9

Affect Theory: Post-Structuralist Accounts

Key Aims

In this chapter we discuss some of the post-structural developments of emotion studies known as ‘affect theories’. In doing so we will include:

- A view of Freud's and later Tomkins' affect theories
- A discussion of Deleuze's process of philosophy and affect
- A critical review of Massumi's notions of affect
- A consideration of the place of affect in subjectivity and social psychology

Introduction

What is post-structuralism? Let us briefly remind ourselves. It can be described as a body of work which was essentially a response to structuralism. Structuralism viewed human culture as being understood through the signs and symbols which structure it. Structuralists tend to reject notions of human freedom, autonomy and free will, instead there is a focus on the ways that human behaviour is determined by various structures, like language systems. Indeed the very term ‘subjectivity’ tends to be concerned with the way that systems of language are related to power and shape the individual’s outlook on the world; in other words, the individual is subject to structures of language (for example discourses) which speak through the person. For Karl Marx (1818–1883) human existence could be understood by analysing economic structures. Freud has also been claimed to be a structuralist as he described human functioning in terms of the structure of the psyche. Although Michel Foucault (1926–1984) is often considered to be allied with structuralism because his philosophy tends to agree with the notion that language and society are governed by various systems, he was sceptical of the endeavour to find underlying structures and was also concerned that we could never put ourselves outside of the power of discourse...
to think through these systems objectively. Jacques Derrida (1930–2004) argued against this latter point through his pioneering work on the critical theory known as ‘deconstructionism’. He felt that all texts have ambiguities, paradoxes and binary oppositions entailed within them which facilitate interpretation through a careful textual analysis, or a questioning of the so-called metaphysics of presence. For Derrida, texts do not naturally or simply reflect the world that they speak of, but exhibit ‘différance’ which allows for multiple interpretations. They tend to be produced by a hierarchy of binaries; for example, man vs. woman, good vs. evil, cognition vs. emotion and so on. Thus, many of the forms of qualitative linguistic analysis draw on the deconstructive philosophy of Derrida. Indeed, in Chapter 8 we looked at Edwards’ ten emotional constrastives when looking at how discursive psychology deconstructs the structure of emotion in language (Edwards, 1997).

Affect Theory

Theories of affect have become a hot topic in the humanities and social sciences in recent years. The concept of affect is fashionable again as part of post-structuralist responses to the tendency for reductionist thinking in relation to emotions and the body in mainstream humanities and social scientific theory. As we have previously discussed, theories derived from structuralism (and indeed post-structuralism) in the humanities and social sciences have been extremely dissatisfied and critical of bio-psychological reductionist accounts of human functioning. This is largely due to the tendency to biologise psychosocial phenomena. Critiques of the naive realism of the biological sciences in relation to social and psychological phenomena became heavily focused on the deconstruction of language. One of Derrida’s most quoted sayings is that ‘there is nothing outside the text’ (Derrida, 1988). The so-called ‘discursive turn’ has addressed the creative and productive role of language in a plethora of ways across the whole range of social and cultural theory. To some extent, the (re)emergence of theories of affect has led to an ‘affective turn’ that is taking up the baton from discourse theory as the primary tool for critical theories of emotion (Brown and Stenner, 2009). It has been said that the interest and focus on emotion in the turn to language acted as a catalyst for the subsequent turn to affect (Greco and Stenner, 2008). In general, affect theories argue that deconstructionism tends to be stuck in analysing that which is socially produced, it does not have the capacity and theoretical capability for looking beyond to what constitutes the very fabric of our being (Hemmings, 2005). Affect theories attempt to understand our experiences of the social world as not completely socially determined. In this way they attempt to overcome the pessimism of social determination by offering versions of social processes that are not completely subject to social constraint.

Given the range of disciplines that have become interested in affect, it is difficult to provide a neat summary of all their definitions and empirical explorations of and with affect. In this chapter we aim to draw attention to key themes and
AFFECT THEORY: POST-STRUCTURALIST ACCOUNTS

points of similarity, as well as differentiation, across the affective turn. Our focus though is primarily social psychological so we will develop our argument in the direction of affect theories in psychology.

