INTRODUCTION

This book is about something important. It is concerned with the role that the media and other forms of communication can play in improving the conditions of life for the world’s poorest people. The scale and depth of world poverty is perhaps too familiar, but the some of the figures bear rehearsing once again. According to the World Bank, in 2002 there were 1,200,000,000 people who lived below its official poverty line, which is set at an income of $1 per day (World Bank, 2002a: 2). Many millions more live on incomes only a little higher. Roughly the same number of people has no access to safe drinking water and 2.4 billion lack adequate sanitation facilities (Schumacher, 2005). More than one billion have no access to electricity (World Energy Outlook, 2002). Worldwide in 2005, 771 million people, the majority of them women, were judged illiterate according to the most basic of definitions (UIS, 2005). 150,000,000 children under five years of age were malnourished in 2000 (World Bank, 2002b: 3). The litany of absolute deprivation goes on and on. The lives of these people are immeasurably remote from the experiences of the writer of this book, and from that of the vast majority of its readers, but common humanity must surely suggest to all of us that improving the lot of the world’s poor is one of the most pressing collective tasks we face.

Poor and very poor people are to be found all over the world, even in the fabulously rich cities of Europe and North America, just as extremely rich people are to be found living in luxury surrounded by a sea of poverty in those countries where 23 per cent of the population exist below the World Bank’s official poverty line. The vast majority of the poor, however, live in poor countries. Many live in Asia and make up a good proportion of the huge populations of India and China. Many more live in Africa and further millions are to be found in Latin America. There are even many who are very poor, in relative terms at least, living in the countries that have emerged from the collapse of Soviet communism.

The countries that are hosts to these oceans of human misery have been given various labels, many of which contain some derivative of the verb ‘to develop’: less-developed countries, under-developed countries,
and developing countries. The very categories proclaim that changing the circumstances that blight the lives of millions is an urgent and present task. Literally millions of people – politicians, scholars, bankers, activists and very ordinary people – have over more than half a century tried to find ways to end the conditions that produce poverty. These efforts have not been entirely fruitless. There has been change and progress, but it has been bitterly slow. The total number of people living on an income below $1 per day fell from 1.3 billion to 1.2 billion in the course of the 1990s. In some parts of the world, notably China, the fall in the numbers of the extremely poor was quite sharp, although the gap between rich and poor widened drastically and the destruction of existing social infrastructure has meant that while incomes rose marginally living standards remained static or even declined (Hart-Landsberg and Burkett, 2005: 67). Elsewhere, notably in the former communist countries of central Asia, poverty increased inexorably (World Bank, 2002a: 2).

Some of the people who have been concerned about development issues have been interested in the media. They have tried to find ways in which communication, and particularly the mass media of newspapers, radio and television, can be used to help countries ‘develop’ and thus to reduce the amount of poverty. Most recently, there has been enormous interest in the potential of the internet to aid in development. Many of those who have tried to use the media for development have been activists – journalists and broadcasters, development workers and politicians – but some have had a more theoretical role. There have been thousands of books and articles dedicated to trying to understand what role the media might play in development, and to finding ways in which it might play such a role more effectively. Unlike many areas of communication theory, these investigations have often been closely tied to practice: scholars have theorized about the best ways to use the media to help development, and activists have tried to implement their findings.

This book is concerned first with ideas about development and the media. It seeks to understand the theories that have more or less directly guided thousands of practical development projects, and it draws on the distilled experience of those projects – some of the most grandiose were even formally called ‘experiments’ – as one of the ways of judging the value of the theories themselves. These close links between the ideas discussed in the academy and their immediate practical utility are a relatively rare, and for this writer very attractive, feature of much of the writing about the role of the media in development. Here, however, the focus is on the theories that guided action rather than on the details of the practical implementation of development projects.

Not everyone who has written in this field has had a close concern with practical projects, and even many who did have such concerns based them explicitly on general theoretical propositions. More recently, and
particularly in the last decade, writers about the international role of communication have tended to be influenced by theories of globalization, and have more or less consciously believed that the solution to poverty lay not in human agency but in the impersonal working of the market. For many of them, the only valid kind of practical project is that which leads to the opening of markets and the freeing of trade. Just as the World Bank, the IMF and the governments of the developed world came to agree on the ‘Washington Consensus’ that attempts at protection and the defence of local industries are obstacles to development, so there are those in the field of communication who hold similar views of the mass media. This book is also concerned with those theories, since they have, in the academy at least, replaced earlier interests in communication and development, although, as we shall see, ideas that are regarded as hopelessly outmoded in the best universities can retain a vigorous life outside their walls.

The historical dimension

The intellectual history of this field is conventionally divided into three, and sometimes four, distinct phases (Boyd-Barrett, 1997: 16–21; Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1991). The first concerns were with the effect of international propaganda, particularly in the context of the great wars of the twentieth century. Immediately after the Second World War, some of the people who had worked on propaganda issues began to think about the media and development. They believed that the mass media had a crucial role to play in fostering modern attitudes and beliefs, which were thought to be the primary conditions for any significant social changes. This was the period during which what came to be called the ‘dominant paradigm’ of development communication was elaborated. It was followed by a much more critical phase, in which two distinct emphases are discernable in the literature. On the one hand, attention was focused upon the structures of international communication, which were held to be at least partly responsible for the continued subordination of developing countries to the interests of the metropolitan powers. Media and cultural imperialism were the central theoretical concerns of what we may term the ‘imperialism paradigm’. The other line of thought saw the key weakness of the dominant paradigm as residing in its top-down approach. It started from a belief that the experts know what is best for everyone else, and designed communication programmes to transmit the fruits of that expertise to the people who were to ‘be developed’. The alternative was to find ways of allowing the objects of development to become its subjects, and to use the media to give them a voice of their own. This stress upon the needs of the communities in question in discussion of development we may term the ‘participatory paradigm’.

