

1 Max Weber

The Processes of Rationalization




Photo from Getty Images.

To include the works of Max Weber in a volume on the study and practice of public administration in the United States may have seemed somewhat unusual at the time the first edition of this book was published, but, in view of the vast literature that has appeared on his work since then, Weber is clearly back in fashion. Indeed, according to Thomas Kemple, “metaphors of awe and veneration abound” next to acknowledgments of “the fragmentary, unfinished, and ambiguous quality of his work.”¹ Weber, a German scholar of catholic interests and extensive knowledge of economics, law, history, anthropology, and sociology (of administration, religion, music, and so on), was neither much read nor often noted in this country until more than half a century after the beginnings of the study of public administration as an object of self-conscious study.² The reason for considering Weber here is that he places public administration, including public administration in the United States (of which he was quite conscious), in a broad historical context and describes its development as part of the more general process of rationalization in Western societies. The purpose of this chapter is not to attempt to summarize Weber’s works—that would be an impossible task in the space available. The scope of Weber’s interests and the reach of his intellect are truly awesome. Instead, our more modest ambition is to place Weber’s ideas about administration in the broader setting of his more general concern with processes of rationalization and patterns of domination. His analysis of the social and historical context of administration and, more particularly, of bureaucracy may well be Weber’s distinctive contribution to the literature on public administration and probably accounts for his lasting impact on the field.

Weber clearly saw administration in general, and bureaucracy in particular, as vital to these historical processes. Indeed, Weber asserts that domination is exerted through administration and that legal domination requires bureaucracy for its exercise. Moreover, Weber considered bureaucracy to be the most rational and efficient form of organization yet devised by man. In this stance,

Weber, who may have penned the most famous statement on bureaucracy, uses the term in a manner opposite to its common meaning, both before and after he wrote. Weber contends that bureaucracy embodies a concept of justice familiar to Western systems of jurisprudence. In the case of bureaucracy, the “equal application of the law” is simply translated into the equal (and impersonal) application of the rule.

Despite his general admiration for bureaucracy, Weber was also aware of its flaws. As an organizational form, bureaucracy subjects the individual to an oppressive routine, limits individual freedom, and favors the “crippled personality” of the specialist. As a potential political force, bureaucracy becomes a danger when it oversteps its proper function and attempts to control the rule of law rather than being subject to it. Weber argues that the bureaucrat should stay out of politics and limit himself to the “impartial administration of his office,” and that he should subordinate his personal opinion on matters of policy to his sense of duty.

There are obvious relationships between Weber and the authors of the Classical period. His call for bureaucrats to be the neutral servants of their political masters echoes Wilson’s admonition that administrators should be responsible only for the efficient execution of the law. His description of the “ideal-type bureaucracy” is similar in form and process to organizations widely prescribed by the Classical authors. But to limit Weber’s influence to the Classical approach alone would be misguided. His call for the construction of a value-free social science corresponds to the ambition and stated intent, if not the accomplishment, of the Behavioral approach. His overall concern with power relationships in society is similar to the concerns of the Administration-as-Politics approach. In short, Weber’s influence, although often indirect, has been pervasive in the field of public administration.

Life

Max Weber was born in Erfurt, Thuringia, Germany, on April 21, 1864. His family numbered among its members a long line of persons distinguished in the professions, especially the Lutheran clergy. Weber’s father, Max Weber Sr., was a prosperous right-wing politician whose governmental posts included a seat in the Reichstag, while his mother, Helene Fallenstein Weber, was a cultured liberal woman of the Protestant faith and the daughter of a well-to-do official.

Weber was a sickly child, suffering from meningitis at an early age, and the object of his mother’s brooding concern. As a student in his pre-university

years, Weber had a recognized talent but was perceived as lacking ambition by his teachers, who were not much impressed by this stringy young man with sloping shoulders.³

In 1882 Weber commenced the study of economics, philosophy, and law at the University of Heidelberg. He also began to change from a slender, withdrawn adolescent into a large, pompously virile young man. Joining heartily in the social life of a dueling fraternity, he engaged in drinking bouts and fell into debt. After three semesters at Heidelberg, Weber moved to Strassburg to serve a year in the military. Here, the man who would later become a recognized authority on bureaucracy suffered under what he considered to be the stupidity of barracks drill and the chicanery of junior officers. He rebelled against attempts to, in his words, “domesticate thinking beings into machines responding to commands with automatic precision.”⁴ On receiving his officer’s commission, however, Weber learned to see the brighter side of army life.

The next year, Weber resumed his studies, this time at Göttingen University in Berlin. In 1886, he took his first examination in law, and he subsequently took up the practice of law in Berlin. Three years later, Weber completed a PhD and subsequently qualified as a university teacher by writing a *Habilitation* thesis on Roman and agrarian legal history (1891). In 1892, he obtained a position teaching law in Berlin.

The following year, Weber married Marianne Schnitzer, who was a second cousin on his father’s side and, reputedly, something of a beauty. She was to become one of the leading exponents of women’s rights in Germany and a scholar in her own right.⁵ After his marriage, Weber embarked on the life of a successful young scholar in Berlin, and his early academic years were filled with both practical studies directed at public policy issues and more scholarly works. He soon accepted a chair in economics at the University of Freiburg, having found economics to be more challenging than legal history, and in 1896, he became a professor of economics at Heidelberg.

Complications in Weber’s life began shortly after his appointment at Heidelberg. Weber’s father unexpectedly collapsed and died, leaving the son suffering from exhaustion and anxiety and forcing him to suspend his regular work. In fact, Weber would not resume that work full-time for a period of three and a half years. Although he suffered repeated setbacks, Weber published a book review in 1903 and became the associate editor for the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*. By the following year, his writing productivity was returning to its previous level, and Weber visited the United States, where he delivered a paper and toured the country.⁶ An inheritance received in 1907 enabled him thereafter to focus entirely on his writing.

24 *Mastering Public Administration*

Weber spent the war years as a hospital administrator; after the war, he served as a consultant to the German Armistice Commission in Versailles and to a commission that drafted the Weimar constitution.⁷ In 1918, Weber spent the summer in Vienna, where he gave his first university lectures in nineteen years. He still experienced compulsive anxieties, however, and had to use opiates to sleep. Weber accepted an academic position in Munich in 1919, but held it only for a short time before his death from influenza at the age of fifty-six on June 14, 1920.⁸

Weber has been graphically described by a personal associate, who noted that he spoke in an exquisite German that was entirely different from his labored writing style and that he had a volcanic temperament coupled with occasional coarseness.⁹ Weber was capable of both great impetuosity and righteous indignation. He had an ascetic drive for work and was considered by his colleagues at Heidelberg to be a difficult person with a demanding conscience and a rigid sense of honor.¹⁰

Weber did not consider himself to be a scholar, and although he chose an academic career, he held a regular academic position (that is, teaching and research) for only five years. Reportedly more at home on a political platform than in an academic setting, Weber was, in the context of his times, a “liberal,” a “nationalist,” and something of a socialist. As a liberal, he fought against both conservatives, who sought protection for agriculture and bureaucratic control of industry, and the Marxists.¹¹ As a nationalist, Weber believed in force as the last argument of any policy, and he developed a German tendency to “brutalize romance and to romanticize cynicism.”¹² As far as socialism is concerned, he became a member of the *Verein für Sozialpolitik* populated by so-called *Kathedersozialisten*, that is, professorial socialists,¹³ and had—after the First World War—briefly been a member of the Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council in Heidelberg.¹⁴ In Weber’s words, “Policymaking is not a moral trade, nor can it ever be.”¹⁵ As both a nationalist and a German patriot, Weber perceived the German culture to be worth preserving against the Russian menace and the rising Slavic tide. He even had fleeting political ambitions of his own. Presented with an opportunity to be nominated for election to the National Assembly in 1918, however, he refused to make any effort on his own behalf and lost the nomination.

Religion, as we see later in this chapter, played an important role in Weber’s sociology, but he described himself as “religiously unmusical.”¹⁶ Although Protestantism was integral to his family, Weber rejected conventional “church” Christianity and was indifferent toward religion in general. He was apparently equally repulsed by his father’s philistinism and his mother’s piety. Nonetheless,

Weber's writings on religion start from a Protestant viewpoint and offer the ideas generated by Protestantism as the wave of the future.¹⁷

Weber's Sociology

Widely acknowledged as one of the founders of modern social science, Weber conceived of sociology as a science with the objective of interpreting and understanding social conduct. Weber's own ambition was to examine the relationships among economic institutions and actions and all other social institutions and actions constituting a given social structure.¹⁸

Though Weber acknowledged that sociology is not confined to the study of social action, it was the main focus of his analysis. He viewed the world of man in society as "a world of unit social acts, ordered by the need to make choices for an always uncertain future in terms of some principle of choice which we call a value."¹⁹ In analyzing social action, Weber hoped to go beyond statements of "lawful regularities" (the limited preoccupation of the natural sciences) to the definition of the causal and motivational forces that produce systems of action in social situations. More precisely, Weber's work is concerned with examining and explaining individual, purposive, rational social actions.

Weber's focus on motivated behavior means that he is interested in what he calls "meaningful" action, not merely reactive behavior. Processes that are not the results of motivations are to be considered only conditions, stimuli, or circumstances that further or hinder motivated individual action. Moreover, the affective and irrational components of human behavior are relegated to the status of "deviations" from rational behavior as Weber concentrates on ideal-type rational behavior, such as that exhibited in the formal elements of law and pure economic theory.²⁰ Weber's sociology thus focuses on the single deliberate action of the individual that is directed toward affecting the behavior of others. The intention of the act is primary, and the success, failure, or unanticipated consequences are of only secondary importance.

Weber asserts that individual actions fall into categories and that they can be combined into social structures. His intent is to understand the categories and structures of social actions as they have appeared in history. In classifying social actions, Weber's distinctions are based on degrees of rationality, ranging from rational expediencies such as economic actions, which are the most understandable of motivated actions, through the pursuit of absolute ends and affectual actions flowing from sentiments, to instinctual behavior and traditional conduct. Weber groups social actions by their determinants and orientations. Purposive, rational conduct is determined rationally and is oriented

toward discrete individual ends.²¹ Affectual conduct is both determined by, and oriented toward, feelings and emotions. Traditional conduct is determined by, and oriented toward, historical precedent. These categories of social action yield three kinds of social structure: *society*, which is based on rationally expedient social action; *association*, which is based on affective social action; and *community*, which is based on traditional social action.²²

Weber's approach to sociology is one of the primary alternatives to a Marxist perspective, and it was clearly intended as such by the author. Weber felt that Marx had only a partial perspective on history and had unduly emphasized material interests in his analysis. In contrast, Weber argues for causal pluralism, in which factors such as nationalism and ethnicity join material interests as determinants of social actions. Although Weber agrees with Marx's belief that ideas are powerless unless joined with economic interests, he denies that ideas are simply reflections of those economic interests. Weber emphasizes the autonomous role of ideas and is concerned with the relative balance between "ideal" and "material" factors in history.²³ This viewpoint is most dramatically stated, of course, in Weber's famous analysis of the relationship between Protestantism and capitalism, in which he argues that the particular form of capitalism that arose in the West was, in large part, a product of the ideas and ethics of Protestantism. (We will have more to say on this subject later.)

This emphasis on the importance of ideas leads Weber to distinguish between class and status and to identify the latter as the primary basis of social dynamics. According to Weber, while class is based solely on economic power, status is determined by social estimates of honor and a style of life.²⁴ Weber maintains that society is a composite of positively and negatively privileged status groups, within which the positively privileged status groups attempt to preserve their style of life through the monopolization of economic opportunities. Consequently, for every idea or value, one should seek out the status group whose ideal and material interests are served. Conflicts among the divergent interests of status groups are resolved in social patterns of compliance and domination.²⁵

A final distinction between Marx and Weber arises on the role of class struggle in their formulations. Weber does not deny the importance of class struggle, but he rejects the idea that class struggle is the central dynamic of society. Instead, he emphasizes the forces of rationalization and their organizational counterpart, bureaucracy. Human behavior is thus guided not only by economic interests but also by social affinity (status) and by a legitimate order of authority that depends on a bureaucratic structure for its exercise.

Weber's Methodology

Weber's methodological objective is to make possible the treatment of social phenomena in a systematic and scientific manner, and, to this end, he emphasizes the importance of both quantitative and qualitative methods and research. Though it is little known, he "pioneered the large-scale empirical programs that really did not take off until the 1920s."²⁶ We, however, will focus on Weber's comparative, historical approach to the causal analyses of social action since it is more germane to the matter of assessing his impact on the field of public administration.

The first crucial element of Weber's methodology is his use of the ideal-type construct. Weber believes the construction of ideal-types to be essential to causal analysis, and it is part of his broader effort to codify the concepts of the social sciences. He asserts that two kinds of meaning can be ascribed to social behavior: a concrete meaning and a theoretical or "pure" type of subjective meaning. The problem with concrete meaning is that there is a bewildering variety of actual social phenomena, each of which is complex in its own right. Consequently, most concepts in the social sciences are necessarily abstractions from reality, not "presuppositionless" descriptions, and they are not likely actually to appear in their full conceptual integrity.²⁷

The ideal-type is intended as a mental construct that categorizes thought and helps to capture the "infinite manifoldness of reality."²⁸ More precisely, the ideal-type is the conceptual construction of elements of reality into a logically precise combination that represents historical phenomena but that may never be found in its ideally pure form in concrete reality.

