The Constitutional Convention of 1787 was, as Governor Samuel Huntington of Connecticut told the delegates to his state’s ratifying assembly, “a new event in the history of mankind. . . . Never before did a people, in time of peace and tranquility, meet together by their representatives and, with calm deliberation, frame for themselves a system of government.\footnote{1} In the midst of this “new event,” nothing was newer than the American presidency, an invention unlike any other national executive in history. When designing the office, the fifty-five convention delegates drew on their personal and professional experience, study of history and philosophy, understanding of political reality, and individual and collective wits.

The constitutional presidency that the convention created may be regarded as, in a sense, the office’s genetic code. Because of the Constitution, the presidency is a one-person office, and the president, who is elected for a fixed four-year term by the entire country, shares virtually all the powers of the national government with an equally distinct and independent Congress.

The constitutional presidency contains, as does an individual’s configuration of DNA molecules, some ingredients whose meaning has been clear and unchanging from the moment of conception, such as eye color for a person and the 35-year minimum age requirement for the president. The Constitution also includes sentences and phrases that are the legal equivalent of genetically rooted baldness: their meaning, although determined at the very beginning, could only be discovered later. For example, “He shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” first appeared as a passing constitutional reference—the fifth of six clauses in the single sentence that constitutes Article II, Section 3. But in later years, this provision afforded the president a strong legal claim to powers as varied as acting against secession by the southern states and directing the activities of the extensive federal bureaucracy. Finally, there are those attributes whose meaning could be found only in the vagaries of individual choice and prevailing circumstance. Just as the relation of physical strength to well-being varies from person to person and situation to situation, so has
the president’s constitutional power to “recommend to [Congress’s] consider-ation such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient” been of varying importance to different presidents at different times.²

**Antecedents**

As is true of any invention, the presidency had antecedents, all of which influenced the form the office took in the Constitution. The delegates to the Constitutional Convention had long experience with British executives—namely, the king in London and his appointed governors in the American colonies. And ever since independence was declared in 1776, delegates had the benefit of a decade’s worth of experience with governments of their own design, both the state constitutions and the Articles of Confederation, which created and defined a kind of national government. These experiences set the stage for the calling of the convention and the creation of the presidency in the late spring and summer of 1787.

**British and Colonial Executives**

During their long years as colonists of Great Britain, Americans became well acquainted with the British form of government, which is best described as a constitutional monarchy. Great Britain was headed by a king (or, less frequently, a queen) who assumed the throne through inheritance and reigned for life. The monarch’s power was limited by Parliament, the British legislature. Although the king could order the nation into war, his order prevailed only if Parliament was willing to appropriate the funds needed to finance the effort. Conversely, Parliament could pass laws, but the king could veto them. Parliament, a bicameral legislature, consisted of the House of Commons (an elected body) and the House of Lords (made up of hereditary peers with lifetime tenure).

The British form of government was more than the most familiar one to the American colonists. Many of them also regarded it as the best that human beings ever had devised. Basic liberties seemed better safeguarded by Great Britain’s constitutional monarchy than by any other government in history. British wealth and power were first among the nations of the world. Indeed, Great Britain seemed to have solved what traditionally was regarded as an insoluble problem of classical political philosophy—that is, the inherent limitations of each of the three basic forms of government identified by Aristotle: monarchy (rule by one person), aristocracy (rule by an elite), and democracy (rule by the people).³ As the problem usually was formulated, because those who were entrusted to govern on behalf of the whole society ended up using power for their own selfish ends, monarchy
soon degenerated into despotism, aristocracy into oligarchy, and democracy into anarchy, then tyranny. The British remedy, developed over several centuries, was to blend elements of all three forms of government into one—monarchy in the king, aristocracy in the House of Lords, and democracy in the House of Commons—and to allow each element to check and balance the others.

In at least one important way, the governments of most of Great Britain’s American colonies were different from the British government. Although the British constitution was a long-evolving amalgam of laws and traditions, the colonies operated according to written charters issued under royal authority. As historian Linda Colley wrote, these charters served as “examples of how systems and principles of government might be conveniently set down in writing in a single document.” When the time came for Americans to create their own state and national governments, it seemed obvious to them that they should do so in written constitutions.

In other ways, the British and colonial governments bore a close resemblance. Each colony had a governor chosen by the king and a legislature composed of an upper house, which was appointed in most colonies by the governor, and a lower house, which was elected by the people—that is, the people as defined in early America: the roughly two-thirds of white males who owned at least a small farm or shop. Royal governors were armed with substantial powers, including the right to cast an absolute veto over colonial legislation, the right to create courts and appoint judges, and even the right to prorogue (dissolve) the legislature. Politically astute governors exercised these powers cautiously because only the legislature was empowered to appropriate the funds required to finance a colony’s government and pay the governor’s salary.