Affect in Tomkins

So what is this affect that affect theory proposes? Hemmings states that ‘[A]ffect broadly refers to states of being, rather than their manifestation or interpretation as emotions’ (Hemmings, 2005: 551). In this respect, to some extent, we can see the roots of affect theory in Freudian notions of affect, in which affect is the qualitative expression of the quantity of the drive’s mental energy. The affects of the drives can be tied to objects in the world through the pleasure principle, which allows for the drive discharge. These may be manifest and tied to what we consider to be particular emotions such as love and hate. The work of Sylvan Tomkins is an important part of the history of affect theory in psychology, particularly in how it has been taken up in contemporary non-cognitive social psychology. Tomkins took up the affect theory of Freud, but was not satisfied with the central place of the drives (Tomkins, 1962). Instead, he theorised the affects as at times having their own rewards (autotelic). Similar to Darwin, Tomkins suggests there are a number of basic (hard wired) affect systems: interest/excitement, enjoyment/joy, surprise/startle, distress/anguish, disgust/contempt, anger/rage, shame/humiliation, and fear/terror. These, he stated, were mainly expressed through the face and form feedback loops which are likened to amplifiers, enhancing the volume of the affect and in turn increasing motivation. However, although the affects may be biological and evolutionarily hard-wired, they are understood as being socially malleable through the development of motivational narratives (scripts), with which the affects interact. These scripts are developed through ongoing experiences, not just deterministic forms of cultural scripts, and they can become quite idiosyncratic and help us to negotiate the social world in our own unique ways. Hence, similar to Damasio’s (1994) somatic marker hypothesis (Chapter 6), past emotional experiences mark and flavour the way that individuals re-experience a new emotional situation.

Additionally, Tomkins was interested in the forms of affective contagion that occur in social encounters with others. He uses the contagious nature of a smile, yawn or blush to illustrate this. Once one smiles for example, it may transfer to others and then double back to the self but increases in its original intensity in a circuitry form. So the affect that is transferred to others can be understood as a narration of our own inner life. Gibbs states that it is very difficult not to respond to a spontaneous smile with a smile of one’s own, and one’s own smile provides sufficient feedback to our own bodies to activate the physiological and neurological aspect of joy (Gibbs, 2010). Hemmings states that this is one of the main reasons that affect theory has been taken up as an alternative to social determinism (Hemmings, 2005). The individual is theorised here has having a degree of control over his or her life.
Affect in Deleuze

Whilst psychoanalytic accounts of affect have been very influential in social psychological and psychosocial accounts of affect, in cultural studies (and human geography) the work of Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995) has been a primary reference point. Hemmings describes the main distinction between Tomkins’ and Deleuze’s affect theories as the former breaking it down ‘into a topography of myriad, distinct parts’ while the latter understands it as ‘the passage from one state to another, as an intensity characterized by an increase or decrease in power’ (Hemmings, 2005: 552). Affect for Deleuze is always active, never passive, as it moves (or flows) from one state to the next. It is forever ‘becoming’, it has no fixed identity. The times affect becomes fixed are when it forms into prefigured emotional categories. At these times a line is crossed from affect to emotion, and a knowledge associated with classifications of emotion can be used. Deleuze’s own account of affect draws influence from the seventeenth century work of Spinoza that we discussed in Chapter 3. Principally it is the notion that human experience is not about knowing the world, but rather ‘the way the world affects us’ (Brown and Stenner, 2009: 112) that is important. Deleuze never really marks a clear distinction between affect and emotion, and indeed, his explicit mentions of affect are not as frequent as his subsequent influence suggests. Nevertheless, the notions of moving from models of stable categories of the subject that are defined according to specific sets of inherent properties, towards an understanding of affect as action (verb) rather than a thing (noun) have spread across cultural theory. This has led to thinking of experiences of feeling and intensity not as emotions that are defined according to linguistic grids of meaning, but as creative and contingent practices that are relational and processual. Indeed, Deleuze draws on early Greek process philosophies, which emphasised the ever changing nature of so called reality: being as becoming. Deleuze then understood life as characterised by such things as connections, disjunctions and flows.