It is important to understand what Weber's ideal-type is *not*. The ideal-type is not a description of reality, which is too complex to be seized and held. It is not a hypothesis, though it can be used to generate hypotheses. Most emphatically, it is not a normative model. As Weber puts it, the ideal-type "has no connection at all with value judgments and it has nothing to do with any type of perfection other than a purely logical one."²⁹ The ideal-type is, instead, "the pure case, never actualized, uncluttered by extraneous attributes and ambiguities."³⁰

The second crucial element in Weber's methodology is his use of *Verstehen* (interpretive understanding) as the approach to understanding actions and ideas in their own time and context.³¹ *Verstehen* is often confused with Herder's and Dilthey's *Einfühlung* (empathetic understanding), which concerns intuitive and empathic comprehension of inner considerations. Instead, Weber's position is one between positivism and hermeneutics. To Weber, *Verstehen* is an act of rational interpretation, and he outlines the process in detail in a 1904 essay.³²

28 *Mastering Public Administration*

The Role of Science

Science, according to Weber, is the affair of an intellectual aristocracy, and its quest the knowledge of the particular causes of social phenomena. It is not possible to analyze all social phenomena in their complete manifestation and causality, and Weber notes, further, that a description of even the smallest slice of reality can never be exhaustive. One can bring order to the complexity of reality only by concentrating on that part of reality that is interesting and significant in regard to cultural values or research questions.³³ Accordingly, a cultural social science necessarily involves some subjective presuppositions in regard to significance.³⁴

It is clear that Weber sees a crucial role for values in the development of a cultural social science. Value discussions are important in the elaboration of value axioms as one attempts to discover general, irreducible evaluations. Value discussions are important in deducing the implications of value axioms and in the determination of the factual consequences of alternative courses of action insofar as necessary means or unavoidable consequences are involved. Value discussions are important in providing problems for investigation by empirical research, particularly in Weber's cultural social science. Moreover, science itself is not free from suppositions of its own that may mask value orientations.³⁵ Science supposes that the rules of logic and method are both valid and that the knowledge yielded is worth knowing. These suppositions are based on faith, not proof.

Nonetheless, Weber argues strongly that science must eschew value judgments and seek "ethical neutrality." By value judgments, he means practical evaluations of the satisfactory or unsatisfactory character of the phenomena under consideration.³⁶ Weber asserts that there is no way to resolve conflicts about value judgments except by acceptance of a transcendental order of values such as those prescribed by ecclesiastical dogmas. Such an acceptance, he contends, is more an intellectual sacrifice than an assertion of science. Weber asserts that science cannot tell us what we shall do, it cannot tell us how we shall live, it cannot tell us whether the world has meaning or whether it makes sense to live in such a world.³⁷ These matters, however important, are simply beyond the legitimate purview of science.

In particular, Weber condemns those who "feel themselves competent to enunciate their evaluations on ultimate questions 'in the name of science' in governmentally privileged lecture halls in which they are neither controlled, checked by discussion, nor subject to contradiction."³⁸ He argues that it is one thing to state facts, to determine mathematical or logical relationships, or to reveal the internal structure of cultural values; it is another to take a stand on

the value of culture itself. The task of the teacher is to serve students with knowledge and scientific experiment, not to imprint values or personal political views.³⁹ The teacher in the lecture hall should simply fulfill this given task in a workmanlike fashion—by recognizing facts and distinguishing them from personal evaluations, and repressing the impulse to exhibit personal tastes or other sentiments unnecessarily. Weber contends that those who seek something more than analysis and statements of fact in the classroom crave a leader, not a teacher.⁴⁰

Processes of Rationalization

In moving from the method of sociology to its substance, Weber focuses on the concept of rationalization, which he considers to be the most general element in the philosophy of history and the constitutive element of modern Western society.⁴¹ Weber contends that only in the contemporary West does science exist at a stage recognized as valid, that law is characterized by the strictly systematic forms of thought essential to rational jurisprudence, and that the trained official has become the pillar of both the modern state and economic life. He measures the degree of rationalization in society in two ways: by the extent to which ideas gain in systematic coherence and consistency, and by the displacement of magical elements of thought. Weber distinguishes between two basic types of rationality: value rationality (*Wert Rationalität*) and purpose rationality (*Zweck Rationalität*). Value rationality focuses on intrinsic value only and is oriented on the inner demands; it will consider the meaning of action only. Purpose rationality is focused on consequences or results of action. Both value and purpose rationality are subjective by nature—that is, in the eye of the beholder. As such, they must be distinguished from objective or objectified manifestations of rationality (such as economic organization, political order, legal system, religion, ethics, and science).⁴²

A second and related emphasis in Weber's analysis is the concept of domination. Weber maintains that the emergence of rational societies is critically dependent on the way in which domination has been exercised. Domination, for Weber, is a subset of the broader phenomenon of power, which he defines as the possibility of imposing one's will on the behavior of other persons despite their resistance.⁴³ Domination is distinguished from other exercises of power on the basis of the perceived legitimacy of its exercise; that is, in the case of domination, it is believed that the ruler has the right to exercise power and the ruled have a duty to obey.⁴⁴ Weber describes two forms of domination: that

based on constellations of interests and that based on authority.⁴⁵ Domination based on constellations of interests is found in religious and economic associations, whereas domination based on authority is found in legal and bureaucratic relationships.

Domination Based on Constellations of Interests

The first example of domination based on constellations of interests is religion. Weber's sociology of religion contains three major themes: an explanation of the distinguishing features of Western civilization, an analysis of the relationship between social stratification and religious ideas, and an examination of the effects of religious ideas on economic activities. Underlying all of this scrutiny is Weber's central theme of the rationalization of the processes of domination, which, for religion, comes in a movement from magicians to priests, who attempt to protect their positions by systematizing established beliefs. Within each religion, he identifies domination with a particular status group of religious leaders. For Confucianism, that status group is governmental officials with a literary education; for Hinduism, it is a hereditary caste of expert advisers (Brahmins); for Judaism, it is intellectuals trained in ritual and literature; and for Christianity, it is the urban bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, Weber did not argue that religion is simply a function of the ideal, material, or political interests of a particular status group. Instead, the church stands for a universalism of grace and for the ethical sufficiency of all who are enrolled under its institutional authority. Moreover, as is the case with all bureaucracies, there is a democratic tendency in religions as they become bureaucratized that fights against status privileges (an argument to which we will return in discussing bureaucratic organizations).⁴⁶

Weber's analysis of Christianity focuses primarily on the Protestant sects and their relationship to capitalism.⁴⁷ His interest in the development of capitalism is derived both from his perception that capitalism has been a pervasive and unifying theme in modern history and from a desire to respond to Marx's concept of historical materialism. Weber's examination of the relationship between Protestantism and capitalism, and his assertion that causality flows in that direction, is an excellent example of both his emphasis on ideas, as opposed to material interests, and his historical, comparative approach to causal analysis. But Weber did not posit a simple cause-effect relationship between Protestantism and capitalism, nor did he consider the Protestant ethic to be the sole cause of capitalism. Instead, he emphasizes that social dynamics require a pluralistic

analysis and that capitalism should be seen as the result of a specific combination of political, economic, and religious factors, not just the religious factor.

In discussing the relationship between Protestantism and capitalism, Weber employs a rather special perspective on modern capitalism—which, he asserts, presupposes the existence of a number of conditions: that there is private ownership of the means of production; that formally free labor exists; that a limited government allows the market to operate relatively freely; and that a system of finances exists, particularly a money economy.⁴⁸ Modern capitalism is characterized by the following attributes:

1. The calculation of capital is made in terms of money.
2. Everything is done in terms of balances.
3. Calculation underlies every act of partners to a transaction.
4. Economic action is adapted to a comparison of money income with money expenses.⁴⁹

Weber believes that capitalism represents the highest stage of rationality in economic behavior. By “rational,” he means an economic system based not on custom or tradition, but on a systematic and deliberate adjustment of economic means to attain pecuniary profit.⁵⁰ The rationality of modern capitalism is of a special type, however. The rationality of capitalism is “formal” and is measured by the extent to which quantitative calculation is both technically possible and actually applied. In contrast, “substantive” economic rationality involves the adequacy of the provision of goods and services.⁵¹ Weber asserts that the two concepts of economic rationality are always in conflict and that the formal rationality of money accounting and capitalism has no direct relationship to substantive considerations concerning the provision and distribution of goods and services.

A primary question for Weber, and one that joins his interests in religion and economics, is the source of the particular ethic of modern capitalism. His answer is Protestantism. Weber maintains that the Reformation did not mean the elimination of the church’s control over everyday life. Instead, it meant a new form of control in which a religiously based secular ethic and a worldly asceticism replaced the otherworldly asceticism of Catholicism and its indifference toward the rewards of this life.⁵² Protestantism gave positive spiritual and moral meaning to worldly activities and imparted an ethos of planning and self-control to economic activity.⁵³ The Protestant sects joined the idea that the gods bless with riches those who please them

with a kind of religious conduct embodying the notion that honesty is the best policy. It thus delivered to capitalism its special ethos: the ethos of the modern bourgeois middle classes.⁵⁴

The relationship between the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism is most clearly illustrated in the doctrines of Calvinism and its emphasis on predestination. The doctrine of predestination holds that only a small proportion of men are chosen for eternal grace and that the meaning of individual destiny is hidden in impenetrable mystery. Furthermore, the elect do not differ visibly from the damned. Thus, one cannot know his destiny. He must simply consider himself to be chosen and combat all doubts as temptations of the devil. The Calvinist creates his own salvation, or at least the conviction of his salvation, by the performance of deeds and in the service of a "calling." This independent salvation requires systematic and continuous self-control in the performance of each deed rather than an accumulation of deeds, as the Catholic Church had asserted.⁵⁵ In its emphasis on deeds, Calvinism rejected pure feelings and emotions and eliminated the idea that salvation could be granted by the church. Weber contends that whereas Catholics saw magic as the means to salvation with the priest as the magician, Calvinists demanded a life of good works that had no place for the Catholic cycle of sin, repentance, atonement, and release, followed by new sin. Calvinism sought to subject man to the dictates of a supreme will and to bring man's actions under constant self-control guided by ethical standards.⁵⁶

Calvinism also sought to destroy spontaneous, impulsive enjoyment by insisting on ordered individual conduct and by transforming monastic asceticism into a worldly asceticism while adding the positive idea of proving oneself in worldly activity.⁵⁷ Protestant asceticism holds that it is morally objectionable to relax in the enjoyment of one's possessions; the individual needs hard, continuous bodily or mental labor. The acquisition of wealth in the performance of one's calling is encouraged, but consumption should be limited. The combined effect of limiting consumption and freeing acquisitive activity is a compulsion to save and accumulate capital.

Weber concludes that the religious roots of modern capitalism soon gave way to the tenets of worldly utilitarianism, which has resulted in an orgy of materialism. But the religious epoch gave to its utilitarian successor an amazingly good conscience about the acquisition of wealth and comforting assurance about the unequal distribution of worldly goods.⁵⁸ It also legitimated the exploitation of labor, since the employer's activity is also a "calling." But whereas the Puritan wanted to work because it was his "calling," modern man is forced to work in the "iron cage" of the new economic order, and the pursuit of material goods controls his life.⁵⁹

Domination Based on Authority

Weber's second major form of domination is that based on authority. In systems of domination based on authority—as was the case with domination based on constellations of interests—obedience is dependent on the perception of legitimacy. The sources of legitimacy differ, however. Weber asserts that there are three sources of legitimacy for domination based on authority: charisma, tradition, and legality. These are pure, or ideal-types, while the bases of legitimacy usually occur in mixtures in their historical manifestations.

Charismatic Authority

Charismatic authority derives its legitimacy from the personal qualities of the leader. Weber defines charisma as the “quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities.”⁶⁰ Accordingly, charismatic authority is a form of rule to which people submit because of their belief in the magical powers, revelations, or heroism of the leader.⁶¹ Weber states that the pure type of charismatic authority appears only briefly, in contrast to the relatively more enduring structures of traditional and legal authority. Charismatic authority is a force for revolutionary change, and it is irrational in the sense that it is not bound by any intellectually analyzable rule.⁶²

The authority of the charismatic leader is constrained only by his personal judgment; he is not governed by any formal method of adjudication.⁶³ Disputes are settled by prophetic revelation or Solomonic arbitration. The relationship between the leader and the led under charismatic authority is typically unstable. Although the authority of the leader is not derived directly from the will of his followers (obedience, instead, is a duty or obligation), the charismatic leader still must constantly prove himself through victories and successes, since charisma disappears if proof is lacking. In sum, the charismatic leader knows only inner determination and inner restraint. He “seizes the task that is adequate for him and demands obedience . . . by virtue of his mission.”⁶⁴

Administration under charismatic authority, according to Weber, is loose and unstable. The leader's disciples do not have regular occupations, and they reject the methodical and rational pursuit of monetary rewards as undignified. Whatever organization exists is composed of an aristocracy chosen on the basis of charismatic qualities. There is no procedure for appointment, promotion, or dismissal, and there are no career tracks. There is no continuing hierarchical assignment of tasks, since the leader can intervene at will in the performance of any task. Perhaps most important, there are no defined spheres of authority

34 Mastering Public Administration

or competence to protect against arbitrary exercises of power, and no system of formal rules to ensure equal treatment and due process.⁶⁵

Traditional Authority

Like charismatic authority, traditional authority involves personal rule, but unlike charismatic authority, it is not the product of crisis and enthusiasm. Rulers enjoy personal authority and followers are subjects, but the routine governs conduct. Traditional authority is based on respect for the eternal past, belief in the rightness and appropriateness of the traditional or customary ways of doing things. It rests on piety for what actually, allegedly, or presumably has always existed.⁶⁶

Weber argues that administration under traditional authority tends to be irrational because the development of rational regulations is impeded; there is likely to be no staff with formal, technical training; and there is wide scope for the indulgence of personal whims. A person, not an order, is obeyed, as the leader claims the performance of unspecified obligations and services as his personal right. Traditional authority is a regime of favorites in which a shifting series of tasks and powers is commissioned and granted by a leader through arbitrary decisions.⁶⁷ Justice under traditional authority is a mixture of constraints and personal discretion. There is a system of traditional norms that are considered inviolable, but there is also a realm of arbitrariness and dependence on the favor of the ruler, who judges on the basis of personal relationships.⁶⁸

Legal Authority

In legal authority, legitimacy is based on a belief in reason, and laws are obeyed because they have been enacted by proper procedures.⁶⁹ Thus, it is believed that persons exercising authority are acting in accordance with their duties as established by a code of rules and regulations.