For all their virtues, the British and colonial governments were prone to abuse by executives who were hungry for power. King George III, who reigned during the American Revolution, used government contracts, jobs, and other forms of patronage as bribes to ensure the support of members of Parliament. Some colonial governors employed similar practices to influence their legislatures. The king and his governors also stubbornly resisted the colonists’ pleas to respect their rights as Englishmen, disregarding Parliament member Edmund Burke’s argument that force would be “a feeble instrument, for preserving a people so numerous, so active, so growing, so spirited” as the Americans. In 1776, the colonists’ anger about these abuses of power was expressed fervently in the Declaration of Independence. The Declaration is best known for its ringing preamble (“all men are created equal,” “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness”), but it consists mainly of a long, detailed indictment of royal “injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States.”
The lesson many Americans learned from their experience with the British and colonial governments was that liberty is threatened by executive power and safeguarded by legislative power. As James Wilson—a Scottish-born Pennsylvanian who signed the Declaration, fought in the Revolutionary War, and later served as a delegate to the Constitutional Convention—observed, “the executive and judicial powers of the government were . . . derived from a foreign source. . . . On the other hand, our assemblies were chosen by ourselves: they were guardians of our rights.”

State Constitutions

During the course of the Revolutionary War, 17 constitutions were written by the 13 newly independent states. (Some states began with one constitution, then replaced it with another.) For all their flaws, these were remarkable documents, marked like the colonial charters by their concise, written character but adding new features as well: “rights declaration, democratic pedigree, republican structure, and amendability. Never before in history,” legal scholar Akhil Reed Amar observed, “had this particular combination of features come together.” Revulsion against their experience with the British executive—the king in London and his royal governors in the colonial capitals—led almost all the authors of state constitutions to provide for weak governors and strong legislatures.

In the state constitutions written after independence was declared, governors typically were elected by the legislature for a brief term (one year, in most cases) and were ineligible for reelection. They were forced to share their powers with a council whose members were appointed by the legislature or elected by the people. This arrangement made the governors, in the assessment of historian Gordon S. Wood, “little more than chairmen of their executive boards.” Indeed, at the Constitutional Convention, Governor Edmund Randolph of Virginia opposed the proposal to make the presidency a unitary office by saying that as governor, he was merely “a member of the executive.”

The powers the governors did have were meager. Most state constitutions made vague grants of authority to their executives and, by specifically denying them the right to veto legislation and make appointments, rendered them incapable of defending even that modest influence from legislative encroachment. In his Notes on the State of Virginia, Thomas Jefferson described the result in his home state, where in practice “all the powers of government, legislative, executive and judiciary, result to the legislative body.”

The constitution of the historically pro-British state of New York offered a striking exception to the general practice of weak governors and strong legislatures. New York’s governor was elected by the people
(not the legislature) for a term of three years (not one) and (rather than being confined to a single term) could be reelected as often as the voters wanted. George Clinton, the first governor to be chosen under the New York constitution, was elected seven times for a total of 21 years. The executive power in New York's government was unitary, exercised by the governor alone and not shared with a council. The governor was empowered to veto legislation (subject to override by the legislature) and to make appointments (subject to legislative confirmation).

The Articles of Confederation

The decision by the Continental Congress to declare independence from Great Britain in the summer of 1776 was accompanied by another important decision. Congress adopted Virginian Richard Henry Lee's motion that “a plan of confederation be prepared and transmitted to the respective Colonies for their consideration and approbation.” Such a step was militarily necessary. Although the Declaration of Independence made each of the states, in effect, an independent nation, they could not fight a common war against the British without some sort of common government.

The states, jealous of their independence and reluctant to substitute even a homegrown central government for the British government they had just rejected, surrendered power grudgingly. They stipulated to their delegates in Congress that the confederation was to be no stronger than was absolutely necessary to wage the war for independence. Reacting against their experience with British rule, the states also made it clear that the confederation's executive component must be minimal. Nothing remotely resembling a king would be tolerated.

On June 11, 1776, the Continental Congress formed the Committee of Thirteen (one delegate from each state) to draft a plan of confederation. The committee acted expeditiously, submitting its recommendation on July 12. More than a year later, on November 15, 1777, Congress adopted a revised version of the plan, calling it the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union. Ratification by the states came slowly, with the last state not voting its approval until March 1, 1781. But because the articles so much resembled the ad hoc arrangement the states were already using under the Continental Congress, the delay in ratification made little difference.

