Introduction: Alternative Economic Geographies

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There was a time, during the 1990s, when the hegemony of a particularly virulent strand of global capitalism seemed assured and unquestioned. The strident assurances of advocates of neo-liberalization – perhaps the most notorious being that of a certain British Prime Minister who, a decade earlier, had stated that ‘there is no alternative’ to a mode of economic co-ordination based primarily upon market signals – seemed, in retrospect, to be less an example of dogmatic political rhetoric than a chilling prophesy of a monochrome global economic future. Economic globalization, the collapse into economic anarchy of state socialism in the Soviet Union and its satellites, and the emergence of a form of bureaucratic capitalism within states such as China and Vietnam seemed to confirm the unfettered extension of capitalist mores and values into new spaces and places. Although even the harshest critic of capitalism should perhaps give pause to regret too strongly the passing of undemocratic and authoritarian social formations that prioritized the deferment of social consumption and rising living standards in favour of the seemingly perpetual reinvestment of surpluses within the means of production, the collapse of these systems had symbolic power because they also removed from view modes of economic and social reproduction that stood in contrast and in opposition to capitalism (see, for example, Bauman, 1992). It also meant the gradual erasure of economic geographies produced by non-capitalist social relations as these alternative economic spaces began to import market-based modes of co-ordination (Gowan, 1995).

At the same time, places that had long been characterized by capitalist social relations were witness to an intensification and increasing pervasiveness of such relations. Commentators on both
left and right agreed that the core capitalist economies of the West had undergone something akin to a ‘corporate takeover’ of civil society (Crook, 2001a; Monbiot, 2000), as capitalism and its agents seemed to be determined to achieve what, to borrow from Habermas, could be described as the ‘colonization of the lifeworld’, by penetrating the nooks and crannies of everyday life (Hutton, 1995; Klein, 2000), which even included an attempt to colonize the precognitive domains of human subjects (Thrift, 2000).

Indeed, for some it was as if the disturbing predictions of the likes of Francis Fukuyama and Richard O’Brien were bearing fruit. Fukuyama (1989) argued that with the end of the Cold War a new era was beginning which represented, in Hegelian terms, the ‘end of history’, as societies abandoned ‘their ideological pretensions of representing different and higher forms of human society’ (1989: 13), and admitted the ‘victory’ of capitalism. As such, ‘life for that part of the world that has reached the end of history is far more preoccupied with economics than with politics or strategy’ (1989: 16), and involves societies around the world coalescing around a liberal, market-based model of social organization. Meanwhile, O’Brien (1991) claimed that a combination of information and communication technologies plus re-regulation was bringing about the end of geography within the global financial system, as it became increasingly straightforward to move money and information from place, and as the regulatory context within which exchange took place underwent convergence. For O’Brien, the ‘End of Geography means [increased] competition’ (1991: 115), and a concomitant speed-up in the pace of economic (and social) life (Reich, 2001; Schor, 1992).

On sober reflection, and in the wake of sustained and effect critiques, it was fair to say that the reports of the death of history (Derrida, 1994) and geography (Martin, 1994, 1999) were greatly exaggerated. Nevertheless, the arguments of Fukuyama and of O’Brien succeeded in striking a chord among many who witnessed with some unease the greater priority given to economic and financial matters in everyday life and the ways in which the spread of global corporations and products appeared to bring a new conformity, homogeneity and pace of life across capitalist societies. Moreover, this transition was actively supported by a capitalist elite that at every turn seemed willing to suggest that these transformations were not only in the best interest of society as a whole, but were also, incidentally, inevitable and unstoppable.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the celebrants and defenders of global capitalism are perhaps not as confident as they
were. Cracks have begun to appear in the edifice of global capitalism. This statement might appear odd given that the capitalist system remains robust and durable, and actually underwent one of the longest periods of sustained growth in its history in the five years between 1995 and 2000, mainly on the back of a remarkable rise in the value of US financial assets (Brenner, 2000). Moreover, during this period the system was able to shrug off a sequence of major financial crises – including financial panics in Russia and the continuing crisis in Argentina and a more generalized financial crisis in East Asia (Kelly et al., 2001) – with the long bull market coming to an end only with the collapse in the share prices of ‘technology’ companies at the beginning of 2000 (Cassidy, 2002). Yet, it was actually during this period of long growth that a number of new theoretical and practical challenges to global capitalism arose to plant seeds of doubt in the minds of those who believed that the spread of neo-liberalized, global capitalism to all parts of the world was inevitable.

Indeed, David Harvey argues that opposition to capitalism flourished over this period to such an extent that it is now almost as widespread and ubiquitous as are capitalist social relations themselves. There is, he observes:

... not a region in the world where manifestations of anger and discontent with the capitalist system cannot be found. In some places or among some segments of a population, anti-capitalist movements are strongly implanted. Localized ‘militant particularisms’ ... are everywhere to be found, from the militia movements in the Michigan woods (much of it violently anti-capitalist and anti-corporate as well as racist and exclusionary) through the movements in countries such as Mexico, India and Brazil militating against World Bank development projects to the innumerable ‘IMF riots’ that have occurred throughout the world. (Harvey, 2000: 71)

