

The Termination of Civil War and Post-Conflict Issues

How wars end has much to do with how, and for how long, they are fought. In this chapter, we will find that wars can resolve political conflicts and lead to peace when all belligerents become exhausted or when one wins decisively (Luttwak 1999). War brings peace only after passing a culminating phase of violence, as hopes of military success must have declined for accommodation to be more attractive than continued fighting (Luttwak 1999). Some research indicates that the longer the war's duration, the less likely it will lead to one faction's victory and the more likely there will be a negotiated settlement. Indeed, rebel victories (the least likely outcome) usually occur in the first few years of the war and government victories typically within the war's first 5 years. After about ten years, a decisive victory by either group is rare (Brandt et al. 2008).

This chapter first examines the outcome of conflicts and the peace agreements that can be signed to cease hostilities before focusing on the nature of such agreements. Here, power sharing, territorial autonomy, and electoral and amnesty agreement provisions, along with their impact on the successful implementation of a peace agreement, are outlined. Finally, major post-conflict issues are identified. More specifically, state formation, democratization, and peace-building are outlined in this section.

TYPES AND TRENDS IN CIVIL WAR OUTCOMES

Theories of war termination rarely conceptualize or explain war termination as the obverse of war initiation. This is because of two key reasons. First, unlike decisions to initiate or join wars, which often are made unilaterally, war termination is not always the result of unilateral action because in many cases both sides must cooperate to end conflict. Wars can be terminated through unilateral action if one side defeats the other militarily. Second, war initiation and termination do not necessarily share the same causes (Wolf 2011:1756).

Scholars classify war outcomes according to several different types, and they often use UCDP data in their research. The UCDP's figures on major armed conflicts are published in the annual Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) *Yearbook*. (For more on SIPRI, see Box 6.1.) Among the types of outcomes, a cease-fire agreement with conflict regulation is an agreement between the main parties active in the last year of conflict, regarding the ending of military operations, along with some sort of mutual conflict regulatory steps. The agreement is signed and/or accepted either during the last year of active conflict or during the first year of inactivity.

BOX 6.1 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

The SIPRI is an independent international institute that undertakes research into conflict, armaments, arms control, and disarmament. The Institute provides data, analysis, and recommendations, based on open sources, to policy makers, researchers, the media, and interested members of the public. Although based in Stockholm, Sweden, the SIPRI has a presence in China and the United States. The institute cooperates closely with intergovernmental organizations, such as the United Nations and the European Union (EU). It was established in 1966 on the basis of a decision by the Swedish Parliament, and a significant part of its funding is via an annual Swedish government grant. The institute seeks additional financial support from other organizations to assist with its broad research program. The SIPRI is currently directed by Tilman Brück with staff numbering approximately 50 to 60 (SIPRI 2013a).

A cease-fire agreement is an agreement between all, or the main, parties active in the last year of conflict on the ending of military operations. The agreement is signed and/or accepted either during the last year of active conflict or during the first year of inactivity. The *victory* outcome means one side active in the last year of conflict is either defeated or eliminated, or otherwise succumbs to the power of the other through capitulation or public announcement. The *low activity* outcome obtains when conflict activity continues but does not reach the UCDP threshold for fatalities. Finally, *other* simply means the conflict does not fulfill the UCDP criteria for organization or incompatibility.

A useful way to evaluate how civil wars end is through using the comprehensive UCDP dataset of conflict terminations from 1946 to 2009. The dataset provides outcomes for 332 civil war episodes (see Table 6.1). An armed conflict was counted as having terminated each time the conflict or the warring party failed to reach UCDP's threshold for inclusion in one calendar year. This occurred when the incompatibility was solved either by an agreement or by a victory, when a party ceased to exist, or when the use of armed force did not meet the 25 battle-related deaths criteria (UCDP 2014b).

The most common termination outcome was the continuation of low activity fighting whereby fatalities did not meet the UCDP threshold for armed conflict (142 cases), followed by the victory of one faction over the other (102 cases) and peace agreements (42 cases). These were concerned with resolving or regulating the incompatibility—completely or a central part, which is signed and/or accepted by all or the main parties either during the last year of active conflict or during the first year of inactivity. The government was victorious over the rebels the majority of times (71 to 31 victories). The aggregate data on termination shown in Table 6.1 obscure some important historical context that distinguishes conflicts fought during the Cold War versus those fought after the Cold War, for reasons we will elaborate below.

During the Cold War, one party often was able to secure its victory. If analysts isolate the 141 Cold War civil wars that took place from 1946 to 1989, they find that victory for one party was the most common way conflicts were terminated (82 terminations or 58.2 percent). A high-profile example of this was the defeat of South Vietnam by North Vietnamese forces in April 1975. The second most common way conflicts were terminated—45 (31.9 percent)—involved neither a victory nor any type of agreement (an *other* outcome). For instance, conflict might have continued but not have reached the threshold of 25 battle-related deaths per year, or a party might have withdrawn from the fighting. A peace agreement, an agreement concerned with the resolution of the incompatibility signed and/or publicly accepted by all or the main conflict

TABLE 6.1
Outcomes of Civil Wars Terminated 1946–2009

Low or no activity	Victory	Peace Agreement	Cease-fire Agreement with Conflict Regulation	Cease-fire Agreement	Other
142	102	42	25	13	8

Source: UCDP Conflict Termination dataset v.2010–1, 1946–2009 and Codebook (2010) (see <http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/>)

actors, was the third most common outcome (12, or 8.5 percent). The least number of conflicts—two, or 1.4 percent—were ended by a cease-fire whereby an agreement between all the main conflict actors terminated military operations, though the incompatibility between them was not addressed (Kreutz 2010:245–246). Luttwak has written that cease-fires allow factions to regroup and rearm. Thus, cease-fires can intensify and prolong conflict once they end, which usually occurs (Luttwak 1999).

In the years during and after the decline of Cold War tensions (1990–2005), the dataset indicates that changes occurred with how conflicts ended. Here, more conflicts ended through peace agreements and cease-fires. This was potentially influenced by many of the Cold War conflicts being proxy wars where the superpowers assisted the fighting parties. After the Cold War, the most common end of a conflict was via an *other* outcome (71 terminations, or 48.3 percent) and cease-fires (29, or 19.7 percent). These were followed by peace agreements (27, or 18.4 percent) and victory (20, or 13.6 percent). Research indicates that such outcomes might have been facilitated by the post-Cold War international community becoming more willing and capable at mediating conflict and by increased third-party peacekeeping abilities (Kreutz 2010:246). As already noted in Chapter 3, approximately 25 percent of post-World War II insurgencies were won by the government, and 11 percent were won by insurgents (Jones 2008:10, 14).