In administration, the legitimacy of legal authority rests on rules that are rationally established. Submission to authority is based on an impersonal bond to a generally defined “duty of office,” and official duty is fixed by rationally established norms.⁷⁰ Obedience constitutes deference to an impersonal order, not an individual, and even the giving of a command represents obedience to an organizational norm rather than the arbitrary act of the person giving the order. Thus, the official does not exercise power in his own right; he is only a “trustee” of an impersonal, compulsory institution. The organization of the administrative staff under legal authority is bureaucratic in form. The system of justice under legal authority is a balance between

formal or procedural justice and substantive justice, but with relative emphasis on the formal aspects of justice.

In outlining the bases of legitimacy, Weber purposely eschews the notion of an evolutionary, linear progress from one form to another. Instead, he sees a general trend toward rationalization, which is punctuated by spontaneous and creative bursts of charisma. The victory of charisma over the rational and the routine is never complete, however, and, in the end, charisma itself is routinized.⁷¹

The basic problem of charismatic leadership is one of succession: What occurs when something happens to the charismatic leader? In coping with the problem of succession, the charismatic situation starts to yield to a “routinization of charisma.”⁷² Weber states that when the personal authority of the charismatic leader is displaced by mechanisms or rules for formally ascertaining the “divine will,” a routinization of charisma has taken place.⁷³ In regard to succession, as established procedures used to select a successor come to govern the process, the forces of tradition and rationalization begin to take effect, and charisma is disassociated from a person and embedded in an objective institutional structure. In the process, an unstable structure of authority is transformed into a more permanent traditional or legal structure of authority. With routinization, discipline—in the form of consistently rationalized, trained, and exact execution of received orders—replaces individual action. The development of legal authority, either through the routinization of charisma or through the breakdown of the privileges of traditional authority, exerts a certain “leveling” influence, whereby the recognition of authority is treated as a *source* of legitimacy rather than as a *consequence* of authority. Thus, legitimacy in legal authority takes on some democratic overtones.⁷⁴

Law. The two major examples of domination based on legal authority discussed by Weber are the legal structure and bureaucratic administration. Weber asserts that law grows out of the “usages” and “conventions” found in all societies.⁷⁵ Law is distinguished from mere usage and convention, however, by the presence of a staff, which may employ coercive power for its enforcement. Weber notes that not all legal orders are considered authoritative. Legal authority exists only when the legal order is implemented and obeyed in the belief that it is legitimate.

Weber says that there are two kinds of rationality associated with the creation of legal norms: substantive and formal. An act is substantively rational if it is guided by principles such as those embodied in religious or ethical thought. An act is formally rational when it is based on general rules. Conversely, an act is formally irrational if guided by means beyond the control of reason (such as prophetic revelation or ordeal) and substantively irrational if based on

emotional evaluations of single cases.⁷⁶ Weber traces a developmental sequence in the rationalization of the law that begins with primitive procedures relying on a combination of magically conditioned formalism and revelation. Next comes a theocratic or patrimonial form of legal system, and, finally, from this stage, there emerges an increasingly specialized and logically systematized body of law.⁷⁷ Although economic interests play a limited role in the systematization and rationalization of law, there is at least a parallel between economic systems and legal structures. Modern capitalism is the prototype of purposively rational behavior, and the formal rationality of legal thought is the counterpart of purposive rationality in economic conduct.

Legal Domination and the State. The concepts of legal domination and state are not coextensive for Weber, who holds that law is not exclusively a political phenomenon, but one that exists wherever coercive means are available. Conversely, the state has at its disposal means of greater effectiveness than coercive ones. Nonetheless, Weber defines the state in terms of the specific means peculiar to it—that is, the use of violent force. The state is a relationship of people dominating people, supported by means of the legitimate use of violence. It is a compulsory organization that structures domination and, in the modern state, concentrates the means of administration in the hands of the leaders.⁷⁸

According to Weber, the state was originally created to protect interests, particularly economic interests, and it arose from the struggle between the estates and the prince—between the holders of privilege and the holders of power. This struggle resulted in an alliance between the monarchy and bourgeois interests that wanted to be free of administrative arbitrariness and the irrational disturbances of the privileged and to affirm the legally binding character of contracts. This stabilizing process eventuated in a legitimate legal order in the form of the modern state.⁷⁹ The modern state is characterized by a body of law, bureaucracy, compulsory jurisdiction over territory, and a monopoly over the legitimate use of force. Government administration in the modern state is bound by rules of law and is conducted in accord with generally formulated principles. The people who occupy positions of power are not rulers but superiors; they hold office temporarily and possess limited authority. The people, on their part, are citizens, not subjects.⁸⁰

The rise of the modern state, based on systematized and rationalized law and administration, has produced a conflict between the formal justice embodied in that state and substantive justice. The difference is that whereas formal justice derives its premises from formal concepts, substantive justice derives its premises from the experience of life.⁸¹ In traditional society, Weber says, judicial administration aims at substantive justice and sweeps away formal rules of evidence. This

mode of proceeding may be rational in the sense of adherence to some general, fixed principles, but, Weber argues, not in the sense of logical rationality. Decisions in such a system may be based on considerations of equity, but they may equally well be made on the basis of expediency or politics.⁸²

Bureaucracy. The second example of domination based on legal authority is bureaucracy. In addressing the topic of bureaucracy and its role in society, Weber makes one of his most influential contributions. Weber did not invent the term *bureaucracy*, nor was he the first to examine its role in society.⁸³ Nevertheless, Weber has given us one of the most famous descriptions of the characteristics of bureaucratic organizations and surely one of the most penetrating and controversial analyses of the bureaucratic phenomenon.

Weber's analysis of bureaucracy is logically tied to his interest in legal domination in the modern state. In fact, Weber considered bureaucracy to be a major element in the rationalization of the modern world and the most important of all social processes.⁸⁴ He asserts that domination both expresses itself and functions through administration. Organized domination calls for continuous administration and the control of a personal executive staff and the material implements of administration. Legal domination calls for an increasingly bureaucratic administration in which domination is based on systematic knowledge.

Weber defines an organization as an ordering of social relationships, the maintenance of which certain individuals take as their special task. The organization consists of members accustomed to obedience; an administrative staff that holds itself at the disposal of the masters; and the masters themselves, who hold a power to command not derived from a grant of power by others.⁸⁵ The orientation of human behavior to a set of rules is central to Weber's concept of the organization. Organizational rules regulate the possession and scope of authority in the organization.⁸⁶

Weber identifies bureaucracy as the dominant organizational form in a legal and rational society. The development of bureaucracy is a product of the intensive and qualitative (as opposed to extensive and quantitative) enlargement of administrative tasks—in other words, complexity breeds bureaucracy. Weber defines bureaucracy by listing the features that are characteristic of a particular type of organization as well as those of a particular type of personnel system. The features of the “ideal-type” of bureaucracy as organization are as follows:

1. Administration is carried out on a continuous basis, not simply at the pleasure of the leader.
2. Tasks in the bureaucratic organization are divided into functionally distinct areas, each with the requisite authority and sanctions.

3. Offices are arranged in the form of a hierarchy.
4. The resources of the bureaucratic organization are distinct from those of the members as private individuals (that is, administrators do not own the means of administration). This characteristic derives from Weber's concept of office, in which the official role entails specific duties to be performed, but the resources to fulfill those duties are provided by someone other than the official.
5. The officeholder cannot appropriate the office (that is, the office cannot be sold by the official or passed on by heredity).
6. Administration is based on written documents.
7. Control in the bureaucratic organization is based on impersonally applied rational rules. Thus, it is not simply the existence of rules but the quality and mode of application of those rules that distinguishes the bureaucratic organization.⁸⁷

Weber also outlines the specific personnel system in the bureaucratic organization:

1. Officials are personally free and are appointed on the basis of a contract.
2. Officials are appointed, not elected. Weber argues that election modifies the strictness of hierarchical subordination.
3. Officials are appointed on the basis of professional qualifications.
4. Officials have a fixed money salary and pension rights.
5. The official's post is his sole or major occupation.
6. A career structure exists in which promotion is based on merit (though there may also be pressure to recognize seniority).
7. The official is subject to a unified control and disciplinary system in which the means of compulsion and its exercise are clearly defined.⁸⁸

It is important to observe that the features of bureaucracy as an organizational system and as a personnel system are all internal to the organization and have been, since the 1950s, extensively investigated for their internal consistency. Time and again, it appears that the correlation between these features of the ideal-type of bureaucracy, as outlined above, is confirmed through empirical research.⁸⁹

Weber states that the bureaucratic mechanisms described above exist only in the modern state and the most advanced institutions of capitalism. The ideal-type bureaucracy possesses rationally discussable grounds for every administrative act; it centralizes and concentrates the means of administration; it has a “leveling” effect in that it does away with plutocratic privilege and rests on equality in the eyes of the law and equal eligibility for office; and it creates permanent authority relationships.

Weber clearly believes bureaucracy to be the most rational and efficient organizational form devised by man. Bureaucracy is rational in that it involves control based on knowledge, has clearly defined spheres of competence, operates according to intellectually analyzable rules, and has calculability in its operations.⁹⁰ Bureaucracy is efficient because of its precision, speed, consistency, availability of records, continuity, potential for secrecy, unity, rigorous coordination, and minimization of interpersonal friction, personnel costs, and material costs.⁹¹ In Weber’s words,

Experience tends universally to show that the purely bureaucratic type of administrative organization—that is, the monocratic variety of bureaucracy—is, from a purely technical point of view, capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is in this sense formally the most rational known means of carrying out imperative control over human beings. It is superior to any other form in precision, in stability, in the stringency of its discipline, and in its reliability. . . . It is finally superior both in intensive efficiency and in the scope of its operations, and is formally capable of application to all kinds of administrative tasks.⁹²

It is very important to emphasize that Weber argues *not* that bureaucracy is the most efficient of all conceivable forms of organization, but that it is merely more efficient than the known alternative forms of organization.⁹³ The alternatives, according to Weber, are collegial and avocational administration, which, he contends, are inadequate beyond a certain size limit or where functions require technical training or continuity of policy.⁹⁴ Weber is particularly determined in his opposition to democratic administration, a form of collegial administration. He argues that even simple forms of democratic administration are unstable and likely to fall into the hands of the wealthy, since those who work do not have time to govern. Moreover, as soon as mass administration is involved, democratic administration falls prey to the technical superiority of those with training and experience and thus to domination by technical experts.⁹⁵ Weber also has substantial reservations about the broader form of collegial administration. Collegiality, he argues, almost inevitably involves

obstacles to precise, clear, rapid decisions and divides personal responsibility. Collegial administration impairs promptness of decision, consistency of policy, the responsibility of the individual, the requisite ruthlessness toward outsiders, and the maintenance of discipline within the group. Weber asserts that it is impossible for either the internal or the foreign policy of great states to be carried out on a collegial basis. And, as is the case with democratic administration, collegial administration will eventually give way to the technical superiority of the hierarchical organization.⁹⁶

Weber considers bureaucracy and capitalism to be mutually supportive social structures, a “mixed economy” as Schumpeter later called it, where market and policy mechanisms are in place to assure that the other does not stray too far from desired objectives.⁹⁷ The capitalist market demands what bureaucracy provides—official business discharged precisely, unambiguously, continuously, with as much speed as possible, and according to calculable rules that make bureaucratic behavior predictable.⁹⁸ Moreover, capitalism and bureaucracy share an emphasis on formalistic impersonality in their relationships. In the market, acts of exchange are oriented toward the commodity, and those acts, Weber asserts, constitute the most impersonal relationship into which humans can enter. Market ethics require only that partners to a transaction behave legally and honor the inviolability of a promise once given. The private enterprise system transforms even personal relationships in the organization into objects of the labor market and drains them of all normal sentiment.⁹⁹ The bureaucratic organization, for its part, also offers the elements of calculability and depersonalization. Bureaucratic organizations—that is, civil servants—operate *sine ira et studio* (without hatred or passion)¹⁰⁰ and thereby exclude irrational feelings and sentiments in favor of the detached—or “neutral”¹⁰¹—professional expert. By eliminating incalculable emotional elements, bureaucracy offers the attitudes demanded by the apparatus of modern culture, in general, and modern capitalism, in particular. The demand for legal equality and for guarantees against arbitrariness requires formal, rational objectivity in administration, not the personal choice of traditional authority or the emotional demands for substantive justice in a democracy.¹⁰²

Although Weber admires the rationality and efficiency of bureaucratic organizations and respects the concept of justice embodied therein, he also associates bureaucracy with an oppressive routine that is adverse to personal freedom.¹⁰³ He observes that bureaucracy has penetrated all social institutions, public and private, and that bureaucracy limits individual freedom, renders the individual incapable of understanding his own activities in relation to the organization as a whole, and favors—in business, government,

and education—the “crippled personality” of the specialist.¹⁰⁴ Indeed, Weber recognized the possibility that bureaucracy could become mankind’s “iron cage,” whose rigidity would easily snuff out human feelings and values.¹⁰⁵ The iron cage metaphor of bureaucracy is often interpreted as indicating a prison wherein the movement and activity of inmates is tightly controlled, but it can also be interpreted as pointing to an “essential scaffolding for thought,” or a prerequisite structure of an entire body of thought. Finally, the iron cage can be regarded as a playground structure, where available apparatuses give structure to play but do not determine how the play is pursued or conducted. This iron cage as playground structure motif closely fits Weber’s definition of bureaucracy as organization. Also, it is non-pejorative and thus nicely complements his definition of bureaucracy as a personnel system.¹⁰⁶

Thus, though bureaucracy extends human capacities, it also increases the number of forces to which man is subject and may not even be just, since the propertyless masses may not be well served by a doctrine of formal equality before the law.¹⁰⁷ Weber sees reversion to small-scale organizations as the only means of avoiding the dysfunctional consequences of bureaucratic organizations, but he realizes that such a reversion would deprive society of bureaucracy’s benefits.¹⁰⁸

Weber’s Political Perspectives

Moving from Weber’s sociological analysis to his political writings, we encounter some shifts in emphasis, if not changes in direction. Weber’s political writings place more emphasis on class conflict and less on ideal interests, and they treat capitalism as an independent phenomenon, not just part of the processes of rationalization. Also, whereas Weber’s sociology focuses on the achievements of bureaucracy, his political writings stress the limitations of bureaucracy and the likely future struggle between political leadership and bureaucracy.

