Globalizations*, takes up that same story, but examines the process from the perspective of the periphery rather than from the centre. It begins with Second Expansion of Europe and colonization in the mid-nineteenth century. It takes in the violence of decolonization across the world in the period through to the 1960s, and it considers the question of contemporary postcolonial violence – not just military, but broader questions of structural violence today. Volume 3, *Globalizing War and Intervention*, examines the changing nature of military intervention, including the remarkable shift in the form of violence across the globe from interstate violence to intrastate conflict in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. This volume includes a section on one of the most dramatic instances of global violence in our time – terrorism and the War on Terror. The emphasis here is on ‘violence from above’, as it were – violence that is in some way institutionalized or directed with the power of sovereign body. Finally, Volume 4, *Transnational Conflict*, complements the third volume by examining the different forms of transnational and intra-state violence in the world today, what might be called ‘violence from below’. In all of the volumes we are concerned to understand both the globalizing processes and the more general effects of empire in world history.

Paul James
A Critical Introduction

Paul James and Tom Nairn

The concepts of ‘empire’ and ‘imperialism’ slipped into relative disuse during the later part of the twentieth century, but they are now back as the central tropes of current and raging debates. Using the theme of globalizing empires for the opening volume of the ‘Central Currents in Globalization’ series is nevertheless provocative. The theme has an unsettled and controversial status in current discussions of the nature of globalization. Empire is our point of departure, not because it is controversial but rather because it provides us with a useful locus for introducing many of the issues of contemporary globalization. At the same time it allows us to cover vast historical ground from the early empires of the classical period across the last two thousand years to the present. Along the way, it provides one dimension of the necessary historical background to later volumes in the series. Traditional empires going back at least to the Romans were arguably one of the carriers of lines of globalizing connection across the ‘known world’. The theme also relates to a dominant literature in the social sciences today, heralded in by the much-debated book by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (2000), a section of which is reproduced in this volume.1

One of the suggestions in that literature is that we have arrived at new stage of imperial expansion. Contemporary empire, despite its contradictions and cleavages, is said to be more totalizing, or at least more comprehensive in its global reach, than ever before. The writings in the present anthology, including this overview, use the theme of empire to interrogate this argument and others. The arguments were first introduced in the related fields of imperialism studies, international relations, historical sociology and economic history, but the present volume looks at those debates from a slightly different perspective; one that takes into account the new literature on globalization. Some of the contributions, such as the classic essay by Gallagher and Robinson, ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’ (1953), were written before the overt emphasis on globalization, but in republishing them here we intend them to be read in a broader light.

Empire is back as a contentious theme for three or four inter-related reasons. Firstly, after the initial dominance of the breathlessly optimistic and uncritical economic literature on globalization in the 1980s,2 the more recent debates on globalization took up questions of differential economic power with an increasingly critical edge. Through the 1970s and 1980s, the work of Immanuel Wallerstein and the world-systems theorists or Andre Gunder Frank and
the dependency theorists had kept the critical spirit alive, but they nevertheless signalled a partial shift away from classical imperialism studies as the major carrier of work on globalizing relations. Across the turn of the millennium, confronted by structures of increasing economic inequity and wretchedness, both within and across nation-states – particularly in some parts of Africa, Asia and Latin America – a number of writers returned to concepts of imperialism, but with new sophistication. With a much more critical sense of the structures of political economy, the work on empire focuses on issues of Americanization, cross-boundary extensions of national economic interests, and the globalization of production and exchange, including the culture-industries. In a sense then, empire re-emerged as a concern as writers became sensitized to the analytical-normative problem of what drives the economic processes of globalization, and who potentially benefits from them.

Secondly, the globalizing effects of recent military interventions evoked memories of past empires. The speeches of George W. Bush on the USA in Iraq started to sound reminiscent of Lord Balfour’s interwar speeches on the British Empire’s role in the Middle East. With this as background, some commentators sought ways of generalizing about the recent pattern of military interventions into zones of conflict including the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq (one of the issues explored in Volume 3, *Globalizing War and Intervention*). The later interventions by the United States, in conjunction with the US-named ‘Coalition of Willing’, coincided with the ascendancy to power of a group of neo-liberal politicians in the United States who had since the late 1990s been laying out a program for what they called the ‘Project for a New American Century’. One of its precepts was the necessity of ‘pre-emptive intervention’ – that is, the notion that it sometimes becomes imperative to strike militarily before actually being attacked oneself. In the aftermath of the terrorist strike of September 11 (2001), the notion of ‘pre-emptive intervention’ returned as a formal policy option. The ‘National Security Strategy of the United States of America’ (2002) set as its major concern countering what it called ‘terrorists of global reach’. The document was explicit that all available methods which needed to be used against such enemies would be used. This was a war without end: ‘The war against terrorists of global reach is a global enterprise of uncertain duration’, the document said, repeatedly underlining the global nature of the problem. In normal times, nationally self-interested pre-emptive strikes would have been in contravention of the Westphalian international norm against intervening across nation-state boundaries, but this moment of history was taken by the proponents of the Project for a New American Century to be a time-out-of-time. They saw themselves as speaking for a global freedom and democracy that began in Washington and spread outwards across the earth.

Thirdly, the discussion of empire revived with the collapse of the Soviet Union. There was slow realization, as multilateralism gave way to increasing
US unilateralism, that the world now lives under the dominance of the United States as a single great power – a ‘super power’ or global hegemon in the language of International Relations. Notwithstanding the USA’s fragilities and limitations, and the difficulties of operationalizing the old-fashioned possibilities that such dominant military and economic power would have brought in an earlier era, many writers started to talk about the re-emergence of an American Empire.7 Ironically, in the early 1980s the US President Ronald Reagan had implied that the USSR was the ‘evil empire’: ‘I urge you to beware the temptation of pride’, he said, ‘the temptation of blithely declaring yourselves above it all and label both sides equally at fault, to ignore the facts of history and the aggressive impulses of an evil empire …’8 A decade on, the world started to talk of a different empire: the United States of America. Even those in favour of the ascendancy, commentators such as Deepak Lal writing in Praise of Empires: Globalization and Order,9 began to presume that the United States had assumed the mantle of a new imperium.

Of course, these issues are handled differently by different authors. Hardt and Negri, for example, treat contemporary empire as post-national. Empire in their terms is beyond any nation-state, even one as powerful as the USA. For Hardt and Negri, the United States of America is not at the centre of that Empire even if it occupies a privileged place in it. They open their book Empire with the following passage:

Empire is materializing before our very eyes. Over the past several decades, as colonial regimes were overthrown and precipitously after the Soviet barriers to the capitalist world market finally collapsed, we have witnessed an irresistible and irreversible globalization of economic and cultural exchanges. Along with a global market and global circuits of production has emerged a global order, new logic and structure of rule – in short a new form of sovereignty. Empire is the political subject that effectively regulates these global exchanges, the sovereign power that governs the world.10

Their book became the fourth (though perhaps the least consequential) reason for the new wave of interest. Hardt and Negri were theorizing the passage of a fundamentally new form of empire – a decentred (postmodern) Empire – and it set in train a bevy of laudatory and damning reviews, some of which are reproduced in this volume. There is a lot that is contentious in the passage quoted above, including the claim that Empire regulates globalization, or that it is ‘irresistible and irreversible’. We will come back to examine critically the Empire debate later in this essay, but first we need to clarify a few more issues.

