Overview

- The notion of ‘welfare’ features prominently in the social policy literature but the term belies simple definition.
- The ‘welfare state’ is at the heart of the social policy debate but both scholars and politicians disagree on what should fall within its boundaries and what it means for a country to be or to possess a ‘welfare state’.
- An exploration of the ‘social divisions of welfare’ makes it clear that state-supported welfare takes many forms beyond the provision of core social services.
- The welfare state is not a neutral player: it stratifies societies and can reinforce social divisions.
- Welfare is not delivered solely by the state: a mixed economy of provision is evident in all societies.
- Broad-based notions such as ‘well-being’ or even ‘happiness’ have become increasingly fashionable alternatives to ‘welfare’ in recent years.

Introduction

For any student of social policy, ‘welfare’ is a term that will be invoked on a regular basis, for studying the welfare state is at the heart of the subject. Moreover, unlike some of the other concepts explored in this book, it is also a term that features very prominently in policy debates too: the phrase ‘welfare reform’, for instance, has long been a staple element of political discourse in the UK and beyond.
Yet, despite its common usage – perhaps, even, because of it – the term is a slippery one that belies simple definition. Indeed, scholars and policy makers alike are prone to using the term somewhat unthinkingly, holding a general idea of what they mean by it but without a specific definition in mind. Partly this is because the term ‘welfare’ will always have a normative political dimension that makes it difficult to derive a commonly accepted meaning. This is true even for the everyday meaning of the word ‘welfare’, which is rooted in the fusion of the verb ‘fare’ with the adverb ‘well’: what does it mean for someone to fare well? What needs to be in place to ensure someone’s welfare is protected? How can we be sure if someone’s welfare is under threat? And does the word mean something altogether different if, say, we talk of the welfare of children, the welfare of families or even the welfare of animals, as people so commonly do? The answers to these questions will always remain, in part at least, political ones, reflecting different values, ideologies and world views.

However, the picture is further muddied by the fact that the term ‘welfare’ is regularly fused with other words and so can have subtly distinct meanings in specific contexts. So, for example, phrases such as ‘welfare state’, ‘welfare service’, ‘welfare regime’ and ‘social welfare’ all hint at different notions of welfare. Added to this, the meanings of these phrases are not permanently fixed and nor are they consistently deployed. So, for example, the meaning of the term ‘welfare state’ might change over time as governments expand or contract the range of services commonly provided to citizens. Similarly, while some scholars or policy makers might favour a very narrow definition of the term ‘welfare state’, others might argue that our understanding is enhanced by a much broader conception.

For those new to the subject of social policy, it may be frustrating to find that the term ‘welfare’ is used in such loose and overlapping ways. Certainly, it seems likely to be a source of confusion for some, for many authors use the phrase inconsistently or without precision and clarity. Worse still for our purposes here, many authors simply take the phrase for granted: there are numerous textbooks with ‘welfare’ in the title that begin with an introductory chapter that outline the author’s understanding of the key elements of the book title but omit any definition of the term ‘welfare’. Much of the time, the phrase is used merely to signal that the author’s concern is with issues of pertinence to social policy rather than to policy and politics more generally. So, for instance, in Understanding the Policy Process: Analysing Welfare Policy and Practice Stuart Lowe and I use the term ‘welfare’ to flag that the book is concerned with how social policies such as health care or social security are shaped by the policy process and we ignore issues outside of this sphere such as those relating to defence policy or foreign policy (see Hudson and Lowe, 2009).

However, it is also fair to say that the term is often used in a rather general sense because scholars wish to avoid engaging with what can be rather complex definitional issues each time they flag ‘welfare’, broadly conceived, as the being the focus of their attention. As we will show in this chapter, these issues go right to the heart of the purpose of social policy in both theory and practice, so rehearsing them each time the phrase ‘welfare’ is invoked would be exhausting. Yet, as with so many first principle-type debates, periodic reflection on the issues is essential, for they act as both a guide for the subject as a whole and raise fundamental questions about the purpose of social policy.
The welfare state

The most common usage of the term ‘welfare’ in the social policy literature comes through the notion of the ‘welfare state’, the examination of which is at the heart of the subject. Indeed, as Hill (2000: 8) notes, ‘The study of social policy, as it has developed in Britain, has been concerned to examine the extent to which the welfare state meets people’s needs’.