More recently, other conflicts have been classified as no longer active by the UCDP, though their conclusion is not necessarily permanent. The Russian conflict over Chechnya technically ended with the Chechen insurgent leader proclaiming the independent “Caucasus Emirate” including most of Russia’s North Caucasus region. This created a more far-reaching territorial incompatibility, and there were fewer than 400 battle-related deaths during 2008. The Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People—National Liberation Forces signed a peace agreement in December, 2008 and the Tamil Tigers were defeated militarily the following May. After negotiations, a cease-fire officially declared in 2003 between the Philippine government and Moro Islamic Liberation Front was also reaffirmed in July 2009 (SIPRI 2005–2013, *Yearbook* 2009:73–74; *Yearbook* 2010:66; *Yearbook* 2011:65).

Eleven conflicts registered for 2011 by the UCDP, including 10 civil wars, were no longer active in 2012. The civil wars involved Iran, Cote d’Ivoire, Libya, Mauritania, Myanmar (Karen), Myanmar (Shan), Senegal (Casamance), Sudan (Abyei), Tajikistan, and Uganda. The Iranian and Tajikistan governments successfully targeted the insurgents, whereas Cote d’Ivoire and Libyan insurgents were victorious. Peace negotiations occurred in Myanmar and Senegal, with fighting

deescalating in Mauritania and Uganda. Conflict over the Abyei area became an intrastate war with South Sudan's independence (Themnér and Wallensteen 2013:514–515).

TYPES OF PEACE AGREEMENTS

As peace agreements can be an effective tool for ending and resolving civil wars, they require study. This is reinforced by the use of such agreements changing over time and by their various types along with levels of effectiveness. As mentioned, overall, the UCDP conflict termination dataset 1946–2009 identified 42 observations of intrastate conflicts terminated by peace agreements (see Table 6.1). A peace agreement is a formal agreement between warring parties, which addresses their disputed incompatibility. This is either by settling all or part of it, or by clearly outlining a process for how the warring parties plan to regulate the incompatibility.

All agreements that concern, manage, or regulate the stated incompatibility are considered peace agreements, including peace process agreements. A full agreement occurs when two armed and opposing actors (dyads) agree to settle the whole incompatibility, while a partial peace agreement involves one or more dyad agreeing to settle part of the incompatibility. A peace process agreement is an agreement where one or more dyad agrees to initiate a process that aims to settle the incompatibility. Agreements are also categorized between comprehensive, which include all conflict dyads, and dyadic agreements where at least one of the conflict parties is excluded (UCDP 2012c). Although there was a high annual occurrence of signed peace agreements during the 1990s and early 2000s, the number dropped significantly from 10 to one between 2008 and 2009. The figure increased slightly to two the following year before falling to one in 2011, the lowest figure since 1987 (Themnér and Wallensteen 2012:571). Agreements increased to four in 2012, with three seeking to address civil wars (the Central African Republic, the Philippines, and South Sudan). These agreements illustrate the importance of taking into account the multiparty nature of many conflicts (Themnér and Wallensteen 2013:515–516). Such conflicts are particularly difficult to address via agreements given the challenge of negotiating between many parties. Given that many recent civil wars have involved multiple parties, this might help explain the decline of agreements.

Using the UCDP dataset on peace agreements from 1989 to 2005, 144 accords between warring parties, which cover one third of 121 armed conflicts, were identified. Of these accords, 142 were for intrastate conflicts and two for interstate conflicts. Three groups of agreements were distinguished. The most clear-cut was a full agreement where at least one dyad agreed to settle the whole

incompatibility, with 43 such agreements recorded. Another 79 partial agreements, whereby the parties in at least one dyad agreed to settle part of the incompatibility, were made. Finally, there were 22 peace process agreements. These agreements involved at least one conflict dyad agreeing to initiate a process to settle the incompatibility, such as through peace talks (Harbom, Högladh, and Wallensteen 2006:622–624).

Further information is provided by the “Peace Accords Matrix” (Kroc Institute 2012) developed by the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies and UCDP to study comprehensive peace agreements (CPAs). A CPA is defined as a written document produced through negotiations. It is comprehensive in two dimensions. First, the major conflict parties are involved in the negotiations process. Second, the negotiation process includes substantive issues underlying the conflict. A CPA is defined by the process and product of negotiations, not the written document’s implementation or impact. An agreement can still be comprehensive even if it does not lead to a comprehensive peace. The matrix outlines 35 such agreements from 1989 to 2004 in countries including Lebanon, Cambodia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina (see Table 6.2).

Various factors can influence the likelihood of a peace agreement being signed and its outcome. Here, a model developed by Mason, Weingarten, and Fett (1999) is particularly relevant. This implies that a settlement becomes more likely as estimates of the probability of victory decline, conflict costs increase, the estimated time required to win increases, or the utility from a settlement increases relative to that of victory. Contrasting this, factors that increase one faction’s

TABLE 6.2
Selected Comprehensive Peace Agreements (CPAs)

Country	Agreement and Date
Lebanon	Taif Accord, October 22, 1989
Cambodia	Framework for a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, October 23, 1991
Bosnia and Herzegovina	General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, November 21, 1995
East Timor (Timor-Leste)	Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on the question of East Timor, May 5, 1999
Angola	Luena Memorandum of Understanding, April 4, 2002
Sudan	Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement, January 9, 2005

Source: Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame (2012).

probability of victory, increase its payoffs from victory, reduce conflict costs, and/or reduce the time required to win increase that faction's probability of victory and reduce the likelihood of a settlement. The scholars tested these propositions with a model that correctly predicted the outcome in 86 percent of the cases (Mason et al. 1999:239). With regard to the settlement's actual outcome, a statistical analysis of peace agreement concessions since 1989 indicated that rebels received substantially greater concessions when there was a mediator biased in their favor, while measures of relative strength and the costliness of combat were not associated with benefit distribution. The analysis also showed that rebel groups with an ethnic identity obtained greater concessions than those without (Cunningham 2012).

The U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP), an independent, nonpartisan conflict management center established by Congress to prevent and mitigate international conflict without resorting to violence, has identified common provisions included in agreements. This list includes security guarantees, human rights protections, elections, implementation strategies, timetables, return of displaced peoples, and disarmament/demobilization and reintegration (DDR) (see Smith and Smock 2008, Table 6.3). Here power sharing, territorial autonomy, and electoral and amnesty provisions are outlined along with their impact on the successful implementation of a peace agreement.