The Articles of Confederation more than embodied the states' dread of central government and executive power. Indeed, they created less a government than an alliance or, as the articles themselves put it, a “league of friendship” among the states. Each state, regardless of wealth or population, was represented equally in Congress: one state, one vote. The president, chosen by Congress, was merely its presiding officer, not an executive at all. Eventually, after the burden of making all financial, diplomatic, and
military decisions and executing all legislative enactments became more than the legislators could handle, Congress created small executive departments headed by appointed officials. In truth, Congress enacted few laws of consequence because passage required the support of nine of the thirteen states. Because amendments to the articles had to be approved by all the states, none were adopted.

In addition to setting forth a weak institutional structure, the Articles of Confederation undermined the power of the national government in other ways. Technically, Congress was empowered to declare war, make treaties and enter alliances, raise an army and navy, regulate coinage, borrow money, supervise American Indian affairs, establish a post office, and adjudicate disputes between states. Funds and troops were supposed to be supplied by the states according to their wealth and population. But Congress had no power to tax the states or to enforce its decisions, generating “a massive collective-action problem.” When, as often happened, one or two states balked at meeting an obligation, other states followed suit. “Each state sent what was convenient or appropriate,” historians Christopher Collier and James Lincoln Collier observed, “which usually depended on how close to home the fighting was.” After the Revolutionary War was won, states felt even less reason to honor Congress’s requests.

National Problems

For all its weakness, the Articles of Confederation did not prevent the United States from winning independence. The war effectively ended on October 17, 1781, when General George Washington’s American army and a French fleet, anchored off Yorktown, Virginia, forced the British forces led by Charles Lord Cornwallis to surrender. But the problems of a weak, purely legislative national government became undeniable in the half-decade after victory. No longer bound together by the threat of a common foe, the states turned their backs almost completely on Congress and each other.

Overlapping claims to western lands brought some states into conflict. Connecticut settlers and Pennsylvania troops clashed in one disputed area. The western territories, which extended as far as the Mississippi River, were the nation’s most valuable resource, but until the states’ rival claims were settled, it was difficult to develop the land and profit from it. On the Atlantic coast, some states with port cities placed taxes on goods imported from overseas by merchants in neighboring states. Caught between New York and Pennsylvania, Representative James Madison of Virginia wrote, New Jersey was like “a cask tapped at both ends.” North Carolina, also lacking a deep-water port and trapped between Virginia and South Carolina, was “a patient bleeding at both arms.” The new nation was burdened by a crippling debt. By 1789, foreign creditors held more than $10 million
in promissory notes and were owed $1.8 million in interest. Unless paid, they were unwilling to engage in further trade with the United States. Yet Congress was unable to persuade the states to contribute to the treasury. By 1786, states were withholding 98% of congressionally requisitioned funds. Only a series of loans from Dutch bankers, negotiated by John Adams, kept the new nation solvent.

The United States also faced numerous problems on its borders. The nation's northern, southern, and western boundaries were under siege, with only an ill-equipped, poorly financed army of 700 to defend them. British soldiers continued to occupy two Great Lakes forts that their government had promised to vacate under the Treaty of Paris, which formally ended the Revolutionary War in 1783. Similarly, Spain closed the Mississippi River to American ships and made claim to land east of the river that, according to the treaty, belonged to the United States; it also roused indigenous tribes in Florida to attack white settlers in Georgia. Returning from a trip to the interior, Washington lamented, “The Western settlers . . . turn on a pivot; the touch of a feather would turn them any way”—perhaps toward an alliance with Spain or Great Britain that would secure their safety. Abroad, American ships were preyed on by Mediterranean pirates based in the Barbary states of Algiers, Morocco, Tripoli, and Tunis. Great Britain denied American merchants commercial access to its colonies in Canada and the West Indies, two lucrative markets for trade.

In the midst of foreign and domestic difficulties, another problem developed that mixed elements of both. A currency crisis engulfed the United States, largely because Americans had gone on a buying spree, importing luxury items such as glassware and furniture from Great Britain that they had been unable to get during the war. As specie—gold and silver, the only American currency acceptable to foreign creditors—flowed out of the country to pay for these goods, it became scarce at home. Meanwhile, many debtors, especially farmers who had left the land to fight for independence and still had not been paid by the financially destitute national government, faced bankruptcy or foreclosure. In response, these debtors pressured their state legislatures to print vast sums of paper money that they could use to pay their debts to creditors who in turn were unwilling to be reimbursed in depreciated currency.

