JUSTICE GLOBALISM AND GLOBAL CRISES

The Problematic

The breakdown of the Cold War order organized around the opposing ideological poles of capitalist liberalism versus state-controlled communism and the ensuing wave of globalization have unsettled conventional political belief systems. Across political, economic, and cultural dimensions, the expansion and intensification of social relations across world-space and world-time both generate and respond to new ‘global crises’ beyond the reach of conventional political institutions and their associated ideologies. These new challenges include worldwide financial volatility, climate change and environmental degradation, increasing food scarcity, pandemics such as AIDS, SARS, and H1N1, widening disparities in wealth and wellbeing, increasing migratory pressures, manifold cultural and religious conflicts, and transnational terrorism. Intrinsically connected to these complex global problems, we have witnessed a noticeable shift away from state-based international governance mechanisms to transnational networks, NGOs, and non-state actors often referred to as ‘global civil society’. The current transformation of nation-centered political ideologies is part and parcel of these powerful globalization dynamics.

However, much-needed assessments of the current makeover of the ideological landscape have been largely confined to what has been variously referred to as ‘neoliberalism’, ‘globalization-from-above’, ‘market globalism’, and the ‘Washington Consensus’ (Falk 1999; Rupert 2000; Barber 2001; Stiglitz 2003; Mittelman 2004; Harvey 2005; Schwartzmantel 2008; Steger 2009). To some extent, this research focus makes sense. After all, market globalism has remained the most dominant global political ideology in spite of the serious challenges posed by the global financial crisis and the EU debt crisis. The chief codifiers of market globalism have been transnationally networked elites, most of whom are frequent attendants of the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, Switzerland. These include corporate managers, executives
of large transnational corporations, corporate lobbyists, high-level military officers, journalists and public relations specialists, and prominent intellectuals writing to large audiences, high-level civil servants, and politicians. Confining the meaning of their core concept ‘globalization’ to the allegedly ‘inexorable’ formation of a single global market, these power elites assert that, notwithstanding the ‘cyclical downturns’ of the world economy, the global integration of markets is a fundamentally ‘good’ thing for it represents the ‘natural’ progression of (Western) modernity.

Drawing on the economic doctrine internationally known as ‘neoliberalism’, market globalists argue that state interference with the global economy should be minimal, confining itself to providing the legal framework for contracts, defense, and law and order. Public-policy initiatives should be limited to measures that liberate the economy from social constraints: privatization of public enterprises, deregulation instead of state control, liberalization of trade and industry, massive tax cuts, strict control of organized labor, and the reduction of public expenditures. State-regulated models of economic organization are discredited as ‘protectionist’ or ‘socialist’. Ultimately, market globalists seek to enshrine economic neoliberalism as the self-evident and universal doctrine of our global era by claiming that the liberalization of trade and the global integration of markets will ‘inevitability’ lead to rising living standards and the reduction of global poverty. Enhancing economic efficiency and expanding individual freedom and democracy, market globalization is said to usher in a global age of prosperity and unprecedented technological progress.1

Despite its hegemonic status as the dominant ideology of our time, market globalization has been challenged by new global movements on the political Left, which project alternative visions of a global future based on values of ‘social justice’ and ‘solidarity with the global South’. For more than a decade, this ‘global justice movement’ (GJM) has demonstrated its popular appeal on the streets of major cities around the world. Yet, prominent market globalists – and even some influential reformists like Joseph Stiglitz – have dismissed the GJM as unreflectively ‘anti-globalization’. They allege that its agenda amounts to little more than a superficial shopping list of complaints devoid of conceptual coherence and a unifying policy framework capable of responding to the global challenges of the 21st century (Friedman 2000, 2005; Stiglitz 2003; Wolf 2004; Bhagwati 2004; Greenwald and Kahn 2009). Testing the validity of these highly influential allegations, this book undertakes as the first of its two principal research objectives a thorough examination of the under-researched ideological framework of the GJM – an ideational constellation we call ‘justice globalization’. Indeed, this study engages in the first in-depth mapping and analysis of core ideological concepts and claims that span across a wide range of actors connected to the GJM.
The Evolution of the Global Justice Movement

As far back as 1994, Zapatista rebels in Southern Mexico called for the creation of a worldwide network of resistance to neoliberalism. In the following decade, a number of events served as additional catalysts for the emergence of the GJM: the 1997–98 Asian Financial Crisis, the mass strikes in France in 1995 and 1998, the debt crisis in the global South, the growing power of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and other international economic institutions based in the North, and the US-led ‘global war on terror’, following the al-Qaeda attacks of 11 September 2001. Since then, progressive thinkers and activists have gradually developed and articulated ideological claims that connect local and global issues. This expanding ‘network of networks’ demonstrated its popular appeal on the streets of cities around the globe where the WTO, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other key institutions of global capitalism held strategic meetings. Although market globalists quickly branded the movement as ‘anti-globalization’, most organizations emphasized that they were actually ‘alter-globalization’ – in the sense that they envisioned alternatives to corporate-led globalization. Rallying around the slogan ‘Another World is Possible’, the ‘anti-globalization movement’ gradually came to be known as the ‘global justice movement’.

Progressive academics and activists tracing these new social movement developments posited the emergence of a ‘new cosmopolitanism’ anchored in ‘the worthy ideals of justice and equality’ as well as solidarity with people in the disadvantaged global South (Held 1995; Nussbaum 1996: 4). These scholars also identified what Sidney Tarrow (2005) would later call ‘global framing’ – the act of connecting local problems to broader contexts of global injustice, inequality, and unsustainability (Bello 1999; Klein 2000; George 2004). However, despite the continuing attention from these social movements scholars (Tarrow 2005; Della Porta (ed.) 2007; Smith et al. 2007; Moghadam 2008; Cumbers and Cumbers 2009; Pleyers 2010), the GJM has escaped close academic scrutiny with regard to its ideological structures and its role in generating policy alternatives.