POWER-SHARING PROVISIONS

Relinquishing control over conquered territory and creating a new central government is important for groups seeking to end civil war through negotiation. Research has identified dangers of concentrating power with a single party or individual, and various scholars agree that deeply divided societies can best be governed via sharing power. Divided societies can be more stable and peaceful: Power is decentralized in a federal system; power is dispersed via a parliamentary rather than presidential system; individuals are elected through the proportion of votes cast rather than a strict majority; and proportional systems tend to be more consensual (Walter 1999:138–139). The importance of former enemies working together has been noted. For instance, successfully ending ethnic war requires faction leaders changing their nationalist discourses to justify peace and reconciliation, while reducing hostile discourses. Simultaneously, the societies themselves must rebuild their relationship into one cooperative enough to facilitate the resolving of mutual problems and compatible with positive images and attitudes toward the other group (Kaufman 2006a:215). Other scholars have also written that a stable postwar peace is helped by preventing either side from permanently excluding others from the political process (Fortna 2008).

Four types of power-sharing arrangements are typically identified: political, territorial, military, and economic. Political power-sharing rules stipulate that a new executive, legislative, and civil service be established so that factions share power. Territorial power sharing gives the rebel group autonomy to control local politics in a specific region or mandates a federal state where subunits have power relative to the central government. Military power sharing often allows both parties' troops in a new joint defense force and/or the appointment of rebels to high military ranks. Economic power sharing seeks a more balanced distribution of economic resources via redistributive policies (Mattes and Savun 2009:741). Walter (2002) writes that political power sharing involving a guaranteed share of cabinet posts or specific quotas in a main government branch along with military and territorial power sharing are important. Her research indicates that both political and territorial power sharing make it more likely that opponents sign a peace deal and that peace is maintained for at least 5 years (Mattes and Savun 2009:741). The Centre for the Study of Civil War (CSCW) has identified three key policy components often included in power-sharing negotiations: (a) recognition of ethnic and religious group rights, (b) inclusion of a "sunset" date (a limitation on the duration of power sharing), and (c) wealth sharing (formulas that distribute the state's resources or economic product among different regions or social groups) (Gates 2006–2011).

Settlements often include power-sharing provisions. The UCDP dataset on peace agreements 1989 to 2005 identified 48 percent of all agreements addressing intrastate conflict over government as including provisions on elections. Another 30 percent had provisions on the composition of an interim government, 28 percent on integration into the government civil service, and 15 percent on power sharing. The integration of former combatants into the army was provided for in 43 percent of agreements relating to intrastate conflicts over government and 27 percent over territory (Harbom et al. 2006:624).

Of 48 negotiated civil war settlements from 1945 to 2005, 14 (30 percent) included political power-sharing provisions. These were any of the following: legislative elections based on proportional or equal representation, each group being guaranteed cabinet and ministerial posts, and representation in the civil service. Ten (22 percent) had two of these provisions, and another 10 (22 percent) had only one provision. Military power sharing involved the military forces of factions being integrated into the new state's defense force, along with rebel representatives appointed to leadership positions. Seven cases (15 percent) had both these military provisions with 22 (48 percent) having one. Economic power-sharing provisions included resource redistribution to favor disadvantaged groups and specific redistributive policies, such as a percentage share of oil revenues. Three

cases (7 percent) had both these provisions with 13 cases (28 percent) having one. Finally, territorial power-sharing provisions involved the group exercising control over local issues in a particular region (autonomy) and all subunits being given powers separate from the central government (federalism). No agreements had both of these provisions, but 16 cases (35 percent) included one (Mattes and Savun 2009:747–749, 756). Of the CPAs identified in the “Peace Accords Matrix,” 17 included power sharing via a transitional government and three territorial power sharing (Kroc Institute 2012).

According to Hartzell and Hoddie (2007), civil war settlements including power-sharing and power-dividing institutions were most likely to provide enduring peace. First, institutions can be designed to address group concerns over the state’s postwar control of political, economic, territorial, and military power. Second, creating institutions can signal a credible commitment to build long-term peace. The scholars’ study of civil wars concluded through negotiations from 1945 to 1999, and they found that the durability of peace was strengthened by creating more power-sharing and power-dividing institutions. They suggested that implementing peace agreements including power-sharing institutions provided an opportunity for former combatants autonomously to overcome mutual distrust (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007). The nature of the war’s conclusion can influence the success of political power-sharing agreements too. For example, if the war ended in a military stalemate, the government may exploit its offer of political power sharing to insurgents to misrepresent information about its military capacity and then defeat the insurgency. This can exacerbate commitment problems, increase support for insurgent leaders from civilian supporters, and ultimately increase the likelihood of renewed fighting (Mukherjee 2006). Civil war may lead to more inclusive polities if it serves to even the balance of power between contending groups. A balance is more likely to bring about more democratic polities, especially where power sharing is formalized in a negotiated settlement (Gurses and Mason 2008).

The difficulty of implementing power-sharing agreements impacts their durability. DeRouen, Lea, and Wallenstein (2009) write that power-sharing provisions that are costlier to the government and more difficult to implement decrease the agreement’s life span. This is because of the government’s motivations to renegotiate politically costly terms and rebel incentives to strike preemptively before the government does, or out of frustration with delays in implementing costly provisions. Hence, governments abandon the agreement because it concedes too much, or rebels abandon the agreement because of implementation delays and/or to act preemptively. The authors examined three forms of power-sharing provisions: military (integration of rebels into the

army), territorial (autonomy), and political (shared government). The results indicated that the less costly concessions by government of military integration and autonomy increased the duration of peace agreements, while political power-sharing provisions had a negative but insignificant impact on duration (DeRouen et al. 2009).

The difficulties of ensuring stable peace through power sharing are illustrated by various conflicts. Major ethnic conflicts settled by compromise deals among the fighting factions often ultimately collapse. Peace agreements in Lebanon (1958 and 1976) failed with further fighting. Moreover, international efforts to promote power sharing can have major negative consequences. The 1994 Rwanda genocide was staged by Hutu extremists attempting to prevent implementation of a UN-sponsored power-sharing deal with a minority Tutsi-led rebel group. Likewise, when East Timorese voted for independence from Indonesia in a 1999 UN-sponsored deal, militia groups supported by the Indonesian military undertook massacres. More recently, moves to ensure fairer political power sharing in Iraq have not ended the violence. In February 2013, about 35 people were killed in two attacks in Kirkuk, a city in northern Iraq with many Kurds. This was despite the country formally being a parliamentary democracy with a 325-seat unicameral Council of Representatives. The council has 317 members elected by an optional open list and representing a specific governorate, proportional representation system and eight seats reserved for minorities (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] 2013b). Furthermore, the country is classified as *not free* by Freedom House, the later section on democratization providing more coverage of freedoms.