Democracy, Power, and the Nation-State

The *state*, according to Weber, represents the monopoly of the legitimate use of force over a given territory and is an “ultimate” in that it cannot be integrated into a more comprehensive whole.¹⁰⁹ The *nation*, however, is more than coercive control over a territory; it is also a community of sentiment. A nation exists where there is some common factor among people that is regarded as a source of value and produces a feeling of solidarity. This solidarity can be expressed through a vibrant civil, associational society where citizens embrace contestation

rather than apathy and where the feeling of solidarity finds expression in autonomous political institutions or at least creates a demand for such institutions.¹¹⁰

Culture is a complex of characteristics or values that constitute the individuality of a particular national community. Weber asserts that there is a reciprocally interdependent relationship between the state and its culture: The state can survive only if it can harness the solidary feelings of national community and culture in support of its power, while, conversely, the national community preserves its distinctive identity by the protection it receives from the state. Adhering to the position that nations and the cultures they incorporate should be preserved, Weber contends that the state should serve national and cultural values and that politics is the appropriate sphere for the pursuit of these nonmaterial values.¹¹¹ The ultimate value, he argues, is the power position of the nation in the world, which means that struggle and conflict are permanent features of social life. Even more, Weber believes that conflict should be encouraged, because the highest qualities of life—traits of independence engendered by struggles with the difficulties of life—can be developed only through conflict.¹¹² This encouragement extends even to the ultimate conflict, war, which, Weber contends, creates a sentiment of community and gives a consecrated meaning to death. Only in war can the individual believe that he is dying *for* something.

Weber supports democracy as a means of providing leadership for national ends, but his is a “democracy” of a special type, and even then his support is at best reluctant. He warns against viewing democracy as a panacea for society’s ills, and he argues that democracy is inevitably governed by the “law of the small number”—that politics is controlled from the top by a small number of people. Democracy changes the rules for the selection of a leader, but leaders are still selected. Instead, Weber defends democracy as a postulate of practical reason. It is to be preferred simply because it is the only reasonable alternative to authoritarianism. Democracy permits mass involvement, but on an orderly and regular basis, and it is consistent with the requirements of modern institutions and their demands for equality of status.¹¹³

Nevertheless, Weber believes that democracy is not distinguished by direct mass involvement but by the use of demagoguery, the regular use of the vote in choosing leaders, and organization by mass political parties. The influence of a democratic elite is viewed as not only inevitable but also desirable. Warning against the evils of “leaderless” democracy, in which professional politicians who have no “calling” rule, Weber argues that democracy requires strong leadership. In his words,

In a democracy the people choose a leader in whom they trust. Then the chosen leader says, “Now shut up and obey me.” People and party are no

longer free to interfere in his business. . . . Later the people can sit in judgment. If the leader has made a mistake—to the gallows with him!¹¹⁴

Political leadership is required to ensure the supremacy of the political over the bureaucratic. Since Weber regarded bureaucratization of organization (and, in a way, the world) as inescapable, given the increasing complexities of economic, social, and political life, he expected that a caste of administrators would emerge—a new aristocracy, whose power was grounded in specialized skills.¹¹⁵ Political leadership is also required to ensure the supremacy of the political over the economic by focusing on social unity in the face of the divisiveness of class and material interests.¹¹⁶ Although Weber warned against leaderless democracy, he was also aware that democracy could lead to “Plebiscitary Caesarism” in the form of an individual carried to absolute power by the emotionalized masses.¹¹⁷ What is needed is not just leadership but charismatic leadership, which requires more than popularity and is different from Caesaristic rule. The charismatic leader is one who is truly destined to rule and is suited for his tasks by supernatural gifts.¹¹⁸

The importance of leadership to Weber is reflected in his discussion of the role and functions of the politician. The objective of politics, he tells us, is to share power or to influence the distribution of power, and politics itself is any kind of independent leadership in political associations.¹¹⁹ Consequently, the politician must have a capacity for independent action, he should not sacrifice his personal judgment for official duties—that is, he should be willing to resign if it is necessary for him to do so to live up to the responsibilities of leadership—and he must have skill in the struggle for power.¹²⁰ The politician should combine passion and a feeling of responsibility with a sense of proportion—passion in devotion to a cause and a sense of proportion developed by establishing some distance between himself and others.¹²¹ He must fight vanity and avoid seeking power for power’s sake. These attributes, Weber suggests, are most likely to be found among those whose economic position is sufficiently secure that they can “live for” politics, not have to “live off” it.¹²² According to Weber, the prototypical modern politician is the lawyer who both is available for service and has the skills required for effective participation in the struggle for power.¹²³

The functions of the politician are to give direction to policy in a continuing struggle with bureaucratic and party officials and to counter the influence of class conflict and material interests by giving expression to a common interest underlying the superficial perceptions of class interests. In regard to the latter function, Weber differs from Marx in believing that divisions of

class can be overcome within the capitalist system and that workers and entrepreneurs have a common interest in the rationalization of industry. Nevertheless, he also recognizes that capitalism has led to the pursuit of material interests (a “dance around the golden calf”), has replaced personal relationships with impersonality, and has created conflict between those with property and the propertyless.¹²⁴ These negative effects have resulted in a degeneration of the national political outlook and the subordination of the true function of politics to sectional and class interests. Weber argues that politics should be neither merely the pursuit of power nor simply an extension of economic activity in the form of class or interest-group activity. Instead, political leadership should draw people to an awareness of common interests, including a common interest in the perpetuation of capitalism.

Weber further contends that the honor of the political leader lies in his exclusive personal responsibility for what he does. Unfortunately, the ethical bases for the assumption of personal responsibility are ambiguous. Weber distinguishes between two kinds of ethics: the ethic of ultimate ends and the ethic of responsibility. Under the ethic of ultimate ends, one feels responsible only for seeing that the “flame of pure intention” is not quenched and that action is taken regardless of the consequences. Under the ethic of responsibility, one is held accountable for the foreseeable results of his actions.¹²⁵ The ambiguity stems from two sources. First, Weber argues, no ethic can tell us to what extent an ethically good purpose justifies an ethically dubious means. Second, one must face the reality that some of the tasks of politics can be performed only by the use of violence, an ethically dubious means. The ambiguity poses a paradox. On the one hand, everything that is striven for through political action employing violent means and following an ethic of responsibility endangers the salvation of the soul. On the other hand, if one pursues a goal following a pure ethic of ultimate ends, the goal itself may be discredited because responsibility for consequences is lacking. Weber admits that he cannot prescribe whether one should follow an ethic of ultimate ends or an ethic of responsibility, or when one should be followed and when the other. He does assert that only when the two supplement each other does one have a calling for politics.¹²⁶

Weber's emphasis on political leadership was prompted, in large part, by his aversion to bureaucratic domination. He considered the ideologies of his day (primarily capitalism and socialism) to be of small consequence compared to what he perceived to be the nearly inexorable process of bureaucratization. Weber argues that bureaucrats will develop interests of their own and start to shape policy, increasing the attendant danger that the rule of law will be undermined, in the absence of effective political leadership.¹²⁷ Weber asserts that the

official, according to his proper vocation, should not engage in politics; he should undertake only the impartial administration of his office.¹²⁸ The honor of the civil servant, Weber says, is vested in his ability to execute conscientiously the orders of superior authorities “exactly as if the order agreed with his own convictions.”¹²⁹ If the administrator receives orders with which he disagrees, he should make his views known to his superior; however, if the superior insists, the administrator must comply to the best of his ability. In short, a sense of duty placed above personal opinion should be part of the administrator’s ethic and is required for the rule of law.

The problem arises when the bureaucracy attempts to overstep its rightful functions and capabilities. Weber believes bureaucrats to be, like feudal lords, the primary exponents of power and prestige for their own political structure.¹³⁰ The aggrandizement of bureaucracy can subvert the rule of law, as the bureaucracy, which cannot be inspected and controlled, becomes a law unto itself. Moreover, Weber contends that the permanent official is more likely to get his way than is his elected or politically appointed superior, who is not likely to be a specialist and thus may be at the mercy of his expert subordinate. Knowledge becomes an instrument of political power, and secrecy protects the bureaucrat’s monopoly on information.¹³¹

Weber considers the bureaucratic machine to be one of the hardest of social structures to destroy. Bureaucracy is *the* means for achieving rationally ordered societal action. Nevertheless, the bureaucrat is also part of a community of functionaries who have an interest in seeing that the bureaucratic mechanism continues to function. These officials may develop into a status group whose cohesion stems, not from economic interests, but from the prestige of a style of life that fosters the values of status, security, and order.¹³² Even more, bureaucrats may become a privileged class and use their positions for personal advantage. As a power group, bureaucrats may develop a code of honor that includes not only a sense of duty but also a belief in the superiority of their own qualifications.¹³³ Indeed, Weber’s bureaucrat is far removed from Hegel’s civil servant as the new guardian of the modern state. Once in power, the bureaucracy is difficult to dislodge because few among the governed can master the tasks performed by the bureaucracy. Democracy requires the prevention of a closed status group of officials from taking power and the minimization of the authority of officialdom. But the “leveling” consequences of democracy may occur only in regard to the governed rather than to their bureaucratic masters, in a process that Weber refers to as “passive democratization.”¹³⁴

What unites Weber’s work and worldview is a deep-felt concern for how “individualistic life-conduct of the personality, inherited from the age of

liberalism, may be preserved in our own highly bureaucratized and thoroughly rationalized Western culture.”¹³⁵ The central political issue of balancing individualism with bureaucratization translates into the question of how to prevent bureaucracy from exceeding its functions or, conversely, how to maintain the supremacy of the politician. That is no simple matter. Collegial administration is slow and obscures responsibility; a structural separation of powers is inherently unstable, and one power is likely to become dominant; amateur administration does not provide the requisite expertise; direct democracy is possible only in small groups and also does not provide expertise; and representative democracy must rely on political parties, which themselves are bureaucratized. Bureaucracy, Weber maintains, can be controlled only from the top. Charismatic leadership may be the solution, if there is one. It is, at least, the best hope. Politicians are the indispensable counterweight to bureaucracy, and both parliamentary and plebiscitary bases of leadership are necessary to prevent rule by a clique of political notables and governmental officials who will control the rule of law rather than be subject to it.¹³⁶

Nor is the economic sphere immune from possible bureaucratic domination. Such domination, Weber argues, is as likely to be the result of the quest for the bureaucratic values of order and security as it is the result of a power drive by bureaucratic officials.¹³⁷ Weber sees the bureaucratic threat in the economic sphere as emanating from two sources: socialism, which seeks to replace capitalism with a bureaucratic order; and the possibility that the bourgeoisie itself will go “soft” and precipitate a decline in capitalist values. Weber argues that socialism will make autonomous economic action subject to the bureaucratic management of the state. Economic transactions accomplished by political manipulation will replace the rationality and individualism of a capitalist economy. He believes that a system of bureaucratic rule is inevitable, but socialism will accelerate the process of bureaucratization and thus lead to serfdom.¹³⁸ Capitalism also faces dangers from within. Ironically, capitalism is itself a prime reason for the bureaucratization that threatens to stifle individualism. In addition, capitalism has encouraged the pursuit of material goods and the desire for a secure subsistence, which, Weber contends, will result in a “vast army of state pensioners and an array of monopolistic privileges,” and in the demise of the entrepreneurial spirit of capitalism.¹³⁹

Despite an undeniably pessimistic strain, Weber avoids schemes involving inevitable social development or unavoidable historical cycles. There is the notion of a recurrent struggle between routinization and charisma. When the world becomes overly bureaucratized, the prophets and the Caesars return. The future is thus a field of strategy, not a repetition, or

unfolding, of the past. Social life is a “polytheism of values” among which choices are possible, and charisma, says Weber, is the metaphysical vehicle of human freedom.¹⁴⁰

Conclusion

The main points of Weber’s substantive sociology may be summarized as follows:

1. A fundamental dynamic of civilization has been the process of rationalization.
2. The process of rationalization is reflected in various forms of domination, or exercises of power perceived to be legitimate.
3. The two basic types of domination are domination based on constellations of interests and domination based on authority.
4. Domination based on constellations of interests is manifested in religious and economic associations.
5. Domination based on authority is manifested in the operations of the state and bureaucratic organizations.
6. The legitimacy of domination based on authority is derived from three sources: charisma, tradition, and legality.
7. There has been a general historical trend toward increasing rationality in social relationships, but that trend has not been unilinear. Instead, the advance of rationalization has been punctuated by outbursts of charisma and reversions to tradition.
8. Bureaucracy is the dominant organizational form in a legal and rational society, and it derives its characteristics—predictability, calculability, and impersonality—as well as its sense of justice from the society in which it resides.
9. Whereas the past has been marked by a struggle between charisma and the forces of depersonalization, the future will see a struggle over who will enact the rules in a legal-rational society, a struggle that will pit the political leader against the professional bureaucrat.