Harvey argues that these protest movements should be seen as a response to what he describes as the ‘utopian’ post-war project to re-build international capitalism and, in particular, to the role played within this project since the 1950s by the ‘Bretton Woods' institutions like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Harvey, 2000: 173–81), and more latterly the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO). These institutions are key parts of what has become known as the ‘Washington consensus’, a programme of financial orthodoxy, privatization and deregulation which is seeking to reconstruct the world within a neo-liberal image (Peck and Tickell, 2002), the critics of which argue is restructuring the global economy in favour of rich
economies at the direct expense of the poor (Fine, 1999). Harvey insists that such a project may be accurately described as utopian because it has a clear image of the future world that it wishes to create wherein things will be demonstrably ‘better’. Indeed, it is this moral justification that underlies neo-liberal ideas that helps to explain why they have been adopted and implemented so readily, along with the fact that the ‘programme’ for the delivery of this utopia can be expressed in deceptively simple and straightforward terms. For its supporters, a market-based liberal economy is presented not merely as achievable but, because of the stress on its ‘market’ character and avoidance of its socially-constructed nature, as natural and, indeed, utopian. The quest for profit is made ‘civilized’ and becomes ‘an engine of social progress’ through the device of forcing ‘firms … to compete with their rivals for customers and workers’ to value ‘their reputation for quality and fair dealing – even if they do not value those things in themselves’. But even if they do not, ‘[c]ompetition will make them behave as if they did’ (Crook, 2001b). Thus attempts to intervene in order to achieve particular objectives (for example, development through aid) are, in this view, not only undesirable but also doomed to failure. The liberal market is presented as a singular mechanism, the functioning of which can be affected only adversely by any attempt to intervene in it.

The critical point about such a representation of economic progress is that it avoids any notion of the social relations and relations of power though which all economic geographies take place and by which they are shaped. And yet, as is argued below, the social relations of economic geographies are inseparable from their material functioning and their material outcomes. Thus, the simplicity of the moral tale told above necessarily omits to point out that the road to this utopia is hard, and is littered with the casualties and losers in an often brutally competitive system. And it is the attempt to build this liberal, market-based utopia on a global scale that has, at least in part, sparked the recent wave of anti-capitalist and anti-globalization protests. Appropriately, then, given that the attempt to build global neo-liberalism is an inherently geographical project involving the construction of a uniform, neo-liberal global economic geography, the various oppositional movements and projects to ‘think and perform the economy otherwise’ reveal a keen attention to matters of space and place.

This edited collection draws attention to the efforts of individual and collective actors to imagine and, more importantly, to perform economic activities in a way that marks them out differently from the
dictates and conventions of the mainstream economy. This introductory chapter provides a context for the book as a whole and is organized into two main parts. The next two sections consider the processes by which critics have sought to chip away at the edifice of neo-liberalism in order to challenge the primacy of this model and its prescriptive authority. This work has been of two main kinds, and we consider each in turn. First, there has been work of a primarily ideological and theoretical nature, which has sought to undermine the discursive foundation of neo-liberalism on its own terms. Secondly, there has been work of a more practical and performative nature, which has sought to demonstrate ways of enacting the economy otherwise. The division between these two oppositional strategies is, in reality, somewhat artificial, as they draw strength and inspiration from each other and indeed, if anything, the flow of ideas is often stronger from the latter to the former than the other way around. The final section of the introduction presents a synopsis of the book’s structure and a brief discussion of each chapter.

**THINKING THE ECONOMY OTHERWISE**

Theoretical attempts to critique and undermine capitalist social relation are, of course, hardly new. Marxism and political economy have a long and honourable tradition in this regard, although their authority as a critical project has been undermined in recent years, both because of the collapse of actually-existing socialism and, more significantly, because of the rise of alternative critical traditions within social theory that have abandoned many of Marxism’s certainties and its central concern with class in favour of a more relativistic, more discursive and generally contextual approach to enquiry. Taken together, these tendencies are usually described as the ‘cultural turn’. The cultural turn’s demotion of the category of class to a level that is no longer privileged above other social markers such as ethnicity, gender or sexuality has been criticized for bringing about a relegation of economic matters within critical debates at a time of deepening uneven development and income equality across a broad range of geographical scales (Hamnett, 2000; Ray and Sayer, 1999; Thrift, 1992). However, in contrast, we wish to argue that far from being a dilettante distraction from ‘serious’ political economy that many on the left fear, the cultural turn has been responsible for opening up new and effective forms of critique that have produced new strategies for undermining the power and authority of capitalism and its
agents. There are numerous examples upon which we could draw, but we shall limit our illustrations to just two particularly effective examples of this kind of work: first, Gibson-Graham’s work on the proliferative economy and, secondly, Carrier and Miller’s work on ‘virtualism’.

**The proliferative economy**

J.K. Gibson-Graham – a hybrid subject made up of Kathie Gibson and Julie Graham – draws upon the radical possibilities of the cultural turn to imagine alternative conceptions to a hegemonic and all-conquering ‘global capitalist economy’ (Gibson-Graham, 1996). That is, she uses cultural theory to argue that what is taken for granted within economic analysis is not quite so obvious when one takes inspiration from other critiques of dominant discourses. Inspired by the theoretical incursions made by feminist, racial and queer theory, it began to dawn on Gibson-Graham that

a theoretical option now presented itself, one that could make a (revolutionary) difference: to depict economic discourse as hegemonized while rendering the social world as economically differentiated and complex. It was possible, I realized, and potentially productive to understand capitalist hegemony as a (dominant) discourse rather than as social articulation or structure. Thus one might represent economic practice as comprising a rich diversity of capitalist and non-capitalist activities and argue that the non-capitalist ones had been relatively ‘invisible’ because the concepts and discourses that could make them ‘visible’ have themselves been marginalized and suppressed. (1996: x–xi)

She argues that it is critically effective to think beyond the ‘capitalocentricism’ that has characterized conventional political economy writing in order to raise the possibility of dwelling within ‘a non-capitalist place’. There is, she argues, within conventional approaches something approaching a double-deceit, wherein the economy is depicted as something that we can understand but over which we ultimately have no control. Therefore, Gibson-Graham seeks to build an alternative discourse of the economy, one that requires that we step outside its conventional bounds and begin to associate with new modes of thought and critique.