Electoral Provisions

Over one third of civil war peace treaties signed between 1989 and 2005 included a provision for elections or electoral reforms. These elections became increasingly likely shortly after the civil war ended, the average time to the first post-civil war election falling from 5.5 years to 2.7 years (Brancati and Snyder 2011:470, 474). The actual timing of the first post-conflict election was primarily influenced by the balance of power between governments and rebels at the war's conclusion and the level of international involvement in post-conflict countries. Early elections were most likely when peace was tenuous and incumbents and rebels evenly matched, as frequently occurred when wars ended in settlements and truces. In this context, rebels were strong enough militarily to insist on elections, while international actors are capable of using their leverage to encourage early elections. When wars concluded in settlements and truces, rebels were likely to demand elections to win power and politically achieve their goals. For instance,

this encouraged Nepal's Maoist rebels to make elections a central part of negotiations to end that country's civil war in 2006 (Brancati and Snyder 2011:473).

However, research indicates that holding elections soon after a civil war ends might increase the possibility of renewed fighting. Quick elections may increase the likelihood that one faction will reject the results and have the ability to resume fighting. Furthermore, early postwar elections can increase the prospect that the newly elected government consists of antireform elites who adopt policies likely to renew conflict. Elections involving evenly balanced armed parties without institutionalized guarantees of group security are especially dangerous. Thus, elections can lead back to war when they follow negotiated settlements or truces rather than decisive military victories, occur without power-sharing agreements, and precede the rebel army's demobilization and creation of strong governmental institutions (Brancati and Snyder 2011:470). Iraq again is a relevant case study as fighting has continued despite elections. Iraqis voted in December 2005 for the first full-term government and parliament since the U.S.-led invasion, with the most recent election in March 2010.

Territorial Provisions

Territorial autonomy can allow one (or more) subunits of a country to exercise control over local issues, without extending those powers to other subunits (Hartzell et al. 2001:205). Although groups may demand independence or sovereignty while the government seeks to strengthen its central control, autonomy may be acceptable to both. This is because it can allow each group to promote its interests and ensure that the other does not gain predominance on certain matters. Autonomy can reassure groups that state power will not be seized by one group and used to threaten them. By increasing policy-making influence at the subnational level while reducing central powers, groups can feel better protected from the central authority. Similarly, autonomy can be used to divide or balance power, such as through including groups in the central government. Autonomy can help to reduce competition among rival groups in a divided society, perhaps via addressing group disparities by enabling a minority people to advance within their own state bureaucracies and education systems. Providing resources and opportunities available at the subunit level can diffuse some of the economic power controlled by the political center too (Hartzell et al. 2001:191–192).

The frequency and effectiveness of this provision has been included in a study of 103 conflicts from 1945 to 1998. These conflicts had at least 1,000 battle deaths per year, the government was one of the fighting factions, there was effective resistance by both the national government and its adversaries during the

conflict, and fighting occurred within a defined political unit (Hartzell et al. 2001:193–194). Of these conflicts, 13 were still unresolved at the end of 1998, and 49 ended in a military victory for one side. However, 41 were concluded through negotiated settlement with factional representatives holding direct talks. Of 38 peace agreements examined, 18 had territorial autonomy provisions. These included agreements to end conflicts in India (1946–1949), Sudan (1963–1972), the Philippines (1972–1996), Nicaragua (1981–1989), and Bosnia (1992–1995) (Hartzell et al. 2001:194, 204–205).

Research indicates that autonomy provisions can enhance peace agreement durability. The above study found that only 44 percent of agreements without a territorial arrangement were still in force after 5 years compared with a survival rate of 65 percent among those providing for regional autonomy. Territorial autonomy has the advantage of being a relatively flexible provision that can be designed for specific conflicts and by its nature suggests a compromise between factions (Hartzell et al. 2001:191, 200). Moreover, statistical modeling indicates increasing representativeness encouraged public participation by the potentially secessionist, regionally concentrated minority and decreased secessionist activity. This especially occurred when semiautonomous governing structures were created (Lustick, Miodownik, and Eidelson 2004:223).

However, regional autonomy deals may be unreachable when fluctuations in state strength undermine the government's ability to commit. According to Fearon (2004), commitment to an autonomy agreement becomes harder when the center has an enduring political or economic interest in expansion into the periphery. This can occur during sons-of-the-soil wars and when either the government or rebels are able to earn some income while fighting despite the conflict's costs, as might be generated through contraband funding (Fearon 2004:275). Autonomy does not necessarily establish long-term peace. Sudan's first civil war settled via a 1972 deal giving autonomy to the South collapsed with renewed fighting in 1983. Nor has the 2003 granting of more autonomy to Chechnya while enshrining its position within the Russian Federation prevented violence from occurring there. Similarly, violence plagues the southern island of Mindanao in the Philippines where insurgents have been fighting for decades to establish a separate Islamic state. This conflict has continued despite controversial moves to address the issue that have included the prospect of autonomy. There is also debate over the effectiveness of autonomy in producing long-term peace when conflict is based on ethnicity (Downes 2004:246).

Taking autonomy further, an agreement might seek to address secessionist movements by partitioning them or breaking them apart, as in Ethiopia-Eritrea. *Partitioning* is a process whereby a group of people defined by features such as

their ethnicity or ideology extracts itself, together with the land it inhabits, from an existing state (Tir 2005:548). An internally motivated partition results in the division of a country's homeland territory with the creation of at least one new independent secessionist state (for instance, Eritrea in 1991). This leaves behind the now territorially smaller *rump state* (Ethiopia). Partitioning might occur to prevent tensions escalating into conflict (Yugoslavia-Macedonia), or to end conflict that has already started (Yugoslavia-Slovenia) (Tir 2005:545). Researchers in a study of partitions from 1900 to 1996 involving 19 rump states concluded that peaceful partitions were more beneficial than their violent counterparts, secessionist states were less likely to experience conflict than rump states, and partitioning for ethnic reasons did not increase the likelihood of future conflict (Tir 2005:545). The establishment of secessionist states though does not necessarily ensure peace. East Timor (Timor-Leste) became independent from Indonesia during May 2002 and South Sudan from Sudan in July 2011 after conflict, but both continue to face serious challenges such as violence.

Amnesty Provisions

The UCDP data from 1989 to 2005 on peace agreements showed that 30 percent of all agreements for intrastate conflicts over government and 27 percent over territory included amnesty provisions (Harbom et al. 2006:624). Of the CPAs identified in the "Peace Accords Matrix" (Kroc Institute 2012), 20 referred to amnesties. These agreements include the 1992 General Peace Agreement for Mozambique and the 2005 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (Kroc Institute 2012). The coexistence of former enemies within one state generally involves new and increased vulnerabilities for the combatants and faction leaders. Individuals who have survived a conflict by hiding from and fighting their enemy must in a peace process often disarm, disband their units, and leave the relative protection of defensive positions or hiding places. To encourage this, combatants must be desperate for peace or strongly think that their increased vulnerability will not be exploited. Amnesties can help build this thinking (Melander 2009:7).