For Deleuze, affect escapes representation, ‘it cannot be converted into or delimited by the discursive, by images or representations, by consciousness or thought’ (Seigworth, 2005). For Deleuze affect has a form of bodily meaning that can pierce social interpretations by often undoing social expectations and logic. He illustrates this well through Lawrence of Arabia’s account of being gang raped in the desert: while in the midst of the torture of being raped he has an erection. For Deleuze, this demonstrates the autonomy of the body in relation to the tragic event. Lawrence feels shame but not because he was raped but because of his own body’s response to the rape. The unruly body therefore cannot, according to Deleuze, be understood in terms of its social organisation. This particular excerpt of shame is analysed by Deleuze in the light of Lawrence’s autobiographical writings, through which he looks at Lawrence’s subjective disposition (Deleuze, 1998). ‘Subjective’, in this context for Deleuze, does not denote the analysis of a single body, but rather he thinks in terms of, as Probyn
puts it, an ‘affective assemblage of bodies of different orders and elements’ (2010: 142). Deleuze notes that Lawrence’s subjective disposition of his writings is ‘inseparably political, erotic and artistic’ (Deleuze, 1998: 118). Deleuze looks at the way that shame is configured or in Deleuzian terms, ‘assembled’ and ‘territorialised’ through the writings. He is in awe of Lawrence’s writing concerning the flows of shame. Deleuze states, ‘[N]ever before has shame been sung like this, in so proud and haughty a manner’ (Deleuze, 1998: 120). Probyn commenting on Deleuze’s understanding of shame states,

Lawrence’s shame is not the result of a simple psychological quality that is to be explained by some aspect of his person, such as his putative homosexuality. Deleuze makes such characterizations of Lawrence’s shame beside the point. Shame is a product of the machine of subjective disposition, which produces shame as both idea and affect. The subjective, in Lawrence’s case, is deeply connected to the context in which he writes. (2010: 122)

Probyn discusses a number of affects considered to be connected to this particular assemblage of shame; for example, his having to betray the Arabs because of his role during that war and many experiences of shame that were related to his family background. Deleuze’s main focus, however, is more philosophical, more precisely, a philosophy of the body. Deleuze looked at his experiences of shame in the light of the pride he has of his physical strength. He has a particular relationship with his body, in that he, Deleuze writes, has shame because he thinks the mind, though distinct, is inseparable from the body ... The mind depends on the body; shame would be nothing without this dependency, this attraction for the abject, this voyeurism of the body. Which means that the mind is ashamed of the body in a very special manner; in fact, it is ashamed for the body. The mind begins by coldly and curiously regarding what the body does; it is first of all a witness; then it is affected, it becomes an impassioned witness, that is, it experiences for itself affects that are not simply effects of the body, but veritable critical entities that hover over the body and judge it. (1998: 123–4)

Probyn states that for Deleuze affect seems to be concerned with ideas but ones that are not particularly of the mind.

They are a violent collision of mind and body. As such they are not, properly speaking, of either; they are a particular combination of thought and body in which a distinction between the two is no longer important. (2010: 125).
In the analysis of Lawrence’s affective experience of shame, a whole raft of affects ensued. We first see the autonomous affectivity of the body: the surprised erection; secondly, there arises the affect of shame of the body; thirdly the affective subjective dispositions which include: relations of shame with the Arabs (whom he betrays) and a family background of multiple shames. Here we begin to see how Deleuze uses concepts of affect in multiple ways to form a rhizomatic network of roots that comes together as an assemblage of shame in that particular event.

Elsewhere one of the co-authors (Tucker) discusses how Deleuze’s idea of bodies is not concerned with form (e.g. an individual subject), but it is more concerned with thinking bodies as constituted through flows of relation (2010). Deleuze’s theory of affect was far removed from cognitive psychological accounts, as it focuses on the body as a relational form, produced as part of processes incorporating other ‘objects’ (human and non-human) from which affects come to be felt and experienced. The point is that the starting point for analysis should be relational processes rather than stable traits. For Deleuze, affects need to be considered through context rather than individuated and abstracted. That is why so much of Deleuze’s focus on affect is really a consideration of bodies, and how they move and interact with other bodies in the production of everyday life. They are the products of any ‘given relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness (longitude); the sum total of the intensive affects it is capable of at a given power or degree of potential (latitude)’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 287). Thus Tucker states that ‘[A]ffect is this very aspect, the potential that exists in any set of relations to shift direction, to form new relations, to spin off in new directions’ (2010: 521). The Deleuzian school of affect offers a more expansive concept, moving away from what it sees as the restrictive and limited explanatory power of biological and cognitive accounts of emotion. Indeed, this is key to the subsequent influence of Deleuze on contemporary turns to affect. Dominant theories of emotion are seen as at best inflexible and insufficient, and at worst, ignorant of the social and political forces that constitute modern subjective life.