One particularly fruitful course suggested by Gibson-Graham is for economic theorists to learn from feminism and studies of sexuality in order to ‘go beyond’ the boundedness of their subject and to become both more recursive and reflexive, and to problematize the idea of ‘the economic’:
Whereas feminist theorists have scrutinized and often dispensed with the understanding of the body as a bounded and hierarchically structured totality, most speakers of ‘economics’ do not problematize the nature of the discursive entity with which they are engaged. Instead, they tend to appropriate unproblematically an object of knowledge and to be constructed thereby as its discursive subjects. In familiar but paradoxical ways, their subjectivity is constituted by the economy which is their object: they must obey it, yet it is subject to their control; they can fully understand it and, indeed, capture its dynamics in theories and models, yet they may adjust it only in minimal ways. These experiential constants of ‘the economy’ delineate our subjective relation to its familiar and unproblematic being. (Gibson-Graham, 1996: 96)

Therefore, mounting an effective critique of capitalism, and imagining alternative economic spaces, requires a radical rethinking of the ‘the economic object’ (Gibson-Graham, 1996: 97). In particular, Gibson-Graham advocates a deployment of Foucault’s genealogical method within economic analysis, so that it is possible to trace the evolution and development of the discursive formations that support and sustain the contemporary capitalist economy. She draws attention to the ways in which, over a long period of time, economic discourse both became strongly associated with the masculine and successfully imported a number of biological and physiological metaphors to sustain it. This has had at least two main implications. First, the historical tendencies to assume gendered mind/body dualisms, wherein the masculine is associated with the mind and reason and the feminine with passion and nature, etc. (Massey, 1995), ensured that the economy became associated with reason, rationality and order, to which ‘the irrational disorder of non-economic life must submit’ (Gibson-Graham, 1996: 103). Secondly, the central role of biological and physiological metaphors within economic discourse encouraged the capitalist economy to be thought of as an integrated and total ecology, one that effectively ‘crowds out’ other forms of economic reproduction. Moreover, the central role of naturalistic metaphors within economic discourse has produced a mode of thought that draws upon traditional evolutionary theory to suggest that economic forms evolve in a linear manner by passing through different stages to end up at a more ‘advanced’ or ‘developed’ stage.

Gibson-Graham seeks to expose the metaphors and assumptions that underpin conventional economic discourse, so as to pick them apart, reveal their contingent and contextual qualities and, thereby, undermine their power. What she seeks to do, above all else, is to disrupt and destabilize the irrevocable association of ‘economy’ with ‘capitalism’ in order to produce a mode of thinking that considers the economy to
be ‘proliferative rather than reductive of forms’ (Gibson-Graham, 1996: 119). She evokes the ideas of contemporary evolutionary theorist Steven Jay Gould to argue that economic and social development does not proceed in a linear or successive fashion but, again, is proliferative. This observation has important political implications for imaginings of alternative economic systems, and provides crucial intellectual resources for envisioning an economic world wherein there are, indeed, alternatives.

However, as soon as the inseparable and mutually formative relations between the material and the social in the construction and functioning of economic geographies are recognized (for example, Lee, 1989, 2002), this is not an altogether surprising conclusion. Economic geographies are circuits of consumption, exchange and production sustained over space and through time. The purely material possibilities for proliferation are immediately apparent from such a statement. Yet, the neo-liberal agenda argues for a market-induced economic-geographical uniformity and singularity. The assumption here is of an a-social economy controlled entirely by unfettered market exchanges. This is ironic as the particular social construction of the economic advocated by the neo-liberal agenda is itself a social construct – normally unproblematised – that seeks to deny any alternative. Such a denial is actively achieved both through the persistent representation of economic geographies merely as market mechanisms and through the practices of power wielded at a global scale over such geographies by institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO in the attempt to ensure that that is what they remain.

However, all economies and economic geographies are both material and social constructs. Thus the possibilities for proliferation themselves proliferate well beyond the purely material. Economies based upon the particularities of capitalism (involving a particular set of class relations and the objective of accumulation) may exist alongside those based, for example, upon mutuality, ecological sustainability and social justice. However, all economic geographies must (always) be constrained by the requirements of materially effective circuits of consumption, exchange and production. This is simply because if economies are not capable of consuming, exchanging and producing use values, they are incapable of sustaining the means of social reproduction and so are doomed to fail. But to say this is not to say that effective economic geographies are reducible to a singular model. The scope for proliferation, though constrained, is still very wide.

This argument is strongly supported by James Ferguson (Ferguson, 1999) in his analysis of the fate of the Zambian copper belt
following the collapse of the price of copper in world markets and the subsequent decrepitude of its mining industry and the growing burdens of external debt and IMF intervention. These developments have condemned the Zambian economy as a whole to rapid and wholesale economic decline. Amidst this crisis of development, and the disappointment, deprivation and despair so engendered, Ferguson draws attention to the ways in which, as a matter of survival, individuals and households switch to seemingly forgotten and redundant modes of economic and social behaviour. In other words, older modes of economic and social organization are revealed to never truly die out, as conventional evolutionary accounts would suggest, but merely retreat into the background as relic forms that are overshadowed by more ‘modern’ modes of development. However, these older ideas and practices may resurface in times of economic and social crisis, with the result that ‘the ‘dead ends’ of the past keep coming back, just as the ‘main lines’ that are supposed to lead to the future continually seem to disappoint’ (Ferguson, 1999: 251). Thus, to survive, inhabitants of the Zambian copper belt have revived forms of economic behaviour – such as circular migration and shifting cultivation – thought to have died out when Zambia, and Africa more generally, embarked upon its path towards development. As Ferguson makes clear, these so-called ‘dead-ends’ represent vital resources and strategies for the survival of individuals and households experiencing the ‘abjection’ of disconnection from a global economy to which they were once gainfully attached. For Ferguson, the political and theoretical implications of such developments are clear:

... challenging neo-liberal globalization cannot simply be a matter of confronting it with its successor (the next historical stage, a higher rung on the ladder) but must involve working through the ‘full house,’ the actually existing ‘bush,’ of partly overlapping social forces and organized movements that are at work on different visions of the ‘new world order.’ New social movements mobilized around such issues as ecology, sexuality, religion, and human rights can take their place here alongside revitalized Marxist critique, a re-energized global labor movement, a politicized humanitarianism, even a rejuvenated Keynesianism. Emerging new forms of resistance to the brutalities of global capitalism, that is, must coexist with older forms, scrounged ... from the dustbin of history. (Ferguson, 1999: 257)

Work of this kind therefore seeks to undermine the privileged status of neo-liberal discourse and to open up a space to both discuss and practise non-capitalist modes of economic reproduction.