A study of peace agreements from 1989 to 2005 showed that only 26 percent of the agreements with amnesty provisions ended in renewed fighting within 2 years, while the failure rate for those agreements without these was 48 percent. However, the impact of amnesty provisions depended on the regime. They significantly reduced the risk of agreement failure only if the political institutions were authoritarian. This was because within democratic societies, the amnesties were more likely to be questioned with the fundamental clash between impunity for

war crimes and the principles of human rights and the rule of law (Melander 2009:8, 13, 15). Amnesties can be very controversial as those wanted for serious human rights violations might escape justice. For instance, the 1999 Lomé Peace Accord's amnesty provision for human rights violations by warring factions in Sierra Leone was widely criticized because of post-agreement violence, and the notorious crimes committed by the Foday Sankoh-led Revolutionary United Front faction. Sankoh was ultimately arrested in 2000 but died in 2003 during his trial for war crimes.

Agreement Implementation

The successful implementation of peace agreements is important. Indeed, the implementation of an intrastate peace agreement may actually be a much greater challenge for the parties than the initial agreement negotiations (Boltjes 2007). This is graphically shown by the two worst outbreaks of mass violence in the 1990s (Angola in 1993 and Rwanda in 1994) following the failure of peace agreements to end these wars. They cost an estimated 350,000 lives in Angola and 800,000 in Rwanda (Stedman 2001:4). The period immediately after the signing of an agreement is particularly important. The study of agreements from 1989 to 2005 mentioned above indicated that since the Cold War's end, the first two years are vital for durable peace. An agreement that held over these initial years had a 94 percent chance of averting renewed fighting in later years (Melander 2009:4).

The U.S. Institute of Peace identifies factors that can increase the likelihood of successful agreement implementation (see Table 6.3). These factors (apart from external parties covered in Chapter 7) are briefly outlined below:

Incorporate strategies for implementation and monitoring. A key factor is the inclusion of strategies for implementation and for monitoring, and (if possible) enforcing compliance with the agreement's terms. Clarity is needed over who does what by when, how performance is measured and by whom, and what happens if targets are not met.

TABLE 6.3

Selected Features That Can Assist Implementation of Agreements

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- Incorporating in agreements strategies for implementation and monitoring
 - Planning for implementation
 - Making the local population stakeholders and agreement guarantors
 - Using metrics to gauge progress
 - Designing dispute resolution mechanisms
 - Using external parties to support implementation
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Source: Smith and Smock (2008).

Plan for implementation. Overly ambitious agreements without the resources, skills, and commitment to enforce them can cause damage by disillusioning the parties and encouraging the view that fighting is the only feasible way to achieving their goals. Thus, the conflict parties, affected societies, and external partners must be mobilized to assist implementation, from planning and managing to monitoring and enforcing. Plans should take into account the immediate transitions from violence and long-term post-conflict issues.

Make the local population stakeholders and agreement guarantors. Agreements should include the local community as planners, agents, managers, and implementation monitors. Utilizing local knowledge, networks, and leadership provides more resources for implementation, builds social capital, and strengthens local ownership, raising civil society's stake in the implementation. A successful and durable peace will be more likely with the society's full mobilization to implement agreement benchmarks. Local business community members can be directly involved in the economic reintegration of fighters, and traditional justice mechanisms or religious practices can be used to facilitate reconciliation, while local materials and labor can be utilized in reconstruction. Furthermore, local human rights monitors can help safeguard returning refugees, local stewards can keep watch to prevent corruption and waste, and local media can inform the community of developments. Ultimately, societal actors should be involved in ways that make them stakeholders and agreement guarantors rather than passive onlookers.

Use metrics to gauge progress. *Metrics* (measurable indicators of progress) can contribute to agreement formulation and implementation. More specifically, metrics help ensure the mediator and parties establish realistic goals, provide adequate resources and authorities to bear, strategically focus their efforts, and increase the likelihood of a stable peace. It is vital during the peace process to obtain baseline data to help diagnose potential challenges prior to an agreement. Likewise, during implementation, it is important to track progress from the point of the settlement through to sustained peace. The most important metrics must measure results and impact rather than level of effort as these are essential to agreement implementation. For example, the UN mission in Kosovo developed a set of metrics to evaluate progress toward meeting standards in core areas of governance and human rights. These had to be met before the international community would initiate a diplomatic process aimed at resolving the issue of Kosovo's political status.

Design dispute resolution mechanisms. During the transition from conflict, agreements often falter. Implementation designs should include mechanisms to review progress and address problems. Roundtables, implementation councils, or joint committees should be present to hear grievances, mediate

disputes, and make implementation adjustments. The establishment of a monitoring and conflict resolution mechanism by the parties to the agreement may be sufficient (Smith and Smock 2008).

As already noted, research indicates that various factors can influence the durability of negotiated agreements. Success may lie in using various measures appropriate for the situation and the political regime—and not only by principal parties to the main peace process but also by other relevant actors (Boltjes 2007:2). The most durable agreements are often those concerning states where the previous stable regime was democratic and are concluding extended low-intensity conflicts. They also provide security assurances to former fighters by third-party states or regional or international organizations and provide territorial autonomy to threatened groups. Contrasting this, negotiated agreements where the states lack experience with democracy and have just concluded brief, highly intense wars can be more likely to fail in the short term. This is particularly when the negotiating parties do not include territorial autonomy and third-party security assurances in their agreements (Hartzell et al. 2001:202). An analysis of the numerous peace agreements of Liberia's first civil war (1989–1996) indicates that agreement implementation progresses if the level of vulnerability during the implementation period is equally balanced among the faction leaders. Thus, as agreement concessions will bring some change in military, economic, or political vulnerability among the factions, the implementation process proceeds when faction leaders feel mutually vulnerable (Bekoe 2003). Research has indicated that the demobilization of fighters and their reintegration into civilian life is vital for peace implementation (Stedman 2001:16).

POST-CONFLICT ISSUES

Civil wars have devastating consequences (see Chapter 2), and in their aftermath, many issues need to be addressed to increase the prospect of sustainable peace. After fighting ends, there is normally extensive damage to the state's institutions and infrastructure that can hinder the provision of security and basic services to citizens. Likewise, there is a need to improve the poor political rights and freedoms that often exist at the end of civil wars where factions have determinedly sought to exercise and hold power at any price. Hence, both statebuilding and democratization efforts are important, particularly given that strong democratic states should experience fewer civil wars. Peacebuilding, the overall consolidation of peace through tools that can include addressing underlying sources of conflict and strengthening respect for human rights, is another important tool. The next sections outline these three key concepts—statebuilding, democratization, and peacebuilding—within the context of post-civil war society.