Actual Selection

One key concept that keeps cropping up in Deleuze’s writings in relation to affect is the notion of two separate realms of experience: ‘the virtual and the actual’, a concept originally formulated by the process philosopher Henri Bergson (1896/1991). This is the notion that emphasises experience of the world as always necessarily selective. That which we select, that which we experience through our perceptive capacities, is that which is actualised through, for example, semantic organisation. However, there is a whole realm which we do not attend to through perceptive selection: this is the realm of the virtual. That which is not actualised through selection does not undergo social organisation and thus remains virtual. The virtual always exists as a capacity for new
connections beyond those that we have formed (Tucker, 2010). In other words, the virtual is that which has not yet become. The virtual represents a potentiality for experience to spin off in new directions, along new lines of flight.

Deleuze seeks to frame the actual as masking virtuality as we get a sense of concrete reality as existing in states of relative stability. These perceptions are illusions; they are snapshots, points in time and space, of a much wider field. Think of a pearl necklace. Perception, as Bergson would have it, can be likened to a singular pearl, rather than the view of the whole necklace. The perception of the pearl may affectively move us in more or less ways, but it is necessarily limited through the process of selection. It is not possible to select the whole. The thing in-itself is shaded in the virtual realm and has more potentiality emitted (affectivity) than can be picked up in perception. For example, a bee’s perceptions of a flower are quite different from a human’s perceptions. Hence there is always an excess to experience. It is the excess of the virtual that Deleuze is interested in. It is here that change can be affected. It is here where potentiality exists.

Affect in Massumi

Brian Massumi takes up many concepts of Deleuze to produce what is now a very popular form of affect theory in his chapter *The Autonomy of Affect* (Massumi, 2002, pp. 23–45). In this chapter, Massumi develops a useful conceptual distinction between emotion and affect. Firstly drawing on the Bergsonian/Deleuzian notions of the actual and the virtual he suggests that the affective excess (the virtual realm) is conceived of as a realm of intensity. It is intensity, in that it is non-conscious autonomic experiences. When the virtual is experienced (non-consciously) it does not need to conform to the rules of conscious dictations.

An emotion is a subjective content, the socio-linguistic fixing of the quality of an experience which is from that point onward defined as personal. Emotion is qualified intensity, the conventional, consensual point of intersection of intensity into semantically and semiotically formed progressions, into narrativizable action reaction circuits, into function and meaning. It is intensity owned and recognized. (Massumi, 2002: 28)

Massumi, along with a new wave of post-structuralist thinkers interested in developing affect theory, is often not afraid of (critically) drawing on the findings of some experimental psychology and neuroscience to help him develop his theories and concepts. For example, Massumi looks at some research conducted where children were shown three versions of a film of a melting snowman (Robinson and Sturm, 1987). Previously this film was shown on German television and it received a number of complaints as it was seen as frightening the children. The film concerned a snowman melting in somebody’s
garden. The person then takes the snowman to the cold mountains where it stops melting. He then says goodbye and leaves it. There were three versions of the film made for this particular study, which included the original wordless version and two versions with voiceovers added. One of the voiceovers was ‘factual’ in that it narrated a step by step account of the activity of the film, the second version was ‘emotional’, which was more or less the same as the factual version but included some words which amplified the emotional tone. The children were asked to recall the film and rate the three films based on ‘pleasantness’. The factual version was rated by the children as the least pleasant and was the worst remembered, the most pleasant was the wordless version which received slightly higher ratings than the emotional version, while the emotional version was the best remembered. The confusing thing about the study, however, was that the children were then asked to rate the film on a ‘happy-sad’ scale. When compared to the ‘pleasantness scale’, it was found that the sadder scenes were rated as the most pleasant. In fact it seems that the sadder the scene the more pleasant it was rated!

Massumi’s explanatory hypothesis for this finding was that the children were equating arousal with pleasure. Yet the children were also ‘wired up’ so that their autonomic nervous system (ANS) activity could be simultaneously monitored. Of course, increased ANS activity is correlated with emotional arousal (or perhaps we should use the term affective arousal in this context). They found that the factual account elicited the highest level of arousal, even though it was the most unpleasant (therefore rated happy) and generated the least lasting impression. However, Massumi states that there was a physiological split: although the factual account correlated with increased heart rate and deepened breathing, their skin conductance level fell. Skin conductivity is also a way of measuring ANS activity as increased affective arousal generates the secretion of sweat from the eccrine glands within the skin of the palms of the hands. When secretion occurs there is increased conductivity of electrical impulses between two electrodes placed on the hand. Also of interest was that it was the non-verbal account which elicited the highest skin conductance response.