The structure of the present essay opens by addressing some conceptual issues and definitional questions in relation to empire and globalization, and then goes back into history: first to the traditional empires of East and West to examine whether or not they were in fact globalizing; and then, secondly,
to the empires, formal and informal, of the nineteenth century that have been associated with the ‘take-off stage’ of modern globalization. We then examine the question of empire after September 11, the debate over Hardt and Negri’s *Empire*, and conclude with some critical conjectures.

### Some Conceptual Issues

Our overall premise here is not that ‘empire’ is a master category of analysis; nor even that it is the key to framing questions of past or contemporary globalizations. Rather, it is a way in to understanding the deep continuities and profound discontinuities of processes of globalization. When the term ‘empire’ is used here it is not with a capital ‘E’, except when a particular empire is being discussed. The category of things that we call ‘empires’ are simply social formations – in the same way that kingdoms, nation-states or religious sodalities are social formations. They are formations that, like states and sodalities, have been constituted in and through changing modes of social processes – production, exchange, communication, organization and enquiry. They also involve particular ways of organizing time and space. Understanding the peculiarities of empires thus requires us to examine the broad patterns of practice across human history. It requires at the same time attending to the detail of each empire while not getting too distracted by questions such as whether Genghis Khan was more driven by blood-thirst or sexual lust, and whether or not George W. Bush and Tony Blair have similar delusions of grandeur as Napoleon Bonaparte.

### Defining Empire

At one level of analysis the particularities of each empire depend upon the unique conjunction of practices and subjectivities at the time and place under discussion, and in this sense can only be known by detailed study. Nevertheless, in moving back to a more general level of analysis, empires have enough in common to be defined broadly as a particular kind of institutionalized setting for the extension of power. As a general phenomenon, empires extend relations of power across territorial spaces over which they have no prior or given legal sovereignty, and where, in one or more of the domains of economics, politics, and culture, they gain some measure of extensive hegemony over those spaces for the purpose of extracting or accruing value. The ‘value’ being talked about here does not always mean just economic value. Often this is the case, but sometimes empires centre on accruing prestige or symbolic value; sometimes they centre on the value of securing the landscape as part of a global ‘civilizing mission’ or universalizing and proselytizing cause. Empires differ greatly. Sometimes they are homogenizing,
sometimes open to cultural diversity; they can be formal or informal; sometimes they are relatively restricted in spatial terms; and more rarely they stretch across the entire globe.

Relating this to the theme of globalization, we can add that to the extent that these extensions of hegemony have, or are projected to have, the potential to command ‘world spaces’ – with the concept of ‘world space’ defined in terms of the dominant subjectivities of the historical period that we are examining – then empires tend to be globalizing formations. That is, it is not their size that makes them globalizing or not. Empires are globalizing because they project power extensively (rather than just intensively), and they stretch this power far beyond the given borders of a polity, whether it be a city-state, an absolutist state, or a nation-state. They are globalizing to the extent that they push social relations out beyond immediate culturally-framed locales and into spaces that are potentially always expanding. Even if a particular empire does not have a ‘global reach’ as we would define it today, empires by their nature still tend to contribute to processes of globalization because of the way that imperial power tends to generate counter-power at its edge-lands and send out reverberations far beyond the territories of their immediate control.

Within that common form of a regime projecting extensive hegemony, we can distinguish different basic kinds of empire. Across history, very different dominant forms of empires have emerged that can be described in shorthand terms as traditional empires, modern empires and postmodern empires.11 This is said with two provisos. Firstly, we need to be very clear that these are just terms of description.12 There are for instance no pure ‘traditional empires’, ‘modern empires’, or ‘postmodern empires’ as such, but rather there are empires formed in the dominance of traditional or modern or postmodern practices and subjectivities. The British Empire of the nineteenth century, for example, was modern in many of its administrative forms including its dominant practice of indirect bureaucratic and rationalizing rule, but Rule Britannia overlaid a much longer-term historical foundation of archaic and traditional practices linked to monarchical power, patrimonial rule, and a crusading cosmology. That is, the nineteenth and early-twentieth century British Empire was constituted as layers of practices both traditional and modern, but it was dominated by modern modes of organization, exchange, production, enquiry and communication. What they with their competing imperialists spread across the globe, for example, was modernist understandings of spatiality including scientific cartography, capitalist property relations, and an ethos of New World ‘discovery’ and ‘settlement’.

Secondly, these short-hand terms do not denote periods of history except as provisional structures-in-dominance. As Rhys Jones and Richard Phillips argue in their essay reproduced in this volume, ‘Unsettling Geographical Horizons: Exploring Premodern and Non-European Imperialism’, the usual
way of setting a great divide between the modern and the pre-modern caricatures the complexity of the continuities and discontinuities between, for example, the Roman Empire and the Spanish Empire. The distinction between traditional, modern, and postmodern empires is thus a provisional one, based on distinguishing between ontologies of spatiality, temporality, and embodiment.\textsuperscript{13}

Empires formed in the dominance of traditionalism – such as the Sumerian, Akkadian, and Roman Empires and through to the late-nineteenth century Ottoman Empire before it confronted a world of nation-states – were forms of organization that stretched economic, political and cultural power across extended territories that shaded off at their edges rather than stopped at defined sovereign boundaries. Even the fabled boundary of the ‘Great Wall’ did not define the frontier of the T’ang Empire. To that extent, empires were one of the earliest institutionalized carriers of globalization of the embodied kind, as either agents of different imperial centres traveled into previously ‘unknown’ regions or, much more rarely, centres moved with their conquests.

By comparison, empires such as the British, French and German Empires of the nineteenth century, formed in the dominance of modernism, did not fade away at their edges but sought to draw abstract lines around colonized territories and demarcate zones of influence. The empires could be formal or informal, colonializing or mercantile. However, as they scrambled over each other to control the far-flung reaches of the globe, the conflict intensified as did the political ‘necessity’ of formalizing the control turned in a world-wide system of territorialized colonies. Up until World War I, the empires either globalized further or found themselves in retreat. It was often very messy. Nevertheless, at one level, imperialism became systematized across the entire globe in the nineteenth century alongside the emergence of a system of nation-states. Agents of the state and other bodies continued to be very important, but this was increasingly overlaid by techniques of governance from a distance. Representatives of the empires came together in special congresses and cabals – the Paris Congress (1856), the Three Emperor’s League (1872), and the Congresses of Berlin (1878, 1885) – meeting together in the ante-rooms of soon-to-be-famous European buildings such as Radziwill Palace (later Hitler’s Chancellery), and negotiating such problems as the slow death of the wizened old Ottomans or how to carve up new zones of unconquered territory in darkest Africa.

By further comparison, empires formed in the dominance of postmodernism are deterritorializing. This is a more controversial claim to the characterizations of traditional and modern empires and is liable to misinterpretation. Postmodern empires, we suggest, are based on abstracted systems of exchange and production (finance and information-based capitalism), of communication (electronic media) and of enquiry (techno-science) that are quite material but do not depend upon territorial control. Rather than being property-
centred in the modern sense of property, the extraction or accruing of value occurs as a rationalization and commodification of time/space itself. Hollywood/MTV culture, for example, involves an empire of signs that multiplies its value as it simulates but leaves behind the embodied spaces of everyday life. Financial hedging involves an empire of electronic codes that enables the momentary fixing of contracts on the projected value of the transaction even as it leaves behind present time. (See Volume 6, Global Finance and the New Global Economy.)