Although Weber is held in an esteem that approaches reverence, he has not been without his critics. Indeed, scarcely a facet of Weber’s work has not been

the subject of careful scrutiny and, often, intense controversy. There is widespread agreement on one criticism. Weber's writing style is, at best, difficult, and the striking difference between the clarity of Weber's spoken word and the opaqueness of his written word is often noted.¹⁴¹ Weber both defended and explained his sometimes tortured constructions by stating, "Personally I am of the opinion that nothing is too pedantic if it is useful in avoiding confusions."¹⁴² It is not clear that Weber avoided confusion, but his writing certainly qualifies as oftentimes pedantic. Another general criticism of Weber's work is his tendency to rely more on assertion than on demonstration or proof. This imbalance was probably inevitable given the compass of Weber's interests and the sweep of his ideas. Nonetheless, his dismissal of important ideas is, at times, almost casual. For instance, Weber simply rules out some forms of democracy as being "impractical," and popular sovereignty is peremptorily reduced to the status of "popular fiction."¹⁴³

But the bulk of the criticisms have focused on Weber's methodology, his historical analysis, and his analysis of bureaucracy. The critique of Weber's methodology centers on his use of the ideal-type construct. The ideal-type is intended to combine attributes in a logically consistent manner. It is to be based on, but not confined to, historical manifestations that approximate the ideal-type. There are several problems with Weber's use of the ideal-type construct. One is his occasional use of the construct in a self-serving manner. Consider, for instance, Weber's treatment of the concept of capitalism.¹⁴⁴ He defines a particular form of capitalism (an ideal-type, if you will) that has as its essence a "spirit" that emphasizes honest accumulation as a "calling," and he traces the causal roots of this brand of capitalism to ascetic Protestantism. Note that this form of capitalism need never have actually appeared in its "pure" condition in history—which means that an empirical test of the causal relationship is at least inappropriate and perhaps impossible. Note, too, that Weber is dealing with a narrowly defined economic phenomenon whose relationship to ascetic Protestantism may be more definitional than causal and which excludes other forms of economic activity generally considered to be "capitalistic." Nicos P. Mouzelis takes the critique of Weber's ideal-type a step further, arguing that Weber's "ideal characteristics are not always compatible with one another." In particular, Mouzelis contends that Weber's ideal-type bureaucracy is not necessarily rational and efficient, and, consequently, Weber's posited combination of bureaucratic characteristics may not be "objectively possible."¹⁴⁵ Finally, it is argued that the use of ideal-types alone does not accomplish Weber's theory-building objectives. To constitute a theory, it is held, the types should be "arranged and classified in a definite order of relationship."¹⁴⁶ This Weber failed to do.

Weber has also been criticized in regard to his historical analysis. Most of this criticism has been directed at his analysis of the causes of capitalism. Although Weber acknowledges the likelihood of causal pluralism, his own analysis is largely confined to the influence of religious ideas on economic activity. Moreover, while Weber sought to demonstrate that ideas preceded interests in the development of capitalism, he does not demonstrate that *both* Calvinism and capitalism were not the product of prior material interests.¹⁴⁷ Finally, it is argued that Weber failed to deal with the processes by which the religious ideas of a dominant status group actually became an everyday standard of behavior for the common man.¹⁴⁸ This omission leaves open the possibility that forces other than religious ideas may have been instrumental in giving rise to capitalism, and even to its particular “spirit.”

Yet all of these criticisms pale in comparison to the reaction to Weber’s formulation of the concept of bureaucracy.¹⁴⁹ It has been argued that bureaucracy is not necessarily rational, that it may not be efficient, that other forms of organization may well be more efficient, and that bureaucracy, by virtue of its structural and procedural complexity, may permit, if not encourage, evasions of individual responsibility.¹⁵⁰ A particularly penetrating analysis is that of Robert Merton.¹⁵¹ Merton accepts Weber’s construction of the bureaucratic phenomenon, abides by Weber’s ground rules on the intent and use of the ideal-type—that it must stand only the test of internal logical consistency or objective possibility—and goes to the heart of the Weberian bureaucracy (that is, the impersonal application of the rules) in formulating his critique.

For Merton, the problem of bureaucracy comes in the form of a paradox: The very organizational features that Weber thought to be associated with rationality and efficiency may instead be associated with irrationality and inefficiency. Merton cites as a case in point the consequences of the impersonal application of the rules in a bureaucratic organization. The impersonal application of the rules is intended to enhance organizational rationality and efficiency by encouraging a high degree of reliability and conformity in the behavior in the organization. Problems arise, however, when these traits (reliability and conformity) become exaggerated—which, Merton argues, is likely to be the case in bureaucratic organizations given a number of specified formal and informal dynamics. As rule enforcement assumes increasing significance, the organization develops what Merton refers to as a “punctilious adherence to formalized procedures”—more commonly known as “red tape.” Eventually, the enforcement of rules becomes an end in itself, which results in a “displacement of goals” as an instrumental value (the enforcement of rules) is substituted for

a terminal value (the accomplishment of organizational goals) as the purpose of organizational activity. Organizational rules become “sanctified,” or imbued with a moral legitimacy of their own, and the organization develops rigor mortis and becomes unable to adapt to changing circumstances. In sum, Merton argues that bureaucracy contains “the seeds of its own destruction” in its emphasis on rules, and that the bureaucratic environment itself produces a mentality that encourages the enforcement of rules regardless of their consequences for the accomplishment of organizational objectives.

Still, Weber is likely to remain a subject of both respect and controversy. On matters administrative, his particular genius was to place administration in a broad historical context and to associate the processes of bureaucratization with the processes of rationalization in the Western world. Moreover, Weber associated the mechanisms of bureaucracy with familiar concepts of justice, such as due process and equal application of the law, thus lending bureaucratic organization a significance that transcends even considerations of rationality and efficiency.

THE LEGACY OF MAX WEBER IN CONTEMPORARY SCHOLARSHIP

Rethinking Bureaucracy’s Role in Public Administration and Governance

Jongsoo Park and James F. Comeaux

Identifying the intellectual space that Max Weber occupies in the current public administration literature presents several challenges. Among the most obvious is the fact that Weber is the only theorist included in this volume who wrote predominantly in German, and translations may not adequately convey the full complexity of his thought.¹⁵² Another challenge is that Weber made intellectual contributions to a wide array of fields from sociology to law, politics, and beyond. We will focus on the area of contribution with which Weber is most identified—bureaucracy. In addition, we intend to suggest some areas in public administration scholarship (for instance, contract management, network management) that have not yet drawn on that bureaucracy literature.

It has been suggested that the public administration and management literature has featured a “bureaucratic paradigm” for several decades.¹⁵³ Ever since Weber argued both the virtues and challenges of bureaucracy,¹⁵⁴ two predominant avenues of inquiry have been pursued in regard to bureaucracy: first, whether there is empirical evidence to support the proposition that bureaucracy is an effective and

efficient way to administer government; and second, how the inherent tension between democracy and bureaucracy is reconciled in the study.

Bureaucracy and Authority

Bureaucracy is a wide area of study, and there is not always consistency in how scholars define it.¹⁵⁵ To take but one example, bureaucracy has been viewed by some public administration scholars as antithetical to New Public Management,¹⁵⁶ while others suggest that “the spread of ‘New Public Management’ has helped to institutionalize bureaucratic ethos and managerialism in governments around the world,”¹⁵⁷ and still others argue that the types of reforms sought by New Public Management can only succeed if there is already a functioning Weberian bureaucracy in place.¹⁵⁸ Compounding this lack of scholarly agreement on the nature and definition of bureaucracy is the fact that it has become synonymous with red tape and inefficiency, despite active defense of bureaucracy’s role.¹⁵⁹ Indeed, particularly in American literature, bureaucracy is more often a pejorative term,¹⁶⁰ whereas the level of antipathy does not appear to be as great in other Western countries.

In American public administration, Woodrow Wilson’s work is viewed as important in the development of thought regarding the role of public administration in society.¹⁶¹ While there is scant evidence that Wilson and Weber directly informed each other’s thinking, it is clear that they shared common intellectual traditions.¹⁶² A prominent theme evident in both of their work is the politics/administration dichotomy. One aspect is the value of “neutral competence” and technical superiority of expert bureaucrats,¹⁶³ vis-à-vis the level of expertise that elected officials are able to attain.¹⁶⁴ One empirical study suggested that meritocratic professionalism of public administrators, as proposed by Weber, is one factor contributing to higher economic growth rates in developing countries.¹⁶⁵ In a similar vein, theorists have argued that impartiality of government institutions, which is a consequence of the politics/administration divide, results in a higher level of quality of government.¹⁶⁶

In addition to the impartiality of bureaucracy, Weber also suggested that it was a rational tool for executing the wishes of elected officials. Noting the value of stability and predictability of socioeconomic systems, scholars and practitioners have sought to separate the discretionary decision making of bureaucrats from the decision making of elected officials. This area, again, suggests the pervasiveness of the politics/administration dichotomy suggested by both Weber and Wilson. Although a portion of the literature in public administration has included the policymaking process, the politics/administration dichotomy continues to lead many scholars, especially in public management, to focus more on the roles of bureaucrats in and their influence on the implementation and evaluation of public programs instead

of on policy decision making. Notwithstanding this, a number of scholars have observed that as electoral branches abdicate their responsibility to perform effectively as deliberative bodies, the unelected members of the bureaucracy often fill the void.¹⁶⁷

Balancing Bureaucracy and Democracy

Bureaucracy is differentiated from democracy depending on whether the purpose of authority is to decide common objectives (democracy) or accomplish given objectives (bureaucracy).¹⁶⁸ The democratic institutions of the state have the dominant authority to make deliberative decisions about the goals of the state. These institutions provide a mechanism of majority rules, qualified by rules protecting freedom of dissent. In contrast, bureaucracy has the authority to make “discretionary” decisions for accomplishing goals through the routines of administration. However, in addition to the failure of deliberative democratic institutions alluded to above, confining bureaucracy to a more limited role of policy implementation rather than of agenda setting has been questioned due to the increasing importance of expert bureaucrats in the modern state.¹⁶⁹

As the balance of power between bureaucrats and elected officials has shifted in the governance process in terms of which group is “the actual ruler,”¹⁷⁰ more research and debate on the bureaucracy–democracy balance has taken place to address the concerns about how democratic institutions can exercise control of the bureaucracy. According to Weber, bureaucracy can serve any master, whether authoritarian or democratic.¹⁷¹ Bureaucrats make decisions based on their expertise and judgment; accordingly, their decisions need to be circumscribed by elected officials to make sure that they carry out the directions of the latter rather than formulate policies within the bureaucracy. The fact that bureaucrats have interests and power of their own raises the question of how to deal with “potential tension among elected officials, bureaucrats, and citizens.”¹⁷² Therefore, institutions or structures must be developed to monitor the exercise of political power by unelected decision makers who may not be sufficiently responsive to the concerns of elected officials or citizens. While some scholars raise concerns that excessive reliance on bureaucracy can threaten the legitimacy of democracy systems, literature in political science has posited that political control of bureaucracy is effective and demonstrates that bureaucracies are highly responsive to political powers.¹⁷³ For instance, Furlong suggests that senior federal government officials perceive that bureaucratic policymaking corresponds closely to the elected policymaking decisions. In his view, the bureaucracy faithfully follows the directives of elected officials. He argues that the political influence on bureaucracy is less in independent regulatory commissions than in executive

agencies. More recently still, scholars have used formal models and advances in game theory to shed further light on the interplay between delegation of elected branches and control of the bureaucracy.¹⁷⁴

Bureaucracy and the Formulation of Public Policy

As suggested by the discussion above, the history of public administration in the United States and other countries illustrates that, increasingly, there are bureaucratic influences not only on the implementation of public policy but also on the formulation of public policy. Some scholars argue that having bureaucrats play a primary role in policymaking is a natural development, since the complexity of public policy continues to increase and the expertise and sheer numbers of bureaucrats outpaces that of elected officials.¹⁷⁵ Weber anticipated this possibility when he suggested that bureaucracy expands along with the expansion of administrative tasks.¹⁷⁶ The rise of the administrative state has featured increasing examples of the bureaucracy's ability to exercise power in the governance process.¹⁷⁷ These experiences foster the belief among some practitioners and scholars that bureaucracy is superior to electoral institutions in defining public policy options.¹⁷⁸ On the most basic level, street-level bureaucrats as well as public managers are able to exercise significant influence on the implementation of public policies.¹⁷⁹ For instance, by examining differences in the influence of political factors on bureaucratic performance, Meier and O'Toole found that bureaucratic actors are more influential in determining the performance of public education programs than political actors.¹⁸⁰ In a similar fashion, Riccucci suggests that discretionary power of street-level bureaucrats is an important factor in determining the outcome of the implementation of Michigan's welfare policies.¹⁸¹

In addition to literature on the influence of bureaucratic actors over political actors in the *administrative* process, additional research has examined the increasing involvement of bureaucratic actors in the *legislative* process of policy formulation.¹⁸² Schneider and Jacoby found that political factors, such as partisan and ideological makeup of the Congress, had limited impact on bureaucratic policymaking in state Medicaid programs. Noting the expertise of bureaucrats as the primary source of their political power, Nicholson-Crotty and Miller analyzed state legislators' perceptions of bureaucratic influence on legislative outcome to demonstrate that the effectiveness of bureaucratic influences is greater when (1) legislators' terms are limited, (2) legislators and the executive are not divided by political party, and (3) bureaucratic agencies are politically independent from the executive. The finding that civil servants are able to exert control over public policy, and thus over electoral institutions, challenges the primacy of politics doctrine.¹⁸³

54 Mastering Public Administration

Representative Bureaucracy

To satisfy the need for internal controls over civil servants and the need for aligning them with democratic values, representative bureaucracy has been proposed as a viable avenue.¹⁸⁴ Contemporary theorists have suggested that representative bureaucracy has the potential not only to ensure that various stakeholder groups have equal opportunity to participate in policymaking but also further to ensure that a diversity of interests is represented in the bureaucracy.¹⁸⁵ One of the questions posed by representative bureaucracy is how it can ensure representation of diverse populations while at the same time adhering to notions that the civil service appointments should be merit based.