Massumi suggests that the researchers were a bit perplexed by the findings and stated that the difference between sadness and happiness ‘was not all that it was cracked up to be’. Massumi adds that ‘it would appear that the strength or duration of an image’s effect is not logically connected to the content in any straightforward way’ (2002: 84). So what we have here, in Massumi’s terms is: the image (in this example the film), its impact on the person (affectivity or what Massumi calls intensity), and the socio-linguistic qualification (the social meaning applied to it). Massumi suggests that there does not seem to be any conformity between ‘quality and intensity’; in other words the socio-linguistic qualification did not match the affect. Instead, Massumi thinks there appears to be a crossing of semantic wires through which sadness was pleasant. It seems therefore that intensity does not fix semantically ordered distinctions. Also, although both the qualification and the intensity are immediately embodied:
intensity (that which was non-verbal, and presumably for Massumi therefore not qualified in a language system) created reactions at the surface of the body (skin). Qualifications (that which is indexed in language) are registered in deeper levels (heart rate and breathing).

Massumi argues that intensity is directly manifested at the surface of the body, where it interfaces with things. This level is purely autonomic reactions. The depth reactions are associated with expectations which line themselves with a narrative continuity. These are mixed with consciousness, which he calls a ‘conscious-autonomic mix’. Intensity, in contrast, is a ‘never-to-conscious’ (non-conscious) autonomic remainder which is outside of expectation and adaptation. ‘It is narratively de-localized, spreading over the generalized body surface, like a lateral backwash from the function meaning...’ (2002: 85).

Like Deleuze, Massumi’s writings can be difficult to digest. From reading his text, it is possible to get the gist of his arguments, but he attempts to conflate discourses and develops neologisms which make it very tricky to hold onto his arguments. Bell suggests that it is a ‘neo-psychology’ ‘that seeks to move beyond current psychological conceptualizations of people’ which

highlights ‘affect’, the ‘virtual’, ‘movement’ and ‘sensation’ which the author believes will oblige theorists to transcend (or to alter at least) the banal and reductionist physicalism and hedonistic psychogenesis of empirical psychology. (Bell, 2002: 445)

However, Massumi’s philosophical writing style, although it is extremely poetic and has quite a performative effect for the reader, is difficult to follow for someone who is used to more scientific forms of research. Some of his terms interchange and so following a line of argument is difficult, even through a close reading. For example, in Parables for the virtual Massumi (2002) begins the snowman analysis by describing an aspect of the study. He states that the ‘children were tested for recall’ and he states which version was the worst remembered and then which version was the ‘best remembered’: this is extremely straightforward. A couple of sentences later he states that ‘The factual version elicited the highest level of arousal, even though it was the most unpleasant (i.e., happy) and made the least long-lasting impression’. Now, one is not quite sure exactly what ‘long-lasting impression’ refers to here. It is presumed that it refers to the ‘remembered’. Then he states that ‘the strength or duration of an image’s effect is not logically connected to the content in any straightforward way.’ Now, one would expect strength, perhaps, to be associated with autonomic arousal, and duration with recall. But it is now becoming increasingly unclear. Then, however, he states ‘the strength or duration of the image’s effect could be called its intensity’. Intensity, of course, is important for this particular chapter as it is a term he uses as a synonym for affect. So if our presumptions are right, it seems that intensity (affect) is both autonomic arousal and recall, and recall must be understood as qualification. However, much of the focus of the
chapter is concerned with the ways that intensity is set up as quite different to processes associated with qualification!

This is just an example of how it can be confusing to follow an argument when the concepts become too fluid and slippery. In saying this, it must be remembered that Deleuze states that the task of philosophy is the invention of concepts (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994). This small section of Deleuze’s and Massumi’s work must be put into that context. In this section we have only begun to think about these great writers, a single section cannot do justice to the complexity of their work. One really needs to go and read, for example, Deleuze, to get a flavour of his writing and his writing style. Deleuze and Massumi should be read for this very reason; their writings invoke new concepts and new ways of understanding emotion and indeed what it is to be human.