Statebuilding

Statebuilding refers to the strengthening of state capacity by building institutions (e.g., judicial system), enhancing state legitimacy and responsiveness of the state, and enhancing overall service delivery of the government. Statebuilding is obviously most relevant in the case of failed states—those states which have ceased to function in terms of providing security and basic services for the citizens. Statebuilding is tied to civil war termination in cases where the conflict occurs in a failed, failing or weak, or new or fragile state. These types of wars have taken place in Timor-Leste (new, fragile state), Somalia (failed state), South Sudan (new, fragile state), Democratic Republic of Congo (fragile state), and others. In these situations, peacebuilding is a vital step in the progress toward building a strong state able to meet the needs of its people and deter further rebellion. Goldfinch and DeRouen (2014) note that post-termination settings in these states are notoriously unstable. Third-party actors and the state faced with building a stable state must first establish peace. In other words, once a war in a low-capacity state terminates, peace must take root before adequate state mechanisms can be established and more war headed off.

The Failed States Index is a useful indicator of the overall impact of conflict on the state and subsequent challenges faced in state rebuilding. This annual index is by *Foreign Policy Magazine* and The Fund for Peace, a research and educational organization working to prevent war and promote sustainable peace. The index examines 12 indicators divided into social, economic, and political categories. The social indicators are increasing demographic pressures, the mass movement of refugees or internally displaced persons creating complex humanitarian emergencies, the legacy of vengeance-seeking group or group paranoia, and chronic and sustained human flight. The economic indicators are uneven economic development along group lines and sharp and/or severe economic decline. The third category consists of political indicators. These are the state's criminalization and/or delegitimation, the progressive deterioration of public services, the suspension or arbitrary application of the rule of law, and widespread violation of human rights, the security apparatus operating as a state within a state, the rise of factionalized elites, and the intervention of other states or external political actors.

A failing state has various attributes. One of the most common is lost physical control of territory or of a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Others include the erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions, an inability to provide reasonable public services, and the failure to interact with other states as a full member of the international community (Fund for Peace 2011). The 2012 index surveyed 178 states and listed the top failed states as Somalia, the

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Sudan (see Table 6.4). This was the fifth time in a row that Somalia led the rankings. All of the top-10 failed states have witnessed conflict in recent years. The impact of conflict is further shown by the significant worsening of ratings for Libya and Syria because of fighting. Libya's decline was the most remarkable, the country registering the worst year-on-year change in the index's history. It fell from 111th to 50th as a result of civil war, NATO-led air strikes, and the toppling of Muammar Gaddafi's regime. Similarly, Syria registered the fourth-greatest year-on-year negative change in history as escalated fighting against the Assad government led it to fall from 48th to 23rd, the bloody costs of this fighting noted in Chapter 2 (Fund for Peace 2012:13, 15, 25).

Many factors contribute to the failure of states. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012a) have outlined 10 main reasons for states collapsing with conflict included. According to the scholars, most countries collapse because they have what they term *extractive* economic institutions that seek to benefit the elite who then gain significantly. The extraction can take the form of forced labor, valuable minerals, or protected monopolies. Such extraction erodes incentives,

TABLE 6.4
Ten Worst Ranked Failed States in 2013 and Their 2012 Ranking

Country	2013 Ranking	2012 Ranking
Somalia	1	1
Democratic Republic of Congo	2	4
Sudan	3	3
South Sudan*	4	N/R
Chad	5	4
Yemen	6	8
Afghanistan	7	6
Haiti	8	7
Central African Republic	9	10
Zimbabwe	10	5

Source: Fund for Peace, "Failed States Index" (2011–2013).

* Although South Sudan was included for the first time as the 2012 Index's 178th country, it did not receive a formal rank for that Index as the data available since independence did not constitute a full year and, thus, could not be accurately compared to the other 177 countries.

discourages innovation, and wastes the talents of citizens, with states built on exploitation ultimately failing. The scholars identify 10 more specific reasons behind state collapses. These are the lack of property rights, forced labor, an unfair economy for most, the economic dominance of an elite few, elites blocking new technologies, no law and order, a weak central government, bad public services, political exploitation, and fighting over power (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012:89–91).

With the presence of such failed states, there have been international statebuilding efforts. This involves the complex and multidimensional set of activities aimed at promoting the creation of functioning and functional states. The main objective of statebuilding is to move a state from fragile or failed status to one where the organs of state operate and the state has full administrative control of all of its territory, effective rule of law, and stability. The importance of constructing institutional foundations for functioning governments and markets, and of identifying potential outcomes if those tasks are not undertaken, has been identified by Paris and Sisk (2009:2). For instance, the absence of mechanisms such as pre-election power-sharing pacts and institutions to uphold election results initially served as a catalyst for renewed conflict in Angola during 1992. Without arrangements ensuring that newly elected officials would themselves respect the rule of law, autocratic elites returned to undemocratic rule in Cambodia during the 1990s. Economic reforms were also blocked by black marketers in Bosnia after the 1995 Dayton Peace Accord as there were no institutions to govern the market (Paris and Sisk 2009:2). More recent moves have been made at statebuilding in Afghanistan (outlined below) and Iraq with mixed results.

There have been major recent efforts at statebuilding, with one of the largest being in Afghanistan, the 2012 sixth-ranked failed state. Both the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and ISAF are mandated by the UN Security Council to operate in Afghanistan, and they are there at the request of the Afghan Government. ISAF, which has been deployed since the end of 2001, has a peace-enforcement mandate and operates primarily in support of Afghanistan's National Security Forces. As an *integrated* Mission, UNAMA has two main operational areas: development and humanitarian issues, and political affairs. Both organizations have an integrated approach: coordinating governance, development, and security efforts to help the Afghan government promote peace and stability. UNAMA is mandated to support the government in its moves to improve critical areas. These include security, governance and economic development, and regional cooperation, along with the full implementation of commitments made at both 2010 London and Kabul Conferences (UNAMA, no date).

With the major international statebuilding efforts in Afghanistan, there have been positive developments, but serious challenges remain. From 2000 to 2011, life expectancy at birth increased from 45.3 years to 48.7 years, the expected years of schooling increased from 2.2 years to 9.1 years, and the standard of living measured by gross national income per capita rose from \$435 to \$1,416 (in constant 2005 purchasing price parity; UN Development Program 2011:2). The economy has improved since the 2001 fall of the Taliban regime primarily due to international assistance, the agricultural sector's recovery, and service sector growth. Indeed, the international community pledged over \$67 billion at nine donors' conferences between 2003 and 2010. More recently, at a 2012 Tokyo donor conference, \$16 billion in civilian aid was pledged up to 2016 (CIA 2013a). However, Afghanistan is extremely poor and very dependent on foreign aid. Many people continue to face shortages of housing, clean water, electricity, medical care, and paid work. Criminality, insecurity, weak governance, and the government's difficulty in extending rule of law throughout the country discourage future economic growth. Economic growth is further hindered by low revenue collection, limited job creation, widespread corruption, weak government capacity, and poor public infrastructure (CIA 2013a).