It is complimented by a second strand of work that also seeks to destabilize the discursive formation of neo-liberalization. A particularly
good example is the development of the concept of ‘virtualism by the anthropologists James Carrier and Danny Miller, to which we now turn our attention.

Virtualism

Carrier and Miller set out to illustrate the power of abstract theory within the material reality of economic social life and to argue that, through the process of neo-liberalization, the economic realm is becoming more abstracted from its pre-existing social and political contexts (Carrier and Miller, 1998; Carrier, 1998; Miller, 1998, 2000). Virtualism is defined as ‘the conscious attempt to make the real world conform to the virtual image, justified by the claim that the failure of the real to conform to the ideal is a consequence not merely of imperfections, but is a failure that itself has undesirable consequences’ (Carrier, 1998: 8). Reinforcing Harvey’s insistence that neo-liberalism is driven by an utopian impulse and the drive towards abstraction (2000: 241–2), Carrier argues that economic thought and practice influence one another in an ongoing recursive and reflexive loop, which is ‘driven by ideas and idealism [and] the desire to make the world conform to the image’ (Carrier, 1998: 5). These abstractions have become more powerful because of the way in which are supported by the academic discipline of economics, which they has successfully colonized a number of key economic and political institutions so that they assist with the propagation of such abstractions.

For Miller, the power of abstraction contained within virtualism is an alienating force, and one that is bringing about a mutation within capitalism, which has become a more regressive and polarized social formation than it was during much of the post-war period of the twentieth century. Thus, the quest for an abstracted ideal of a market-economy pursued through the political project of neo-liberalism has eroded many of the social gains made from the 1930s onwards when governments sought to temper the impacts of markets through a series of social compromises and settlements (Polanyi, 1957). The creation of the welfare state during this period did much to negate many of the alienating impacts of capitalism, as levels of income rose and growing sections of the population began to enjoy increases in disposable income and access to a greater volume of consumer goods. Subverting the idea within Regulation Theory that mass consumption was necessary to ‘balance’ the forces of mass production developed in the earlier part of the twentieth century, Miller argues that mass consumption enabled capitalism to enter a period of relative stability
within the post-war period not just because it provided a market for the goods and services so produced, but more because the benefits of participation within mass consumption – supported by the intervention of the welfare state in many economies – by the majority of the population fended off the alienating tendencies of capitalism (Miller, 1998: 193).

However, through the 1980s and 1990s neo-liberalism unleashed the effects of virtualism, bringing about new extremes of income inequality on a global scale. Examples of virtualism include models of structural adjustment, inspired by neo-classical economics, and the rise of a generalized audit society. What Miller reveals is that although these projects have had significantly alienating effects, they have, as indicated above, also been introduced with a moral agenda of making social gains. The power of neo-liberal economic theory within virtualism has ensured that these gains are validated at the level of the individual, constructed as a consumer. But, as Miller points out, these gains are claimed not in the name of actual, living consumers but, rather, in the name of abstracted, idealized or virtual consumers:

Since it was consumption as an expression of welfare that was the main instrument in negating the abstraction of capitalism, the move to greater abstraction had to supplant consumption as human practice with an abstract version of the consumer. The result is the creation of the virtual consumer in economic theory, a chimera, the constituent parts of which are utterly daft. ... Indeed, neo-classical economists make no claim to represent flesh-and-blood consumers. They claim that their consumers are merely aggregate figures used in modelling. Their protestations of innocence are hollow, however, because these virtual consumers and the models they inhabit and that animate them are the same models that are used to justify forcing actual consumers to behave like their virtual counterparts. Just as the problem with structural adjustment is not that it is based on academic theory but that it has become practice, so the problem with the neo-classical consumer is the effects that the model has on the possibilities of consumer practice. In some kind of global card trick, an abstract, virtual consumer steals the authority that had been accumulated for workers in their other role as consumers. (Miller, 1998: 200)

Thus, in the name of lower prices, greater ‘efficiency’ and a greater freedom to make economic choices by those who can afford it, economic virtualism has removed many of the substantive social advances and improvements brought about by the welfare state and reduced the number of people that enjoyed freedom from poverty and deprivation.

Miller insists that the problem is not so much the creation of abstractions as such, but the way in which abstractions are afforded such power within the practical projects that politicians and
administrators execute in our name. There is, therefore, a clear need for intellectual work that directly confronts such abstractions, and prises them open to scrutiny so that they ‘can be re-appropriated as part of the enhancement of human self-understanding and cultural development’ (1998: 212).

There are numerous other examples of culturally inflected economic research that seek to open up a space for thinking creatively about opposing neo-liberal capitalism and imagined alternatives. One particularly germane example is the work of Actor Network Theory (ANT), given both its stated intention to open up the ‘black boxes’ created by the unfolding of socio-technical networks to make possible a world configured otherwise (see Bingham and Thrift, 2000), as well as its growing interest in the economic sphere (Callon, 1998). Indeed, this conception of economic activities as networked achievements that are spread across space encourages a mode of thinking that is strongly reminiscent of the Gibson-Graham project, which is to encourage a way of seeing capitalism as a more fragile and vulnerable entity than hitherto. Thus, imagining capitalism as a network in the manner of ANT is contrary to the conventional ‘understanding of capitalism as a unitary figure coextensive with the geographical space of the nation state (if not the world)’ and helps develop a geographical imaginary wherein capitalism is depicted as a ‘desegregated and diverse set of practices unevenly distributed across a varied economic landscape’ (Gibson-Graham, 1996: 117). In other words, by re-imagining capitalism as a network that has constantly to be achieved, it becomes possible to identify those places within space economies where the network is very weak, and where potential exists for new forms of alliances, social formations and economic geographies first to take root, then to become established, and finally to flower and bloom.