Neither do postmodern empires have a centre of their own. Finance capitalism is extensively hegemonic, and it is certainly globalizing of a layer of power, but we cannot say that postmodern empire is centred on Wall Street or controlled by cabals of capital traders and captains of industry meeting in the wood-panelled anterooms of modern imperialism. Postmodern empires are therefore very different from both traditional empires and modern empires where the emphasis is on different kinds of political-military, economic or cultural control of territory for the extraction or accruing of value. If we take the nature of spatiality as the basis for the form of comparison we can thus say – as an empirical comparative tendency rather than an intrinsic definition – that traditional empires tended to radiate contiguously outwards in lines from sovereign city-states or other cosmologically understood centres of power; modern empires tended (and tend) to take control of territories in a Cartesian patchwork of conquests based on the centred authority of sovereign monarchical states or nation-states; and postmodern empires are post-territorial systems of abstracted sovereignty which have no overriding national centre and no last-instance centres of embodied authority.

This discussion can be summarized through a number of interconnected propositions.

**Proposition 1.** Empire have taken different dominant forms over human history – traditional, modern and postmodern – and while the dominance of various forms can be seen as falling into broad periods, it is very important not to caricature this process of intersecting formations and overlaying levels as the replacement of one epoch by another.

**Proposition 2.** Empires tend to be globalizing to the extent that they do not take prior cultural or political borders as given, but forge relations or negotiate power across world-space, where the concept of ‘world-space’ is defined in terms of how people in a particular time and place define the limits and nature of their spherical world.

**Proposition 3.** Empires have had a profound effect on the landscape of contemporary global life, including contributing to the territorial abstraction of older forms of spatial organization;
displacing or oppressing indigenous peoples; and setting up structural divides between colonizers and the colonized that are still being worked through in international relations and political economics today.

Defining Globalization

All too often globalization, like imperialism, is reductively defined in economic terms. For example, in *Praise of Empires* mentioned earlier, Deepak Lal defines globalization as ‘the process of creating a common economic space which leads to the growing integration of the world economy through increasingly free movement of goods, capital and labour’. Apart from smuggling in a normatively-charged belief in neo-liberal freedom, the emphasis on economic liberalization redoubles the problems of the definition’s over-emphasis on economics. Moreover, it is not even historically helpful. In political terms at least, goods and labour were more ‘free’ to move during the time before the consolidation of nation-state boundaries when processes of globalization were less embracing than they are at the moment. That is just one example of the multitude of definitions that do not work, but it gives some sense of what an alternative definition has to avoid.

In the present series of volumes, ‘Globalization’ is simply defined as the process of extending a matrix of social relations – practices and subjectivities of production, exchange, communication, organization and enquiry – across *world-space*. Contemporary systems of global extension include finance capital, electronic warfare, or electronic broadcast culture. There are, however, earlier forms of globalization that need to be incorporated into any definition. There are lines of traditional globalization carried by emissaries of the church, by traders on silk routes, by crusading war-makers, and – as the previous discussion has begun to outline – by agents of the early expansionist imperial states. Here globalization was in process long before Immanuel Wallerstein talked of a European ‘world-system’ in the sixteenth century, and it does not take the closed form that Fernand Braudel distinguished as the development of a ‘world-economy’. In this sense, we are much closer to Janet Abu-Lughod’s work when she describes a globalizing system of exchange and surplus production in the thirteenth century based on intersecting empires and city states across northern Africa, the Middle East, Europe, Central Asia and China.

Given this long-term history, the breadth of the phenomenon, and its changing nature, globalization cannot be defined as the liberalization of market, the annihilation of space, or as an end-state that we will finally reach when the local is subsumed by the global. Rather, globalization is the extension of social practices across *world-space* where the notion of ‘world-space’ is itself defined in the historically-variable terms that it has been
practiced and understood. Globalization is thus a layered and uneven process, changing in its form, rather than able to be defined as a specific condition as a concept like ‘globality’ implies. The concept of ‘world-space’ is thus very important to the definition. If the classical Greeks philosophized about their place in a heliocentric cosmos then this is a historically-bounded form of subjective globalization within the mode of enquiry. On the other hand, unless we want to trivialize the term so that it means any engagement across any extension of space, globalization has to carry some sense of ‘the global’, the earth as known.

The associated concept of ‘globalism’, at least in its more specific use, is defined as the dominant ideology and subjectivity associated with different formations of global extension. This is in the same sense that imperialism can be defined as an ideology and/or subjectivity associated with different formations of empire. In both cases then the nature of the phenomenon is historically framed. Just as in late-nineteenth century, imperialism for the British was defended as a way of life, so we are seeing in the present, neoliberal globalism being defended as natural and necessary stage of development. The definition of globalism also implies that there were pre-modern or traditional forms of globalism (and globalization) long before the driving force of capitalism sought to colonize every corner of the globe, for example, going back to the Roman Empire in the second-century C.E., and perhaps to the Greeks of the fifth-century B.C. In the case of the Greeks, globalism was conceived as a contested field mostly confined to the mode of enquiry, one with little impact on other modes of practice. Later, the Roman Empire drew lines of organizational connection across vast expanses of the known world, and although this was still very restricted by comparison to what might be called modern globalization, it entailed a subjectivity of globalism nevertheless. The most famous expression of this is Claudius Ptolemaeus’s (c90–c150) revival of the Hellenic belief in the Pythagorean theory of a spherical globe.

Alongside the secular Roman Empire, the Roman Catholic Church, as its name suggests – katholikos universal, kata in respect of, holos the whole – had what were in effect globalizing pretensions. This does not mean that globalism was the dominant or even a generalized understanding of the world inside the Vatican. By the same definition, neither does it mean that sacred universalism is necessarily the same as globalism, even if its historical effects have in practice ultimately been globalizing as the Roman Catholic Church, for example, set out to save the souls of everyone of earth (see Volume 10, Global Religions). However, we need to counter a strong and clichéd tendency in the literature that suggests that Nicolaus Copernicus brought about a complete revolution in thinking about the globe – in effect enabling the first thoughts of the global. Malcolm Waters writes that ‘globalization could not begin until [the early modern period] because it was only
the Copernican revolution that could convince humanity that it inhabited a
globe’. The evidence suggests to the contrary, firstly, that even before
Copernicus the image of the earth as orb was a strong theme in Renaissance
cosmology, with an adherence by some to the Ptolemaic system of the fixed
centrality of this globe. Secondly, we should note that Copernicus worked
within that old Greco-Roman system to reform it rather than revolutionize
it. In his words: there is ‘a certain natural appetency implanted in the parts
by divine providence of the Universal artisan, in order that they should
unite with one another in their oneness and come together in the form of a
globe’. Copernicus’s major contribution was to put the sun at the centre of
the universe rather than the earth; not to globalize our understanding of the
earth. The point here is that we see a contradictory overlapping of onto-
logical formations giving rise to antinomies and tensions.