As noted above, our first research objective is to fill the vacuum of scholarship on the ideological dimensions of the GJM by mapping and analyzing its core political ideas and claims. The relevance of this research effort seems to be even more obvious in the second decade of the 21st century when, after a temporary setback caused by the attacks of 11 September 2001, the combined forces of justice globalism have gathered political strength. This has been evident not only in the massive demonstrations against bank bail-outs during the global financial crisis, the global impact of WikiLeaks and its radical ‘informationism’, but also in the worldwide proliferation of the ‘Occupy Wall Street’ network.

One ideational inspiration of this new wave of global justice activism can be found in informal global forums such as the World Social Forum (WSF), a key...
ideological site of the GJM. To this day, the WSF still draws to its annual meetings tens of thousands of delegates from around the world. These proponents of justice globalism established the WSF in the global South as a ‘parallel forum’ to the influential WEF in the global North. Similar to market globalists who treat the WEF as a platform to project their ideas and values to a global audience, justice globalists have utilized the WSF as one of the chief sites for developing their ideological vision and policy alternatives. The abiding relevance of such massive informal ‘think tanks’ reinforces not only the increasingly globalized nature of political contestation but also underlines the academic imperative to move beyond the conventional research focus on state-based political actors.

The Significance of Ideology

Political ideologies are comprehensive belief systems comprised of patterned ideas and values believed to be ‘true’ by significant social groups (Freeden 1996; Schwartzmantel 2008; Steger 2009; Sargent 2009). Codified by political elites who contend over control of political meanings and offer competing plans for public policy, ideologies play a key role in consolidating social forces as political groups. The perpetual struggle over meaning and control places ideologies at the heart of the political process. Consequently, scholars have highlighted the importance of the comparative and transdisciplinary study of ideologies (Zizek 1994; Ball and Dagger 2008). For many years, the pioneers of ideology studies have used various qualitative methodologies to analyze and evaluate the historical evolution and conceptual structures of political belief systems. Their efforts have yielded familiar ideal-types: liberalism, conservatism, socialism, anarchism, communism, and fascism/Nazism. Ideology is often viewed as a tool of power, and certainly all ideologies engage in simplifications and distortions, but their functions should not be reduced to such a ‘critical conception’ (Thompson 1990). A more ‘neutral conception’ would also affirm their constructive and integrative functions as indispensable shared mental maps that help people navigate the complexity of their political environments (Mannheim 1936; Althusser 1969; Gramsci 1971; Ricoeur 1986; Freeden 1996; Steger 2008).

During the last two decades, political and social theorists have researched the impact of globalization on existing ideational systems, arguing that the contemporary transformation of conventional ideologies is linked to the rise of a new social imaginary that casts the world as a single, interdependent place (Robertson 1992; Albrow 1996; Appadurai 1996; Giddens 2000; Sassen 2006; Steger 2008). Like all social imaginaries, the rising global imaginary fosters implicit background understandings enabling common practices and identities (Taylor 2004) as well as providing common background understandings for our daily routines (Bourdieu 1990). But the thickening consciousness of the world as a single,
interdependent place neither implies the impending ‘death of the nation-state’ (Ohmae 1995; Guéhenno 1995) nor suggests the disappearance of localisms and tribalisms (James 2006). As we emphasized above, the local, national, and regional persist in hybrid symbolic markers, identities, and socio-political systems, but these are increasingly reconfigured and recoded around the global.

Political ideologies translate the largely prereflexive social imaginary – and their associated social forces – into concrete political agendas. Conventional political ideologies have been predominantly linked to national imaginations, such as Italian fascism, American liberalism, Russian ‘socialism in one country’, ‘communism with Chinese characteristics’, ‘Swedish democratic socialism’, and so on (Anderson 1991; Steger 2008). Since the late 20th century, however, political ideologies have been articulating the emerging global imaginary into political programs. Variants of political Islamism, ecologism, and transnational feminism are obvious examples of how the rising global imaginary has provided a novel frame of reference that increasingly destabilizes nationally based ideologies and introduces new ideational formations assembled around the global.

This unsettling dynamic is reflected in a remarkable proliferation of qualifying prefixes adorning conventional ‘isms’: neo-liberalism, neo-conservatism, neo-fascism, neo-Marxism, post-Marxism, post-modernism, and so on. These semantic add-ons point to the growing public awareness that something ‘new’ is pushing conventional worldviews ‘post’ their traditional meanings and categories. An underlying force generating such novelty, we argue, is globalization manifesting itself subjectively in the form of a rising global imaginary – a globalizing reflexivity – and its associated ideological articulations. Conditioning the norms and interests of actors, competing globalisms both shape and are constituted by the contemporary global order and its many fissures. However, rather than adding prefixes to conventional political ideologies rooted in the national imaginary, globalization researchers need to develop new typologies of political ideologies that more adequately recognize an important source of their ideational novelty. A central factor in this process is the increasing prominence of the global in contemporary political belief systems.

Recent attempts to sketch the conceptual structures of today’s political belief systems have so far focused on market globalism, and, since 9/11, religious globalisms like political Islamism (Kepel 2004; Karam (ed.) 2004; Mandaville 2007). As we noted, the considerable lack of research on justice globalism has fueled confusion and speculation over the main claims, objectives, and policy alternatives of the GJM. Previous conceptual mapping exercises have been carried out chiefly to track organizational flows and processes, the geography of global civil society, and the intricacies of North–South relations (Rupert 2000; Bleiker 2000; Carroll 2007). General forays into the ideational composition of justice globalism can be found in the burgeoning literature on new global justice movements (Tarrow 2005; Della Porta et al. 2006; McDonald 2006; Pleyers 2010). But even in these very useful studies, the focus is more on ‘issue framing’ than on
the analysis and evaluation of politically potent ideas and claims, leading one observer to describe ideology as the neglected ‘orphan’ of social movement theory (Buechler 2000).

One possible explanation for this neglect of ideology within social movement theory may be the long shadow cast by the ‘end of ideology’ debates. Erupting in Europe and the United States in the late 1950s (Waxman (ed.) 1968), the first wave of these debates postulated the exhaustion of both Marxist socialism and classical liberalism. Proponents argued that modern political belief systems were rapidly displaced by a non-ideological pragmatism associated with the Keynesian welfare state. A side effect of this argument was that the already pejorative concept of ‘ideology’ accumulated further negative connotations. Professionals working in areas of policy development and provision viewed ideology with suspicion and skepticism, a view that continues to be held even by members of the GJM (Wilson 2009a, 2009f, 2009i; Steger 2011a).2

After the upsurge of ideological politics and cultural protest in the 1960s and 1970s discredited the end of ideology thesis, it was unexpectedly resurrected with the 1989 collapse of communism. A number of influential scholars argued that the passing of Marxism-Leninism marked the disappearance of viable ideological alternatives to capitalist liberalism from the stage of world history, which signified the unabashed victory of an increasingly information and communication technology-driven liberal capitalism (Fukuyama 1989, 1992; Furet 2000). However, the emergence of the GJM and the significance of globalized Islam have once again cast severe doubt on the validity of this thesis.

As we noted earlier, a globally articulated political ideology of the Left centered on ‘social justice’ and ‘solidarity with the global South’ emerged forcefully during the 1990s in response to market globalism’s unfulfilled promises (Steger 2008: 197; Wilson 2009b, 2009c). But rather than looking for new ways of folding social justice issues back into nationally-based political ideologies, many GJM activists sought to link their normative commitments to concrete policy alternatives capable of tackling the global problems of our age. The universalist claims of market globalism, and the global crises they create, have required a dramatic rescaling and transformation of justice questions. The GJM has responded, as we shall see, with an insistence on multiplicity against the singularity of market globalism, framed by a distinctly global set of alternative values and claims. Our assessment of the connection between ideology and policy initiatives related to global crises constitutes the second principal research objective of this study.

Research Questions and Book Structure

Taking the WSF as our primary research focus, Chapters 2 and 3 draw on relevant data and textual evidence from 45 organizations linked to the WSF as well
as 24 semi-structured interviews conducted with representatives from 22 of these organizations. After mapping the core ideological concepts and claims of the GJM, we offer an analysis of the political ideological structure that underpins the global justice movement. Here are our central research questions:

- Does the GJM possess a coherent political ideology?
- If so, what is the conceptual structure of that ideology?
- In particular, what are the core ideas, key values, and claims (decontestation chains) that make up justice globalism?

As we discuss in more detail in the methodology section below, we also ascertain the extent to which these concepts and claims are distinct from other ideologies. The determination of ideological uniqueness allows us to assess whether justice globalism should be considered a maturing political ideology that offers clear conceptual alternatives for collective political action.

In Chapter 4, we examine how organizations strategically operationalize ideological values and claims into policy proposals emanating from the GJM. In particular, we consider the extent to which these policy alternatives reflect the core concepts and claims of justice globalism, the points of rupture (incoherence) between justice globalism’s ideological structure and its apparent policy preferences, alongside continuity and dissonance that exists at the policy level within the GJM. We explore the process of generating alternatives – the process of responsiveness – and how it produces proposals that address global crises. In the final three chapters centered on responses to global crises, we then ask the following questions:

- How has the GJM sought to translate values into policy proposals?
- What programmatic frameworks have been put forward and how can such alternative policies be implemented?
- Are these policy proposals and action programs consistent with the espoused ideological commitments of the GJM?

Thus, we outline how the GJM brings its values to bear, through its strategic engagement with the social field. Engagement across the values and claims of global justice groups is documented, to demonstrate strategic engagement against emergent power structures. In Chapters 5–7, we pursue these policy-oriented questions through an examination of the GJM’s responsiveness to three major global crises of our time: the 2008–09 global financial crisis; the crisis of food production and distribution (from 2008 onwards); and the ongoing crisis of climate change linked to global energy supply. We explore the emergence of each of these crises, the mainstream neoliberal political and economic responses, and the alternative interpretations and responses offered by major GJM organizations connected to the WSF.
Throughout the book, we elaborate on our broader argument that political ideologies are no longer purely nationally focused, but increasingly articulate a rising global imaginary (Steger 2008). We want to understand if and how justice globalism articulates the underlying social imaginary in global context. We are also interested in how major geographical scales (local/national/regional/global) are situated and represented within justice globalism.

Finally, in addition to mapping the ideology and policy alternatives of the GJM, our research efforts are intended to contribute to the important process of self-clarification within the movement. In our interviews, members of the GJM frequently expressed their desire to find out whether there exists a significant ideological overlap among the organizations linked to the WSF. Moreover, there is now a widespread acknowledgement across the GJM that it cannot confine itself to pointing out the shortcomings of neoliberal measures but must offer constructive policy alternatives. This perspective is very clearly expressed by Focus on the Global South as follows:

Focus on the Global South … search policy analysis, organizing, conferencing, networking, even joining mobilizations, publications, … in pursuit of our ideal, … to come up with viable alternatives to the kind of world that we have right now. Of course that’s the strategic aim, but a big part of the work that we are doing at the moment – that we have been doing – is exposing and explaining what is wrong with the present dispensation. This is the deconstruction part of our work or the resistance part of our work. But the strategic aim really is the reconstruction of an alternative path. (Wilson 2009e, emphasis added)

Additional Themes

We interweave four additional themes with our key focus on ideology and policy. The first theme relates to the question of geographic scales at which both the political ideology and the policy proposals of the GJM are targeted – the local, regional, national, or global. But we refrain from analyzing justice globalism according to such rigid geographical scales that suggest the separation of the ‘global’ from the ‘national’ or ‘local’. Leading global studies scholars like Saskia Sassen (2001, 2006) have long argued that with the intensification of globalization dynamics and the related rise of global cities in the late 20th century, these spatial scales should no longer be conceived of as vertically nested hierarchies, but as overlapping horizontal spaces.

The significance of Sassen’s work for this project lies in producing a theoretically sophisticated and empirically sound analysis of how these spatial scales interpenetrate each other on both the ideational and policy levels. For example, it is important to note that the main focus of the GJM’s policy proposals is democratic participation of a vast majority of populations and a shifting of power
from corporations and governments to local communities, regional organizations, and development banks and national cooperatives. As such, the policies form part of a global agenda that is usually implemented and enacted on all levels simultaneously, which, in turn, amplifies the mutual interpenetration of geographical scales, a phenomenon referred to as ‘multiscalarity’ (Steger 2005). Thus, the spatial dynamics involving the GJM should be characterized as a ‘global-local nexus’ constituted by the intermingling of the local, national, regional, and the global.

A second additional theme in this book relates to the firmly entrenched conceptual binary of singularity versus multiplicity. Given the rather monolithic conceptual framework of market globalism centered on the ideal of the ‘free market’, it seems sensible to expect that its ideological challengers also need to put forward a similar singular vision and set of proposals in order for these to be seen as ‘legitimate’, ‘feasible’, and ‘viable’. Yet, there exist alternative models of conceptualizing coherence based on the common acceptance of multiplicity and diversity. Here, the ‘carnival of resistance’ is a deliberate exercise, a dialogue for transformation, defined against the singularity and authoritarianism it opposes. In short, coherence and unity in social movements can be predicated upon a common embrace of difference as much as it might arise from privileging singularity. At the same time, however, social movements like the GJM face the political challenge of articulating multiplicity in the form of clear normative principles and social demands.

The popularized WSF slogan, ‘Another World is Possible’ – the irresistible desire for a ‘world where many worlds fit’ – suggests that many members of the GJM are aware of this crucial political challenge. Insisting that the dominant model of market globalization is not the only one, they envision alternative forms of globalization rooted in diversity and difference that incorporate more transparent and participatory models of decision-making, as the following quotes from the World Council of Churches (WCC) and OneWorld representatives demonstrate:

In terms of globalization, it is about alternative globalization. We have a new earth community developing that is so wired to each other that things happen fast, and that’s exciting. It could also go crazy, but so far it is really helping the development of global movements. And of course we are part of that. I think we wouldn’t have had something as successful as the World Social Forum without electronic communication … But most of all it really is about emphasizing the need for a new paradigm of economic development, which is fair, compassionate, wealth. So this is now policy … and what patterns, good governance, diversity, vitality, all those good things. (Wilson 2009h)

It is a profoundly different paradigm. The word ideology often has a negative ideology. And I think ideologies become fixed very quickly, and everyone has to follow the doctrine, and it becomes very dogmatic. The whole point of this [new paradigm] is that it is not dogmatic. It is about inviting in different voices, with different points of view, and diversity. (Wilson 2009f)
It is important to note that the GJM leaders cited above do not argue that there exists only one alternative. Their valorization of diversity includes the recognition that ‘one-size-does-not-fit-all’. Globally networked communities will need to develop their own responses to global problems and crises. On the surface this seems to present a fundamental contradiction – how can an ideology be global yet be promoting diverse, specific solutions to local problems, national and regional sovereignty and autonomy? Resistance to singularity produces a world of multitudes – no singular multitude – presenting a deepening praxis to be pursued. We explore this paradox in greater depth throughout the ensuing chapters.

The singularity-multiplicity binary relates closely to a third theme raised in this study – the contrast between bottom-up and top-down modes of operating. As we shall see, justice globalists actively promote the values of transparency, dialogue, and openness while resisting secrecy, authoritarianism, and the impulse to push for closure on policy initiatives. Recently, this emphasis on transparency within the GJM has been on global display in the war on secrecy waged by WikiLeaks and similar cyberspace-based groups committed to what they call ‘informationism’ (Sifry 2011; Leigh and Harding 2011). This commitment marks a significant difference between the practices and methods employed by justice globalists and those of market globalists. The GJM openly embraces dialogical, bottom-up modes of operating, while market globalism’s expressed sympathies for ‘democracy’ seem to coexist rather comfortably with a preference for top-down decisions made in closed-door meetings.

The fourth theme addresses the centrality of socioeconomic discourse in the GJM. As we will discuss, this is a surprising finding given the fact that many of the examined organizations consider themselves primarily as cultural organizations. Yet, GJM members often speak in a decidedly socioeconomic tongue rather than use language that would correspond more closely to their central cultural concerns. While our quantitative data establishes that issues related to racism, sexism, and indigenous rights are clearly eclipsed by keywords related to social and economic issues such as rights, trade, and economy, our qualitative analysis offers an explanation for why the GJM, on the whole, has focused on the socioeconomic discourse of market globalism. Finally, our analysis also establishes that the socioeconomic idiom is gradually shifting in a socioecological direction, with profound consequences for how political community is understood. This has occurred not merely within the GJM but, more broadly, within a global public discourse increasingly focused on the social, environmental, and health impacts of disasters such as the 2011 earthquake in Japan and the ensuing meltdown of the nuclear reactors in Fukushima.

In this context we are confronted with the magnitude (and asserted magnificence) of the natural world, which can so dramatically re-position the meanings of consumer capitalism. The reality of embeddedness, and of the global linkages that shape our existence, is reflected in the following quote from the OneWorld
representative comparing economic problems with natural disasters impacting vast regions of our planet:

The economic crisis is small beer; it’s really small beer. It’s a first sign, it’s a bit like you sneeze once but that’s not the cold. The [2006 Christmas] tsunami is another sneeze, but that’s not the cold. And that’s one of the things that really upset me a lot. The tsunami made people wake up a lot, even though it wasn’t in one sense about climate change. (Wilson 2009f)

Methodological Issues

This study utilizes morphological discourse analysis (MDA) to map and critically evaluate the core ideological structure of justice globalism. This methodological approach was introduced by Freeden (1996; 2003) and later refined by Steger (2002; 2009). As noted, language is critical to how ideologies distort, legitimate, integrate, and, most importantly, ‘decontest’ their core values and claims. Successfully decontested ideas are held as truth by large segments of a given population with such confidence that they no longer appear to be assumptions at all. Freeden (2003: 54–5 emphasis in original) explains ‘decontestation’ in the following way:

An ideology attempts to end the inevitable contention over concepts by decontesting them, by removing their meanings from contest. ‘This is what justice means’, announces one ideology, and ‘that is what democracy entails’. By trying to convince us that they are right and that they speak the truth, ideologies become devices for coping with the indeterminacy of meaning …. That is their semantic role. [But] ideologies also need to decontest the concepts they use because they are instruments for fashioning collective decisions. That is their political role.

Ideological morphologies can thus be pictured as decontested truth-claims that facilitate collective decision-making. Their interlinked semantic and political roles suggest that control over language translates directly into political and social power. Consequently, any analysis that attempts to identify, map, and critically evaluate core ideological claims must focus on the use of language. Ultimately, these claims give each ideology its unique conceptual configuration or ‘morphology’.

Morphological discourse analysis is a qualitative method for a contextually sensitive mapping and assessing of the structural arrangements of political ideologies (in terms of core claims) that attribute meanings to a range of mutually defining political concepts. The key difference between Freeden’s methodology and that developed and applied by Steger (2002, 2009) concerns the proper conceptualization of basic ideological units that carry meanings. Unlike Freeden, who disaggregates ideational systems into relatively static elements according to
levels of decreasing contestation (from ‘core concepts’ to ‘adjacent concepts’ to ‘periphery concepts’), we evaluate the ideological status of justice globalism on the basis of its ability to arrange concepts of roughly equal significance into meaningful ‘decontestation chains’ or ‘central ideological claims’. This adjustment better captures the dynamic and changeable character of ideational systems as well as the contested and evolving process of concept formation and contextual responsiveness (Steger 2009). For this study, we have made additional methodological innovations by complementing the qualitative analysis with a quantitative word frequency count and in-depth semi-structured interviews with senior representatives from our sample organizations.

But what criteria should be used to distinguish a conceptually thin and rather incoherent ideational cluster from a coherent and mature political ideology? Following Michael Freeden (1996: 485–6), we argue that maturity of ideologies should be assessed according to three cardinal criteria: (a) their degree of distinctiveness; (b) their context-bound responsiveness to a broad range of political issues; and (c) their ability to produce effective conceptual decontestations. Thus, the ability of justice globalism to distinguish itself from other ideologies through distinct core concepts and core claims, respond to a broad range of political issues (such as, in our case, global climate change, the global financial crisis, or the global food crisis), and its ability to present decontested explanations of the current global context provide evidence for whether justice globalism may be considered a mature (and thus coherent) political ideology.

This book assesses the political ideology and practice of the global justice movement using these three criteria as a guide. If the ultimate test of any ideology is its responsiveness to concrete political problems and its capacity to offer meaningful answers to these problems, then our analysis has to address the dynamics of creative transformation. An assessment of the policy capacity of justice globalism to produce alternatives thus provides the main focus of Chapters 5 to 7 of this book. Indeed, the conceptual mapping accomplished in the first three chapters offers an evaluative framework for various types of political action under contemporary globalization (Goodman (ed.) 2002, 2006). Never before have the policy proposals of justice globalists been systematically and holistically assessed and situated within their corresponding ideological framework. Rare attempts to assemble the policy proposals of the GJM have been conducted mainly to investigate dynamics of transnational networks, rather than to address ideological coherence (Reitan 2007). Our study represents an encompassing attempt to evaluate the range of GJM policy positions set against its overarching ideological architecture. Moreover, our evaluative synthesis has been grounded and verified with a select range of in-depth investigations into the emergence, relevance, and effectiveness of key policy proposals emerging from the GJM in response to global crises. Ultimately, this book thus tests the successful translation of ideological claims into policy analysis and institutional contexts. Such forays into the theory–practice connection are especially significant with regard to the hotly

Why the WSF?

It is important to emphasize that this study is not concerned with the WSF as such but with its constituent organizations that are part of the GJM. The WSF was chosen as a key site of the GJM for a number of reasons. Although there may be disagreements over the future significance of the WSF, there is virtual unanimous agreement in the authoritative literature on the importance of the WSF as the intellectual and organizational epicenter of the GJM in the first decade of the 21st century (Conway 2004; Patomäki and Teivainen 2004a, 2004b; Sen et al. 2005; Della Porta (ed.) 2007; Smith et al. 2007). Supported by influential organizations within these global justice networks, such as the Transnational Institute and Focus on the Global South, the first WSF meeting was held in January 2001, in Porto Alegre, Brazil. It attracted 5000 participants from 117 countries and thousands of Brazilian activists. Attendance at subsequent meetings skyrocketed, reaching over 100,000 participants in 2003. Since then, the WSF has met in Mumbai, Nairobi, Porto Alegre (again), and Dakar, Senegal in 2011. Around the globe, numerous regional, national, and local ‘social forums’ have also taken place.

Secondly, the WSF constitutes the largest and most diverse organizational umbrella of the GJM. While other large global justice networks exist (for example, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the Amsterdam-based Transnational Institute, or Friends of the Earth International), these organizations are focused on particular sector concerns. The WSF brings together a vast diversity of social sectors, spanning North and South, crossing a range of linguistic divides. The WSF is also politically diverse: unlike other global justice formations (such as People’s Global Action), it draws together a broad range of political orientations and tendencies. Although much of the WSF’s membership is in Latin America, Europe, and North America, there is also significant involvement from African and Asian groups. Indeed, no other global justice coalition comes close to the WSF’s geographical, ethnic and linguistic reach and diversity.

Thirdly, unlike other large global justice coalitions, the WSF was consciously established as an ideational alternative to the market-globalist World Economic Forum (WEF). Designed as an ‘open meeting place’ (as stated in the first clause in its Charter of Principles (WSF 2002), the WSF was intended to encourage and facilitate a free exchange of ideas among justice globalists. As the representative from Associazione Ricreativa Culturale Italiana (ARCI) expressed it, ‘The WSF … offers itself more as a common ground, an open forum for common research. So it’s more the idea of a big laboratory, and the place of convergence, and the
meeting of different cultures, that can together look and try to define a possible global alternative in terms of policies’ (Steger 2011a). Hence one would expect to find a particularly rich source of ideological materials among its membership. Moreover, there has been an animated debate within the GJM as to whether the WSF should remain an open meeting place or become a political action-oriented ‘movement of movements’ (Keraghel and Sen 2004; Patomäki and Teivainen 2004b; Funke 2008). While the WSF played a critical role in mobilizing at the grassroots level and educating communities and individuals on issues that are generally hard to communicate, some activists have argued that it did not go far enough in engaging with and utilizing dominant political forces for social change. As a result, some affiliated organizations, such as the Global Progressive Forum (GPF), contemplate developing their own alternative politically focused forums and political parties outside the WSF (Wilson 2009c).

Why these Organizations?

Our sample includes 45 out of the over 150 organizations affiliated with the WSF (see Table 1.1). We specifically selected 20 organizations because of their membership in the WSF International Council’s Liaison group, which indicates their high level of involvement and commitment to the Forum. The remaining 25 organizations were randomly selected from the list of groups affiliated with the WSF International Council displayed on the WSF website (WSF n.d.). As far as was possible, we endeavored to obtain a broad geographic and linguistic spectrum within the organizations selected. Thus, we were able to gather a snapshot of the GJM in its various local, national and regional iterations that reflects the views of justice globalists from both global North and South.4

We conducted background research on each organization through examination of their websites and publications. Three representative texts from each organization were chosen and subjected to morphological discourse analysis. These included the website – chiefly the organization’s homepage and sections related to the history and identity of the organization – a press release, and a public statement or declaration. These documents were also used as sources of data for the analysis of policy proposals although we made sure to add longer and more detailed publications that focused on specific policy issues. We provide additional detail regarding data in subsequent chapters.

In addition to the wealth of textual data that has been collected for this project, the three authors of this study – plus two research assistants – interviewed 24 leading members of 22 organizations. These individuals expressed their deep commitment to the pursuit of a more just world – or, more accurately, their ideal of a more just world – while also displaying critical awareness of shortcomings of the WSF and the GJM at various stages of their development and across a
broad range of issues. The insights gained from these interviews provided us
with a plethora of ‘insider’ perspectives on the GJM, its history, and its future.

Our selected organizations provide a representative snapshot of the diversity of
issues, organizations, *modus operandi*, and geographic locations that make up
the membership of the GJM. The groups we sampled included international, regional,
and national trade union confederations, which were particularly concerned with
how the global finance and climate crises impact on jobs amongst their members,
and agitate for proactive innovation on these issues, particularly climate change.5
A further important insight is that some of the trade unions see themselves as
both part of and distinct from other groups in the GJM (Wilson 2011).

Other organizations sampled included cultural and religious organizations,
which focus on a broad array of issues, with a particular concern for the recogni-
tion of economic, social, and cultural rights.6 These groups would highlight the
ways in which they believed the richness of the human experience in a number
of different areas was slowly being devalued and limited by the influence of
neoliberalism around the world. The sample also included a number of net-
works concerned with communication and democratization of media and
access to information, including OneWorld and AIDC. We also included
research-centered organizations such as International Forum on Globalization
and the Latin American Council for Social Services (CLACSO).

Feminist organizations such as the World March of Women and Articulacion
Feminista Marcosur also formed a key part of the sample. Single-issue groups, such
as Food First International Action Network (FIAN), Palestinian Grassroots Anti-
Apartheid Wall Campaign (PGAAWC), People’s Health Movement (PHM), Friends
of the Narmada River, Jubilee South, World Fair Trade Organization (WFTO), and
Association pour une taxation des transactions financières pour l’aide aux citoyens
(ATTAC) were also included. It is important to emphasize that while these organi-
izations focus primarily on one issue – such as global financial reform, the right to
food or the right to health – they nonetheless consider how a broad range of global
problems has an impact on their respective single-issue areas.

Human rights organizations such as Terre des Hommes (TDH), Federacion
International Direitos Humanos (FIDH), and Poor People’s Economic Human
Rights Campaign (PPEHRC) also formed part of the sample. Several groups con-
cerned particularly with inequalities in trade relationships, such as Third World
Network and the Africa Trade Network, were also included. A final category of
organizations were multi-issue networks that engaged not only with a broad
range of issues, but also focused on research and policy development alongside
political advocacy and grassroots activism. As one Transnational Institute (TNI)
representative put it, ‘It’s not a think tank … it’s not completely academic; it’s not
completely activist. It’s not a single-issue organization. It has a lot of pieces of the
wheel, and there are a lot of interactions’ (Wilson 2009i). These groups included
Focus on the Global South and TNI, who, along with ATTAC and peasant move-
ments such as La Via Campesina and Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem
Terra (MST) (also included in the sample) are especially prominent within the GJM. It is important to note also that a large number of the organizations that are members of the WSF International Council Liaison group are so-called ‘representative organizations’, which means that they represent a vast number of other member groups. Hence, the popularity of the terms ‘association of associations’, ‘network of networks’, or ‘movement of movements’ (Steger 2011a). Such ‘representative organizations’ include ARCI, all of our selected trade unions, Hemispheric Social Alliance, Global Progressive Forum, and Jubilee South. Table 1.1 provides a brief description of each organization included in this study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Organization</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Areas of Concern/Focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU)*</td>
<td>Melbourne, Australia</td>
<td>Workers’ Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association pour une taxation des transactions financières pour l’aide aux citoyens (Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens) (ATTAC)*</td>
<td>Paris, France plus multiple regional offices</td>
<td>Tobin Tax, reform of global financial institutions and infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Federation of Labor – Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO)</td>
<td>Washington DC, USA</td>
<td>Workers’ Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articulacion Feminista Mercosur (Southern Common Market) (AFM)*</td>
<td>Montevideo, Uruguay</td>
<td>Rights of women, indigenous people, and marginalized people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative Information Development Centre (AIDC)</td>
<td>Cape Town, South Africa</td>
<td>Promote social justice through the production and dissemination of alternative knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associazione Ricreativa Culturale Italiana (Italian Cultural Recreational Association) (ARCI)*</td>
<td>Rome, Italy</td>
<td>Social development organization which uses the arts to promote democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa Trade Network (ATN)</td>
<td>East Legon, Accra, Ghana</td>
<td>Trade and investment issues in Africa; reform of global financial system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comissão Brasileira Justiça e Paz (Brazilian Commission/Organization for Justice and Peace) (CBJP)*</td>
<td>Rio de Janeiro, Brazil</td>
<td>Catholic Church initiative promoting research and action on social change, human rights, democracy, and justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confédération Européenne des Syndicats/European Trade Union Confederation (CES/ETUC)</td>
<td>Brussels, Belgium</td>
<td>Workers’ rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordenadora de Centrais Sindicais do Cone Sur (Coordinator of Trade Unions of the Southern Cone) (CCSCS)</td>
<td>Montevideo, Uruguay</td>
<td>Workers’ rights, democracy, human rights, representation of trade unions in economic integration of South America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales (Latin American Council of the Social Sciences) (CLACSO)*</td>
<td>Buenos Aires, Argentina</td>
<td>Collaborative research network promoting good governance, equality, and democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Labour Congress (CLC)</td>
<td>Ottawa, Canada</td>
<td>Workers’ rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name of Organization</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Areas of Concern/Focus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of Canadians (CoC)</td>
<td>Ottawa, Canada</td>
<td>Protecting Canadian independence in policy areas of trade, clean water, energy security, health care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corpwatch</td>
<td>San Francisco, California, USA</td>
<td>Human, environmental, and worker rights at the local, national, and global levels; transparency and accountability into global finance and trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)*</td>
<td>Johannesburg, South Africa</td>
<td>Workers’ rights, protection of democracy, promoting African development at an international level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Trabajadores Argentina (Argentina Workers’ Centre) (CTA)</td>
<td>Buenos Aires, Argentina</td>
<td>Workers’ union concerned with international relations, health, migration, disability, human rights, poverty, famine, energy, culture, and youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Unica dos Trabalhadores (Central Workers’ Union) (CUT)*</td>
<td>Sao Paulo, Brazil</td>
<td>Workers’ rights, equality, and democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental and Development Action in the Third World (ENDA)*</td>
<td>Dakar, Senegal</td>
<td>Development in Africa, economy, rights of women and children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food First International Action Network (FIAN)</td>
<td>Heidelberg, Germany</td>
<td>Promote the right to food, food sovereignty, and food security around the world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federation Internacional Direitos Humanos (International Federation for Human Rights) (FIDH)</td>
<td>Paris, France</td>
<td>Promote human rights around the world as outlined in international human rights treaties, declarations, and covenants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on the Global South*</td>
<td>Manila, Philippines; Bangkok, Thailand; Delhi, India</td>
<td>Policy research, advocacy, activism, and grassroots capacity building; critique of corporate-led globalization, neo-liberalism, and militarization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends of the Narmada River</td>
<td>India and global</td>
<td>Campaign against dam project on Narmada River; rights of indigenous people, environmental degradation; democracy and transparency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Union of Oil Employees in Basra</td>
<td>Basra, Iraq</td>
<td>Workers’ rights; equality between workers and administrators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grassroots Global Justice (GGJ)</td>
<td>California and Florida, USA</td>
<td>Rights of workers and the poor locally and globally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Progressive Forum (GPF)</td>
<td>Brussels, Belgium</td>
<td>Political organization promoting justice, equality, sustainability, rights of workers in policy circles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hemispheric Social Alliance Alliance Social Continental (ASC/HSA)*</td>
<td>Rio de Janeiro, Brazil</td>
<td>Strengthen civil society, promote rights, especially workers’ rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instituto Brasiliero de Analises Sociais e Economicas (Brazilian Institute for Social and Economic Analysis) (IBASE)*</td>
<td>Rio de Janeiro, Brazil</td>
<td>Promote democracy, active citizenship and economic, social and cultural rights</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Continued)
Table 1.1 (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Organization</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Areas of Concern/Focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Forum on Globalization</td>
<td>San Francisco, USA</td>
<td>Think tank providing critique of neoliberal globalization; emphasize developing alternative global trade and commerce that promotes interests of people and environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institut Panos Afrique l’Ouest (Panos Institute West Africa) (IPAO)</td>
<td>Dakar, Senegal</td>
<td>Free speech, participatory democracy, active citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instituto Paulo Freire (IPF)*</td>
<td>Sao Paulo, Brazil</td>
<td>Right to education globally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC)*</td>
<td>Brussels, Belgium</td>
<td>Promotion and defense of workers’ rights and interests globally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jubilee South</td>
<td>Manila, Philippines</td>
<td>Debt cancellation, reform of global financial rules and institutions, redistribution of wealth and resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean Confederation of Trade Unions*</td>
<td>Seoul, South Korea</td>
<td>Promote and protect workers’ rights; democracy; support reunification of North and South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST)*</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Reform of land use; rights of indigenous people and marginalized poor; promote equal access to food, shelter, health care, education, a healthy, sustainable environment, and gender equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OneWorld</td>
<td>London, UK</td>
<td>Information organization; facilitate networks amongst organizations committed to justice, equality, democracy, action on climate change, poverty, development, and resource distribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign (PGAAWC)</td>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>End construction of wall in West Bank; promote global action against imperialism, racism, and human rights abuses. Focus on violations of economic rights of Palestinians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Health Movement (PHM)</td>
<td>Cairo, Egypt</td>
<td>Advocacy for provision of public health care and circumstances that enable good health – clean water and sanitation, shelter, electricity, education, and food</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor People’s Economic Human Rights Campaign (PPEHRC)</td>
<td>Minneapolis, USA</td>
<td>Promote access to basic public services such as health care, education, welfare for the homeless and traditionally marginalized in US – African-American and Hispanic communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terre des Hommes (TDH)*</td>
<td>Brussels, Belgium and Geneva, Switzerland</td>
<td>Focus on the rights of children globally</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Justice Globalism Versus Market Globalism**

As this book will demonstrate, the GJM critique of market globalism is multifaceted and addresses a multitude of issues. Before delving into the specifics of the conceptual structure of the GJM in Chapter 2, we outline in general terms three fundamental disagreements between justice globalism and market globalism over processes and meanings of ‘globalization’, the nature of ‘development’, and the question of ‘power’. Each side has offered opposing definitions and views on these subjects and how they are related. Especially critical to the arguments are conflicting understandings of power – and where power is located or should be located in the emerging global order of the 21st century.
Organizations and individuals belonging to the GJM have long contested the central ideological claims of market globalism (Steger 2009). They have insisted that neoliberal policies have actually increased inequality and disparities in wealth throughout the world. They have suggested that market-driven globalization does not benefit everyone (George 1976; Bello 1999). They have pointed to the growing power and influence of Transnational Corporations (TNCs), hedge funds, and financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank to argue that, rather than being led by neutral techno-economic forces, globalization is fueled and directed by corporate elites and pro-business governments of the global North whose main goal is the maximization of profits at the expense of the wellbeing of people, communities, and the environment. Members of the GJM have emphasized that globalization should not focus on the liberalization and integration of markets. Instead, they argue for a world founded on a global ethic of planetary co-responsibility towards each and all.

With regard to the nature and purpose of ‘development’, there has been a clear discursive shift in the pertinent debate from the national to the global arena (McMichael 2004: xviii, 154–7). Codifiers of conventional political ideologies like liberalism or socialism argued over the best model for future growth and stability pertaining to particular national states. Today, market globalists clash with members of the GJM over the best way to manage global resources in the immediate and long term for the benefit of humanity in general. Market globalists hold that economic growth is the central defining feature of development, although they have begun to use the term ‘sustainable’ alongside their market model to indicate their awareness of serious obstacles in the path of ‘development-as-usual’. Still, economic growth has remained their credo along with an emphasis on wealth accumulation, consumption, and ever-rising living standards (Sachs 2005). Once a pattern of strong and consistent growth has been established, neoliberals argue, then countries can begin to focus on ‘soft issues’ such as adherence to human rights standards, education, health care, and the environment.

The GJM has challenged neoliberal meanings of ‘development’ based upon the primacy of economic growth. They insist that factors other than economic growth must be taken into consideration when measuring a society’s level of ‘development’ such as democratic participation and equitable patterns of income distribution. Consider the following remarks made by GJM leaders in interviews with the project team:

We ... have a critique of the word development, because development is actually something that has progressed in history from civilization to progress, and then came to development, and this was used by the World Bank for the first time in 1949 to mean growth. So from there people talked about then just to qualify development as not just to grow things, it has to be distribution, it has to be people’s participation. (Goodman 2010a)

When we say development we talk about the eradication of poverty, we talk about gender development, equality, food security, food sovereignty and these things. (Scerri 2011a)
As discussed in subsequent chapters, the GJM does not simply present an alternative development model, but instead insists on public participation in defining what is meant by global development, encompassing both the North and the South. This reflects what Jan Nederveen Pieterse (1998) calls ‘reflexive development’ where the movement produces its own critical perspectives, defined against top-down programs for maximizing economic growth in the name of ‘lifting people out of poverty’. Through debates within the GJM ‘development’ is thereby redefined as reflexive in a social and political sense – a participatory, popular reflexivity, which takes the form of ‘broad social debates and fora on development goals and methods’ (Pieterse 1998: 369).

Finally, a key GJM criticism relates to the intensification of asymmetrical power relations on a global scale. Marketization, the argument goes, promises a more open, free, competitive trading system while deepening class divisions. Thus, corporate-driven globalization and its profit-based vision of development actually exacerbate conventional inequalities or power imbalances. In addition, members of the GJM have castigated market globalism as a hierarchical and authoritarian regime, which allows little space for dialogue and negotiation:

What’s difficult with neo-liberalism is that there is no dialogue … . So first there is no longer any dialogue between the governments and the social society … . CUT has been investing a lot in studying the social dialogues, and the social responsibility of the companies. We always try to dialogue. But dialogue is a two-sided thing, it’s not only to say ‘Yes Sir’. (Steger 2010c)

Complaints about the lack of dialogic space and negotiation are raised at all levels of the GJM and across different geographic locations. Their impression is that decisions are made by political and corporate elites that affect the livelihoods and daily experiences of vast swathes of the global population with little to no discussion about those decisions, the reasons for them, or the possible consequences of them.

Thus, one of the key demands put forward by the GJM has been to permanently alter worldwide power networks spun by global corporate and political elites in the global North. In the last decade, this demand has become even more pressing with regard to top-down decision-making processes in relation to global crises. As part of the condemnation of what they perceive as the opaque, authoritarian, and rigid structures of market globalism, GJM organizations have advocated for the empowerment of individuals and communities generally marginalized from global decision-making processes. Encouraging more participatory and transparent styles of global democratic governance, the GJM has argued that decision-making power should increasingly involve local communities, and indigenous populations, particularly in the global South. This does not mean that GJM organizations claim to ‘speak for’ or ‘represent’ indigenous populations and groups. Rather they endeavor to open up space in which these groups can speak for themselves.
Much is known about the core ideas, key values, and central claims that constitute the morphology of market globalism. But the ideological status of the political vision of justice globalism, connected to the GJM, has not yet been clearly identified. The next chapter performs this important task.

Notes

1 For a detailed discussion and analysis of market globalism and its central ideological claims, see Steger (2009).
2 Interviews have been referenced according to the surname of the interviewer (a member of the project team), the year in which the interview was conducted, and then assigned a letter indicating their chronological order for that year. For example, Wilson (2009a) indicates that the interview was conducted by Wilson in 2009 and was the first interview she conducted that year. Full interview details may be found in the reference list.
3 At the beginning of the research project, the three authors developed a list of 17 questions around the key themes of core ideological concepts, claims and policies. These questions were then used as a basic structure for each interview, whilst also allowing space for other avenues of enquiry as they arose during the course of the interviews themselves.
4 To some extent, this broad snapshot sheds some light on claims of elitism within the GJM. Some authors and critics have questioned whether the political views expressed by the GJM are actually the views of the people they claim to represent. This is not a question which our research engages with directly and as such we are not able to offer a definitive comment. The diversity of issues, geographical locations, socio-economic and cultural contexts represented by the sample group do suggest that there is a deepening of justice globalism beyond its intellectual elite, permeating grassroots movements in a variety of areas around the world. However, this is an issue that requires further investigation, which is presently beyond the scope of this project.
5 The trade union confederations included the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), Canadian Labor Congress (CLC), Congress of South African Trade Union (COSATU), Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU), Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT), Coordenadora de Centrais Sindicais do Cone Sul (CCSCS), Central de Trabajadores Argentinos (CTA), General Union of the Oil Employees of Basra.
6 For example, the World Council of Churches, ARCI, CBJP, Council of Canadians, IPA0, ENDA, and Ibase.