Constraints of space mean that we are unable to develop these ideas in any detail here, although some practical examples of this process of working away at such points of weakness and least resistance are developed in the next section of the chapter. Before we move on to consider these examples of ‘enacting the economy otherwise’, it is also important to note that the cultural turn has, alongside the collapse of state socialism, been responsible in large part for an internal re-assessment and re-statement of the Marxist project itself. In doing so, it has also engendered a renewed interest in the possibilities of alternatives to capitalism that go beyond the failed models of state socialism. For example, David Harvey points out that while a large number of critics have drawn attention to the failings and problems
associated with a life dominated by capitalist social relations, hardly any of these critics have been prepared to say what kind of alternative world they would like to see inserted in capitalism’s stead (Harvey, 2000). The reluctance of these critics to do so, Harvey insists, stems from the way the cultural turn has so privileged a sensitivity to difference that it has disabled the possibility of suggesting alternative worlds, lest some aspect of them be accused of being oppressive or repressive of various kinds of cultural and political expression. This hesitation reveals for Harvey an inability to arbitrate which has unfortunate political implications given the advance of neo-liberal projects that are unhindered by an openness to alternatives:

The anti-authoritarianism of liberatory political thought … reaches some sort of limit. There is a failure to recognize that materialization of anything requires, at least for a time, closure around a particular set of institutional arrangements and a particular spatial form and that the act of closure is itself a material statement that carries its own authority in human affairs. What the abandonment of all talk of Utopia on the left has done is leave the question of valid and legitimate authority in abeyance (or, more exactly, to leave it to the moralisms of the conservatives – both of the neoliberal and religious variety). It has left the concept of Utopia … as a pure signifier without any meaningful referent in the material world. And for many contemporary theorists … that is where the concept can and should remain: as a pure signifier of hope destined never to acquire a material referent. But the problem is that without a vision of Utopia there is no way to define that port to which we might want to sail. (Harvey, 2000: 188–9)

Thus, Harvey argues that the left has abandoned any claim to the idea of utopia, due to what he sees as a fear of engaging in an act of political arbitration that would prioritize some values over others. But not do so, he argues, sustains the deceit of living in what he describes as a ‘both/and’ world; ultimately, he insists, and as the protagonists of neo-liberalism clearly recognize, we live in an ‘either/or’ world where certain hard choices need to be made. This is because, as argued above, economic geographies are simultaneously – and inseparably – sets of social and material processes and relations. Critics of capitalism therefore need to set out practical visions of a non-capitalist world, if only as a mechanism of encouraging the idea that there can indeed be such an alternative. This position is strongly supported by other critics, such as Andrew Sayer for example (Sayer, 1995), who argues that Marxists have traditionally resisted setting out what their vision of a post-capitalist world might look like, as they wished to avoid prejudging the course that class struggle might take. As Sayer
points out, this refusal to project into the future is curious, arguing that it is ‘strange that a critical social science which is so exacting in its explanations and critiques of what is, should be so lacking regarding what could or should be’ (Sayer, 1995: 35). However, as his careful critique of different modes of economic co-ordination reveals, there are far more possibilities available than the conventional divide between ‘markets’ and ‘planning’ and that the potential to develop ‘possibilities’ are ‘less constrained than is commonly assumed on the Left’ (Sayer, 1995: 182).

Both Harvey and Sayer draw particular attention to the dialectical tension that exists between processes of economic abstraction on the one hand and the more substantive processes of performing economies on the other. They argue that such a tension exists both within the formal or mainstream economy and within the struggles to create alternative economies of different kinds. In addition, they both point to the fact that these tensions, and the constructions and performances of mainstream and alternative economies, are necessarily played out in economic space. Indeed, Harvey argues that utopian ideas of an alternative to capitalism are highly geographical, often associated with an attempt to relocate ‘beyond’ the heartlands of capitalism, which are seen to be understandable – although, Harvey believes, ultimately futile – efforts to defend such experiments against the social relations of the outside world. The next section of this chapter looks at some examples of these substantive attempts to create alternative economic worlds.

**PERFORMING THE ECONOMY OTHERWISE**

There are numerous examples of practical attempts to challenge the hegemony of neo-liberal capitalism and that begin to explore the possibility of organizing economic life otherwise. Perhaps the most spectacular has been the emerging consequences of the anti-capitalist protests that have taken place since the end of the 1990s. These protests move around the world, both shadowing and drawing attention to the ways in which global economic and political elites meet at regular intervals to co-ordinate the governance of the global economy. The third ministerial meeting of the World Trade Organization in Seattle in December 1999 marks the beginning of an extraordinarily visible wave of protest against the effects of neo-liberalism and capitalist globalization. The meeting was a failure on its own terms, as it collapsed without agreement on a new round of trade protocols.
However, this was rather overshadowed by the events outside the conference where over 100,000 people marched in peaceful protest to the meeting. The extensive media coverage of the event was promoted by the fact that the demonstrators were met by police in riot gear, leading to three days of pitched battles between the police and a minority of protestors, which produced over 500 arrests, a state of emergency within Seattle, and around $3 million of damage to property in the city. The outlets of particularly ubiquitous capitalist corporations, such as McDonalds and Gap, were singled out for particular attention in this regard (Fannin et al., 2000; Wainwright et al., 2000). However, of more significance is the fact that the Seattle demonstration was so well attended, and that it set in motion a wave of subsequent protests that disturbed and unsettled subsequent meetings of this nature across the world (Smith, 2000). Thus, over the next 18 months, the meetings of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in Washington DC and in Prague, the World Economic Forum’s annual meeting in Davos, the Summit of the Americas in Quebec City, a European Union expansion meeting in Gothenburg, and the annual meeting of the G8 in Genoa were all subject to vociferous – and at times violent – protests.