In contrast to both of these approaches, more recent writing has stressed the extent of the global flow of media content, and seen in the variety
of interpretations open to audiences evidence that the mass media could not possibly have the kinds of direct influence ascribed to them by earlier schools of thought. On the contrary, the products of the world’s media industries often had a liberating effect, breaking down the habits and routines of obsolete social orders and promoting change and development. This domestication of the interests of grand social theory to the concerns of the media we should obviously term the ‘globalization paradigm’. To this more or less conventional account, I will only add that most recently there have been some small signs of the emergence of a generation of writers who are advancing what may become another new paradigm, although this is as yet so underdeveloped that it is difficult to give it the same kind of snappy title as its predecessors (Hafez, 2007).

The general outline of this intellectual history is widely agreed by commentators on the field, and this book will not offer any radical departures from its main contours. We should note, however, that the different phases of this debate do not fit perfectly together. The concern with development communication, in all its variants, has a stress upon the local. The imperialism paradigm and the globalization paradigm, on the other hand, are concerned with very large scale issues. In practice, it is true, some of the later versions of development communication were quite closely associated with the imperialism paradigm, and more recently attempts have been made to associate them with globalization. As we shall see, these linkages have never been theorized, and indeed they rest on radically different foundations. The aim of making such a linkage was nevertheless entirely justified. The kinds of social change that are at stake in this book are ones that necessarily raise broader issues of power and property, and one of the aims here is to sketch how these two levels of analysis might be brought together more satisfactorily.

As a consequence, this book follows the established historical succession rather closely, but I would like at the outset to offer a disclaimer: this book does not pretend to be a formal history of the field. The study of intellectual history is as fascinating as any other kind of historical enquiry, but it imposes disciplines of completeness that are not appropriate to this project and it implies a greater dependence upon the written record than will be found here, where the focus is more on interpretation. There are large parts of what everyone would recognize as the ‘history’ of this field that are treated rather cursorily because they are not pertinent to the main focus of the book. A case in point is the detail of the progress of the New World Information and Communication Order through the various arms of UNESCO, which was one of the major sites of conflict about international communication for a decade in the 1970s and 1980s. As it happens, the succession of conferences, resolutions, amendments, victories and defeats, are well covered elsewhere, for example by Nordenstreng (1984, 1993), and I have very little to add to such scholarly endeavours. Many of the issues that were raised in that
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conflict, however, remain unresolved and the aim here is to address at least some of those rather than re-analyse the record. Of course, it is neither possible nor desirable to ignore the succession of events, since the relationship between theory and practice was, in this instance, both extremely close and very problematic, but the focus is on the guiding ideas rather than on the details of resolutions and votes.

Issues of redundancy and competence apart, the main reason there is no attempt here to produce a genuine history of the field is because the aim is to present many of these ideas as contemporary concerns that continue to inform practice. Just as development, at least in the non-theoretical sense of people struggling to lift themselves out of poverty, remains the central existential concern for millions of people, so important parts of the legacy of thinking about the developmental role of the mass media remain in active use as practical guides around the world.

It is entirely true that very few people in the best academies in the USA or Europe are today much interested in development communication, in theoretical critiques of the dominant paradigm, or the implications of the distinction between media and cultural imperialism. At best, it is the province of specialists closely linked with practical concerns (Gumicio-Dargon and Tufte, 2006). This is partly for a very good reason: academics are trained to keep up to date, and to concentrate their energies on emerging issues and concerns. Intellectual historians apart, few people are concerned with material published forty or fifty years ago. There are, however, also some very bad reasons for the neglect of these ideas. One is the belief, which is emphatically not shared here, that change in the social sciences equates with progress in our understanding of the world. On this account, ‘more recent’ equals ‘better’. Whatever may be the case in the physical sciences, social science is so bound up with interpretation that we cannot assume that date determines value. Max Weber, who figures largely in much of what follows, as he must in any account of communication theory, died eighty years ago, but he still remains an enormously interesting and stimulating author whose ideas were, in the 1990s, applied with great effect to very contemporary phenomena (Ritzer, 1993). The view taken here is that it is worth reading some of the texts of earlier phases of communication theory for the same reason: because we might learn something from them that will help us understand our present situation.

The second bad reason for not reading dated texts is that academics seldom look outside the world of scholarship. It is assumed that if an idea is disregarded in the best academies, then that is the end of the matter, and nobody anywhere could possibly be so foolish as to find it valuable or useful. This is a completely mistaken approach, at least for the issue of development and communication. Studies have shown that the founding texts of the dominant paradigm, despite a surprisingly long academic afterlife, have
more or less vanished from the contemporary scene, at least as far as explicit citations in the scholarly literature are concerned (Fair, 1989; Fair and Shah, 1997). We shall see, however, that there are numerous contemporary large-scale social programmes that operate within the intellectual framework of the dominant paradigm, and even one or two academic studies that sneak it in, perhaps unconsciously. If one asks what currency many of the ideas discarded by academics decades ago still have, then in this case at least, the answer is: a great deal, amongst politicians, activists and development organizations.