Challenges for Bureaucracy and Defense of Bureaucracy

Some scholars have raised concerns about increasing bureaucratization of the governance process in the modern society. According to Weber, the primary criterion for determining success and failure of bureaucracy is whether bureaucrats follow the directions of their elected officials. Bureaucratic adherence to the mandates laid out by elected officials makes possible the procedural and institutional rationality that Weber sought. In regard to the tension between bureaucracy and democracy, Olsen proposes that criticisms on bureaucratic failures take two forms: “that public administration is not bureaucratic enough and that it is excessively bureaucratic.”¹⁸⁶ Elements of both can be seen in the literature, though there is more emphasis on the latter. The first type of criticism is that public administration does not meet Weber’s vision of bureaucracy. The negative images of civil servants—such as inefficiency, incompetence, and rigidity, as well as unresponsiveness and lack of accountability to the elected leaders and citizens—reflect the first type of criticism. In one study, the managerial mediocrity of public management is demonstrated to have strong, negative impacts on productivity and on citizen trust in government.¹⁸⁷ Using a national survey of senior managers in city governments, Berman and West describe mediocre public managers who do not get the big picture of public policy, hide behind rules, focus on promotions rather than on being a good manager, and have gaps in their skill inventory. In contrast, other studies have suggested that effective public bureaucracies can bridge the tension between bureaucracy and democracy and enhance citizen trust in government.¹⁸⁸

The second type of criticism leveled against bureaucracy is that bureaucrats tend to follow rules too slavishly.¹⁸⁹ Weber anticipated this when he discussed the institutional rationality of bureaucracy as a hierarchical, rule-based, and professionally staffed system. The procedural and institutional rationality built into the system has been perceived by some as establishing barriers to improving productivity of public organizations and policy programs. A substantial body of research

on “red tape” focuses on the problems associated with red tape and personnel rules that constrain the flexibility of bureaucracy. Such constraints limit the environmental change available to public administration and weaken the positive impacts of bureaucracy on public organizations and policy programs. Identifying the negative aspects of rule-bound and hierarchically structured systems of bureaucracy, a stream of research has defined bureaucratic red tape as “burdensome administrative rules and procedures.”¹⁹⁰ It has been suggested that the pathologies of red tape negatively impact the efficiency of administrative processes—for instance, by showing the connection between red tape and administrative delays¹⁹¹—and to constrain the innovativeness of administrative procedures.¹⁹² In addition to the negative impacts on the effectiveness of public organizations, research also suggests that red tape has a negative effect on the work force in a public agency by increasing the alienation of public managers in the workplace.¹⁹³

In contrast, some researchers break from that established viewpoint to examine potential benefits of bureaucracy. For instance, one study concluded that hierarchical authority served to minimize problems associated with ambiguous goals and to enhance organizational effectiveness.¹⁹⁴ A further positive benefit of bureaucracy is the widely held belief that bureaucracy operates to reduce uncertainty.¹⁹⁵ Further, it is argued that effective public bureaucracies advance liberty and freedom by enforcing uniformity rather than stifling liberty.¹⁹⁶ By reducing the arbitrariness that often results from uncertainty, bureaucracy plays an important role in the impartial administration of the business of the state.

Bureaucracy and New Public Management

Acknowledging the changing nature of the tasks and circumstances that government has faced over time, the suitability of Weberian bureaucracy as a traditional way of governing society has been challenged in the contemporary public administration literature. Among the notable frameworks positioned against the traditional bureaucracy were the proposals related to New Public Management. That movement encouraged government reforms toward a more “business-like” approach to governing. The principles of that movement suggested that better management of public administration was an alternative to bureaucracy.¹⁹⁷ Although significant reductions in the size of government during the reforming eras were not evidenced, the Classical model of Weberian bureaucracy has been changed in response to these and other critiques. Among the changes is a more diffuse and decentralized authority for administrative functions.¹⁹⁸

Considering the tension between bureaucracy and democracy, New Public Management has been criticized for its excessive emphasis on efficiency and the lack of concern for democratic values. Emphasizing the desirability of bureaucratic

responsiveness to masters, Denhardt and Denhardt critique the principles of “new public services” with the statement that the primary role of civil servants is to preserve citizens’ shared interests and help citizens to meet those interests.¹⁹⁹ In an effort to increase citizen involvement in the governance process, some argue that public managers’ attitudes toward citizen involvement determine the level of citizen involvement in the governance process.²⁰⁰ These findings provide predictions on how well and under which conditions civil servants are responsive to their elected officials and citizens.

Emerging Bureaucracy Scholarship: Networks and Contracting Out

In addition to increasing concerns relating to the interaction between bureaucracy and democratic decision making, another emerging area of study is the nature of collaboration within inter-organizational networks²⁰¹ and how those relate to bureaucracy. Will networks emerge as an alternative governance mechanism to bureaucracy, or will bureaucracy adapt to meet the needs such networks demand in terms of coordination, cooperation, and collaboration? Considering the nature of recent policy problems, which are more frequently characterized as “wicked,”²⁰² public administration has adopted several alternative ways of managing public service delivery systems, ranging from vertical and horizontal integrations to contracting out and networked governance. While vertical integration of different functions and tasks is related to government decisions about whether they should produce certain services (make decisions), horizontal integrations are more relevant to government decisions about whether they should contract out for the provision of services (buy decisions). The option to make a decision relies primarily on hierarchy, whereas the option to buy is more dependent on markets. Beyond the make-or-buy selection of government’s strategic decisions, allying with other actors or relying on networked relations has been considered an alternative to institutional configurations, which may replace or alter the hierarchical bureaucratic system of public administration.²⁰³ Using a national survey of city managers’ outsourcing decisions in local governments’ public service delivery, the authors suggest that direct public provision, intergovernmental cooperation, and contracting out with for-profits and nonprofits are frequently used by local governments, and the selection of any of these options is determined by transaction costs and relevant asset specificity. In contrast to the suggestion that the bureaucratic system is likely to be replaced by networks, it has been observed that it is more often the case that bureaucracies are not replaced, but rather represent an additional layer in the complex web of the networks.²⁰⁴

The increase in interactions and exchanges between public sector organizations and for-profit and nonprofit sectors raises the necessity of reconsidering classical

concepts of bureaucracy, such as authority, accountability, and institutional and procedural rationality. Although Weber observed that the complexity of modern society increased, the framework he laid out could not contemplate the magnitude of those changes. Before the rapid expansion of the inter-organizational nature of the governance process, the public administration literature attempted to analyze and apply the essence of Weberian bureaucracy to the contextual setting of a single organization and a stable environment. As inter-organizational relations continue to expand, both bureaucracy scholars and practitioners will need to come to terms with challenges to the legitimacy and rationality of and decision making by civil servants. Among the most important issues that need to be confronted is how authority is circumscribed for a bureaucracy operating in the context of networks. Further, how can measures of accountability be adapted to the network context? Some theory has emerged on the interplay between bureaucracy and network management. For example, Wachhaus criticizes the use of the language and framework of hierarchical bureaucratic systems as inappropriate for analyzing the inter-organizational networks in the public sector.²⁰⁵ Instead, he proposes the advantage of applying an anarchist perspective in understanding networks in three domains: their formation, stability, and accountability.

In an effort to reduce costs and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public services, public administration has engaged in a variety of contractual relationships to transfer tasks, functions, and responsibilities from government agencies to private business firms and nonprofit organizations. This change in the manner in which public services are provided reverses historical trends in government that resulted in the expansion of the bureaucratic state. As a result, the power and influence of government agencies on controlling and managing transactions of public service production and delivery may diminish as well. The current environment discourages integration and merging of production and distribution of public services in the hierarchical and rule-based systems of government agencies. The increasing transfer of tasks and functions from state to nonstate actors implies that the responsibilities and accountabilities of producing and delivering public services will become dispersed between contracting partners. Indeed, one of the fundamental challenges of outsourcing government services is the threat that it poses to bureaucratic accountability.²⁰⁶ In addition, the growing involvement of nongovernmental actors in the operation of public service delivery systems raises the question about the extent of the shift of authority and responsibility from governmental to nongovernmental actors. It is evident that while public managers may move from directly managing provision of services to managing contracts for the provision of services, there will still be a need for oversight by bureaucracy.

There are some empirical studies and theoretical developments that reflect these changes in the provision of public services. For instance, researching the interplay

between private provision of services with notions of accountability, Moulton and Feeney test the model of public service in the public sector and conclude that private actors' understanding of public values can help to advance the public good even though the delivery of public services is primarily dependent on private vendors instead of public providers.²⁰⁷ In regard to the relationship between the involvement of nongovernmental actors and the desirability of bureaucracy, DeHart-Davis proposes an interesting theory of "green tape" and effective rules as an alternative to "red tape."²⁰⁸ Her research contributes to understanding how the mix of technical proficiency of bureaucrats and stakeholder cooperation can help to design and implement effective rules in the bureaucratic systems as a remedy to the pathologies of red tape.

Conclusion

Nearly a century has passed since Weber made his contributions to understanding the development of bureaucracy and the modern administrative state. While many criticisms have been leveled at Weber's views on bureaucracy, there are many scholars who continue to build on the framework he provided. Like it or not, bureaucracy is very much a feature of any modern and large organization, whether public, nonprofit, or private. Discarding Weber's theories about bureaucracy is tantamount to throwing out the baby with the bathwater. Instead, we need to focus on theory that increases our understanding of the vertical and horizontal mechanisms through which public, private, and nonprofit actors interact.

Notes

1. Thomas H. Kemple, "'Unfashionable Observations' on the Use and Abuse of Weber," essay review of five recent Weber studies, in *Minerva* 44 (2006): 325–326. See also a lengthy essay review by Isher-Paul Sahni in the September–October 2005 issue of *Canadian Journal of Sociology Online*, at www.cjsonline.ca/pdf/maxwebertoday (accessed March 27, 2007); and another by Gianfaranco Poggi, "Recent Work on Weber," *Political Theory* 26, no. 4 (1998): 583–590. Tracking the reception of Weber's work in the past half-century and considering its current relevance are Michael Lounsbury and Edward J. Carberry, "From King to Court Jester? Weber's Fall from Grace in Organization Theory," in *Organization Studies* 26, no. 4 (2005): 501–525.

2. In his *The Administrative State*, Dwight Waldo only references Weber in one footnote, and this reflects perhaps the isolation of American scholarship from broader European influence until after the Second World War. In an e-mail message of August 25, 2010, to one of the authors of this book, Richard Stillman recalled that Dwight Waldo told him after having read Weber, and especially the latter's essay on bureaucracy, that it was a major revelation, an "ah-hah moment" that had significant impact on his own thinking and that of an entire generation of American scholarship.

3. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 6. Since the late 1980s, much more material on Max Weber's life and background has become available, together with publications of his letters and with translations of some of his quantitative-statistical studies. On this flurry of publication since the late 1980s, see Richard Swedberg, "The Changing Picture of Max Weber's Sociology," *Annual Review of Sociology* 23 (2003): 283–306. Indeed, one author observed in 1993 that Weber had too often been labeled an opponent of empirical work, but mainly because his quantitative-statistical work had never been translated; see Lynn McDonald, *The Early Origins of the Social Sciences* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993), 300. For intellectual biographies of Weber, see Fritz Ringer, *Max Weber: An Intellectual Biography* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004); Gianfranco Poggi, *Weber: A Short Introduction* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006); and John Patrick Diggins, *Max Weber: Politics and the Spirit of Tragedy* (New York: Basic Books, 1996). For a personal biography, see Joachim Radkau, *Max Weber: A Biography* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009). A review of Radkau's book contains a variety of less frequently referenced sources; see Jos C. N. Raadschelders, "Did Max Weber's Agony and Ecstasy Influence His Scholarship?," *Public Administration Review* 70, no. 2 (2010): 304–316.

4. Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, 8.

5. While Marianne Weber is best known for the extensive editorial work on her husband's papers after his death, she did write several scholarly papers and a book: *Ehefrau und Mutter in die Rechtsgeschichte* (1907; Wife and Mother in the History of Law). For all this work, she received an honorary doctorate from the University of Heidelberg in 1922.

6. For a thorough study of Max Weber's travels in the United States, see Lawrence A. Scaff, *Max Weber in America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011).

7. Reinhard Bendix, *Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960), 3.

8. *Ibid.*, 3. Bendix states that Weber died of pneumonia.

9. Karl Loewenstein, *Max Weber's Political Ideas in the Perspective of Our Time* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1966), 94, 98.

10. Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, 26.

11. David Beetham, *Max Weber and the Theory of Modern Politics* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1974), 19.

12. Bendix, *Max Weber*, 8.

13. See Anthony De Jasay, *The State*, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1998).

14. As mentioned in Malcolm Warner, "Kafka, Weber and Organization Theory," *Human Relations* 60, no. 7 (2007): 1029. Warner draws this information from S. Eliaeson, "Constitutional Caesarism: Weber's Politics in Their German Context," in *The Cambridge Companion to Weber*, ed. S. Turner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 131–150.

15. Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, 39.

16. Donald G. MacRae, *Weber* (London: Fontana/Collins, 1974), 26.

17. *Ibid.*, 39.

18. Max Rheinstein, *Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), xviii; and Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, 49. The first complete translation of Weber's *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* did not appear until 1968: *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, trans. Guenther Roth, Claus Wittich, and others (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968).

19. MacRae, *Weber*, 20.

60 Mastering Public Administration

20. Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, trans. A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1947), 92, 96.

21. Weber believes that the individual is rational and responsible *despite* surrounding organizational and social environment. To Simon, on other hand, an individual's rationality and responsibility exist *within* a particular organizational environment. See Michael M. Harmon and Richard T. Mayer, *Organization Theory for Public Administration* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1986), 144.

22. Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, 157.

23. Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (New York: Scribner's, 1958), xiv.

24. Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, 186–187.

25. Bendix, *Max Weber*, 259.

26. See Sven Eliassen, "Max Weber's Methodology: An Ideal-Type," *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 36, no. 3 (2000): 250. Weber conducted, inter alia, a survey among publishers and presses. See Wilhelm Hennis, *Max Weber: Essays in Reconstruction* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1988), 55.

27. Max Weber, *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, trans. Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch (New York: Free Press, 1949), 94.

28. Rheinstein, *Max Weber on Law*, xxx.

29. Weber, *Methodology of the Social Sciences*, 98–99.

30. MacRae, *Weber*, 66. While Weber did his best to outline the nature of an ideal-type, several authors in the 1960s found it necessary to clarify further. E.g., A. Diamant, "The Bureaucratic Model: Max Weber Rejected, Rediscovered, Reformed," in *Papers in Comparative Public Administration*, ed. Ferrel Heady and Sybil L. Stokes (Ann Arbor: Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan, 1962), 62–65; Seymour M. Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1963), 58–59; Renate Mayntz, "Max Weber's Idealtypus der Bürokratie und die Organisationssoziologie," *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 17 (1965): 493–501; and Nicos P. Mouzelis, *Organisation and Bureaucracy: An Analysis of Modern Theories* (Chicago: Aldine, 1967), 43–46. More recent discussions include W. J. Mommsen, "Toward the Iron Cage of Serfdom? On the Methodological Status of Max Weber's Ideal-Typical Concept of Bureaucratization," *Transaction of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th series, 30 (1980): 157–181; Jürgen Kocka, "The Social Sciences between Dogmatism and Decisionism: A Comparison of Karl Marx and Max Weber," in *Modern German Sociology*, ed. Volker Meja, Dieter Misgeld, and Nico Stehr (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987): 76–111; and Mario Bunge, *Finding Philosophy in Social Science* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996): 66–67. Such clarification continues to be necessary: e.g., Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, in "Authority and Power in Bureaucratic and Patrimonial Administration: A Revisionist Interpretation of Weber on Bureaucracy," in *World Politics* 31, no. 2 (1979), write (199) that Weber thought bureaucracies most effective "when they most closely approximate the ideal-typical . . . features he identified"; their conclusion (226), that Weber did not recognize the difference between power and authority, is equally wrong and is a simplistic distortion of Weber's—admittedly—complex thought. On Weber's careful distinction between authority and power, see also Norman Uphoff, "Distinguishing Power, Authority & Legitimacy: Taking Max Weber at His Word by Using Resources-Exchange Analysis," *Polity* 22, no. 2 (1989): 296.

31. See Max Weber, "Die 'Objektivität' sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozial-politischer Erkenntnis" (1904), in Max Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre*, ed.

J. Winckelman (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1985), 146–214. The term was first introduced by the German historian Johann Gustav Droysen in the 1880s; see Donald N. Levine, *Visions of Sociological Tradition* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995): 195, 197; see also Bunge, *Finding Philosophy in Social Science*, 80, 83–83, 150–157, and 287.

32. Ibid.; see also Eliassen, “Weber’s Methodology,” 242–243, 249–250; and Levine, *Visions of Sociological Tradition*, 187.

33. Considering various problems with and challenges to causal explanation, Weber sighs, “[H]ow is causal explanation of any individual fact at all possible? . . . The number and nature of causes that somehow influenced an individual event is, after all, always infinite.” Author translation from Weber, *Wissenschaftslehre*, 177.

34. Weber, *Methodology of the Social Sciences*, 82.

35. Ibid., 20–21.

36. Ibid., Joseph Agassi, “Bye-Bye, Weber,” in *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 21, no. 1 (1991): 103, argues that the literature fails to distinguish two variants of value-free social science. The first is Weber’s and “requires that every value stays put within a value system that justifies it so that only the ultimate values or the axioms of any value system should remain unjustified.” The second variant, that of a readiness to give up individual preferences, is often thought of as from Weber, but it is not.

37. Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, 143–144.

38. Weber, *Methodology of the Social Sciences*, 4.

39. Cf. Weber, *Wissenschaftslehre*, 151: “An empirical science should teach no one what they ought to, what they can and what they will do” (author’s translation). This statement is reminiscent of Dwight Waldo’s “I cannot and will not teach you what to think, I can teach you how to think” (Richard Stillman, verbal communication to author).

40. Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, 149.

41. Beetham, *Max Weber and the Theory of Modern Politics*, 29.

42. On this distinction between subjective and more objective manifestations of rationality, see Mark R. Rutgers and Petra Schreurs, “The Morality of Value- and Purpose-Rationality: The Kantian Roots of Weber’s Foundational Distinction,” *Administration & Society* 38, no. 4 (2006): 403–421. For more on Weber’s Kantian roots, see also Andrew M. Koch, “Rationality, Romanticism and the Individual: Max Weber’s ‘Modernism’ and the Confrontation with ‘Modernity,’” *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 26, no. 1 (1993): 1123–1144.

43. Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, 180.

44. Mouzelis, *Organisation and Bureaucracy*, 15–16.

45. Rheinstein, *Max Weber on Law*, 324. Weber defines authority as a command of a definite content finding obedience on the part of specific individuals. See Martin Albrow, *Bureaucracy* (New York: Praeger, 1970), 39.

46. Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, 288.

47. The first translation was that by Talcott Parsons: Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (London: Unwin University Books, 1930). For further exploration of the link between capitalism and religion, see Volker Heins, “Weber’s Ethic and the Spirit of Anti-Capitalism,” *Political Studies* 16, no. 2 (1993): 269–283.

48. Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, 42–50.

49. Weber, *Protestant Ethic*, 18–19.

50. Ibid., 1(e). Weber, e.g., considers capitalism to be more rational than centralized planning. Central planning, according to Weber, does not have the advantage of a price system, which reduces the scope of required decisions; it is limited by inadequate

62 Mastering Public Administration

knowledge; planning authorities may serve only their own interests; planning decisions may be unenforceable; and it is likely to encounter difficulty in maintaining property rights and labor discipline. See Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, 37–39.

51. Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, 184–186.
52. Weber, *Protestant Ethic*, 40.
53. The same argument has been advanced by Richard J. Stillman, *Creating the American State: The Moral Reformers and the Modern Administrative World They Made* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1998), 165–170. See also Heins, “Weber’s Ethic and the Spirit of Anti-Capitalism,” 272.
54. Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, 313, 321.
55. Weber, *Protestant Ethic*, 103–115.
56. *Ibid.*, 119.
57. Weber ascribes the following characteristics to Protestant asceticism: (1) inhibitions against immersion in the world; (2) a drive for mastery over worldly things so as to make the world over in a transcendental image; (3) an emphasis on rationality through the systematization of conduct according to practical norms; accordingly, the goal is not mere mastery, but *rational* mastery; (4) an ethical universalism in that all are treated by the same impersonal standards; and (5) high functional differentiation in which each serves God’s will in his own particular “calling.” See Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, 80–81.
58. Weber, *Protestant Ethic*, 177.
59. *Ibid.*, 181.
60. Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, 358.
61. Weber offers the concept of charisma as one from which value judgments about particular individuals perceived as having charisma have been excluded. *Ibid.*, 359.
62. Indeed, it has been suggested that charismatic authority may be “particularly applicable and effective in today’s chaotic and rapidly changing environments”; see Jeffrey D. Houghton, “Does Max Weber’s Notion of Authority Still Hold in the Twenty-First Century?” *Journal of Management History* 16, no. 4 (2010): 449.
63. Bendix, *Max Weber*, 295–296.
64. Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, 246.
65. Bendix, *Max Weber*, 302; and Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, 360.
66. Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, 296.
67. Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, 343.
68. Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, 296.
69. It is very common in the literature to speak of legal-rational authority. However, Weber only writes about legal authority, a usage followed by Gerth and Mills in their 1946 translation of parts of *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*; by Mouzelis in his *Organisation and Bureaucracy*; by Bendix in his *Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait*; as well as by G. Starling in *Managing the Public Sector* (Boston: Thomson Wadsworth, 1998). For a discussion of Weber’s legal authority in relation to rationality, see Jos C. N. Raadschelders and Richard J. Stillman, “Towards a New Conceptual Framework for Studying Administrative Authority,” *Administrative Theory & Praxis* 29, no. 1 (2007): 17–18.
70. *Ibid.*, 299.
71. Mouzelis, *Organisation and Bureaucracy*, 19–20.
72. Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, 54.

73. Ibid., 250.
74. Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, 73, 386.
75. A “usage” is a collective way of doing things that individuals perpetuate without being required by anyone to do so. A “convention” is a collective way of doing things that is perpetuated because failure to do so would provoke disapproval by persons in the environment. Convention is distinguished from mere usage in that it carries with it a sense of obligation or duty. Bendix, *Max Weber*, 389.
76. Rheinstein, *Max Weber on Law*, xl and xli.
77. Weber attributes the rationalization of legal systems in the West to several factors, including the rise of an economic system and other interests that were served by the systematization of the law; the concept of a higher or natural law, which led to the notion that general law should prevail over special law; and the influence of Roman law. Ibid., 304.
78. Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, 78–83.
79. Rheinstein, *Max Weber on Law*, 345–348.
80. Bendix, *Max Weber*, 418–422.
81. Rheinstein, *Max Weber on Law*, xli and xlii.
82. Ibid., 264. Weber holds much the same opinion of the “popular justice” of the jury system. The jury system, he says, appeals only to the layman who feels annoyed whenever he encounters formalism and satisfies only the emotional demands of the underprivileged classes. Ibid., 318.
83. Martin Albrow, *Bureaucracy* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1970), 16, mentions that the first time the word *bureaucracy* appeared was in a letter by Baron de Grimm, who remembered that the late M. de Gournay, an *intendant* (high-ranking public official), used to say, “We have an illness in France which bids fair to play havoc with us; this illness is called ‘bureaumania.’ . . . Sometimes he used to invent a fourth or fifth form of government under the heading of bureaucracy.” The major author briefly examining bureaucracy, or, more specifically, the civil servant’s role in society, before Max Weber is Georg Hegel. See, especially, C. K. Y. Shaw, “Hegel’s Theory of Modern Bureaucracy,” *American Political Science Review* 86, no. 2 (1992): 381–389.
84. Albrow, *Bureaucracy*, 43.
85. Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, 56; and Rheinstein, *Max Weber on Law*, 335.
86. Albrow, *Bureaucracy*, 38–39.
87. Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, 330–332; Albrow, *Bureaucracy*, 43–44; Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, 196–198.
88. Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, 333–334; Albrow, *Bureaucracy*, 44–45; Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, 198–204. For a more expanded listing of features of bureaucracy as organization and as personnel system, see Jos C. N. Raadschelders, *Government: A Public Administration Perspective* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), 211, 313.
89. See, especially, Eric J. Walton, “The Persistence of Bureaucracy: A Meta-Analysis of Weber’s Model of Bureaucratic Control,” in *Organization Studies* 26, no. 4 (2005): 569–600.
90. Beetham, *Max Weber and the Theory of Modern Politics*, 69.
91. Rheinstein, *Max Weber on Law*, 349.
92. Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, 337.
93. It is important to observe that mistranslation of Weber has often resulted in confusing rationality with efficiency. But Weber is very clear about the difference

64 *Mastering Public Administration*

between these two concepts. See, e.g., Gyorgy Gajduschek, "Bureaucracy: Is It Efficient? Is It Not? Is That the Question? Uncertainty Reduction: An Ignored Element of Bureaucratic Rationality," *Administration & Society* 34, no. 6 (2006): 700–723. Gajduschek argues (716) that an advantage implicit in Weber's listing of why bureaucracy is more efficient than other forms of organization is "uncertainty reduction," which works both toward the future (predictability, calculability) and toward the past (reconstructing past outputs and procedures from written records).

94. Ibid., 415.

95. Rheinstein, *Max Weber on Law*, 331–334. The notion of domination by the wealthy or by technical experts under mass democracy is comparable to Michels's "iron law of oligarchy." See Roberto Michels, *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy* (1915; rpt. New York: Free Press, 1966), 342–356.

96. Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, 397–402. On more specific devices, Weber does not like functional representation because it leads to mere compromise rather than to general agreement, and he does not like workers' councils because disagreements are settled on the basis of economic power, not spontaneous agreement.

97. Thomas J. K. McCraw, *Prophet of Innovation: Joseph Schumpeter and Creative Destruction* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007): 422.

98. Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, 215.

99. Rheinstein, *Max Weber on Law*, 190–192.

100. While sometimes rendered as "sine ira ac studio" (e.g., the translation of Gerth and Mills translation, *From Max Weber*, 215), Weber writes "sine ira et studio" and follows this phrase with the German "ohne Haß und Leidenschaft," which translates as "without hatred or passion." Cf. *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 129.

101. See also Brian R. Fry and Lloyd Nigro, "Max Weber and U.S. Public Administration: The Administrator as Neutral Servant," *Journal of Management History* 2, no. 1 (1996): 37–46.

102. Rheinstein, *Max Weber on Law*, 351, 355.

103. Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, 50.

104. Mouzelis, *Organisation and Bureaucracy*, 19.

105. Weber used the metaphor of the iron cage in *The Protestant Ethic*, but he spoke of *stahlhartes Gehäuse*, which translates better as "shell as hard as steel." The image of the iron cage originates with Parsons's translation; see Peter Baehr, "The 'Iron Cage' and the 'Shell as hard as steel': Parsons, Weber and the *stahlhartes Gehäuse* Metaphor in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*," *History and Theory* 40 (2001): 153–169. The iron cage metaphor actually refers to the binding nature of the contemporary state, which includes bureaucracy.

106. For discussion of the iron cage as prisoner structure, as prerequisite structure, and as playground structure, see Jay Klagge, "Approaches to the Iron Cage: Reconstructing the Bars of Weber's Metaphor," *Administration & Society* 29, no. 1 (1997): 63–77. For bureaucracy as an essential scaffolding of thought, see Hunter Crowther-Heyck, *Herbert A. Simon: The Bounds of Reason in Modern America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 117. Further discussion of the iron cage metaphor is found in Robert Gregory, "NPM and the Ghost of Max Weber: Exorcized or Still Haunting?" in *Transcending New Public Management: The Transformation of Public Sector Reforms*, ed. Tom Christensen and Per Laegreid (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2007), 225.

107. Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, 221.

108. Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, 338.
109. Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, 48. Monopoly over the use of violence is central to Weber's concept of the state. Tilly's definition of the state contains four elements: control over a well-defined continuous territory; a relatively centralized administration; differentiation from other societal organizations (e.g., the church); and control over the use of violence. See Charles Tilly, *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), 27.
110. On the civil society element of Weber's thought, see Sung Ho Kom, "In Affirming Them, He Affirms Himself': Max Weber's Politics of Civil Society," *Political Theory* 28, no. 2 (2000): 197–229, esp. 220–221. On the need for institutions, see Beetham, *Max Weber and the Theory of Modern Politics*, 122.
111. Beetham, *Max Weber and the Theory of Modern Politics*, 44.
112. *Ibid.*, 39–42.
113. *Ibid.*, 103–105. Democracy, in Weber's view, should incorporate features such as universal suffrage, popular representation, the initiative and the referendum, and the popular election of the head of state. See Loewenstein, *Weber's Political Ideas*, 25–26.
114. Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, 42.
115. On this issue of the emergence of a new aristocracy, see also Regina F. Titunik, "The Continuation of History: Max Weber on the Advent of a New Aristocracy," in *Journal of Politics* 59, no. 3 (1997): 680–700.
116. Beetham, *Max Weber and the Theory of Modern Politics*, 217. See also Fry and Nigro, "Max Weber and U.S. Public Administration," 45, on this point.
117. Loewenstein, *Weber's Political Ideas*, 8, 26.
118. *Ibid.*, 74–76.
119. Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, 77.
120. Bendix, *Max Weber*, 441.
121. Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, 115.
122. Beetham, *Max Weber and the Theory of Modern Politics*, 228.
123. Bendix, *Max Weber*, 442–443.
124. Beetham, *Max Weber and the Theory of Modern Politics*, 218–220.
125. Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, 120–121.
126. *Ibid.*, 127.
127. Bendix, *Max Weber*, 485.
128. Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, 95.
129. *Ibid.*
130. *Ibid.*, 160.
131. Many years later Jürgen Habermas voiced concerns along the same lines, imagining the possibility of a dominant scientific-technical-administrative elite seizing control of daily life, translating moral issues in cost-benefit decisions. See Steven Seidman, *Contested Knowledge: Social Theory Today* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 124–125.
132. Beetham, *Max Weber and the Theory of Modern Politics*, 81.
133. *Ibid.*, 73.
134. Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, 226.
135. Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *The Political and Social Theory of Max Weber: Collected Essays* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), x. See also the review of Mommsen's book by Robert J. Antonio, *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 24, no. 1 (1994): 103–110.
136. Bendix, *Max Weber*, 457.

137. Ibid., 463.
138. Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, 49–50.
139. Bendix, *Max Weber*, 461–462.
140. Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, 72.
141. See, e.g., Albrow, *Bureaucracy*, 54; and Rheinstein, *Max Weber on Law*, vii.
142. Weber, *Methodology of the Social Sciences*, 20.
143. Beetham, *Max Weber and the Theory of Modern Politics*, 266.
144. Weber, *Protestant Ethic*, 7.
145. Mouzelis, *Organisation and Bureaucracy*, 47–48. However, in this particular section of an otherwise outstanding study, Mouzelis also writes (47), “[O]ne can argue that a perfectly rational-efficient organization having Weber’s ideal characteristics is not objectively possible.” This remark is puzzling when considering Mouzelis’s clear discussion (43–46) of ideal-types (see also note 25 above), but it shows how difficult it is to escape the notion that an ideal-typical bureaucracy is possible.
146. Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, 28.
147. Weber, *Protestant Ethic*, 7.
148. Bendix, *Max Weber*, 275.
149. See Albrow, *Bureaucracy*, 54–61, for a summary of these critiques.
150. On bureaucracy as a source of evil, see Guy B. Adams and Danny L. Balfour, *Unmasking Administrative Evil* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2004); and Guy B. Adams, Danny L. Balfour, and George E. Reed, “Abu Ghraib, Administrative Evil, and Moral Inversion: The Value of ‘Putting Cruelty First,’” *Public Administration Review* 66, no. 5 (2006): 680–693.
151. Robert K. Merton, “Bureaucratic Structure and Personality,” *Reader in Bureaucracy*, ed. Robert K. Merton et al. (New York: Free Press, 1952), 361–371.
152. For observations on this, see Gyorgy Gajduschek, “Bureaucracy: Is It Efficient? Is It Not? Is That the Question? Uncertainty Reduction: An Ignored Element of Bureaucratic Rationality,” *Administration & Society* 34, no. 6 (2003): 700–723.
153. Laurence E. Lynn Jr., “The Myth of the Bureaucratic Paradigm: What Traditional Public Administration Really Stood For,” *Public Administration Review* 61, no. 2 (2001): 144–160.
154. Brian R. Fry and Lloyd G. Nigro, “Max Weber and US Public Administration: The Administrator as Neutral Servant,” *Journal of Management History* 2, no. 1 (1996): 37–46.
155. Edward C. Page, *Political Authority and Bureaucratic Power* (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), 5–11.
156. Fred Thompson, “Why a New Public Management? Why Now?” *Review of Public Personnel Administration* 23, no. 4 (2003): 329–336.
157. Tina Nabatchi, Holly T. Goerdel, and Shelly Pepper, “Public Administration in Dark Times: Some Question for the Future of the Field,” *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 21 (2011): i29–i43.
158. Jon Pierre and Bo Rothstein, “How Should the State Behave? The New Public Management versus The New Weberianism” (Working Paper, 2008).
159. See, e.g., Charles T. Goodsell, *The Case for Bureaucracy* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2004), 18–23.
160. Hugh T. Miller, “Business Values and Bureaucracy,” *Review of Public Personnel Administration* 23, no. 4 (2003): 337–341; Peter Evans and James E. Rauch, “Bureaucracy and Growth: A Cross-National Analysis of the Effects of the ‘Weberian’ State Structures on Economic Growth,” *American Sociological Review* 64, no. 5 (1999): 748–765.

161. Woodrow Wilson, "The Study of Administration," *Political Science Quarterly* 2, no. 2 (1887): 197–222.
162. Fritz Sager and Christian Rosser, "Weber, Wilson, and Hegel: Theories of Modern Bureaucracy," *Public Administration Review* 69, no. 6 (2009): 1136–1147.
163. Francis E. Rourke, "Responsiveness and Neutral Competence in American Bureaucracy," *Public Administration Review* 52, no. 6 (1992): 539–546.
164. Kenneth J. Meier and Laurence J. O'Toole, "Political Control versus Bureaucratic Values: Reframing the Debate," *Public Administration Review* 66, no. 2 (2006): 177–192.
165. Evans and Rauch, "Bureaucracy and Growth."
166. Bo Rothstein and Jan Teorell, "What Is Quality of Government? A Theory of Impartial Government Institutions," *Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions* 21, no. 2 (2008): 165–190.
167. See Kenneth J. Meier, "Bureaucracy and Democracy: The Case for More Bureaucracy and Less Democracy," *Public Administration Review* 57, no. 3 (1997): 193–199; and Nabatchi, Goerdel, and Peffer, "Public Administration in Dark Times."
168. Peter M. Blau, "Critical Remarks on Weber's Theory of Authority," *The American Political Science Review* 57, no. 2 (1963): 305–316.
169. Meier and O'Toole, "Political Control versus Bureaucratic Values."
170. Max Weber, *Economy and Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); Larry B. Hill, "Who Governs the American Administrative State? A Bureaucratic-Centered Image of Governance," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 1, no. 3 (1991): 261–294.
171. Meier and O'Toole, "Political Control versus Bureaucratic Values."
172. Johan P. Olsen, "Maybe It Is Time to Rediscover Bureaucracy," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 16, no. 1 (2006): 5.
173. Terry M. Moe, "Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration," *American Journal of Political Science* 26, no. 2 (1982): 197–224; John T. Scholz, Jim Twombly, and Barbara Headrick, "Street-Level Political Controls Over Federal Bureaucracy," *The American Political Science Review* 85, no. 3 (1991): 829–850; John T. Scholz and B. Dan Wood, "Efficiency, Equity, and Politics: Democratic Controls Over the Tax Collector," *American Journal of Political Science* 43, no. 4 (1999): 1166–1188; Scott R. Furlong, "Political Influence on the Bureaucracy: The Bureaucracy Speaks," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 8, no. 1 (1998): 39–65.
174. Terry M. Moe, "Delegation, Control, and the Study of Public Bureaucracy," *The Forum* 10, no. 2 (2012).
175. See, e.g., Edward C. Page, *Governing by Numbers: Delegated Legislation and Everyday Policy-Making* (Portland, OR: Hart, 2001).
176. Weber, *Economy and Society*; Olsen, "Maybe It Is Time to Rediscover Bureaucracy."
177. Hill, "Who Governs the American Administrative State?"
178. Meier, "Bureaucracy and Democracy."
179. Meier and O'Toole, "Political Control versus Bureaucratic Values"; Michael Lipsky, *Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1980); Heather C. Hill, "Understanding Implementation: Street-Level Bureaucrats' Resources for Reform," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 13, no. 3 (2003): 265–282; Norma M. Riccucci, "Street-Level Bureaucrats and Intrastate Variation in the Implementation of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Policies," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 15, no. 1 (2005): 89–111.
180. Meier and O'Toole, "Political Control versus Bureaucratic Values."

181. Riccucci, "Street-Level Bureaucrats and Intrastate Variation."
182. E.g. Sandra K. Schneider and William G. Jacoby, "Influences on Bureaucratic Policy Initiatives in the American States," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 6, no. 4 (1996): 495–522; and Jill Nicholson-Crotty and Susan M. Miller, "Bureaucratic Effectiveness and Influence in the Legislature," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 22, no. 2 (2012): 347–371.
183. See note 27; also William T. Gormley Jr. and Steven J. Balla, *Bureaucracy and Democracy: Accountability and Performance* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2004).
184. Kenneth J. Meier, "Representative Bureaucracy: An Empirical Analysis," *The American Political Science Review* 69, no. 2 (1975): 526–542.
185. Sandra Groeneveld and Steven Van de Walle, "A Contingency Approach to Representative Bureaucracy: Power, Equal Opportunities and Diversity," *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 76, no. 2 (2010): 239–258.
186. Olsen, "Maybe It Is Time to Rediscover Bureaucracy."
187. Evan M. Berman and Jonathan Page West, "What Is Managerial Mediocrity? Definition, Prevalence, and Negative Impact (Part 1)," *Public Performance & Management Review* 27, no. 2 (2003): 9–29.
188. See, e.g., Eran Vigoda-Gadot, Aviv Shoham, and Dana R. Vashdi, "Bridging Bureaucracy and Democracy in Europe: A Comparative Study of Perceived Managerial Excellence, Satisfaction with Public Services, and Trust in Governance," *European Union Politics* 11, no. 2 (2010): 289–308; and Goodsell, *The Case for Bureaucracy*, 8–12.
189. Gerald E. Caiden, "What Really Is Public Maladministration?" *Public Administration Review* 51, no. 6 (1991): 486–493; Olsen, "Maybe It Is Time to Rediscover Bureaucracy."
190. Barry Bozeman and Patrick Scott, "Bureaucratic Red Tape and Formalization: Untangling Conceptual Knots," *The American Review of Public Administration* 26, no. 1 (1996): 1–17; Sanjay K. Pandey and Patrick G. Scott, "Red Tape: A Review and Assessment of Concepts and Measures," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 12, no. 4 (2002): 553–580; Hal G. Rainey, Sanjay K. Pandey, and Barry Bozeman, "Research Note: Public and Private Managers' Perceptions of Red Tape," *Public Administration Review* 55, no. 6 (1995): 567–574.
191. Sanjay K. Pandey and Stuart I. Bretschneider, "The Impact of Red Tape's Administrative Delay on Public Organizations' Interest in New Information Technologies," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 7, no. 1 (1997): 113–130.
192. M. Jae Moon and Stuart I. Bretschneider, "Does the Perception of Red Tape Constrain IT Innovativeness in Organizations? Unexpected Results from a Simultaneous Equation Model and Implications," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 12, no. 2 (2002): 273–292.
193. Leisha DeHart-Davis and Sanjay K. Pandey, "Red Tape and Public Employees: Does Perceived Rule Dysfunction Alienate Managers?" *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 15, no. 1 (2005): 133–148.
194. Edmund C. Stazyk and Holly T. Goerdel, "The Benefits of Bureaucracy: Public Managers' Perceptions of Political Support, Goal Ambiguity, and Organizational Effectiveness," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 21 (2011): 645–672.
195. Laurence J. O'Toole Jr. and Kenneth J. Meier, "Bureaucracy and Uncertainty," in *Uncertainty in American Politics*, ed. Barry C. Burden (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 98–117; Gajduschek, "Bureaucracy"; Stazyk and Goerdel, "The Benefits of Bureaucracy."

196. Paul Du Gay, "Bureaucracy and Liberty: State, Authority, and Freedom," in *The Values of Bureaucracy*, ed. Paul Du Gay (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 41–62.
197. Paul C. Light, "The Tides of Reform Revisited: Patterns in Making Government Work, 1945–2002," *Public Administration Review* 66, no. 1 (2006): 6–19.
198. J. Edward Kellough and Sally Coleman Selden, "The Reinvention of Public Personnel Administration: An Analysis of the Diffusion of Personnel Management Reforms in the States," *Public Administration Review* 63, no. 2 (2003): 165–176.
199. Robert B. Denhardt and Janet Vinzant Denhardt, "The New Public Service: Serving Rather than Steering," *Public Administration Review* 60, no. 6 (2002): 549–559.
200. Kaifeng Yang and Kathe Callahan, "Citizen Involvement Efforts and Bureaucratic Responsiveness: Participatory Values, Stakeholder Pressures, and Administrative Practicality," *Public Administration Review* 67, no. 2 (2007): 249–264.
201. While inter-organizational networks are treated as a relative new phenomenon, some scholars point out that such policy networks have existed for a considerable time. See, e.g., Daniel P. Carpenter, *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862–1928* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).
202. Laurence J. O'Toole Jr. "Treating Networks Seriously: Practical and Research-Based Agendas in Public Administration," *Public Administration Review* 57, no. 1 (1997): 45–52.
203. Amir Hefetz and Mildred E. Warner, "Contracting or Public Delivery? The Importance of Service, Market and Management Characteristics," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 22, no. 2 (2012): 289–317.
204. Laurence O'Toole Jr., "The Ties that Bind? Networks, Public Administration, and Political Science," *PS* (January 2010): 7–14.
205. T. Aaron Wachhaus, "Anarchy as a Model for Network Governance," *Public Administration Review* 72, no. 1 (2012): 33–42.
206. Hon S. Chan and David H. Rosenbloom, "Four Challenges to Accountability in Contemporary Public Administration: Lessons from the United States and China," *Administration & Society* 42, no. 1S (2010): 11S–33S.
207. Stephanie Moulton and Mary K. Feeney, "Public Service in the Private Sector: Private Loan Originator Participation in a Public Mortgage Program," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 21, no. 3 (2011): 547–572.
208. Leisha DeHart-Davis, "Green Tape and Public Employee Rule Abidance: Why Organizational Rule Attributes Matter," *Public Administration Review* 69, no. 5 (2009): 901–910; and Leisha DeHart-Davis, "Green Tape: A Theory of Effective Organizational Rules," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 19, no. 2 (2009): 361–384.