The scale of these protests, and their signification of a broader dissatisfaction with the progress of global neo-liberalism, has at least given leading politicians and capitalist representatives pause for thought. Reactions range from a blanket condemnation of the protests by leaders such as British Prime Minister Tony Blair and a vigorous defence of the moral authority of globalization by The Economist magazine (Crook, 2001b) to a willingness by the then German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin to countenance extra regulatory controls on the worst excesses of ‘fast capitalism’, such as the imposition of a tax on currency speculation (Elliot, 2001; Hooper, 2001).

These anti-capitalist and anti-globalization protests also draw attention to the importance of place to the co-ordination of global capitalism and its successful governance, and the fact that it requires the co-presence of global political and economic leaders to thrash out conventions and agreements for neo-liberal capitalism to continue to go on. As the increasingly well-organized demonstrators clearly recognize, this temporary ‘spatial fix’ is a point of weakness within the network of global capitalism. However, this is less because capital has shown a historical tendency to distance itself from challenges to its authority – from the labour movement, for example – through the simple expedient of reorganizing its assets over space (Harvey, 1982).
than because a multi-local capitalism is difficult to regulate. Regulatory economic summits are therefore continuously necessary; they have to take place and, for the regulators, there is nowhere to hide. No doubt, as the organizers of such meetings obtain more experiencing of dealing with and subduing these protests, the ability of protestors actually to disrupt the course of the meetings will decline. Yet, as long as the protests continue so they will serve to remind people that the progress of global neo-liberalism should not be taken for granted and that, ultimately, its ability to survive requires that it continues to achieve a degree of political legitimacy, at least within the core capitalist countries of the West.

However, in addition to the attempt to curb such protest from without, the anti-capitalist, anti-globalization movement also suffers from the problem that Harvey argues infects most critical studies of capitalism; in that the protestors are more united by what they are against than what they are for. As Crook (2001b) has observed: ‘The main things holding the anti-globalist coalition together are a suspicion of markets, a strongly collectivist instinct and a belief in protest as a form of moral uplift’. However, he argues that the ‘protest coalition can hang together only if it continues to avoid thinking about what it might be in favour of’.

More work in this direction is clearly needed, although if inspiration is required perhaps it can be gleaned from the numerous examples of practical, day-to-day experiments in performing the economy otherwise. Such opposition is demonstrated in various ways, such as participation in ‘elective’ alternative social movements and a modification of lifestyle (Hetherington, 1998), participation in consumer boycotts, or using greater discretion in acts of consumption (Hartwick, 2000). Such acts are typically not directly confrontational – although there is anecdotal evidence that many of the key movers within anti-capitalist protest are members of new social movements – but aim to bring about change in the nature of the economy through everyday practices. Thus, these actions are seeking to influence the day-to-day rhythms and cycles of the capitalist economy, and by so doing, divert and reshape them. Perhaps the best example of these activities is the fair trade movement that has developed from critical analysis of the production chains of commodities such as coffee, tea and clothing (see Klein, 2000). Building upon academic work on the circulation of commodities through value chains (Cook and Crang, 1996; Dicken and Hassler, 2000; Dicken et al., 2001; Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994; Hartwick, 1998; Hartwick, 2000; Hughes, 2000; Jackson, 1999; Mather, 1999; Robbins, 1999), organizations such as Fair
Trade and Clean Clothes (Ross, 1997) attempt to make visible the passage of commodities from (developing country) producer to (western) consumer, and of the social relations of exploitation that accompany them. These organizations seek to replace these exploitative relations with ‘fairer’ terms of exchange, which involve producers obtaining better terms of trade than if they sold their products directly to large global corporations. Such movements have a clear educative purpose, and exist in the belief that consumers in the West would purchase in a more ethically responsible manner if only they were aware of the ways in which their purchasing decisions feed through these commodity chains to support and sustain exploitation and impoverishment elsewhere. Indeed, these educative aims are currently being taken further in Britain where, according to Thrift, efforts are in process to get the subject of commodity chains introduced into schools at Key Stage 3 of the National Curriculum, with the idea of using permanently-sited webcams which would allow schoolchildren to see each part of the commodity chain, thereby not only registering the geography of the commodity but also making them think about their own role as responsible consumers since they are able to see exactly what labour they are in part responsible for. (Thrift, 2002: 5)

At the same time, however, financial and entrepreneurial education is also advocated within the school curriculum.

Akin to such developments is the emergence of ‘green’ and ‘ethical’ development, which allow investors to profit from the proceeds of capitalism but only in ways consistent with their desire to avoid investing in the stocks and shares of companies considered to transgress various standards of ‘appropriate’ behaviour (Lewis and Mackenzie, 2000a, 2000b; Winnett and Lewis, 2000). Clearly, these examples are merely indicative and illustrative. There exist a range of other ‘everyday’ examples of performing and practising the economy otherwise, and they are the subject of the chapters of this book. Thus, the final section of the introduction provides a synopsis of their content.