**Scholar militants**

One of the reasons for the long life of the ideas under discussion is that, for the first two phases of thinking, the people who developed and advanced them were self-consciously concerned with implementing their ideas in social action. While the founders of the dominant paradigm taught in elite US universities (MIT, Stanford, Illinois), they did not consider themselves as privileged inhabitants of ivory towers cut off from the mundane activities of the world. They had a conception of the role of the academic that placed them in the centre of the great social conflicts of their age. The phrase they had to describe themselves was ‘policy scientists’, whom they defined as ‘the man of knowledge as adviser, applying his special skills to current problems of public policy’ (Merton and Lerner, 1951: 284). Programmatically, impartial scientific enquiry was one dimension of the work of policy intellectuals, but they willingly involved themselves in providing solutions to problems identified by their government, while remaining aware of, and avoiding the dangers of becoming, what they termed bureaucratic intellectuals for a garrison state.

In practice, however, the leading figures amongst them aligned themselves very closely indeed with the garrison state. If the policy scientist was ‘concerned with bringing the findings of systematic research to bear upon issues current issues and process of policy’ it was clear that ‘one persistent issue of democratic policy in the last three decades has been: how to cope successfully with aggressive totalitarianism’ (Lerner et al., 1951: 91). Any study of the published record shows a group of very prominent social scientists – Klapper, Lasswell, Lerner, Merton, Pye, Schramm, de Sola Pool – working together in different combinations on projects for various US government agencies. The historian of their efforts writes of ‘the continuing, inbred relationship among a handful of leading mass communication scholars and the US military and intelligence community’ (Simpson, 1994: 89). Simpson perhaps overstates the case that these scholars were attempting to develop a ‘science of control’, but a glance at two of the leading figures shows that the links he identifies were certainly significant in their careers. According to Daniel Lerner, ‘The policy sciences
of democracy face no more important task than to produce an accurate diagnosis of the Communization process as a guide to effective – in this case, usually preventive – therapy’ (Lerner, 1967a: 467–8). He himself traced a path from the Psychological Warfare Division of the US Army, through the Hoover Institute, where he directed the programme on ‘Revolution and the Development of International Relations’ (Ithiel de Sola Pool was his assistant), to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Samarjiwa has persuasively argued that during that trajectory he established a relationship with the US Department of State that fundamentally influenced the intellectual framework of his major book, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (Samarjiwa, 1987: 7–10). The work at MIT, at least according to Mowlana, was funded by the Ford Foundation, allegedly acting as a conduit for the CIA and the US Air Force, and constituted an attempt to develop a systematic basis for government policy (Mowlana, 1996: 6ff). Wilbur Schramm was similarly engaged. He co-authored a US Air Force funded study about the North Korean takeover of Seoul (Riley and Schramm, 1951). The intellectual concern with anti-communism was a continuing one for Schramm. His influential volume on *The Processes and Effects of Mass Communication* (1961) displays a strong interest in propaganda and anti-communism: one of its chapters is a reprint from a USIA handbook (Bigman, 1952/61). Later in his career, Schramm founded the East–West Communications Institute, on the initiative of then Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, with funding from the US government (Keever, 1991: 7–8).

The later and very harsh critics of writers like Lerner and Schramm, coming from the imperialism paradigm, were at least as keen to involve themselves in political action, perhaps believing that philosophers had only the interpreted the world differently but that the point was to change it. Among the key figures, Schiller, Smythe and Nordenstreng all identified themselves with leftist politics, although only Smythe acknowledged having joined a leftist party (Lent, 1995). Nordenstreng was for several years the President of the Prague-based International Organisation of Journalists, and as such played a very prominent role in UNESCO and other highly politicized fora in which media and cultural imperialism were hotly debated. Others, notably Colleen Roach, worked directly or indirectly for UNESCO itself, during the period when it was the key site of battles over a New World Information and Communication Order. As we shall see, the positions they took in these conflicts involved some very serious compromizes, both in theory and in practice. The proponents of the participatory paradigm similarly contain many activists within their ranks, notably in non-governmental organizations oriented on development and communication, such as the World Association for Christian Communication.

It is only when we reach the period in which the globalization paradigm dominates academic discussion that we find a markedly lower level of involvement in direct social and political action. As we will see below,
this detachment arises not from some scrupulous desire to retain scholarly
independence but from a new assessment of the relationship between
theories of communication and social change. The new paradigm more or
less forecloses the possibility of the systematic use of the media for definite
and intended social change, and thus there remain no grounds for the media
theorist to contribute to practical projects.

The context of debate

These paradigm shifts did not take place in an historical vacuum. No ideas
ever do evolve without reference to the times in which they are developed,
and this general rule is doubly true in the case of ideas that attempt to make
the sort of close link between theory and social action that characterizes
those under discussion here. It is in fact very difficult to understand the
emphases and implications of the different paradigms without at least some
awareness of the historical conditions under which they were developed.

We can conveniently date the key moments in the evolution of these
ideas to three pivotal dates: 1947 and the birth of the Cold War; 1968 and
a global wave of radicalism; 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Empire.
We might, just possibly, add a fourth sometime around the start of the new
millennium, although dating its precise origins remains problematic. In all
of these cases, the fit will never be exact, but each of the periods inaugurated
by those dates had characteristics that shaped the thinking of intellectuals
who were engaged in work on the media. In order better to understand the
detailed discussions in later chapters, we must here briefly review some of
the key aspects of each of those periods.

The USA emerged from the Second World War overwhelmingly the
world’s strongest power. It dominated the world economically, politically
and militarily. Fighting had wrecked many of its industrial competitors,
while the USA had escaped direct damage and seen its economy shake
off the Depression and grow explosively. Even after five years of peace
and reconstruction, the total 1950 GNP of the USA was larger than that
of the USSR, the UK, France, West Germany, Japan and Italy all added
together (Kennedy, 1989: 475). The new political institutions of the peace,
notably the United Nations but also the International Monetary Fund and
the World Bank, were headquartered in the USA, which was by far their
largest paymaster. US navies dominated the seas from the Mediterranean
to the Formosa Strait, and US bombers alone carried the devastating new
atomic weapons.

Like Britain a century earlier, the US translated this enormous economic
superiority into a belief in international free trade. But France, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Portugal and, particularly, the UK all had vast colonial empires
that were anything but open to free trade. Despite being the victors in a ‘war
for democracy’, the imperial powers showed no sign of being prepared to
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extend that system of government to their overseas subjects. Indeed, they had been prepared to use the soldiers of the defeated Japanese empire to help them restore their rule in Asia. The US had long devoted considerable efforts to trying to dismantle the barriers that surrounded these empires. During the Second World War, ‘nearly all important leaders in Washington assumed and hoped that the United States would revive and reform capitalism everywhere in the world, but pre-eminently in the British Empire’ (Kolko, 1990: 623). Within the field of communication, the US news agencies UPI and AP had long been in conflict with the British Reuters and the French Havas. They had even entered an alliance with the Soviet Union’s TASS in order to break the hold of the imperial cartel (Rantanen, 1992: 1994).

The old colonial empires were now politically and economically enfeebled, but they were still prepared to fight to hold on to their possessions. True, never in their wildest dreams would they think of fighting the USA, but they were certainly prepared to fight their colonial subjects, and they did so, frequently and bloodily. It would have been logical for the USA, itself a nation borne out of armed revolt against an imperial master, to side with those who sought to establish their independence.

The reason why the USA was never prepared to do that openly and unequivocally, indeed why it very often found itself giving aid and comfort to the colonialists, and why in the most notorious case of Vietnam ended up taking over the role of occupier from one of them, was because it now faced a new and, its leaders believed, far more dangerous enemy than the tottering European empires. The real threat, Presidents from Truman onward believed, was the awful spectre of International Communism. The USSR was much weaker than the USA economically and politically, but everybody, friend and foe alike, believed it had a stronger economic model and was catching up with the west very rapidly. Ideologically, it was a very powerful pole of attraction indeed.

‘Marxism–Leninism’ as propagated by Moscow and its allies offered an ideology that stressed the struggle for national independence and which called for unity against the foreign exploiters and their allies. The ‘socialist stage’ would come later, long after the achievement of statehood (Harris, 1971: 130–203). These ideas found thousands, perhaps millions, of willing adherents around the world, particularly amongst those fighting colonialism and its legacies. In the struggle between the USA and the USSR, the latter’s weakness in arms was compensated by its strength in ideas. As one US communication scholar noted, the local supporters of its ideas gave the USSR an additional channel of communication and ‘this extra channel gives the Soviet Union an immense advantage’ (Smith, 1952/1961: 173).

The USA thus faced a problem. The people with whom it might wish to ally in forcing open the markets of the old colonial empires were very often in thrall to the ideas, and sometimes the policies, of the new communist enemy. As the post-war world unfolded, in country after country, the USA
found itself forced to abandon any democratizing ideas it had cherished during the struggle against fascism. Japan is an excellent example. Faced with mass support for ‘overenthusiastic democratization’, the US occupation forces reversed their policies and repaired relations with the Emperor and the old order. As a recent US historian of the occupation wrote: ‘Initially, the Americans imposed a root-and-branch agenda of “demilitarisation and democratisation” that was in every sense a remarkable display of arrogant idealism – both self-righteous and genuinely visionary. Then, well before their departure, they reversed course and began rearming their erstwhile enemy as a subordinate Cold War partner in cooperation with the less liberal elements in society’ (Dower, 1999: 23). Particularly after the victory of the Chinese communists, the US decided that anti-communism was more important than anti-colonialism and that it would at least tolerate the continuation of the old empires.

In the struggle against the reds, military power and economic leverage were important weapons, but the US needed an ideology as a counter to Marxism–Leninism as well. At home, the values of ‘Americanism’ could be redefined so that anyone with even moderately leftist views could be persecuted (Caute, 1978). Internationally, however, the something else was needed. Communism offered a path out of dependence and poverty, and if the US was to counter that threat it needed an alternative that promised at least as much chance of success. As one proponent of development communication later wrote: ‘If a nation was able to build a foundation of economic sufficiency … the perils of a Communist revolution would be greatly reduced’ (Chu, 1994: 35). ‘Development’ as a corpus of theories about communication and society arose directly out of these Cold War imperatives (Leys, 1996: 5–6). Within that general concern to provide a ‘non-communist manifesto’, as Rostow subtitled his famous book on economic growth, the dominant paradigm of development communication occupied a central place.

The critics of the dominant paradigm worked in the very different climate of 1968 and its aftermath. What one radical historian called the ‘year that cast its spell on a generation’ inaugurated a period when all of the contradictions of the post-war settlement came to a head (Harman, 1988: vii). The crisis of 1968 shook the developed West, the Stalinist East, the poorer countries of what was then called the Third World, and everywhere it had a profoundly radicalizing effect. A new generation of intellectuals developed, whose assumptions about the world did not automatically slot into the ready-made definitions provided by Washington and Moscow. True, the struggle between the ‘Free World’ and ‘International Communism’ remained the main feature of world politics, but in many ways its contours were changed. For one thing, the US was now clearly seen as the inheritor of the role of the former colonial powers. It might not have the same territorial ambitions as its predecessors, but it seemed, if anything, even
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more unwilling to allow the people of developing countries make their own choices about the future. What was more, as the US stumbled to defeat in Vietnam in the aftermath of the Tet offensive of 1968, it looked very much as though this new informal empire, too, was on the wane. Student unrest in the US, a general strike in France, several years of intense class struggle in other major European countries like Italy and the UK, all combined to make it look as though private capitalism had reached the end of its useful life.

But if the end of capitalism seemed nigh, it did not follow that all of its opponents looked any longer to Moscow for inspiration. The Soviet empire, too, faced an internal challenge, and it was the most serious since the Hungarian revolution of 1956. In Czechoslovakia, a group of reform communists won the leadership of the party in March 1968 and began to introduce some cautious market reforms, and to allow a small degree of political liberalization. The leadership of the USSR saw this as unacceptably threatening and invaded the country in August, in the name of ‘proletarian internationalism’. They imposed their own leadership on the party and jailed, exiled or demoted the reformers. Popular opposition to their invasion was crushed. Although less bloody than the defeat of the Hungarian rising, with perhaps 100 opponents of the invasion killed in protests as opposed to the 20,000 or so in 1956, the outright conservatism of the Russian leadership was just as obvious (Harman, 1983: 187–211). The belief that communism could somehow be given a ‘human face’ and that it might somehow evolve into democratic socialism received a massive setback.

Resistance and repression echoed around the world. To name but a few, in Mexico, in Derry in Northern Ireland, in Bolivia, a few years later in Chile, and in the black ghettos of the USA itself, there were outbreaks of popular opposition to the existing order. Everywhere, the established orthodoxies, political and intellectual, that sustained the ruling elites were subject to critical attack.

New thinking was clearly called for, in the field of development as much as anywhere else. The old recipes appeared to have failed. They had not brought much in the way of development, and what there was had ended up solidifying the power of the elites rather than helping the poor out of poverty. It was clear that the problem of development could not be explained entirely by the backwardness of the population. It seemed to be rooted either in the social structure of developing countries, or in the relationship between developing countries and the metropolitan centres, or perhaps in some combination of the two factors.

There were two main lines of thought in response to these reflections. The first concentrated on the fact that the domination of the rich countries over the poorer ones, of the developed over the underdeveloped, was obviously much more complex than the brutal simplicities of colonial dominance. The Portuguese empire collapsed in 1974 and the struggle for decolonialization was by then in the main victoriously completed. Nevertheless, the rich
countries continued to dominate the economic and political life of the poorer ones. New mechanisms of domination, it was argued, had replaced the colonial governor and his military garrison. It was these external structures of dominance, articulated in the ‘dependency thesis’, that prevented the poorer countries from developing in the same way as the now-rich countries had done earlier. According to proponents of this view, ‘development in the centre determined and maintained underdevelopment in the periphery’ (Servaes and Malikhao, 1994: 9). It followed from this that the struggle for national independence implied an economic as well as political dimension. Just as it had been essential to kick out the viceroy and his soldiers and build an independent state, so it was necessary to separate the economy as far as possible from the tentacles of international capitalism, to protect the national industries and to try to build up a powerful economy out of one’s own resources.

It was a simple further step from this stress upon breaking the economic ties that bound countries into a cycle of underdevelopment to arguing that it was necessary to break the cultural and media ties that had the same functions. The social and economic imbalance ‘found itself reinforced by a no less important disequilibrium at the level of communication’ (Masmoudi, 1986: 51). To proponents of this view, the model of the USSR, and even more of China, seemed attractive. In contrast with the stagnation and international impotence of the capitalist underdeveloped states, first the USSR and then China had managed to transform the structures of their societies. Starting from the most benighted backwardness, they had been able to construct modern industry and modern weapons, and thus build themselves into world powers. The USA, by contrast, had demonstrated that its difference with the old colonial powers were only secondary, and it appeared now as the main centre of economic, political and military domination (Tran van Dinh, 1987). It was out of that analysis of the nature of the world that the imperialism paradigm in media studies emerged.

It was, however, possible make a different reading of the lessons of 1968, and to chart a different route for thinking about the role of the media in social change. Wherever one looked at that time, the old order was being challenged, whether it waved the Stars and Stripes or the Red Flag. The politicians and generals in Washington and Moscow alike found their plans opposed from below. US conscripts, French strikers, and Czech students all had in common the fact that they took initiatives of their own accord, developed their own ideas of what they wanted, and acted independently and decisively to realize them. They were not uniformly successful in achieving their aims, but they did suggest a powerful alternative to the elite-directed, planned and regimented theories of social change that inspired both the orthodox Communist Parties and the US proponents of development. It was one of the ironies of development theory in general, and of the dominant paradigm of development communication in particular, that it
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relied very heavily on the state as the main mechanism for achieving its goals (Stevenson, 1993: 27–8). In this account, in order to counter the threat of a statist ideology, it was necessary to rely on the state. The lessons of 1968 seemed directly to contradict this pervasive statism. It was from the perception that social change could, and perhaps should, be initiated from below, that the impetus to the participatory paradigm in development originated.

The third historical moment we need to consider is 1989. By that date, the whole world picture looked very different. The economies of the USSR and its allies no longer looked as though they would overtake those of the west. On the contrary, they were clearly riddled with crises. Popular discontent, particularly in Poland, had demonstrated that the regimes lacked any legitimacy with the working class whose interests they purported to represent. The USSR itself had been defeated in its very own colonial war in Afghanistan. The Chinese, for their part, had long since embraced the imperialist enemy and introduced large elements of capitalism into their economy. 1989 was the moment at which the Iron Curtain, which had metaphorically divided Europe since 1947, collapsed in a few breathtaking weeks. Communist parties lost power everywhere in the Soviet Empire, and by 1991 they were discredited even in the USSR itself. The ‘other’ pole that had sustained the Cold War simply collapsed under the strain.

These rapid transformations, however, were only the dramatic representations of a much deeper and wider change that had been going on for perhaps a decade. The 1980s saw a renewed wave of intellectual confidence in the market, and the collapse of the planned economies demonstrated the practical superiority of private capitalism. What was more, a number of countries, notably in East Asia, had succeeded in breaking out of the cycle of poverty and establishing themselves as genuinely developing countries. They all had vigorously capitalist economies with very strong export orientations. After the collapse of the USSR, the old recipe of the closed, autarchic economy no longer looked a viable alternative pathway for national development. The societies that stayed trapped in the Stalinist model, like Cuba and North Korea, were few and poor, and under constant siege from their richer and more powerful neighbours. Those that were prepared to enter the world market and carve out a niche for themselves, like South Korea and Taiwan, enjoyed economic growth and rising living standards. Other countries that had adopted much milder versions of national development than that propounded by the Stalinist regimes, based upon import substitution and substantial state direction of the economy, most notably Brazil and India, were also forced to accommodate to the power of the new global marketplace and seek to integrate more closely into international trade. For the Washington Consensus, ‘the role of government is to provide ample room for entrepreneurs to invest in agriculture, industry, and services. That allows private firms … operating in competitive markets
to be the engine of growth and job creation, providing opportunities’ (World Bank, 2002c). The collapse of world communism simply confirmed in practice a theoretical conclusion that most had already reached.

Globalization, as a theory of an undirected, market driven, dynamic system, is clearly the intellectual product of these historical conditions. It was part of a more general shift in the intellectual climate away from Enlightenment-derived theories, as were both Marxism and its Cold War opponents like Positive Social Science, towards what is usually termed postmodernism. It shared with other theories in this school a scepticism towards the value of social and political action that was quite alien to the ideas of both of the sides in the preceding epoch. Marxists and anti-Marxists were agreed that something must be done, even if they could not agree as to what that was to be. Where the economic version of Globalization differed radically from the philosophical scepticism that characterizes many postmodern theories was in its absolute belief in the truth of the (characteristically Enlightenment) proposition that the market is the most benign form of social organization possible for humanity. The globalization paradigm in communication studies is clearly part of this more general re-alignment of thought towards an uncritical acceptance of the benign nature of capitalism.

It is possible that we are witnessing the beginning of another phase of thinking, although it is not yet quite clear whether we can easily ascribe a date to its origins. The later 1990s saw a series of international economic crises and a renewed interest in writing critical of the effects of globalization, and from Seattle 2000 onward the discontent that the workings of the market has provoked began to take organized form. It is also possible that, in a terrible and distorted way, the horrors of September 11 2001 and its continuing bloody aftermath have clarified the contours of the contemporary world. Its shape is far different from the rosy pictures of progress. Other writers in the same vein point to the extent to which the USA is the dominant world power, exceeding even the colossal imbalances of 1945 (Brooks and Wohlfirth, 2002). In economics, politics, and particularly in military affairs, it is harder and harder to sustain the claims of polycentrism that underlay theories of globalization.

What precisely this new paradigm might be, and how it would differ from earlier attempts to understand the world, is still difficult to say. There is as yet nowhere near the same clarity and unity of thought that allows us to identify the dominant paradigm, or the imperialist paradigm. This is partly because we can make those judgements with the benefit of a hindsight that is denied us with respect to debates through which we are now trying to thread our way. Another major factor, however, is the fact that while the various inadequacies of earlier paradigms are more or less apparent, at least to the critical observer if not the practical militant, there is as yet very little agreement as to what factors are of central importance in the new period,
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and no unified sense of where we should concentrate either our theoretical or practical energies. It is one of the aims of this book to help towards clarifying what the new paradigm might look like, and to suggest ways in which we need to think and act in order to develop it.

Issues of method

Throughout this introduction, and in the rest of the book, liberal use is made of the term ‘paradigm’. This word is often used in the literature, for example by Servaes, (1989: 2–5). The term is, however, notoriously ill-defined, and some clarification is necessary as to how it is being used in this work. For the present writer, as for many intellectuals of a certain generation, including perhaps Jan Servaes, there is no mystery as to the origin of the term: it is derived from our youthful reading of Thomas S. Kuhn’s brilliant book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Although it was later to be the subject of withering criticisms from a wide variety of viewpoints, the basic idea around which it was organized retains an enormous persuasive power (Easlea, 1973: 11–26). Kuhn did not offer much by way of a definition of the term ‘paradigm’, and according to later commentators he used it in a range of discrete senses, but what more or less stuck for a generation was the simple, non-philosophical sense that all ‘scientific’ enquiry rests on a common set of assumptions about the nature of the problem under investigation and the ways in which it was proper to investigate it. Kuhn argued that in choosing the term paradigm ‘I mean to suggest that some of the accepted examples of actual scientific practice – examples which include law, theory, application, and instrumentation together – provide models from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research’ (Kuhn, 1962: 10). What it is that a science will study is defined in a paradigm. Methods appropriate for scientific investigation are defined. What counts as evidence is defined. The nature of proof and disproof are defined. Within those definitions, science can be practised and will produce, not surprisingly, results that are recognized by other scientists as valid and legitimate, even true. This is what Kuhn called ‘normal science’ and it can endure for hundreds of years. This seems to be a convincing way of thinking about the historical record that was briefly described above, and it is in this sense that the concept of paradigm is used in this book.

There is a further step to Kuhn’s account which is followed less closely in this book. In his account, it is the pressure of internal factors, the accumulation of contradictory evidence which he calls an ‘anomaly’, that lead to a crisis of normal science, and eventually the abandonment of one paradigm and the construction of a new one: this the nature of his concept of a ‘scientific revolution’ (Kuhn, 1962: 91ff). This is one of the most interesting parts of his thinking, but it is of doubtful utility in this context. In all of the cases examined in more detail below, parts of the problems they
have encountered are certainly due to the obstinate refusal of the evidence to fit neatly into the required theoretical moulds, just as Kuhn claimed that experimental science problematized the Newtonian paradigm. The failure of development was a reality and it was upon that evidence that many critics of the dominant paradigm rested. On the other hand, one of the paradigms, that of imperialism, that replaced the dominant paradigm, had certainly been around for longer than development theory and was definitely not a response to a crisis in development theory. It was not so much that people working inside one paradigm came up against accumulating obstacles, but that they were replaced in the centre of intellectual attention by an older alternative. The idea of a shift from one paradigm to another resulting from an accumulation of evidence and a sharp re-orientation of fundamental scientific principles being required to begin to provide a more adequate account does not seem to fit the examples considered here.

The historical sociology I have sketched above seems to me a necessary element in explaining intellectual crises and revolutions, in the social sciences at least. Different paradigms co-exist and it is moments of sharp social change that make one or another seem for a time more attractive to large numbers of people, social scientists and activists. So, in the above account, it is fairly clear that it was the relative decline and eventual collapse of the Soviet Union and its empire that made state-oriented theories of national development very much less attractive, rather than anything internal to the theory of dependency.

In arguing for the primacy of historical events in explaining the perceived relevance of different theoretical systems, I do not think I am thereby simply endorsing relativism. It is perfectly possible to argue that in some periods some ideas are less attractive to many people than others, without at the same time arguing that they are all of equal value. We can most certainly retain the view that a paradigm is more internally coherent and has greater explanatory power than its competitors while at the same time recognizing that it is not widely as accepted or influential as they are. We can acknowledge that there is an important distinction between the claim that something is true and the fact of people accepting that it is true.

The term is used here in what is not, admittedly, a very precise way. It does not rest upon a clear formal definition, and it is shorn of some of its important original constituents. It is useful, however, because it does very clearly indicate the ways in which groups of thinkers, and indeed activists, who differ on many aspects of their thinking, can be grouped together as a class of people who share certain basic, underlying assumptions. We use it in much the same general way as the term ‘discourse’ was used by Tomlinson to discuss ‘the discourse of cultural imperialism’ (1991: 8–11).

The evidence reviewed in this book seems to support the view that there are relatively coherent sets of ideas and practices that we are justified in considering as ‘paradigms’, but of course there are major differences
between different writers, even when they more or less consciously share a common project. There is still a problem of how to classify work that shares much of the framework that informs a particular paradigm but nevertheless makes a significant departure from its main trajectory. For us, this is a problem that is present most acutely in the later work of Rogers, and others who have followed his critical self-evaluation. However one assesses these developments, it is difficult to see either the concepts or the practical outcomes as being straightforwardly a development of the dominant paradigm, but nor do they really seem to constitute sufficient of a break to mark the establishment of a new paradigm. The way around that dilemma adopted here is to introduce the concept of the ‘variant’, by which is meant a position that is derived from the original paradigm but nevertheless displays sufficient degree of difference to warrant being separately considered.

There is one methodological consequence of the above discussion that requires comment. If one is to discuss the ideas of other authors, and particularly if one is intending to be extremely critical of some of the things they say, then it is very difficult to avoid quotation. The present author had his initial training in literature, long before the rise of critical theory, and was taught the absolute value of the text. That is apparently now considered a naïve and approach, but old habits die hard and the belief in the primacy of the original text lingers on. The current author likes to quote, and quote extensively, because this is fairer to the writer under discussion, clearer for the reader, and usually gives a better account of the issues than any attempt at reshaping the original. Earlier versions of this text contained very extensive quotations, most of which were later excized. For one thing, they make an already long text so very much longer. For another, while the agglomeration of vast unedited quotations linked by a few lines of pithy commentary may have worked very well in *The Gutenberg Galaxy*, it does not meet the expectations of contemporary scholars and their students. This text, therefore, does contain quotations but they have been pared to the barest tolerable minimum.

**The structure of this book**

The shape of this volume follows the methodological principles and the historical succession outlined above. It is argued, non-contentiously it is to be believed, that there have been a number of distinct ways of thinking about the role of communication in solving the problems of world poverty, which are sketched at the start of this chapter. It is claimed, again hardly contentiously, that these can be meaningfully called paradigms. More contentiously, four distinct paradigms are identified and the outline of an emergent fifth paradigm is discussed. An attempt is made to give as fair and complete account as is possible of the theoretical underpinnings
of the different paradigms, and to explore their implications. The book examines the main reasons critical writers have given for questioning and rejecting particular paradigms. At the same time, it is shown how the earlier paradigms, which have seemed obsolete to many academic observers, have continued to have vigorous life in shaping practical communication projects right up to the present day.

The overall organization of the book is into three sections. In the first of these, the classical dominant paradigm is outlined and set in its intellectual context, its main shortcomings and critiques are considered and one of its main contemporary developments is introduced. In the second section, the strengths and weaknesses of two new paradigms that resulted from the breakdown of the original dominant paradigm are discussed. The third section looks at more contemporary issues, notably the globalization paradigm, its strengths and limitations, and tries to bring the argument more or less up to date in the light of developments in the twenty-first century.

Chapter 2 therefore examines the emergence of the dominant paradigm and its theoretical origins in the work of Max Weber. Particular stress is placed upon the concept of modernity, and its place in the social structure of development. The third chapter considers the critiques that were made of the dominant paradigm and looks at the ways in which some of its proponents attempted to modify certain aspects in order to retain the fundamental framework. The chapter concludes with an examination of the contemporary practical survivals of this apparently discredited theory, and of the reasons why that may have occurred. It is proposed that these contemporary survivals do not constitute a new paradigm but rather a 'continuity variant' of the old dominant paradigm.

The fourth chapter examines one of the attempts at a new paradigm that emerged from the critiques of the dominant paradigm. The various ways in which the concept of ‘participation’ has been used to question some of the central features of the dominant paradigm are reviewed. Given that there are such a wide range of meanings that have been invested in the term, the different versions of what is here called the ‘participatory paradigm’ are discussed in some detail.

Chapter 5 looks at the other new paradigm that emerged from the critique of the dominant paradigm: that of media and cultural imperialism. The theoretical underpinnings of this new paradigm are considered, as are the political implications that it had in practice. Chapter 6 looks at the critics of the paradigm, particularly those that stress the inadequate accounts of media effects and the complexity of international programme flows.

Chapter 7 outlines the globalization paradigm and examines the ways in which it differs radically from all three of the earlier paradigms. The eighth chapter considers how far the globalization paradigm fits the evidence from the contemporary world. It is argued not only that there is a very poor fit indeed but that the blind adhesion to its precepts has blinded even
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well-intentioned scholars to some of the central social phenomena of the contemporary epoch.

The final chapter considers whether there is sufficient evidence for us to claim that we are living in a new historical epoch in which it is reasonable to expect a new theoretical paradigm. The earlier paradigms are reviewed, and their most important flaws are considered alongside the insights that they have given. All of the earlier paradigms, it is argued, have made some contribution to our understanding of the ways in which the media can and do play a role in the attempt to improve the world. However, it is the participatory paradigm that provides the most promising platform for the construction of a new paradigm that can address the distinctive features of world poverty today.

It must be reiterated that this book is not a practical manual for using the mass media to change the world. On the contrary, it is an academic work that attempts to follow the logic of ideas, and it takes account of their practical consequences only from a theoretical point of view. At times, the nature of the material that is addressed is rather remote from the real and pressing problems that we briefly reviewed at the start of this chapter. The fact that the ideas discussed are rather remote from the difficult task of actually using the media is not something that should be celebrated, but it must be recognized as inevitable. The world is not transparent, and the right course of action does not immediately present itself to people of goodwill and good sense. On the contrary, opacity and obscurity are more important elements in sustaining the existing inequitable and destructive world order than are mendacity and crime, and if the world is to be changed for the better then there is an inevitable task of clarification and analysis to be carried out. That task necessarily involves examining and critically reflecting upon the dominant ways of thinking about a problem, in our case the problem of what kinds of communicative action might improve the world. Perhaps another writer could have done this job more clearly and directly, but anyone embarking on such an undertaking is obliged to follow the paths defined by others and to engage with them on terms that others have set. Sometimes those terms are wilfully obscure, but sometimes it is reality itself that is difficult and complex, and no-one can hope to understand it even in part without some degree of difficulty. Only if we have a pretty clear idea of the way in which the world works today that is even approximately accurate will we know what kinds of action on our part might make it work a bit differently and a bit better.