Mapping Globalization and Empire

Processes of globalization developed long before modernity (with the concept
of modernity always understood provisionally in epoch terms only as a
dominant not totalizing formation). And they will probably continue long
after its heyday. However, this does not mean that ‘globality’ is replacing
modernity. It means that the dominant forms of globalization and globalism
are changing, as is the once-assumed dominance of modernism. This has
allowed us to talk of traditional, modern and postmodern forms of glob-
alization without making this into a series of epochs. Robertson’s mapping
of the processes of globalization by comparison takes the following form:

**Phase I:** *The Germinal Phase* (in Europe from early-15th–mid-18th
century): with the accentuation of ideas about humanity as a
whole, and the development of scientific theories of the world
as a planet.

**Phase II:** *The Incipient Phase* (mainly in Europe: mid-18th century–
1870s): with the formalizing of conceptions of international
relations and of standardized citizenry.

**Phase III:** *The Take-off Phase* (1870s–mid-1920s): the rush to ‘a single
inexorable form centred on four reference points ... of national
societies, generic individuals ..., a single “international
society”, and an increasingly singular, but not unified
conception of humankind’.

**Phase IV:** *The Struggle-for-Hegemony Phase* (1920s–late-1960s):
‘Disputes and wars about the fragile terms of the globalization
process’.

**Phase V:** *The Uncertainty Phase* (late-1960s–present).
One of the issues that concerns our present discussion most is Robertson’s accompanying argument. He suggests ‘that there is a general autonomy and “logic” to the globalization process, which operates in relative independence of strictly societal and other more conventionally studied sociocultural processes’. By contrast, what we suggest across the course of this volume is that globalization and empire are related extensions across space of general patterns of social practice: no more, but also no less. In these terms, globalization does not have a logic of its own, any more than imperialism does. If we map imperialism against Roland Robertson’s map of globalization we find striking coincidences that need explanation in terms of a matrix of determinations. Secondly, there is in this series of stages an over-emphasis on Europe (see our discussion of China in moment), and, thirdly, the mapping seems to infer a teleology of development with such loaded terms as the ‘take-off stage’.

It is not that contingently recognizing dominant patterns of practice and putting dates around them is a bad thing, but problems arise when there is a tendency towards a kind of epochalism that reduces a period to a certain form of practice, and *vice versa*. The group of writers brought together under the editorship of A.G. Hopkins fall for this problem in a more profound way. They get beyond the present neo-liberal tendency to say that globalization is the glorious outcome of the progress of the market, and they overcome the tendency to Eurocentrism found in much of the literature, only to again infer another teleology of development. They distinguish four forms of globalization – archaic, proto, modern and post-colonial – but none of their categorizations works even if their empirical descriptions of the complexity of history break new ground. (See the chapter by C.A. Bayly, “Archaic” and “Modern” Globalization in the Eurasian and African Arena’ reproduced in Volume 4, *Transnational Conflict*). ‘Archaic globalization’ refers to the kind of globalization that occurred before the ‘modern era’. The authors quickly tangle themselves in knots with the recognition that in extending ideologies of diversity, ‘Archaic globalization thus exhibited some strikingly “modern” features’. Proto-globalization (even the name carries a teleology presuming what comes after it) is defined reductively as referring to two developments: changing state systems and the rise of the finance systems with pre-industrial manufacturing. If this is the case, what are we to make of the Treaty of Tordesilla (1494) in which the early-modern Spanish and Portuguese empires divided the world down the middle: ‘A boundary or straight line be determined and drawn north and south, from pole to pole, on the said ocean sea [the Atlantic], from the Artic to the Antarctic pole … at a distance of three hundred and seventy leagues west of Cape Verde Islands.’ Modern globalization is equally reductively defined in terms of the rise of the nation-state and the industrial revolution. The final stage, post-colonial is much better as the name for a category than ‘the uncertainty phase’, but it is not
really defined at all, except to say controversially that ‘the latest and most extensive form of globalization is to a large extent the product of one country – albeit a superpower’.28 (See Volume 2 in the present series, Colonial and Postcolonial Globalizations)

**Historical Developments:**

**Traditional Empires, East and West**

**Roman Empire**

Although it was profoundly restricted in its reach and intensity by comparison to modern globalizing empires, the Roman Empire was a traditional empire that drew lines of connection across vast expanses of their known world. A lot of evidence points to it being a globalizing empire. Roland Robertson and David Inglis’s evocative article reproduced in the present volume gives us a picture of the *global animus*,29 and we can express this in terms of the analytical framework established above. Most of the detailed evidence of expressions of globalized extension have come down to us as part of the practice of enquiry rather than as practical connections on the ground. Poets were an important source of the images. *Metamorphoses*, the work of the Roman poet, Ovid’s begins with a description of ‘the god, whichever of the gods it was’ taking care to ‘shape the earth into a great ball, so that it might be the same in all directions’ (CE 8).30 He is credited with the well-known aphorism: ‘To all other peoples, fixed boundaries are set in the world; for Rome the bounds of city and globe are one’ [*urbis et orbis idem*].31 Ptolemaeus, born as a Roman citizen with ‘Greek’ parents in what is now know as ‘Egypt’, developed an eight-volume geographica in which he writes systematically about the known world-space stretching from Caledonia and Anglia to what became known as Java Minor. Significantly, he knew that he did not know everything about the globe. This was not just a theological point. In knowing that vast stretches of the world existed beyond his mappings he not only imagined the global, but established the framework of grid lines for filling in those spaces that was to followed up in the cartographical globalism of the sixteenth-century map-making revolution. In Denis Cosgrove’s words,

It was in the Rome of Cicero, Lucretius, Virgil, and Ovid, in the last years of the republic and the first years of ‘universal’ empire, that the figure of the globe was first used as an imperial symbol within the rhetoric of universalism. Ortelius observed in the Parergon that Rome claimed *imperium ad termini orbis terrarium*. This claim of empire to the ends of the earth was made by Augustus, and the landscape and literature of Augustan Rome was replete with references to the theme of a city ordained to realize universal empire. Augustus’s planned mausoleum complex on the left bank of the Tiber was
located within an orthogonal space, at the center of which stood a great obelisk acting as a giant sundial … here was inscribed Augustus’s claim to have achieved universal empire.32

Universal empire was not in the modern sense ‘global’, but it was globalizing. There are important indications also of a globalizing ethos that went beyond the philosophers, poets and architects to practices of organization. The Peutinger Table,33 an early Roman map known from a thirteenth century copy, draws geometric lines that stretch across the Empire and beyond, from Rome to Gaul in the west and (in the Ptolemaic description) the Ganges in the east. It is stylized map, about 6.8 metres long and rolled out like a narrow scroll. In modern cartographical terms, its straight-line connections distort the world unrecognizably, but they give a clear sense of the practical connections – roads and ports – that integrate the farthest known reaches of the world. What is new about the Roman Empire is not its sense of a ‘world-space’. More than two thousand years earlier, a Mesopotamian clay tablet with a circular Assyrioncentric map shows the Euphrates joining the Persian Gulf and surrounded by the ‘Earthly Ocean’. Rather, what is new is that it was intended to represent an ongoing (and globalizing) set of interconnections of exchange and organization. It is indicative that Trajan, the Roman emperor who presided over the Empire at its greatest geographical spread, came from the Iberian peninsular, not from Rome.34 During this time, Tacitus writes of the kind of conflict that ironically arises when the world has been completely colonized. ‘That old passion for power which has been ever innate in man increased and broke out as the Empire grew in greatness. In a state of moderate dimensions equality was easily preserved; but when the world had been subdued, when all rival kings and cities had been destroyed, and men had leisure to covet wealth which they might enjoy in security, the early conflicts between the patricians and the people were kindled into flame.’35