Democratization

Democratization is a process whereby the government comes to be more transparent, executive power becomes more constrained, unfettered public participation input into the election of governments becomes consolidated, and the right to be a candidate for public office is nearly universal. Democracy is associated with the peaceful resolution of conflict. All things being equal, democracies should have fewer civil wars.

In 2012, there were 47 countries identified, or ranked as *not free* by Freedom House, an independent organization supporting democratic change, monitoring freedom, and advocating for democracy and human rights internationally. In these countries, basic political rights were absent, and basic civil liberties were widely and systematically denied. Another 58 countries were *partly free* with limited respect of political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House 2013:4). More specifically, of the 11 countries experiencing conflict over government in 2010, only two were defined as *free* by Freedom House in 2012. Another five were *not free* and the others were only *partly free*. Countries were ranked from one (*the most free*) to seven (*the least free*) with both Somalia and Sudan receiving the worst possible rankings for both political rights and civil liberties. Countries experiencing conflict over territory in 2010 were better ranked, but half of the four countries were still ranked as either *not free* or *partly free* (see Table 6.5).

TABLE 6.5
Most Costly Civil Wars and Freedom of Country in 2012

Location	Freedom status	Political rights	Civil liberties
Countries with five most costly civil wars over government			
Syria	Not free	7	7
Afghanistan	Not free	6	6
Pakistan	Partly free	4	5
Somalia	Not free	7	7
Yemen	Not free	6	6
Countries with five most costly civil wars over territory			
Turkey	Partly free	3	4
Myanmar/Burma	Not free	6	5
Russia	Not free	6	5
India	Free	2	3
Thailand	Partly free	4	4

Source: Freedom House (2013:14–18) and Themner and Wallensteen (2013:517–519).

The actual success of democratization in many post-civil war countries is debatable. In Cambodia, the civil war was ended by the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement that set a liberal democratic state as Cambodia's political goal. Elections have been held since 1993, and officially the country is a multiparty democracy under a constitutional monarchy. However, Prime Minister Hun Sen has held power since 1985 and staged a coup in 1997 to strengthen his position. There have been concerns that his rule is becoming increasingly authoritarian with Cambodia labeled *not free* by Freedom House. It scores poorly for both political representations (6) and civil liberties (5). Corruption and government unaccountability are issues, even though comparative peace has been maintained (Freedom House 2013). Moreover, although those countries still experiencing conflict might witness moves toward democracy, they still face major challenges. For example, Afghan presidential elections were staged in 2004 and 2009 and the first parliamentary elections in over 30 years occurred during 2005, with further elections taking place in 2010. However, as shown by Table 6.5, the country is termed *not free* by Freedom House, and it rates very poorly in both political rights and civil liberties.

With regard to a country's experiences with democracy, actors that have had a democratic or semidemocratic regime prior to a civil war appear more likely to have experience with the accommodation of competing interests than actors in countries whose former political regime was authoritarian. A history of inclusion at the political center, or at least the ability to compete for inclusion in central political institutions, can help address opponents' fears regarding potentially aggressive intentions by an adversary. This in turn should help reduce concerns regarding the potential for an antagonist's violations of or defections from a negotiated settlement (Hartzell et al. 2001:189). Civil wars that end in negotiated settlements are more likely to experience higher levels of democratization than civil wars that conclude in military victory by either side. Identity-based conflicts often lead to lower levels of democratization, while the impact of democratic experience on post-civil war democratization has been debated (Gurses and Mason 2008).

Post-civil war democratization helps to build sustainable post-civil war peace. However, studies of democratic transition and survival suggest that the post-civil war environment is not hospitable to either the transition toward or the survival of democracy. This inhospitality may be because post-civil war environments are contentious. After fighting, the former combatants might fear for their security and want to protect their political and economic interests. Former rivals can agree to a transition toward democracy to the extent that a stable balance of power exists between the government and rebels, a balance that eliminates the sort of security dilemma encouraging parties to resume fighting. Such a balance should ensure access to political power and economic resources (Joshi 2010). The victorious group in the postwar elections may use its democratically won power to dismantle the institutions of democracy, and repress the opposition. The fear of constant political marginalization, along with the fear of repression, might create incentives for the defeated party to reinitiate hostilities. Joshi (2013) suggests that former rivals would support democratic transition if they were confident that inclusive institutions ensured they could achieve their political interests through democracy. After analyzing data on 1946 to 2005 post-civil war transitions toward democracy, Joshi found that the proportional representation system and parliamentary system are the most important institutions helping sustain post-civil war democratic transitions (Joshi forthcoming).

Research by Joshi and Mason (2012) indicates that a larger governing coalition is more likely to emerge following negotiated settlements and government victories, compared to insurgent victories. Their findings also supported the proposition that enlarging the size of the governing coalition creates stronger incentives for former rivals to sustain the peace. This is because they can pursue

their political objectives through institutional means that are less costly than a return to fighting.

Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding is a concept and practice that developed after the Cold War. The term first appeared in the 1992 report *An Agenda for Peace*. Here, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali defined it broadly as “action to identify and support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a relapse into conflict” (Boutros-Ghali 1992). Newman, Paris, and Richmond (2009:8) provide a slightly more expansive definition. They refer to peacebuilding as preventing a resumption or escalation of violent conflict in conflict-prone societies and establishing durable and self-sustaining peace; addressing underlying sources of conflict; building or rebuilding peaceful social institutions and values, including the respect for human rights; and building or rebuilding institutions of governance and rule of law. They then outlined peacebuilding activities. These targeted challenges that in their most acute form could weaken overall peacebuilding objectives. The definitions agree that peacebuilding means the consolidation of peace after war.

There has been debate over what constitutes the success of such operations. Doyle and Sambanis (2006) wrote that successful multilateral peacebuilding built functioning states that could defend their own interests. Indeed, such peacebuilding when well-designed and managed could produce sustainable peace from which neighbors and the wider international community would benefit, and did so while sharing costs fairly. They believed that *sustainable peace* was the measure of successful peacebuilding. This was influenced by three key factors characterizing the post-civil war peace environment. First, the degree of factional hostility measured by human cost (deaths and displacements), the type of war, and number of factions were influential. Added to this was the extent of local capacities remaining after the war, such as per capita GDP. The level of international assistance represented the final factor. This could be measured by economic assistance or the type of mandate given to a UN peace operation and number of personnel tasked with its undertaking (Doyle and Sambanis 2006:3–4).