Affect and Subjectivity

The drive of much affect theory has focused on a de-subjectification of emotion and bodily activity. It has been concerned to point to the many ways that affective activity operates outside of pre-conceived notions of emotion and embodied experience. This endeavour is seen as important for the potential utility and value of contemporary theories of affect, for if they cannot tell us something about forces potentially at work outside our current frame(s) of understanding, how can they bring about valid change in thought? Wetherell, in her comprehensive review and critique of the ‘affective turn’ in respect of social psychology, raises this question as central to her engagement in the area; ‘[S]ubjectivity becomes a no-place or waiting room, through which affects as autonomous lines of force pass on their way to somewhere else’ (2012: 123). Wetherell’s concern is that subjectivity is written out of accounts, particularly those emanating from human geography and cultural studies, that expend considerable theoretical effort to unravel some of the multiplicity of non-human relations at work in the constitution of patterns of affect. For Wetherall, key geographers of affect, such as Nigel Thrift, tend to construe affect as “becoming”, as unspecific force, unmediated by consciousness, discourse, representation and interpretation of any kind’ (2012: 123). Wetherell’s accusation is that such moves de-subjectify affect, through placing it outside of a range of realms usually seen to operate at the level of the subject (e.g. biology, consciousness, discourse). Wetherell sees social psychoanalysis as a potential way to keep the subject at the centre of affect theory (e.g. Layton, 2004), but claims it ultimately falls short through a reliance on depth psychology processes from which a viable ‘affective intersectionality’ is not possible. In its place Wetherell offers a ‘minimal subjectivity’ as the starting point for empirical and theoretical accounts of affect. Here there are no prefigured categories of the subject present, but rather a commitment to see the subject as an ‘organising site contributing pattern and order to affective practice’ (2012: 139). Wetherell’s concerns resonate with wider questions regarding the strand of
post-structuralist accounts that are heavily influenced by the work of Deleuze (Hemmings, 2005). Whilst we share the view that it can be easy to forget about the subject at times when reading the intricate and nuanced accounts of relationality, fluidity, power and process in Deleuzian work, we feel it provides some valuable theoretical support when one is primarily concerned with the role of emotionality in human activity. Furthermore, such models of affect prepare us for a journey into exploring the collective expression of emotional experience, which has for a long time been a concern of crowd psychology.

Conclusion

Contemporary theories of affect have proved valuable for understanding the context from which emotional activity, both individually and collectively, emerges. As we have seen, models of affect have been varied and differentiated, particularly in relation to the role and constitution of the subject. Nevertheless, the socialising of emotion that features throughout the affective turn helps us to consider the multiplicity of ways that emotional experience is produced in and through relations between bodies and materialities, with shifting flows of power. Affect theory is useful for demonstrating links between classic and contemporary theories of emotion, e.g. from Spinoza to the ‘affective turn’. Furthermore, it demonstrates how theories of emotion have recruited past conceptions of affect and feeling, which have been used to (re)position our understandings of emotion. They demonstrate some of the value of mining historical concepts of emotion and affect, which is something we have been keen to do throughout the book. For instance, Deleuze specifically draws his theory of affect from the work of Spinoza we saw in Chapter 3, which itself was positioning itself against (although not in entire opposition to) the work of Descartes.

A trajectory can then be seen from some of the earliest thinking on emotion and contemporary theories that are focused empirically on modern social worlds that take a very different form than those in which classic theories were written. We want to address some of this in the next, and final, chapter that addresses a question as to the potential impact/s of living in social environments that involve increasing amounts of technological and informational activity. This reality has been said to be a contemporary threat to emotion, in the sense that increased digital activity may mean reduced bodily activity. We use an exploration of digital media and emotion to consider one example of what is at stake for contemporary social psychology accounts of emotion. Namely, creating, organising and managing social relations in and through digital media, which is often framed as ‘virtual’, as opposed to the ‘real’ world of face to face interactions. Digital media has the potential to exhibit a significant impact on social psychological experience and activity, which is one reason we think them a worthwhile topic for our final chapter.
FURTHER READING

It is very much worth the effort to have a read through some of the work Gilles Deleuze produced with the psychoanalyst Felix Guattari. However, his writing on Spinoza will be of particular interest to those who are interested in how he draws on Spinoza’s notion of affectus.


We have discussed the work of Brian Massumi, particularly in relation to a chapter that he wrote entitled *The Autonomy of Affect*. This can be found in the following title:


The various contemporary affect theories are well illustrated in the following Reader which one of the present authors (Tucker) has contributed to: