

## Why What Happened in Montana Won't Stay in Montana

**M**ontana witnessed a Senate campaign for the ages in 2012. That race itself was a singular event and the state certainly is unique. But the record of that campaign, and the insights it provides, are applicable to other competitive races, whether for House or Senate seats and irrespective of location. Through careful study of this campaign, we gain a better understanding of the politics of the American West and of the substantial political clout it has gained. And, we can see more clearly how members of Congress understand the process of representation and its electoral consequences.

Incumbent Senator Jon Tester was elected by a razor-thin margin in 2006 and was considered to be one of the most vulnerable Democrats running for reelection. Although characterizing Montana as a Republican state is overly simplistic, voters frequently cast their ballots for Republican presidential candidates. In 2008, Barack Obama may have had the best showing of a Democratic presidential nominee since Bill Clinton, who eked out a win in 1992, but the newly elected president quickly became unpopular among Montanans.<sup>1</sup> The Republican nominee was expected to win the state by double digits in 2012. The Tea Party-fueled midterms in 2010 that brought Republicans a stunning 60-seat gain and a majority in the House of Representatives coincided with similar gains for Montana Republicans. Democrats lost 18 seats in the lower house of the state legislature, becoming a tiny minority in the chamber.

Two years before Election Day 2012, internal Tester polls showed the senator losing to Congressman Denny Rehberg—the widely anticipated Republican nominee—by more than eight points.<sup>2</sup> Tester was in trouble—and if Tester fell, the Democratic majority in the U.S. Senate likely would follow. In February 2011, Rehberg, who had served as the state's lone congressman since 2001, announced his candidacy. This prompted respected national political prognosticators Charlie Cook, Larry Sabato, and Stu Rothenberg to rate Tester as “extremely vulnerable.” All considered the race a toss-up.<sup>3</sup> Many months later, in his final election prediction for the *New York Times*, election forecasting guru Nate Silver gave a 66 percent chance of a Republican Senate victory in Montana.

But Silver would be wrong. Jon Tester defied nearly everyone's expectations and beat Republican Denny Rehberg by nearly four percentage points while Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney handily carried the state by thirteen. Out of

the thirty-three Senate races in the 2012 cycle, Montana was only one of two that Silver predicted incorrectly. Why were Silver and so many other prognosticators wrong? How did Tester survive? Finding an answer to that puzzle is one of the reasons I wrote this book.

It is not the only reason. Through an in-depth analysis of the Montana Senate race, we learn a lot about congressional campaigns, elections, and the process of representation. One might ask whether we can learn anything generalizable from one race unfolding in such a distinctive place. Admittedly, Montana is unusual, as any Montanan will proudly tell you. While it is the fourth-largest state geographically, it is sparsely populated (and only one of seven states with just one member serving in the House of Representatives). Montana also is one of the poorest states in the country and has little ethnic or racial diversity. The two largest minority groups in the country—Latinos and African-Americans—together make up a mere fraction of the state's population. In many ways, Montana appears to be an outlier from which one could not make broad, sweeping conclusions about political phenomena.

But as unique as Montana is, the state—and this particular campaign—is exactly the place a student of politics should study to look for widely applicable conclusions about electioneering and representation at the dawn of the 21st century for four reasons. First, because the race was competitive from start to finish, the 2012 Montana Senate campaign sheds light on whether and under what conditions campaigns affect electoral outcomes. Second, the rise of the West politically throughout the 20th century has made the region critical to the balance of political power nationally while simultaneously altering the content of the national political debate. Third, Montana is no different when it comes to how members of Congress craft and communicate representational styles to constituents—representational styles which are central in the campaign narratives of all congressional campaigns (and especially meaningful in competitive campaign environments). Finally, because I enjoyed unprecedented access to both candidates during the campaigns, I saw campaigns in a way few political scientists do. I travelled with the candidates, watched them interact with constituents, interviewed their staff members after the campaign, and had access to some of their internal data. As a result, we get an up-close-and-personal look at the campaign and its issues.

## **DO CAMPAIGNS MATTER? MONTANA VOTES “YES”**

Let's begin by acknowledging a larger debate among political scientists that has beset the discipline since its very beginnings: Do campaigns matter? Some of the earliest research suggested “no.” These studies of voter behavior indicated that casting a ballot was mostly a function of a person's partisan identification and

socioeconomic status.<sup>4</sup> Given that these characteristics are immutable, campaigns really didn't matter much because voting was a reflexive act. Add more recent scholarship indicating that partisanship actually acts as an information filter—individuals seek information conforming to their preexisting views and discard information contradicting those beliefs<sup>5</sup>—and some political scientists quickly conclude that campaigns are full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.

Alternatively, the authors of *The American Voter*, who identified partisanship as a critical determinant of voter behavior, addressed a puzzle contradicting this theory. In 1952 and 1956, the electorate was overwhelmingly Democratic, and yet Republican Dwight Eisenhower won two presidential races decisively. Something about Eisenhower caused Democrats to abandon their party—at least in the short term—for someone carrying the other party's banner. The authors attribute Eisenhower's appeal to his "projecting a strong personal image and stressing the foreign policy concerns of voters. This allowed less attached and less interested Democratic adherents to overcome their predispositions and cast a vote for Eisenhower."<sup>6</sup> In short, the Republican campaign for Eisenhower mattered. Other scholars have found important campaign effects on the ability of voters to identify and recall candidates, the ways in which candidates and parties are evaluated, increasing voter turnout, and how accurately voters recall the ideology and issue positions of a candidate.<sup>7</sup> This book sheds light on this larger debate among political scientists about campaign effects, concluding that campaigns matter.

A related reason to look at one Senate race in one state—even if that state may not be representative—is that if we believe that campaigns can matter, they should matter the most in a competitive race. The fact is that campaigns often do not matter in many congressional elections because most congressional races are no longer competitive. A singular feature of the modern electoral landscape is the disappearance of so-called marginal congressional districts, a phenomenon first noted by David Mayhew in the early 1970s. Mayhew wrote that between 1956 and 1972, the number of contested House seats with incumbents running for reelection—where the Democratic Party vote share is between 45 percent and 55 percent—declined by roughly half.<sup>8</sup> He argues that one factor for the decline is the increasing value of incumbency; political scientists spent the next two decades measuring incumbency's precise electoral value.<sup>9</sup> When a House incumbent chooses to run for reelection, they win 95 percent of the time throughout the postwar period. According to *The Cook Political Report*, the number of swing congressional districts declined 45 percent between 1998 and 2013, from 164 to just 90.<sup>10</sup> A substantial minority of House members run uncontested each cycle, while another sizeable percentage never face a quality, well-funded challenger (defined as a candidate who has successfully run for and served in an elected office before running for Congress).

But Senate incumbents are not as well-protected as House members. They represent states, not districts, so they are not subject to the redistricting that increases electoral security. Senators are also more likely to draw a quality challenger to run against them. Even so, they enjoy a substantial incumbency advantage. From 1946 through 2012, Senate incumbents choosing to run for reelection who reached the general election won reelection 82 percent of the time. On average, those incumbents won with 63 percent of the vote; only 37 percent of Senate incumbents received less than 55 percent of the vote in the previous election. Forty-five percent of Senate incumbents in the postwar era do not even draw a quality challenger.<sup>11</sup>

In noncompetitive congressional races, voter partisanship and the incumbent's greater name recognition yield the almost universal outcome of the incumbent winning reelection regardless of the campaign effort the incumbent undertakes. But these situations are not a true test of the hypothesis that campaigns matter, because the incumbent dominates the information environment. To better test the proposition that campaigns affect election outcomes, we must look at races where the information environment is up for grabs, such as open seat races or races where the incumbent faces a competitive challenge from a quality candidate.

Congressional incumbents actively discourage the emergence of competitive challengers, so races where they are at an informational disadvantage are rare. Incumbents establish a veneer of invulnerability by constructing massive financial war chests and winning elections by substantial margins. These two factors signal to would-be candidates that most challenges would be costly and unsuccessful. The best candidates—those who have run and won a campaign for elected office—often chose not to run against incumbents because the costs of entry are high, and the return on investment low. Open seats represent the obverse scenario: a lower cost of entry with a higher potential payoff. As a result, the best quality candidates often choose not to challenge incumbents, waiting instead for the incumbent to retire. The end result is that most incumbents breeze easily to reelection while open seats are often expensive, hard-fought affairs where either party's nominee could win. Campaigns can and often do matter in open seat races.<sup>12</sup>

But incumbents can and do lose, and they are much more likely to do so when they present a target of opportunity for a strategically minded challenger. Incumbents embroiled in scandal, as well as those who are perceived as out of touch with constituents, have health problems, or simply have not created a large reelection constituency shatter the cloak of invulnerability. These situations draw quality challengers to run against weakened incumbents. One way to systematically identify incumbent vulnerability is to classify incumbent campaigns as

competitive or not by using three factors: the incumbent's previous vote share, whether the challenger they face in the general election is "quality," and whether the incumbent represents a state that was won by their party's presidential candidate in the last presidential election.

I examined each Senate election featuring an incumbent between 2000 and 2012 and coded a race as "competitive" if the incumbent won the previous election with less than 55 percent of the vote and faced a quality challenger. I also coded a race as competitive if the incumbent's presidential party did not win the state in the most recent presidential election prior to the incumbent's reelection bid. This yielded 79 competitive Senate races with an incumbent candidate running for reelection out of a total of 186. Of the 107 races defined as noncompetitive, the incumbent only lost three times—a reelection rate of 97 percent. In competitive races, 23 incumbents lost for a reelection rate of 71 percent—11 percentage points less than the postwar average of 82 percent.<sup>13</sup>

The Montana Senate race between Jon Tester and Denny Rehberg in 2012 was, by this definition, a competitive race. Rehberg, as the state's lone congressman, was certainly a "quality" challenger. Democrat Tester won his initial campaign in 2006 with only 49 percent of the vote—and, in fact, beat incumbent Senator Conrad Burns by less than 3,600 votes. Finally, Republican presidential nominee John McCain won the popular vote in Montana by a little more than two percentage points in 2008. The most important question for our purposes, however, is whether the Montana Senate race as a case is representative of the larger population of competitive Senate races. If so, it is much more likely that we can apply the lessons learned from this single case to competitive Senate races (and to the bigger question of whether campaigns matter). If it is not, then we have an interesting story to share but not much else.

In three important respects, the 2012 Montana Senate race is a typical example of a competitive Senate campaign. The average Senate incumbent spent \$9.2 million dollars in competitive races between 2000 and 2012. The average challenger? \$5.4 million. In Montana, incumbent Tester spent a little more than \$13 million. His challenger, Rehberg, spent slightly more than \$9 million. In both cases, these amounts are above the mean by less than one standard deviation. In other words, the spending by both the incumbent and challenger is about what one would expect in a typical, competitive Senate campaign. The average Republican presidential share of the vote in competitive Senate elections was 58 percent; in Montana, Mitt Romney won with 55 percent of the vote in 2012. Finally, competitive Senate seats are more likely to be found in more sparsely populated states: Competitive Senate races averaged 850,792 in population compared to 2.5 million in noncompetitive campaigns. Montana—population one million, distinctive and different in so many ways—is precisely the place to understand the dynamics of a

competitive Senate race because it is not terribly distinctive from other places hosting competitive Senate elections. The 2012 Montana Senate race matters to an audience beyond Montana because it is a case from which generalizable conclusions can be drawn about competitive Senate races.

## THE RISE OF THE WEST

To understand the second reason why the 2012 Montana Senate race is important to the study of campaigns and elections, it helps to think about the larger social forces sweeping across the American landscape over the past 100 years. One of the most prominent changes across the 20th and early 21st centuries is the nation's demographic march westward.

At the turn of the 20th century, the West was literally empty. According to a report of the United States Census Bureau, only 5.4 percent of Americans lived in the 13 western states in 1900.<sup>14</sup> The most populated region? The Midwest, which nearly 35 percent of Americans called home. A century later, 23 percent of Americans live in the West—well eclipsing the nine eastern states at 19 percent. And the percentage of Americans living in the Midwest has fallen considerably to just 22.9 percent. The South grew, too, but at a much slower pace. In fact, the report notes that the West grew faster than any other region in every decade during the 20th century—and at twice the rate of every other region in every decade save during the 1930s.

The shift of America's population southward and westward is perhaps best expressed by the movement of the mean demographic center of the country. In 1900, that center was in Bartholomew County, Indiana, to the south and east of Indianapolis.<sup>15</sup> In 2000, the center had gravitated all the way to Phelps County, Missouri—324 miles west but only 101 miles south. Americans were moving to sunnier and more temperate climates in droves, but the shift westward was more dramatic than it was to the old Confederacy. The West has been the engine of demographic growth and change in modern America. As Horace Greeley exhorted famously “Go West, young man!”—we have.

The West was becoming less isolated culturally and politically. The diffusion of innovation and ideas was challenging in a region with few navigable rivers, often impenetrable mountains, and nearly no urban centers. In 1900, only San Francisco—with a population of 342,000—was ranked as one of America's ten largest cities (and it was tenth). Both Cleveland and Buffalo had more people. Fast forward to 2010: Now four of America's largest cities—Los Angeles, Phoenix, San Diego, and San Jose—are in the West and each has a population of 900,000 or more.<sup>16</sup> The creation of the federal highway system allowed Americans to spread beyond the crowded cities north and east of the Mississippi. Some moved

to suburbs, but still more moved to the open spaces of the West. The establishment of reliable water supplies has been critical for urbanization and population growth. Reliable water came courtesy of federally funded irrigation and hydroelectric projects built by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, which was established by the Newlands Reclamation Act of 1902.<sup>17</sup> As the West overcame isolation and water scarcity, it became a more attractive place for Americans to live.

As Americans moved west, political ramifications followed.<sup>18</sup> This massive demographic movement drained the East and especially the Midwest of political clout in the House of Representatives. In 1900, 40 percent of House seats belonged to the Midwest—more than any other region and fully ten percentage points more than the South and the West combined. The West only had five percent of those seats.<sup>19</sup> If population growth trends continue as estimated, the West will receive 105 House seats by 2020—or 24 percent of available seats, beating the Midwest by 2 seats.<sup>20</sup> The West already surpassed the East in congressional seats during the 1990s apportionment and will be second only to the South politically in 2020.

Unlike the South or the East, the West remains a politically contestable region. During the last decade, more than two-thirds of all House and Senate seats were controlled by the Democratic and Republican Parties in the East and the South, respectively. In the West, 51 percent of Senate seats were held by Republicans during the same period. In the House, Republicans controlled 43 percent of House seats. The Midwest also remains quite competitive between the parties, with Democrats controlling 58 percent of Senate and 47 percent of House seats, respectively.<sup>21</sup>

As political power shifts to the competitive West, the influence of the region on the nation's politics increases. This means that specifically Western issues—public land use, water law, the management of endangered species, and environmental management more generally—will take up a greater portion of the national political conversation. If we want to understand where American politics is going, we must study the region gaining political prominence and examine the congressional elections there, such as Montana's Senate race between Congressman Rehberg and Senator Tester.

## **BUILDING CONSTITUENT CONNECTIONS**

Finally, the reason why the 2012 Montana Senate campaign may be applicable to other elections centered on the art of connecting with constituents. Richard Fenno's pioneering studies of members of Congress, which spanned more than a dozen books across four decades of scholarship, advanced a simple but powerful observation: To understand how members of Congress represent their constituents, one

must observe them as they spend time at home. Fenno argues that members of Congress develop “home styles” reflecting relationships with constituents, their allocation of official resources, and their Washington work.

All members of Congress cultivate distinctive home styles in dealing with their constituents. Although it is true that particular home styles are more widely used by House members than by senators, and while there is clear evidence that state size affects how members choose to represent constituencies and allocate their representational resources, the cultivation of a home style is fundamental to understanding how members of Congress do their jobs.<sup>22</sup> It is also fundamental to the reputations they craft and communicate on the campaign trail. Significantly, Members of Congress themselves behave as if those representational relationships matter in terms of how their constituents perceive them. This belief is grounded empirically.<sup>23</sup> To witness how these relationships are forged requires an in-depth case study such as the one that unfolds in these pages. And while the representational styles Jon Tester and Denny Rehberg chose to adopt are a function of the state they represent, the fact that each chose different styles in the same geographic constituency is further evidence that what is witnessed in Montana is not unique to Montana. That a diversity of home styles exists within a place that is, by most measures, not terribly diverse is powerful evidence that the routines and relationships observed in Montana are applicable elsewhere.

To show the importance of each candidate’s relationship with constituents to the outcome of the 2012 Senate election, I documented their home styles—the interactions both Congressman Rehberg and Senator Tester had individually with the folks back home in Montana. To do this, I relied not only on their communications with constituents but also their legislative accomplishments. I also repeatedly travelled with and interviewed them as they engaged in the process of representation while their campaigns for the United States Senate unfolded in 2011 and 2012. Although events dictated many of my questions, I began with their perceptions of representation and often went back to those perceptions. Did they see themselves as primarily constituent servants, looking for and solving constituent problems? Was their primary responsibility as representatives to take positions on the key issues of the day? What about bringing pork back to the state? Or did their conception of representation defy such categorization? How did they define Montana and the value of its citizens? I wanted to know how each communicated his work in Washington to Montanans and how his conceptualization served as a rationale for why he should either be reelected (Tester) or sent to the Senate instead (Rehberg).

Who they believed they represented within Montana was as important as each of their individual conceptualizations of representation. In Fenno’s words, who were their primary constituents, and who were their intimates? To which groups

did each pay the most attention, and why? And, last but not least, how did they work to communicate that message to Montanans when they travelled throughout the state? Just as important as their answers to these questions are the interactions I observed between them and Montanans. By travelling with both the senator and the congressman, I could see clearly not only how each *did* the job of representation but how that representation was *perceived*. The difference in the styles each demonstrated and their reception by Montanans explains in part why Tester was able to prevail despite facing fundamentals on the ground favoring his erstwhile challenger.

## A RINGSIDE SEAT

The stakes were high in Montana in 2012. The Senate majority was up for grabs, and the path to that majority ran straight through the Big Sky. The low cost of media in Montana, the successful recruitment of Montana's lone congressman, Denny Rehberg, to run, and first-term Senator Jon Tester's low margin of victory made this an attractive pickup opportunity for Republicans. Democrats absolutely had to retain this seat or risk losing their recently achieved competitive edge in the Rocky Mountain West. The two men vying for the seat had deep roots in Montana agriculture but represented very different political philosophies. Both could readily claim a connection to Montana's unique and somewhat contradictory political traditions. Most importantly, the story that unfolds here illustrates the process of congressional representation in an era of polarized parties and social media while providing a window into the elusive world of modern electioneering that so far is absent from much scholarship on congressional elections and campaigns. And, as I had access to and cooperation from both candidates throughout the campaign, I am uniquely positioned to understand and evaluate the actions and responses of both sides as events unfolded to a grand conclusion—one that was never pre-ordained or certain. I had a ringside seat. And now, so do you.

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## NOTES

1. Clinton's victory was likely because Ross Perot's third party candidacy pulled 26 percent of the vote, well above the 19 percent he received nationally in the popular vote.
2. Tom Lopach, interview with author, January 7, 2013.
3. Jeremy P. Jacobs, "Starting Lineup: Rehberg Running," *Hotline on Call*, February 1, 2011, <http://www.nationaljournal.com/blogs/hotlineoncall/2011/02/starting-lineup-rehberg-running-01>; "Montana Senate: Rehberg Moves Race to Toss-up." *Rothenberg*

*Political Report*, February 1, 2011; Larry J. Sabato. "The Crystal Ball's 2012 Roll-Out, Part One," *Sabato's Crystal Ball*, January 6, 2011, <http://www.centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/articles/ljs2011010601/>.

4. Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954); Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960).

5. Leon Festinger, *A Theory on Cognitive Dissonance*. (Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson, 1957); Susanna Dilliplane, "All the News You Want to Hear: The Impact of Partisan News Exposure on Political Participation," *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 75, no. 2 (2011), 287–316; Natalie J. Stroud, "Polarization and Partisan Selective Exposure," *Journal of Communication* 60, no. 3 (2010), 556–576.

6. David C.W. Parker, *The Power of Money in Congressional Campaigns, 1880–2006*. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008), 5n, 245n.

7. Parker, *The Power of Money in Congressional Campaigns*; Richard Johnston, Andre Blais, Henry E. Brady, and Jean Crete, *Letting the People Decide: Dynamics of a Canadian Election* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992); Larry M. Bartels, *Presidential Primaries and the Dynamics of Public Choice* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Samuel L. Popkin, *The Reasoning Voter*. 2nd edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); John Zaller, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Geoffrey C. Layman and Thomas M. Carsey, "Party Polarization and 'Conflict Extension' in the American Electorate," *American Journal of Political Science* 46 (2002): 786–802; Constantine J. Spiliotes and Lynn Vavreck, "Campaign Advertising: Partisan Convergence or Divergence?" *Journal of Politics* 64 (2002): 249–61; John R. Petrocik, "Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study," *American Journal of Political Science* 40 (1996): 825–50; Steven E. Finkel and John G. Geer, "A Spot Check: Casting Doubt on the Demobilizing Effect of Attack Advertising," *American Journal of Political Science* 42 (1998): 573–95; Paul Freedman and Kenneth M. Goldstein, "Measuring Media Exposure and the Effects of Negative Campaign Ads," *American Journal of Political Science* 43 (1999): 1189–1208; Richard R. Lau and Lee Sigelman, "Effectiveness of Political Advertising," in *Crowded Airwaves: Campaign Advertising in Elections*, eds. James A. Thurber, Candice J. Nelson, and David A. Dulio, 10–43, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000); Kenneth S. Goldstein and Paul Freedman, "New Evidence for New Arguments: Money and Advertising in the 1996 Senate Elections," *Journal of Politics* 62 (2000): 1087–1108; Kenneth M. Goldstein and Paul Freedman, "Campaign Advertising and Voter Turnout: New Evidence for a Stimulation Effect," *Journal of Politics* 64 (2002): 721–40; Kim Fridkin Kahn and Patrick J. Kenney, "How Negative Campaigning Enhances Knowledge of Senate Elections," in *Crowded Airwaves: Campaign Advertising in Elections*, eds. James A. Thurber, Candice J. Nelson, and David A. Dulio, 65–95 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000); Travis N. Ridout and Michael M. Franz, *The Persuasive Power of Campaign Advertising*, Kindle Edition, (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2011); James E. Campbell, *The American Campaign: U.S. Presidential Campaigns and the National Vote*, (College Station, TX: Texas A & M Press, 2000); Donald P. Green and Alan S. Gerber, *Get Out the Vote: How to Increase Voter Turnout*, 2nd Edition, (Washington, DC: Brookings

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8. David R. Mayhew, "Congressional Elections: The Case of the Vanishing Marginals," *Polity* 6 (1974), 295–317.

9. See Morris Fiorina, *Congress: The Keystone of the Washington Establishment*, Revised Edition. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989); Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn, and Morris Fiorina, *The Personal Vote and Electoral Independence*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987).

10. David Wasserman, "Introducing the 2014 Cook Political Report Partisan Voter Index," *Cook Political Report*, April 4, 2013, <http://cookpolitical.com/story/5604>. A great debate in political science concerns the causes of polarization and the decline of competitive House seats. See Sean M. Theriault, *Party Polarization in Congress*, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

11. Analysis available upon request.

12. Gary C. Jacobson and Samuel Kernell, *Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982).

13. Analysis available upon request.

14. Frank Hobbs and Nicole Stoops, *Demographic Trends in the 20th Century*, United States Census Bureau Special Report, November 2002, 19, <http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/censr-4.pdf>. The Census Bureau defines the American West as Montana, Wyoming, Idaho, Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, California, Washington, Oregon, Nevada, Alaska, and Hawaii. The Midwest includes Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. The Eastern states are New England plus New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.

15. *Ibid.*, 17.

16. United States Department of Commerce, Census Bureau, "Highest Ranking Cities, 1790–2010," <http://www.census.gov/dataviz/visualizations/007/508.php>, accessed September 26, 2013.

17. Marc Reisner, *Cadillac Desert: The American West and Its Disappearing Water*, Revised Kindle Edition, (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1993).

18. Political scientists have spent more time focused on the South's political development than on the West's.

19. I used Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal's NOMINATE data for congressional membership and coded members of Congress by region. Analysis available from author. NOMINATE data can be downloaded at <http://www.voteview.com>.

20. Sean Trende, "What 2010 Census Tells Us About 2020," *Real Clear Politics*, December 28, 2011, [http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2011/12/28/what\\_2010\\_census\\_tells\\_us\\_about\\_2020\\_reapportionment.html](http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2011/12/28/what_2010_census_tells_us_about_2020_reapportionment.html)

21. Calculated from Poole and Rosenthal's NOMINATE data. See footnote 18 above.

22. David C.W. Parker and Craig Goodman, "Our State's Never Had Better Friends: Resource Allocation, Home Styles, and Dual Representation in the Senate," *Political*

*Research Quarterly* 66, no. 2 (2013), 370–384; Frances E. Lee and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, *Sizing up the Senate: The Unequal Consequences of Equal Representation*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).

23. Ibid.; Wendy J. Schiller, *Partners and Rivals: Representation in U.S. Senate Delegations*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); David C.W. Parker and Craig Goodman, “Making a Good Impression: Resource Allocation, Home Styles, and Washington Work,” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 34, no. 4 (2009), 493–524.

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