Based on SIPRI data, a total of 52 peace operations were conducted in 2011. This was the same number as operations the previous year. The number of personnel involved in these operations was 262,129; international involvement in efforts to terminate conflict is noted in greater detail in the following chapter (SIPRI 2005–2013, *Yearbook* 2012:91). Kaufman’s (2001) study of contemporary ethnic wars in the Caucasus and southeastern Europe indicated that diplomacy and economic incentives were not enough to prevent or end ethnic wars. He believed that the key

to conflict resolution was peacebuilding, whereby nongovernmental organizations changed hostile attitudes at both the elite and local levels (Kaufman 2001).

Various key aspects of successful peacebuilding have been identified. Peacebuilding activities are wide-ranging. Newman et al. (2009:8–9) list a number of peacebuilding activities including the following: supporting cease-fires, demobilizing fighters, destroying weapons, resolving land ownership disputes, and protecting natural resources.

The extent of challenges facing post-conflict societies necessitates the prioritizing of peacebuilding efforts based on the importance of state functions. The state's first and primary function is to provide security and thus is the initial priority of post-conflict peacebuilding. This involves maintaining cease-fires and group disarmament, the creation of secure borders, "renationalization" of the use of force, and prevention of violence within the society. Interlinked with this is the second priority of establishing law and order. The third and fourth priorities are social and economic reconstruction, governance, and participation. Here, a basic degree of economic restructuring is important for building post-conflict confidence.

A key goal is rebuilding economies. Berdal and Wennmann (2010) have considered economic factors, such as harnessing the private sector, along with using taxes and natural-resource revenues, to provide a financial base for sustainable peace. Short-term demands for security and stability may require engagement with informal, often illiberal, power structures toward peaceful, legitimate economic activity. There is also a need to focus on significant actors and their economic interests in post-conflict countries. Resistance to strong central government does not preclude interest in and commitment to local governance systems, including law and order. Thus, external parties could target aid, encourage entrepreneurial initiative, and promote economic activity, including employment programs and direct support for businesses, at the local level. Ultimately, economic challenges facing countries emerging from conflicts, once contextualized and understood, need to be viewed as positive opportunities (Berdal and Wennmann 2010:9–13). The importance of extensive programs to rebuild economies in facilitating sustainable peace is acknowledged by others too (Doyle and Sambanis 2006:5).

IMPLICATIONS FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

This chapter focuses on post-conflict issues. At first blush, there may not seem to be any conflict management issues if the war is over. However, many wars recur, and the probability of recurrence is usually highest just after a war ends. The conflict management implications of this are quite important. How a war

ends can help predict whether the war will recur, for example, civil wars terminating with a military victory having lower probabilities of recurring. As discussed above, many wars end—that is, there are few or no battle-related deaths—with no clear explanation. Many others end with negotiated settlements that falter.

This chapter also considers peace agreements that often accompany the termination of a war. Peace agreements often do not endure. There are sometimes problems with implementation or one disputant will renege for any number of reasons. This party mediation and peacekeeping mission can reduce the odds that peace agreements will fail. Power-sharing provision is politically costly to governments and may lead to the government renegeing on a deal when it comes time to implement these provisions (see DeRouen et al. 2009). State capacity is an important requirement for implementation to obtain (see DeRouen et al. 2010).

The post-conflict phase often involves peacebuilding and statebuilding with the former being an antecedent to the latter. The general argument is that an end to violence is required before a weak, failed, or otherwise low-capacity state can develop and sustain institutions that can provide security, effective public administration, education, service delivery, justice, and rule of law. Some critics of this peacebuilding model see it as a liberal, Western-oriented system designed to control and stabilize the developing world with a top-down approach that stresses free markets. Richmond (2011), for example, attacks the liberal model for undervaluing local actors and understating the importance of cultural diversity and indigenous populations. Paris (2004) takes a more circumspect view of the liberal model but does criticize it for pushing elections before institutions are set up. He argues that elections can actually be stabilizing and should not be rushed. In any case, the connection between peacebuilding and statebuilding is ever tighter in the post-9/11 world. The failed state of Afghanistan allowed a safe haven for al-Qaeda to train, recruit, and plan terrorist strikes.

CONCLUSION

As noted in the introduction, the devastating consequences of civil wars necessitate a better understanding of their termination and postwar issues. Four major conflicts registered for 2010 by the UCDP in Chad, Peru, India (Assam), and India (Bodoland) were no longer active in 2011. The specific outcomes of wars vary with the most common outcomes identified sometimes differing in accordance to the study and its time period. However, it is clear that a stable and durable peace is the best outcome for the war-inflicted society, the region, and international community. Thus, the signing and implementing of effective peace agreements is vital. Here, various factors can influence the likelihood of an agreement being signed and its outcome. Such an agreement can be encouraged by estimates of the probability of

victory declining, conflict costs rising, the estimated time required to win increasing, or the utility from a settlement increasing relative to that of victory.

Peace agreements frequently have common provisions. In this chapter, power sharing, territorial autonomy, electoral, and amnesty provisions were outlined. Power-sharing arrangements generally cover political, territorial, military, and economic areas. Research indicates that power sharing can help effectively end conflict, but there are major challenges that need to be overcome to facilitate this. Elections or electoral reforms are frequently included in agreements, but their success rate is mixed and influenced by their timing. Regional autonomy can enhance the durability of an agreement. Taking this further, an agreement might seek to address secessionist movements by partitioning them or breaking them apart. As with the other provisions, these can help resolve conflict but do not necessarily lead to a durable end of a conflict. The granting of amnesties for fighters after conflict can be particularly controversial, especially when there have been serious violations of human rights.

The successful implementation of peace agreements is vital for a durable peace. Indeed, the implementation of agreements may actually be more challenging for the fighting parties than the initial agreement negotiations. Selected features that can assist here include careful planning for implementation and monitoring, making the local population stakeholders and agreement guarantors, and designing dispute resolution mechanisms. Success may lie in utilizing various measures appropriate for the situation and the political regime—not only by principal parties to the main peace process but also by other relevant actors. Furthermore, the most durable agreements are often those concerning states where the previous stable regime was democratic and where they conclude extended low-intensity conflicts.

Finally, state formation, democratization, and peacebuilding after wars were outlined. Conflict is often associated with failed states, and there have been international state building efforts. Statebuilding involves the complex and multidimensional set of activities aimed at promoting the creation of functioning and functional states. There have been major recent efforts at statebuilding, with one of the largest being in Afghanistan. Democratization efforts frequently are supported by the international community in post-conflict countries. Such efforts can help build a peace, but the post-civil war environment can be inhospitable for democracy. Peacebuilding includes preventing the resumption or escalation of fighting and establishing a durable and self-sustaining peace, addressing the underlying sources of conflict, and building or rebuilding peaceful social institutions and values. As with other efforts to effectively address conflict, major challenges face such endeavors. Ultimately, it is more effective to prevent the initial

outbreak of war than to attempt to find a durable peace once fighting plagues a society.

More specifically, the next chapter covers international intervention and the termination of civil wars.

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