Yet, in keeping with the tenor of the discussion so far, it may come as little surprise to readers that there is confusion over the origins of the term. McGregor (1961: 34) suggested it was ‘a phrase first coined by some unknown [newspaper] sub-editor in 1945’ but others have claimed the term can be traced back to 1941 when the then Archbishop of York, William Temple, used the term as a contrast to the ‘warfare state’ being pursued by Hitler in Nazi Germany (see Timmins, 1995: 6; Lunt, 2008: 415; *Oxford English Dictionary*, 2012). The timing of the first utterances is no accident: the Beveridge Report, published in 1942, outlined a radical and popular plan for addressing major social ills in the UK and it is commonly suggested that the raft of Beveridge-inspired social reforms implemented by the 1945–51 post-War Labour government marked the moment that the UK became a ‘welfare state’ (Alcock, 2008: 6; Fraser, 2009: 2). Yet, as Timmins (1995: 6–7) notes, the phrase ‘welfare state’ was hardly in common usage at that point, with the Prime Minister of the day, Clement Attlee, only adopting the phrase for the 1950 General Election, and *The Oxford English Dictionary* including its first entry for the phrase as late as 1955.

This confusion over the origins of the term ‘welfare state’ is accompanied by disagreement over its meaning. Indeed, in his classic exploration of welfare capitalism, Esping-Andersen (1990: 18) noted with some exasperation that ‘the welfare state itself has generally received scant conceptual attention’. Bryson (1992: 36) suggests that the term ‘is used when a nation has at least a minimum level of institutionalized provisions for meeting the basic economic and social requirements of its citizens’. Mishra (1984: ix) has suggested that even at the most basic level the term has a double meaning, including ‘both the idea of state responsibility for welfare as well as the set of institutions and practices through which the idea is given effect’. More prosaically, Titmuss (1956: 38) distinguished between the ‘performance’ and the ‘promise’ of the welfare state.

Spicker (1995: 274) echoes the above in offering up one definition of the welfare state as ‘the delivery of social services by the state [and] the strategy of developing inter-related services to deal with a wide range of social problems’. But, ambiguity exists in terms of which services might be deemed the ‘social services’ that fall under the purview of the welfare state. In the UK at least, it is not uncommon for scholars to draw the boundaries of the welfare state around services dealing with the five giant social evils identified by Beveridge: what we would describe in modern-day language as social security/income protection, health care, education, employment and housing (e.g. Timmins, 1995; Hudson et al., 2008), perhaps with the addition of social care too (e.g. Hill, 2000; Hill and Irving, 2009). Others, however, would draw the boundaries of the welfare state much more broadly, including areas such as transport policy, the environment, food policy and access to the internet (see Bochel, 2009), while some go even further and suggest that a ‘new social policy’ should include issues around leisure, consumption and sport (Cahill, 1994). It is perhaps fair to say that the majority view favours a more traditional approach. Spicker (1995: 5) even
suggests that those who argue for a broad approach ‘are really interested in a different subject area’. Yet even accepting the narrow definition of the welfare state brings definitional problems because the range of services that might fall under a deceptively simple heading such as ‘health care’ or ‘education’ is vast: should, for instance, an effective health service include access to gyms, cosmetic surgery or healthy-eating classes (Hudson et al., 2008)?

Ambiguity exists not only in terms of which services comprise the welfare state, but also in the extent and quality of the services required. Spicker (1995: 82) argues that there is an inherent ambiguity in the term because it is used ‘both as a form of description and as a normative argument’, and notes that there is an idealism or even mythology around the notion of the ‘welfare state’, which for some might also be defined as ‘an ideal in which services are provided comprehensively and at the best level possible’ (Spicker, 1995: 274). Therborn (1983, cited in Castles, 2004: 31) believes we should reserve the label for states in which the majority of routine policy activities are devoted to the promotion of welfare, rather than for the achievement of other goals such as defence or economic growth: in other words, much as we might distinguish someone who plays football from those who are football players, states that provide welfare services may not meet the definition of what constitutes a welfare state. Indeed, it is for this reason that some challenge the idea that the British welfare state emerged following the post-War Beveridge inspired reforms as it ‘begs questions about […] why these reforms should be seen as achieving it’ (Alcock, 2008: 6). Similarly, Timmins (1995: 7) worries that such a conception ‘suffers the drawback of being static, as though “the welfare state” were a perfect work, handed down in tablets of stone in 1945’. As he notes, ‘Beveridge hated the phrase and refused to use it, disinclining its “Santa Claus” and “brave new world” connotations’ (Timmins, 1995: 7).

Social divisions of welfare

These debates about what the welfare state is or should be make clear that the complexity of defining the ‘welfare state’ is more than a scholarly problem for it necessarily engages with normative political issues. One of the earliest scholars of welfare, Richard Titmuss, was hugely sensitive to such issues, not least because once the term ‘welfare state’ entered popular usage in the 1950s it was often invoked in a pejorative fashion as hostile commentators lined up to attack what they viewed to be the negative impacts of the growth of the welfare state. Indeed, way back in the mid-1950s Titmuss (1956: 37) warned of the ‘tyranny of stereotypes’ in popular debate that built on flawed conceptions of need, the welfare state and social services. He offered an analysis of the ‘social divisions of welfare’ to challenge these misconceptions, arguing that debate about the welfare state dealt purely with ‘social welfare’ – the provision of the core social services – while two other forms of state-sponsored welfare of greater benefit to higher earners – fiscal welfare and occupational welfare – remained largely unexamined.

Titmuss used fiscal welfare as shorthand for the range of tax breaks and allowances the state grants to individuals and households. These have varied in nature and significance over time but his central point that these allowances represent a form of social service remains as valid today as it was then. In fact, they have become increasingly prominent tools of social policy reform in
recent years (Hudson et al., 2008). However, as they are less visible than (say) social security benefit payments or health service expenditures, they can be stubbornly difficult to measure and so often represent something of a ‘hidden’ benefit. Indeed, this was in large part the point Titmuss was making: fiscal welfare often favours those with larger incomes and so represents a hidden way in which their welfare is promoted by the state. As a case in point, at the time of writing this chapter, the UK government revealed the results of a Treasury analysis that showed that some of the richest people in the country were using tax allowances for charitable donations to bring their personal income tax rate to less than half the rate paid by the average citizen which, in some cases, allowed multi-millionaires to pay no income tax whatsoever (Winnett et al., 2012).

The notion of occupational welfare refers to the additional benefits that many employers provide their workers – often, as Titmuss noted, at some considerable expense to the Exchequer – in the form of items such as occupational pensions, company health care and sick pay schemes, education and training grants, company cars, and subsidized meals and rail tickets. Titmuss (1956: 52) suggested at the time that these benefits disproportionately favoured higher earners and, in effect, operated as ‘concealed multipliers of occupational success’. Much the same is true today, particularly for those employed in the higher echelons of international corporations at the heart of the global economy where generous private health, education and housing allowances are commonplace as are ‘equalization adjustments’ that compensate for tax and social insurance contributions (Hudson, 2012).

Questions around the social division of welfare raise fundamental issues about who benefits from welfare provision. In drawing attention to these issues, Titmuss aimed to unpick narrow and simplistic stereotypes of the welfare state as being of benefit only to one group in society. In line with the Fabian thinking that imbued much of the early social policy literature, Titmuss’s analysis was primarily (though not exclusively) concerned therefore with an analysis of class. However, later work, particularly from the 1980s onwards, offered a more nuanced analysis embedded in ‘new critical approaches to welfare’ (Williams, 1989: 39). This work called for a deeper analysis of the interrelations between welfare and gender and welfare and ‘race’ in particular, but also welfare and disability, age and sexuality too, all of which had been neglected in the welfare state literature. This, in turn, meant that many of the assumptions embedded within the welfare state about, for instance, the role of women in society had been inadequately explored or challenged in mainstream debates.

As Williams (1989: 161–2) has pointed out, while the Beveridge-inspired reforms of the 1940s were significant developments for the welfare of the working class […] national and male chauvinism were built into the structure of these provisions. Woman’s dependent status and her role as mother were reinforced by the developments, and the nationalist and imperialist sentiment of many of the policies created a ready framework for the unchallenged development of institutionalized racism.

In short, from the outset the UK welfare state prioritized the welfare of some groups over that of others, making it essential that we ask the question of ‘whose welfare?’ the welfare state promotes. Though there is greater awareness today of the ways in which the welfare state interacts with social divisions, no one could seriously claim that questions about the distribution of welfare no longer
need to be asked. Instead, the social policy literature is replete with studies that demonstrate the opposite (two examples of useful, recently published textbooks relevant here are Craig et al., 2012, and Roulstone and Prideaux, 2012).

The ‘whose welfare?’ question flows into related issues around liberty and control for it is often the case that protecting or promoting the welfare of one person or group of people requires limits to be placed on the freedom of others. At the simplest level, we can observe that the taxing of an individual’s income to pay for services for others restricts the liberty of the taxed individual with respect to how they spend their income, but more complex examples can be found in areas such as criminal justice, anti-social behaviour laws and social work where a core focus of policy is to protect the welfare of some by regulating the behaviour of others.

Welfare regimes and the welfare mix

As the above implies, the welfare state cannot be simply viewed as a neutral instrument that benevolently guards the welfare of citizens for it does not operate in a social vacuum. Instead, discussion of the social divisions of welfare makes clear that the analysis of welfare needs to be located in a broader discussion of the ways in which it interacts with other elements within society. As Esping-Andersen (1990: 23) argues: ‘The welfare state is not just a mechanism that intervenes in, and possibly corrects, the structure of inequality; it is, in its own right, a system of stratification. It is an active force in the ordering of social relations’.

In his classic exploration of welfare capitalism, Esping-Andersen (1990) argued that this means we need to examine welfare regimes rather than merely examine the welfare state in isolation (see Chapter 12 for a further discussion). More specifically, he suggested that we should examine the roles played by the state, the market and the family in the provision of welfare (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1999). In so doing, he suggested, we will find different models of welfare operating in different countries. Indeed, he argued there were, in broad terms, three types of welfare regime: a Liberal regime in which social rights were weak and there was little redistribution of income; a Social Democratic regime with strong social rights and high levels of income redistribution; and a Conservative/Corporatist regime with relatively strong social rights but modest income redistribution. Significantly, the roles of the state, market and family in the provision of welfare differ accordingly in each model of welfare (see Table 1.1) with, for instance, the state playing a minimal role in liberal regimes and individual citizens expected instead to make their own private welfare provision through the market where possible.

A crucial point to stress here is that while the balance between the roles the state, market and family play in welfare provision varies between societies, in all it is the case that each plays a role. Social policy theorists have used terms such as welfare pluralism (Johnson, 1987) or the mixed economy of welfare (Powell, 2007) to capture the idea that welfare is provided not just by the state but also by private companies, voluntary organizations and families and communities. While it has always been the case that welfare has been provided through a mixed economy of providers, the
subject of social policy has shown a stronger concern with issues around the welfare mix in recent years. In part, this is a reflection of current political trends, particularly in the UK where the main political parties have been keen to explore the roles that non-state actors might play in securing welfare. Indeed, Alcock (2008: 9) suggests that social policy analysis is now ‘moving beyond state-based welfare, to focus not only upon public services but also upon partnerships between the state and other providers of welfare and well-being’.

From welfare to well-being

If the study (and pursuit) of welfare is not, therefore, simply concerned with the social services provided by the state, then we are taken back to our initial question: what does welfare mean in the context of social policy? Many scholars aiming to define ‘welfare’ on the basis of first principles have suggested that, ultimately, the term aims to capture a concern with the well-being of people. Indeed, Bryson (1992: 30) argues that ‘at its most basic level, the word welfare merely means well-being’, whilst Spicker (1995: 5) suggests that ‘welfare can be taken in a wide sense, to mean “well-being”’. In recent years, perhaps in part because of the political baggage that has surrounded the term ‘welfare’, both scholars and policy makers have shown an increased interest in exploring ‘societal well-being’ as a closely related alternative to ‘welfare’. Whether this is a helpful departure as regards to creating greater conceptual clarity is a moot point: as Allin (2007: 46) observes, ‘the terms wellbeing, quality of life, happiness, life satisfaction and welfare are often used interchangeably’.

However, there has certainly been considerable progress in developing measures of societal well-being over the last decade or so (Allin, 2007). Indeed, one of the major international bodies responsible for gathering social and economic data – the OECD – has now made measuring well-being a central part of its activity (see OECD, 2011). There are many reasons why the notion of well-being has begun to command increased attention, but perhaps chief amongst these is that it focuses on outcomes (i.e. what has happened) rather than inputs (i.e. what is provided), and it demands a broad outlook that captures a wide array of outcomes relevant to well-being. As the OECD (2011: 18) note:

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**Table 1.1** Esping-Andersen’s welfare regimes summarized

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Liberal regime</th>
<th>Social Democratic regime</th>
<th>Conservative regime</th>
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<tr>
<td>Role of family in provision of welfare</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>Central</td>
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<tr>
<td>Role of market in provision of welfare</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Role of State in provision of welfare</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Subsidiary</td>
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<td>Strength of social rights</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>Maximum</td>
<td>High (for breadwinner)</td>
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<td>Key examples</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Germany and Italy</td>
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*Source: Esping-Andersen (1999)*
Defining well-being is challenging because it requires looking at many aspects of people’s lives [...] most experts and ordinary people around the world would agree that it requires meeting various human needs, some of which are essential (e.g. being in good health), as well as the ability to pursue one’s goals, to thrive and feel satisfied with their life.

A fundamental distinction can be drawn between measures of ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ well-being, the former being based on material or social circumstances that can be externally verified (e.g. the level of a household’s income) whereas the latter is based on self-assessment (e.g. an individual’s personal assessment of how satisfied they are with their life). Most commentators agree that strong measures of well-being encompass both, and the OECD’s Better Life Index (OECD, 2011: 25) includes data on the following components:

- income and wealth (e.g. household income)
- jobs and earnings (e.g. the employment rate)
- quality of housing (e.g. number of rooms per person)
- health status (e.g. life expectancy)
- work and life (e.g. time devoted to leisure)
- education and skills (e.g. educational attainment)
- social connections (e.g. the extent of social networks)
- civic engagement and governance (e.g. voter turn-out)
- environmental quality (e.g. air quality)
- personal security (e.g. murder rate)
- subjective well-being (e.g. life satisfaction).

Much of the increased interest in well-being has, arguably, come from outside the subject of social policy, particularly from Economics where an expanding number of analysts have begun to look beyond (growth in) national income as the main measure of social progress (Allin, 2007). However, each of the items included in the OECD Better Life Index is of direct relevance to social policy in a high-income democratic country such as the UK, and it has been suggested that social policy analysts have focused too heavily on issues around money (e.g. levels of income poverty) rather than focusing on broader conceptions of social well-being. Similarly, there has been a tendency to see welfare as being represented by welfare state inputs (e.g. the level of public spending) or outputs (e.g. the number of schools, hospitals, teachers, doctors), rather than focusing on the outcomes – improved welfare – that ought to be our core concern. A focus on well-being helps rectify this. Indeed, Dean (2006: 1) argues: ‘My preference [...] is for the term “well-being” rather than “welfare” because well-being is about how well people are, not how well they do (which, strictly speaking, is what welfare means)’.

Though close connections between the notions of welfare and well-being mean the exploration of measures of well-being may help flesh out a practical understanding of welfare, we should note that not everyone agrees that the two terms can or should be seen as so closely related as to be near interchangeable. As Spicker (1995: 5) suggests, ‘It is probably truer to say that social policy is
concerned with people who lack well-being’. Indeed, there are those who remain sceptical about the well-being agenda which, in its most extreme form, asks us to focus on ‘happiness’ as the guiding goal of government policy (Layard, 2006). Though the notion of boosting happiness as the ultimate measure of social progress has a simple appeal, there is a risk that politicians might use such an approach as a smokescreen to deflect attention away from thorny and costly issues such as reducing poverty or income inequality.

### Summary/Conclusions

- There are good reasons why ‘welfare’ is such a slippery concept. It means different things in different contexts and has a normative dimension that is impossible to escape.
- We can distinguish between the ‘promise’ and the ‘practice’ of the welfare state: the vision of a fair society that might be achieved and what is actually provided by government for citizens in terms of benefits and services.
- Deceptively simple and commonly used phrases such as ‘the welfare state’ are laden with normative assumptions about the desired scope, scale and structure of social services. Accordingly, questions such as ‘What is the welfare state?’ or ‘Does the UK have a welfare state?’ lack simple answers.
- Questions about the nature of ‘welfare’ cannot be value free and they demand we ask the question of ‘whose welfare?’. The welfare state is not a neutral player, structuring society and with the potential to reinforce social divisions. Though social policies have boosted the welfare of many, this has often been at the expense of the welfare of others.
- Welfare is never simply about the ‘welfare state’. We will typically find a mixed economy of welfare, with the state, market, families and local communities playing a role in the delivery of welfare.
- Welfare and well-being are sometimes used interchangeably and are closely related notions. A focus on the latter might help us to remain fixed on the outcomes we are seeking – the ‘promise’ of welfare – rather than on the money we spend or services we provide – the ‘practice’ of welfare.

### Questions

1. How would you define the welfare state?
2. Pick an area of social policy you are familiar with: how far do you think current policies in this sphere reinforce social divisions and how far do they serve to ameliorate them?
3. With reference to a core area of social policy – such as health care, education or social security – what roles do you think the state, market, family, voluntary sector and local communities play in the delivery of welfare?
4. What indicators would you include in a measure of societal well-being?
Recommended reading


Relevant website

The OECD’s Better Life Index page offers an interactive approach to defining and measuring well-being in high income countries – www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/

References