New ethnographic interpretation suggests firstly, that rather than passively accepting change, indigenous peoples responded actively to imperial extensions, and, second, that ongoing interaction preceded formal empire. Archaeological evidence of prior exchange of goods confirms the interpretation that the lines of the Roman Empire need to be understood as intensifications of interactions that had been going on for generations.36 There are even suggestions of trade between Rome and the other great concurrent empire on the other side of the globe, ‘China’ or what the Romans called ‘Sera’, ‘land of silk’.37 At about the time that Rome was rising to prominence, Han China in about 200 BCE established its capital at the eastern end of the Silk route and began exploring economic and political relationships into Central Asia and Persia. (For more on the globalization of trade see Volume 5, Global Markets and Capitalism.)
In the first century of the ‘Common Era’, a Chinese envoy is reputed to have been prevented from direct contact with Rome by the Parthians who acted as mediators.\(^3\) There are also glimpses of evidence that philosophies of globalism in China go back even further, in parallel with Greek natural philosophy. Tsou Yen, a scholar writing in the fourth century BCE, presented a theory that the world consisted of nine continents rather than one with China at the centre, and in the first century BCE his school argued that the earth was spherical.\(^3\) Other evidence suggests that by the late-medieval period the Chinese had travelled the world as far as the Persian Gulf and the east coast of Africa, extensive travels that do not accord with the dominant academic myth of a ‘closed China’. During the period of Kao Tsung (650–683), traders from western and central Asia poured into ‘China’ and set up enclaves, with evidence of Islamic, Christian and Jewish cultural heritages. The intersection of the Turkish and then later the Mongol Empire with the various ‘Chinese’ empires was strong. This does not mean that the Chinese Empires were charged with a dominant subjectivity of globalism, but it runs directly counter to the usual notion that China was entirely inwardly turned and bound by a Great Wall.

There is little doubt that despite the contradictory nature of their engagement, a series of Chinese empires did contribute to the slow globalization of social relations across that period. In other words, though at one stage the Chinese centred their empire on the Son of Heaven, and, symbolized by the decision in 1436 to prohibit the construction of seagoing ships, there was a wariness of expanding the empire as far as their maps could see, this does not mean that they were not caught up in a globalizing world. The Chinese negotiated treaties with and therefore recognized other empires, even the conceding the other ruler’s rank as emperor. This was handled within the Mandate of Heaven by subordinating the other in familial-traditional terms as the ‘younger brother’ or ‘nephew’. The Celestial Kingdom produced printed atlases that date long before the European Ortelius’s supposedly first historical atlas, and even though the very early maps of China show the world as fading off beyond the ‘natural extent’ of territory,\(^4\) medieval maps by cartographers such as Zhu Siben (1273–1337) included phonetic designations for European place-names and gave the shape and orientation of Africa. In 1267, the Persian geographer, Jâmal al-Dîn brought a terrestrial globe to Khubilia Khan, the expansionist Mongol leader who ascended to the throne in China in 1260, and under Khubilia’s patronage, Arab geography and cartography flourished in the imperial court.\(^4\)

The evidence is all very fragmentary, but the pattern is one of expanding global knowledge and expanding military and trade relations, particularly
in East Asia and Central Asia down to South Asia. By the sixteenth century, in particular through the Jesuits, globalizing Chinese cartography was strengthening, with a version of the world map called the Ricci map (1584) being reproduced in its thousands. The point being made here is a relative and qualifying one – a ban on globalizing shipping does not mean that nothing is happening. In any case, the 1436 ban on shipping was preceded by imperial fleets going as far as Malindi on the east coast of Africa and was lifted by the middle of the sixteenth century, coinciding with the time of Columbus. The subsequent period of the Ming-Qing transition is associated with significant trade in silver and sugar beyond the Empire, including possibly as much as half of the silver mined in the Spanish Americas. Similarly, the subsequent Qing ban on maritime trade in 1661 was imposed as a response to the power relations effected by objective global connections. This may seem an obvious point in the context of the present discussion, but it needs to be said that it usually becomes necessary to ban something only when that something is seen to be actually happening and is actually causing problems.

Modern Globalizing Empires: From the Nineteenth Century to the Present

In 1885 the plenipotentiaries of the world’s powers met at Congress of Berlin. They met in the ‘name of God almighty. Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India; His Majesty the German Emperor, King of Prussia; His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia, etc, and Apostolic King of Hungary; His Majesty the King of the Belgians; His Majesty the King of Denmark; His Majesty the King of Spain; the President of the United States of America; the President of the French Republic; His Majesty the King of Italy; His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxembourg, etc; His Majesty the King of Portugal and the Algarves, etc; His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias; His Majesty the King of Sweden and Norway, etc; and His Majesty the Emperor of the Ottomans’. What an extraordinary list of old-world figures, together with a couple of presidents. Their titles were so attentive to God and archaic empire, and so swathed in ideologies of traditionalism that it was if their underclothes were sewn on against the German winter. And yet these plenipotentiaries were part of a modernization push across the globe that was to take globalization to a whole new level. Their self-appointed tasks were grand:

WISHING, in a spirit of good and mutual accord, to regulate the conditions most favourable to the development of trade and civilization in certain regions
of Africa, and to assure to all nations the advantages of free navigation on
the two chief rivers of Africa flowing into the Atlantic Ocean;
BEING DESIROUS, on the other hand, to obviate the misunderstanding
and disputes which might in future arise from new acts of occupation (prises
de possession) on the coast of Africa; and concerned, at the same time, as to
the means of furthering the moral and material well-being of the native
populations.44

All of Europe was there and the USA sent a representative (though they
seemed to overlook inviting anyone from Africa, the continent under consid-
eration). This respect for other empires and the institution of modern bound-
aries at first glance seems to be a constraint on globalization. However, all
these empires, including the United States which was inexorably moving
westward to assume its Manifest Destiny,45 contributed dramatically to the
broader processes of modern globalization. Their pretensions to systematic
coverage were enhanced rather than limited by negotiation of the control of
the earth’s surface. It worked because, for a time, it made imperial extension
more efficient, and built upon the assumption that marching across the
boundaries of all other forms of community-polity without invitation, partic-
ular those of tribal communities, was quite legitimate.

New kinds of abstract mapping carved up the landscape of the New
World as empires old and new, from the Ottomans to the Americans, emb-
ranked on the relatively new phenomenon of structural genocide. Only a
few years after the American revolution had decided who was going to
dominate North America, the United States Congress in May 1785 author-
ized the survey and purchase of over a billion acres stretching from Canada
to Mexico in an immaculate abstract grid of straight lines. Thomas Jefferson’s
plan included US states that were yet to be named and some that never came
into existence, celebrating older empires – Assenisipia and Metropotamia.46
Across the other side of the globe, Edward Gibbon Wakefield set out to do
the same thing for Australia and South Africa. Into those ‘empty spaces’, Eu-
ropes poured their sense that they were making new worlds, and in
some senses they were ‘empty’ spaces to be filled with new imperial and
national hopes. In Benedict Anderson’s phrase, those spaces became
‘saturated with ghostly national imaginings’;47 but it should also be said
that they also became saturated with the blood of the dead and displaced;
the memories of peoples who were systematically pushed further into the
hinterlands of globalizing capitalism.

Retrospectives on globalization produced in the 1990s naturally tended
to perceive all earlier claims and expansions as anticipations of the 1990s.
Earlier empires, quasi-empires, hegemonies and dominions must have been
tending towards a final resolution, the domain at last realized in the victory
of 1989 and the resultant ‘end of history’ in that older sense. This perspective was reinforced by one particular rule (or apparent rule) of succession: it was as if, in history’s grand relay race, the most important baton had been passed on from the penultimate runner, the British Empire, to the sole occupant of the finishing straight, the USA. Not surprisingly, this view was very popular in London, and quite popular (to take only one example) in Canberra, Australia – an earlier white Commonwealth domain where, in spite of many substantial social shifts, globalization would be addressed at the end of the 1990s by popular refusal to abandon the British Crown in a referendum. Shortly after this, an ardently pro-American foreign policy was pursued by John Howard’s Liberal-National regime into the new century – the government that joined Washington and London in the 2003 Iraqi War.

Unlike its Spanish, Portuguese, French, Dutch, Italian and German predecessors, an important part of the ex-British imperium was given (in effect) a spectacular state funeral by the one overpowering state that replaced the lot of them. After all, the United Kingdom had been successful as recently as 1982, in its South Atlantic War against General Galtieri’s military régime in Argentina (with some help from the USA). Like Margaret Thatcher before him, New Labour’s Tony Blair felt what was left of his old state could still come up trumps by fighting (rather than go down fighting). Some important part of what the imperial British state had stood for might yet be redeemed – the values of liberty and democracy still prized and vindicated as strongly in old London (and Canberra) as in new Washington. Instead of collapsing to their knees and staggering back to the dressing room, the Anglos and Australians must therefore complete the race as close behind the victors as they could. In fact the right sort of globalization demanded this: all earlier empires had coined and advertised Universal Values (Godly or secular) as their justification, and the one that had come out on top was no less justified in doing so. Indeed it was argued that such ‘manifest’ and rewarded fate now provided even better reasons for support and allegiance. There was (in other words, already made ominously familiar by economists and newspaper columnists) no alternative, or no rational alternative, to doing so.

A fundamental gamble underlay all these policies and postures. That is, an assumption that US-recipe globalism was the true formula for the world’s evolution after the Cold War. It did not seem to matter that, roughly and readily, a unified ‘civil society’ had emerged, a counter-movement. Around 2000 there was no state-based competitor to the single super-power that captained this emergent global society: Russia was in retreat, China, India and Indonesia showed every sign of following the socio-economic rules, and nowhere else counted.

Then came September 11, 2001.
Globalization and Empire after September 11

The wager was challenged by desperate events, and shown to be at least premature – and more probably, quite mistaken. Jonathan Friedman in responding to the horror of September 11 wrote the following reflection:

Thoughts might go to Rome where barbarians, formerly in the employ of the empire, were, in the last centuries, often at the gates, burning cities and even Rome itself. They did not so much cause the decline of Rome as express it. Could we be in a similar kind of situation? After all, the new terrorists were former warriors in the employ of empire who have changed sides. But the ideological structures of the situation are different and all the more important for that ... But if [the temporary reintegration within the West] holds then we might well be into a new empire or at least an attempt to establish an empire (Hardt and Negri 2000). The odds, however, are clearly against its success ...

What the shock of the atrocities produced, at least in military and political terms was, unmistakably, a reversion to an older, early-twentieth century, national mode of empire. The guiding 1990’s postmodern notion had been that the USA would itself ‘dissolve’, along with other national states, into the common all-globe imperium. That shared domain which might have numerous urban centres, but no determining imprint of nationality or origin. The leader of the race would, herself, melt into the concluding pot of history, as Rome once (supposedly) had done. Globalism was to bring about the transcendence of national-ism. Instead, as the barbarians aggressively mis-behaved, the dominant power became herself again. A great-nationalist reaction rallied popular Roman-home support for vengeance, revivifying the very sinews and instincts that globalization ideologists imagined to have become past history and functionless. A patriotic furnace restored steam-pressure to that style of world hegemony and initiative. The United States reclaimed her own national place, proudly re-emphasizing the imprint once deemed transitory or secondary. America’s interpretation of ‘the West’ no longer ushered humankind into a global post-national realm: the counter-strike of ‘Terrorism’ (as it was at once categorized) compelled it to be that realm.

Politically, the effects were to divide the West, indeed the entire globe, into dissident parts. However tentative or uncertain, capitalism’s triumph of the 1980s had put down some foundations for general consensus, a semi-acquiescence in free-trading rules and the idea-system (neo-liberalism) regulating them, and qualifying state-power and legitimacy. Such consensual trends disappeared overnight. However querulously, they were then refurbished by ideologues and market-fixated governments. At the same time,
an anti-corporate globalization movement blossomed, inseparable from mounting antagonism to the American national state – nowhere was this more plainly than inside the USA itself. Millions of American citizens rapidly dissociated themselves from the attitudes of that American nationalism so vividly analyzed by Anatol Lieven in his book of the same name. In part, hostile reactions to the George W. Bush presidency and the assaults on Afghanistan and Iraq were derived from persisting nationalisms as apparently anachronistic as those espoused by US neo-conservatism. But not all the spleen and rhetoric put into denouncing these ‘out-dated’ ideas could conceal something much more significant. From the point of view of this volume, the deeper philosophical consequences remain more important than the political polemics and disagreements. President Bush’s neo-conservative takeover of globalism’s meaning and direction had the unintended effect of decisively separating the US state from understanding the objective generalities of globalization. In a way inconceivable around 1990, after 2001 the dominant US ideologies of globalism no longer had much purchase on the processes that they sought to control.

A legitimate response to September 11 by an adequately unified globe – ‘one world’ with an embryonic legal and institutional structure – would have been to identify the perpetrators as criminals, and to pursue a long drawn-out yet relentless process of global co-operation to apprehend and punish them. Instead, an alliance of Anglo-American armies attacked and occupied the national states deemed to have supported or favoured the terrorists. Their globalism was unavoidably contrasted to others: for example, in the example used above, Australia’s acceptance of the Washington-London version was counterposed to rejection from New Zealand, Canada, and South Africa – other former members of the Crown Commonwealth. Most of Asia, Latin America, and a substantial part of Europe followed suit. The rejection of globalization as such by the social movements’ also took off in the same moment, and it took those movements some time to realize that anti-globalization was self-defeating, hence the shift to an anti-corporate globalization stance. By comparison, those states and governments vehemently opposed to US-led policies in the United Nations, and elsewhere, on the whole continued through this period to hold to the principle of enhanced global unity – that is, to globalization in some more qualified, negotiated or moderate form.