**ALTERNATIVE ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHIES**

One of the key observations to emerge from the contents of this book is that the idea and concept of the economic alternative is highly unstable and relational. This is made clear in Chapter 4 by Louise Crewe, Nicky Gregson and Kate Brooks, which analyses the retailing of second-hand, ‘retro’ clothing. As they argue, the notion of the ‘alternative’ is a chaotic conception, and one that varies over space,
through time and by industrial sector. Thus, many of those who work within ‘creative’ or cultural industries perceive what they do to be alternative or oppositional to ‘mainstream’ economic activities, although by the measure of some of the other activities described in this book, their activities would appear to be strongly implicated within capitalist social relations. The self-understanding of the activities performed by the respondents in Crewe, Gregson and Brooks’s study as ‘alternative’ is based upon the importance placed upon creativity, autonomy at work and a general anti-corporate attitude. Thus, retro retailers, which are typically small-scale operations, seek to carve out an economic living for themselves through the deployment of tacit and situated knowledge by revalorizing and re-commodifying clothing; or, in other words, by making unfashionable clothes fashionable again. In doing so, they necessarily operate – initially at least – in opposition to the mainstream retail sector by offering clothing that is not normally available elsewhere. However, to the extent that such retro retailers are successful in revalorizing certain fashions, they are constantly in danger of seeing their market being colonized by larger, more economically powerful outlets. Moreover, mainstream organizations and agents often move not only into the ‘retro’ market but also into the geographical areas in which they operate, which have often been successfully revalorized as new, alternative economic spaces. This makes retro retailing an often precarious means of livelihood, although many of the respondents in the study had made the conscious decision to opt for a more difficult but more autonomous life, within which they would have greater freedom at work, rather than submit to what they saw as the demands and dictates of large, impersonal, bureaucratic organizations. Therefore, the alternative economic strategies pursued by such agents cannot be seen as oppositional to capitalism in general; after all, most of the respondents in the study could accurately be described as members of a proto-petty bourgeoisie. Rather, the efforts of the retro retailers, and other similar creative workers, should be seen as a means of economic reproduction that is developed as an alternative to the hegemony of corporate capitalism and to the powers that such institutions exert over their employees and which, for these respondents at least, made the social relations of employment unacceptable.

The Chapter 5, by Andrew Lincoln, looks at institutions that have sought to transform the social relations of employment through the device of employee-ownership. Over the last 20 years or so, there has been an increase in the number of worker-owned enterprises within economies such as that of the United Kingdom, which Lincoln argues
is a product not so much of efforts to create more democratic workplaces than of defensive strategies developed in response to programmes of privatization within state-owned industries. Worker ownership, and the development of institutional forms like co-operatives, has a long history, dating back at least to the eighteenth century, when it developed as a response to the emergence of an impoverished working class that arose in the wake of the Industrial Revolution. Worker ownership gives employees an opportunity of intervening within economic globalization, and of exerting some degree of control and influence over local economic processes. In other words, worker ownership holds out the possibility of exercising some agency within the structures of global capitalism. By securing some degree of local control and a stake within economic organizations, worker ownership has the potential to fix capital within a locality and, through mechanisms such as preferential purchasing decisions, to perhaps help ensure that capital circulates deeper and faster within a local economy than might otherwise be the case. However, while the examples of worker-owned organizations outlined by Lincoln demonstrate that it is possible to create alternative economic worlds, it is far more difficult to sustain them. Moreover, such worlds can be better sustained in some places than others and their survival, even within accommodating local milieux, requires its subjects to work out a means of negotiating an economic environment that establishes rules and norms of competitive behaviour that are often inimical to the more collective and democratic modes of governance that characterize worker-owned enterprises.

Chapter 2, by Ash Amin, Angus Cameron and Ray Hudson, undertakes a critical analysis of the social economy and, in particular, of the ways in which it has increasingly become a motor of local economic regeneration. The social economy has been projected as a means of moving between the market and the state, by drawing upon resources within local communities. Thus, the social economy is increasingly considered to be an effective modulator of the extremes of market capitalism and facilitates the development of initiatives that present alternative economic options for local communities, which is the level at which many initiatives are scaled. However, as Amin, Cameron and Hudson point out, the social economy is highly dependent upon the state and its agents, which provide most of its funding and much of its ideological support. For this reason, the idea of the social economy as a kind of radical economic alternative is deeply suspect. Indeed, one of the reasons that the state is so interested in the social economy is that it is a vehicle by which social and
economic risk can be moved away from the state and on to local communities, which are expected to assume responsibility for the operation of social economy initiatives, often resulting in the self-exploitation of those involved through the allocation of considerable amounts of time and effort and the foregoing of other potential forms of income. Nor is there much evidence that these schemes deliver the benefits to local communities that many activists claim for them. According to Amin, Cameron and Hudson, the main beneficiaries of the social economy are the state (in its ability to abrogate responsibility for local economic development), the private sector (which may benefit from social economy initiatives), and an emerging cadre of social economy professionals. Thus, rather than being a means of developing radically alternative economic spaces, Amin, Cameron and Hudson argue, after Marx and Engels, that the social economy is perhaps better seen as a form of ‘conservative’ or ‘bourgeois’ socialism that seeks to moderate the effects of capitalism without actually reforming or replacing it.

A further account of alternative economic institutions emerges from Andrew Jonas and Duncan Fuller’s analysis of credit unions (Chapter 3). Their chapter examines the ways in which alternative social forms are produced, and argues that they need to be understood relationally, being located within wider economic and political developments. As such, they propose a more nuanced understanding of alternative institutions, along a spectrum of ‘oppositionality’ to the norms of the mainstream economy. Thus, alternative institutions may be categorized as ‘alternative-oppositional’, ‘alternative-additional’ or ‘alternative-substitute’. Credit unions, which are financial institutions that provide cheap credit to individuals and households on low incomes, have traditionally been examples of ‘alternative-oppositional’ institutions. They provide access to cheap credit, which would otherwise be denied to such individuals and households, with beneficial social and economic outcomes. However, as they argue through an examination of credit unions in Kingston-upon-Hull and Newcastle-upon-Tyne, the relative success of credit unions has led to them being drawn into the kind of policy debates that surround the social economy in general, so that a struggle is emerging between different models of credit union. On the one hand, there is an ‘idealist’ model that advocates local autonomy and empowerment, and on the other an ‘instrumentalist’ model that emphasizes economic viability. The struggle seems to be being won by advocates of the ‘instrumentalist’ model, resulting in a rescaling of the credit union movement, which is moving away from a more overtly local, community focus towards the building
of larger, more ‘efficient’ institutions. As Jonas and Fuller argue, for many credit union activists this rescaling of the movement represents a betrayal of its former community-based, socially-oriented *raison d’être*, and so to a downgrading of the degree to which credit unions can create and sustain alternative economic space.