The implication is of course that neo-conservative Americanism, far from being an inevitable byproduct of post-Cold War trends towards common ground, is in fact an attempt to arrest and divert that movement. Put in another way: Bush’s neo-Republican presidency has been defending a narrow form of globalism against a process of cumulative global co-operation rendered necessary by the conclusion of the Cold War and the implosion of the former Second and Third Worlds. When, following September 11, this ideology of globalism was fused with the residual nationalism of a super-power, political
rejection in some quarters naturally developed into demand for ‘another world’. There is no contradiction whatever between accepting some of the social and economic conditions embodied in the fall of the Berlin Wall, and of the old Soviet and Maoist non-alternatives, and refusing the appropriation of those circumstances by a wildly exaggerated ideology (See Volume 14, *Globalizing Movements and Global Civil Society*.)

Going back to Friedman’s comment quoted earlier: thoughts might have gone in a strikingly different direction following September 11. Most observers saw a threatening new apocalypse. Another analyst, one who regrettably departed the world not long before the dire events, might have focused on these in another way. Over the period 1990–95 (before he died), the main twentieth-century theorist of nationalism, Ernest Gellner, spent much of his time worrying over a single puzzle: why did the Muslim culture of North Africa and the Middle East so stubbornly refuse to fit into his theory? It is no exaggeration to say that the question obsessed him. The orthodoxy he had founded, ‘modernization theory’, perceived the causes of nationalism as residing in industrialization, and the constellation of political and cultural phenomena linked thereto. Though primarily a North Atlantic development, the theory implied that other continents and regions of the globe would be sucked into its effects, along (roughly) a spreading wave model. ‘Uneven development’ was the formula for that, with concomitants like the forced establishment of postcolonial nation-states, more cohesive unilingual cultures, and politically-guided forced marches to catch up with the more industrialized nations. ‘Modernization’ imposed its own rules wherever the wave struck; and this was why former agglomerations like Tsardom, Austria-Hungary and the British Empire had disintegrated. It also explained part of the Soviet and East-European collapse proceeding around him in Prague.

However, this was not happening in the realms of the defunct Ottoman Empire, or at least not in the same way, or at a similar rate: the considerable domains still identifying with ‘the Arab Nation’ were for some reason misbehaving. Pan-Arabism had something different about it, quite unlike Pan-Slavism, Pan-Turkism, Pan-Anglo-Saxonism or other makeshift trans-nationalisms of the previous century. Gellner identified this with a common religion, the revivified Muslim faith that had originally held together the great Arab expansion of mediaeval and early-modern times. He often said that Muslim ideology was ‘taking the place of’ nationalism in the contemporary Arab world, at least in part. Arabs were therefore confronting the dilemmas of uneven development and imperial exploitation in essentially the same way as others before them – but with distinct ideals and cultural tools, transmitted from an idealized dominant ‘nation’ of the past, the state and faith that ought to have fostered ‘globalization’ (and came within sight of doing so) before the fringe barbarians of the Northern Atlantic zone disrupted Allah’s quite reasonable plans. But High (mainly Sunni) Culture
and God’s Will had always remained on their side. Twentieth-century ‘backwardness’ was more meddling from Satan, therefore, to be redressed in their own fashion. The post-1989 fuss about ‘no alternatives’ to Western-Christian global hegemony was the last straw.50

**Debating ‘Empire’**

Even as modern forms of globalizing imperialism continue, they are overlaid with postmodern forms: from the globalization of capital as it commodifies future-time through speculative hedging, to the globalization of cinematic culture with its postmodern sensibility signalled, for example, in the title of a new magazine of Hollywood gloss – *Empire*.51 In this setting, where actual empires continue to exploit the globe, the word ‘empire’ has gained an ironical gloss without political depth. Abstracted from history through a process of modern and postmodern historicalism, the title carries only residual irony. Some of the companies with the word ‘empire’ in them are carry-overs from the period from the end of the nineteenth century to the interwar years when the concept denoted a glorious way of life, extended beyond the locale to the globe. Empire Blue Cross was a healthcare agency founded in New York City in 1935. Empire Poultry, now the largest kosher poultry producer in the world, founded in Liberty, New York, in 1938. However, by contrast there are numerous dot-com and culture-media companies that have taken on the name recently because *empire* has a mysterious cultural cache: DVD Empire, Empire Interactive, Empire Stores, empiromovies.com, empiretheatres.com, empirecomfort.com, roboticempire.com and so on. This is the time in which Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have taken upon themselves to revive the concept of ‘empire’ and to give it a postmodern, post-Marxist twist. Postmodern Marxism amounts to an updated and rewritten *Communist Manifesto*. This is Slavoj Zizek’s verdict in his review of the Hardt-Negri project.52 One should not be put off by the massive contrast between the works in question: on one hand a hastily compiled political pamphlet of 1848, rushed through to try and keep up with a political revolution already under way; on the other hand, two relatively monstrous, thoroughly footnoted, academic tomes written in the teeth of a neo-conservative ascendancy aiming at global dominion. *Empire* and *Multitude* are blueprints for a new transnational democratic foundation, founded upon redemption of the old – but a redemption that cannot avoid transposing much of the ruins and mistakes of the former era as well. The authors have revived the prophetic stance of the *Manifesto* as well as its prescience of globalization: the longing for a shortcut to utopia, as well as its shrewd recognition of the lengthy evolution that lay (as it still lies) ahead. However, the former dimension emerges as more salient than
the latter. Not surprisingly, this has appealed powerfully to a readership resentful of, and puzzled by, the neo-liberal successes. Why have older alternatives like social democracy been so easily disarmed or converted? Is there really no chance of recapturing globalization for some more coherent and humane general purpose?

The *Manifesto* imagined an agency for doing this, the working class of nineteenth-twentieth century industrialization; and an instrument for it to work with, in the shape of a state built either by revolutionary means, or via an electoral machinery eventually controlled by proletarian voters and representatives. But *Empire* and *Multitude* have no equivalent, for the good reason that *enough* of these changes actually occurred to discredit the founding prophecy. In the words of Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm, the ‘forward march’ of labour was halted by the 1970s; and the states intended to defeat and out-do capitalism’s ‘sorcerer’ arose mainly in peripheral, rural or early-industrial conditions. They failed to match the societies that were (in the terms of ‘historical materialism’ itself) more ‘advanced’ and capable of social reforms. In *those* conditions, utopia generated catastrophe. In other circumstances (possibly those emerging from an earlier generation of globalization) that may no longer be true. There is nothing wrong with admitting that the glass is still too dark to see into, and we do not know who will succeed the sorcerer. However, Hardt and Negri have reproduced too much of the prophetic-charismatic mode of address to confront the resultant long-haul questions. They resort to an everybody-multitude in place of the proletariat, and to a rapture of loving souls as their means of transcendence. Philosophical support for the stance is found in retreat to a still earlier prophet, Benedict de Spinoza. Thus post-industrial dilemmas are dealt with in pre-industrial terms, via a rationality ‘uncontaminated’ (but also uninformed) by the intervening history of nationalism, imperialism and their consequences.

Our final comments remain intentional *evasions of*, rather than contributions to, the arguments over empire and globalization. Pursuing such questions demands that greater distance be put between theory and the past – above all, the past of the Left, to which Hardt and Negri self-consciously cling, and want in some way to reanimate or justify. Nor is this simply a matter of or for the Left. Defeats may have hardened its monotheism, and its thirst for a utopia-replacement – a traditional pattern, incidentally, as much as American or Chinese great-power nationalism. But the larger issue remains escape from monotheism, and from the tunnel-perspective of mobilizing and exclusionary ‘isms’. Monotheisms support and count upon one another to survive: one can never be ‘radical’ or ‘fundamental’ enough without antagonistic counterposition to other contenders. Neo-liberalism’s utopia depends upon an adequately sectarian adversary to its Left; both rely upon sufficiently strident proclamations from religiose champions of Deity, whether Muslim
or Christian. Over 2004-05, the cumulative hysteria generated by such ideological spectacles has carried public debate back on to a terrain abandoned by Left and Right alike generations ago: ‘Intelligent Design’ or ‘Creationism’ versus both natural and social science. When the End of History was pronounced fifteen years ago, few thought that the sorcerer’s final triumph might yet be to reduce the whole globe to a restored neo-traditional faith in Divine magic versus the Devil.

**Conclusion**

As we argued in another place, the world is changing, and there is undoubtedly an emergent new global matrix coming into being. However, understanding it calls for detective work and some house-to-house inquiries, rather than (as British tabloids love to say) a ‘swoop’ upon the presumed guilty party. A case has to be patiently built up, beyond premature rushes to judgement. One feature of this deeper alteration in course is – and ought to be – a profound and long-running reaction against those shadows from which the globe began to free itself when the Cold War at last ended. Masterful yet phoney monotheism dominated that shadow-world. We faced a supposed choice between command-economy socialism and liberal capitalism. The choice of worlds had narrowed down, from the competitive spectrum of former would-be Empires to a basic ‘either-or’. Only two of Goya’s ‘Giants’ were left, as it were, capable of devouring (and indeed destroying) everything and everyone else. These Giants, it went without saying, were capable of explaining everything, in one or other omnivorous, all-encompassing fashion. The ‘-isms’ of such a world were apologies for claimed omnipotence: fantasies extolling a brute authority which (fortunately) no actual modern empire has ever had. Now, even that claim has foundered: this is part of what globalization is about – a world with no more giants, merely unequal nations and states, quite possibly a lot more of them, in which there prevails a common consent that such inequalities will never again be expressed as ‘empires’, formal or informal, uniformed or en bourgeois, economic, military, civil or of any other kind. A number of writers have begun to argue that what’s called for is something like a ‘Global New Deal’ based on such consent, and directed at ‘a truly democratic and egalitarian global order’ (developed in Volume 13, Global Political and Legal Governance). When this can be taken for granted – when ‘species-being’ acknowledges the necessary conditions for a worldwide connection of still-diverse communities and polities – then globalization will have become a positive global condition, the diversity-in-unity that all the older traditional faiths and secular modern universalisms were looking towards.
Notes

2. One of the earliest explicit proponents of economic ‘globalization’ was Theodore Levitt. (‘The Globalization of Markets’, *Harvard Business Review*, vol. 61, no. 3, 1983, pp. 92–102. In a section of the essay called ‘Accepting the Inevitable’ he writes ‘The global corporation accepts that for better or for worse technology drives consumers relentlessly towards the same common goals – the alleviation of life’s burdens and the expansion of discretionary time and spending power ... It organizes the twin vectors of technology and globalization for the world’s benefit’, p. 99.
6. The concept of the ‘Westphalian norm’ is used in the international relations literature to refer to a norm of state sovereignty developed in the inter-state system after 1648 and the Treaty of Westphalia.
7. As an apparent counter to the new wave see, for example, Emmanuel Todd, *Après l’Empire*, Gallimard, Paris, 2002, English translation, 2004. Todd denounces US leadership since 2001 as a futile, self-destructive attempt to recover the lost hegemony of pre-1989, but in doing so he is nevertheless naming the USA as an empire in decline, akin to the fall of Rome.
8. Ronald Reagan address to the annual convention of the National Association of Evangelicals in Orlando, Florida on 8 March 1983.
11. It might also be possible to talk of ‘tribal empires’, however, by their very success, they quickly become overlaid by practices associated with traditionalism. For example, the Mongolian tribes united under enghis Kahn in the early-twelfth century seem for a moment to constitute such a tribal empire. Its early organizational form was based on kinship relations and an embodied sense of place, however, the fact of stabilizing its power instituted practices of regularized hierarchy and demarcated and dedicated organizational roles such as the setting up of military regiments.
12. It also should be said that ‘terms of description’ are not ideal types. For example, the term ‘modern’ in ‘modern empire’ describes actual dominant practices and subjectivities that we can elaborate in detail as characterized by ontologies of modernism, even as other layers of practice and subjectivity intersect in a particular formation.
13. It is conventional to talk also of ‘tribal empires’, as Jack Weatherford does of the Mongol Empire of Genghis Khan, *Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World*, Three Rivers Press, New York, 2004, however, while Genghis Khan and his military had a tribal backgrounds, empire only became possible as this was overlaid by traditional practises of organization.
24. Ibid., p. 60.
28. Ibid., p. 8. That point is made having said a few pages earlier (p. 2) that ‘the studies that follow run counter to the dominant assumption of the existing literature, which holds that globalization is the product of the West and, in its current form, of the United States in particular’.
32. Cosgrove, ibid., p. 859.
34. See for example, Richard Hingley, *Globalizing Roman Culture: Unity, Diversity, and Empire*, Routledge, London, 2005. He argues for the replacement of the concept of ‘Romanization’, a term invented in the nineteenth century, for the concept of ‘globalization’ because the Roman Empire did not so much Romanize the culture of its colonies as set the framework for its integration into a loose globalizing polity.
40. See Jeremy Black, Maps and History: Constructing Images of the Past, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1997, pp. 2–3, on Standen’s thesis about the ahistorical depiction of the Great Wall, whether or not it had been built.
42. Waley-Cohen, Sextants of Beijing, pp. 43, 112–14.
44. General Act of the Conference at Berlin, 1885, preamble.
45. Manifest Destiny was a term built upon the Monro Doctrine and was first used in the 1840s as part of a belief in the righteousness of the United States in annexing the western part of the continent including the Mexican Cession. The term was revived in the 1890s for further potential and actual expansions into the Pacific and Caribbean.
55. The Spanish painter Goya produced a famous series of dark premonitory images, after experiencing the horrors of the French occupation of Spain – in many ways a forerunner of nineteenth and twentieth-century imperial and colonial conflicts. The best-known is ‘El Coloso’, The Colossus (1808–12) in the Prado Museum in Madrid, shows a gigantic
figure turning his back upon a terrified, fleeing humanity the size of ants. It has always been noted as one of the greatest yet most enigmatic images of modern times. Robert Hughes’ recent biography of the artist describes the background of this and other dark masterpieces, as an illness that forced Goya to brood upon what he (and many others) had seen, during a foreign military invasion intended to impose ‘regime change’ upon a notoriously backward, superstition-ridden land bent on holding back progress. Interestingly, the idea may have been associated with the work of a Basque poet of the period, Juan Bautista Arriaza, whose ‘La profecía de los Pirineos’, 1808, imagined a giant spirit of resistance, arising against the invaders. See Robert Hughes, *Goya*, Harvill Press, London, pp. 286–7.