The conception of the economic alternative is broadened in Colin Williams and Jan Windebank’s chapter on informal employment (Chapter 6). For Williams and Windebank, alternative economic space is all that which lies beyond formal employment; that is, the non-market production, consumption or exchange of goods and services. By focusing upon the large amount of work that goes on beyond formal employment, they seek to decentre the mainstream from its core position within conceptual understandings of the economy. In their chapter they set out to understand the uneven geographies of work that lie beyond formal employment, which includes paid informal work (which is hidden from the state for tax or other reasons), self-provisioning (unpaid work undertaken for one’s own household) and mutual aid (unpaid work undertaken for other than one’s own household). Williams and Windebank take inspiration from Amartya Sen to argue that social inequality is best analysed in terms of the ‘capabilities’ of households to cope and to reproduce themselves, which is not necessarily dependent upon conventional measures of economic well-being such as income. Thus, some households with relatively low levels of income may be able to demonstrate considerable ‘capabilities’ due to their ability to draw upon broad social networks to deliver important goods and services. Drawing upon research undertaken within cities in the south and north of England, Williams and Windebank reveal that different kinds of informal work are undertaken within rich and poor areas. In higher-income neighbourhoods, paid informal work involved the use of firms and/or self-employed individuals, which were not paid formally for reasons of tax evasion. In lower-income neighbourhoods, meanwhile, informal paid work was largely conducted between friends, neighbours and other family members. Thus, Williams and Windebank argue that as much as one-third of all monetary exchanges in lower-income households were undertaken for reasons beyond the profit motive. Although money exchanged hands in these transactions, payments were made not so much to compensate for the labour and time expended, but rather to alleviate the recipients of the work from an obligation that this ‘gift’ would otherwise impose (Schrift, 1997). Thus, for Williams and Windebank, a good deal of work that goes on within certain communities is already ‘alternative’, in the sense that it is undertaken not
so much for narrow, instrumental reasons, but is performed as part of much wider bonds of social reciprocity, and may be seen as a form of ‘monetized mutual aid’.

The next chapter, by Colin Williams, Theresa Aldridge and Jane Tooke, looks at Local Exchange and Trading Systems (LETS), which in many ways attempt to develop an institutional means of regularizing and extending the mutual aid described in the previous chapter. LETS are examples of local currency systems through which participants can accumulate and expend money for a range of tasks and services. The chapter, which draws upon an extensive study of LETS within the United Kingdom, reveals that participation is skewed towards the socially excluded, and that people join for a range of reasons, both economic and non-economic. LETS are alternative economic spaces in at least two ways. First, they are alternatives to the formal economic sphere. Participation in LETS has, for some people, acted as a means of gaining skills and confidence that made it easier to them to move into the realm of formal employment. Secondly, LETS are also alternatives to the informal sphere. According to Williams, Aldridge and Tooke, LETS act as ‘bridges’, bringing together people who did not previously know each other. Thus, they can help bring the socially marginal and excluded into a broader network of social contact so that the possibility of participating within informal exchange of the kind described in the previous chapter becomes more likely. What LETS seek to do is formalize and ‘scale’ social networks within local communities so that the likelihood of reciprocal exchange is increased.

Chapter 8, by Jeffrey Jacob, looks at the North American ‘back-to-the-land’ movement of neo-yeomanism. This movement is driven by ‘turnaround migration’ and non-economic factors such as the desire to be closer to families and friends, and to achieve proximity to ‘nature’ and the assumed intimacy of small-town life. However, as Jacob points out, although the movement is also underpinned by an idealized notion of greater self-sufficiency through agricultural production, very few of the back-to-the-land migrants are able to carve out an alternative economic space that is capable of reproducing itself. Although the neo-yeomans surveyed by Jacob are able to produce about 30 per cent of their food needs from their properties, the rest of their food and other disbursements are supported by work necessarily undertaken within the formal economy. One of the reasons for this is that the ‘back-to-the-land’ social movement was driven by urban professionals who were rarely able to build up sufficient cash to be able to afford more than relatively small properties. As a result,
almost half of the ‘back-to-the-landers’ surveyed by Jacob are effectively ‘weekenders’ who have to hold down other jobs due to the difficulties of carving out a self-sufficient existence. However, Jacob argues that the tide may be turning in favour of the neo-yeomans as environmental concerns about agricultural production mount. The small-scale nature of back-to-the-land operations means that they would be relatively immune to green taxes that sought to compensate for the environmental ‘footprint’ of agricultural operations. Thus, Jacob suggests that while it is difficult to sustain alternative agricultural spaces under current institutional and regulatory structures, a greater concern with environmental sustainability will make agricultural self-sufficiency a more viable possibility.

The chapters in this book, therefore, set out the possibilities, but also the difficulties, of carving out alternative economic spaces within an era of globalized capitalism. Indeed, the problems faced by many of the models and institutions outlined in this book might seem to confirm Harvey’s pessimism for economic alternatives that seek to operate through a ‘spatial fix’, arguing that such attempts to escape contradictions of capitalism will prove as temporary and fleeting as the those pursued by capitalist enterprises located much more firmly within the mainstream economy. What is needed, Harvey argues, is nothing less than a ‘total’ solution, through a set of social relations that produces an equitable and sustainable economic, political and environmental settlement (Harvey, 2000). Ultimately, of course, Harvey’s pessimism may prove to be well founded. However, we would like to draw a more optimistic reading from these developments, and hope that the ‘spaces of hope’ outlined in this book are the antecedents of a more diverse, proliferative and inclusive economic future.

Note

1 However, Miller has subsequently argued that Callon’s approach is supportive rather than critical of normative economics (Miller, 2002).

References