Lessons of Experience

Fear of executive power remained strong among Americans during the decade after independence was declared. But the problems that beset the United States under the strong legislative governments of the states and the weak legislative government of the Articles of Confederation taught certain lessons, particularly to people of property. As political scientist
Charles C. Thach Jr. wrote, “Experience with the state governments . . . confirmed the tendencies toward increasing confidence in the executive and increasing distrust of the legislature.” Experience also taught several things about the proper design of an effective executive:

It taught that executive energy and responsibility are inversely proportional to executive size; that, consequently, the one-man executive is best. It taught the value of integration; the necessity of executive appointments, civil and military; the futility of legislative military control. It demonstrated the necessity of the veto as a protective measure . . . [for] preventing unwise legislation. . . . It discredited choice [of the executive] by the legislature.19

The Constitutional Convention

Of all the problems that plagued the new nation after independence, none seemed more amenable to solution than those involving commerce among the states. Few benefited and many suffered from the protectionist walls that individual states built around their economies. The Virginia Assembly, at Madison’s urging, called for a trade conference to be held at Annapolis, Maryland, in September 1786 and invited all the other states to send delegations.

The Annapolis Convention was a failure. Only Virginia, New Jersey, and Delaware sent full delegations, and seven states, suspicious of Virginia’s intentions, boycotted the meeting altogether. The convention proposed no remedies to the nation’s trade difficulties. But the delegates who did come to Annapolis, notably Madison and Alexander Hamilton of New York, rescued the enterprise by issuing a bold call to Congress to convene an even more wide-ranging meeting. They urged that the states be enjoined to choose delegates charged to “devise such further provisions as shall appear to them necessary to render the constitution of the Federal Government adequate to the exigencies of the Union.”20

Initially, Congress was cool to the idea. But within weeks, an event occurred that lent urgency to the nationalist cause. An armed uprising of farmers in western Massachusetts, saddled with taxes and debts and unable to persuade the state legislature to ease credit, closed down courts to prevent foreclosure orders from being issued against their lands. Although similar outbreaks had occurred in about half the other states, they had been suppressed easily.21 This one, dubbed Shays’s Rebellion after Revolutionary War veteran Daniel Shays, one of its leaders, threatened for a time to rage out of control.
The reaction around the country among people of property was shock and horror, not only at the class warfare that seemed to be erupting and the inability of the national government to help states maintain the peace but also at several states’ subsequent decision to avert future rebellions by allowing debtors to pay off their creditors with nearly worthless paper money. “What, gracious God, is man!” declared the usually stoic George Washington after hearing of the Massachusetts riots. “That there should be such inconsistency and perfidiousness in his conduct. We are fast verging to anarchy and confusion.”

On February 21, 1787, Congress decided to act on the Annapolis Convention’s request by passing a resolution that called on the states to send delegates to a mid-May convention in Philadelphia. The convention’s “sole and express purpose” would be to propose amendments to the Articles of Confederation, none of which would take effect unless “agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the states.”

The states were no more compelled to obey this congressional summons than to follow any other. But when a sufficient number—whether frightened by the prospect of further uprisings, concerned about the nation’s growing domestic and international weakness, or inspired by the example of the nationally revered Washington (who decided to attend as a delegate from his native Virginia)-selected delegations, all the other states but Rhode Island fell into line for fear of having their interests ignored.

The Delegates

The Constitutional Convention has been variously described as an “assembly of demigods” (Jefferson Thomas), a “nationalist reform caucus” (political scientist John P. Roche), and a “coup” (legal scholar Michael Klarman), to cite but three descriptions. The convention was all of these things. But, mundanely, it also was a gathering of fifty-five individuals.

Who were the delegates? Self-selection had much to do with determining whom states chose to represent them at the convention and who actually went. Political leaders who were committed to the idea that the national government must be dramatically improved embraced the opportunity to attend. Most of those who were basically satisfied with the status quo—including prominent Americans such as Patrick Henry of Virginia, Samuel Adams of Massachusetts, and George Clinton of New York—chose to stay away. Henry, a strong defender of the Confederation, reputedly said that he “smelt a Rat.” If they had attended and fought stubbornly for their position, observed political scientist Clinton Rossiter, the convention “would have been much more perfectly representative of the active citizenry of 1787. It would also, one is bound to point out, have been crippled as a nation-building instrument.”
The fifty-five delegates were generally united in their belief that a stronger national government was vital to the health of the new American nation. In part, this agreement stemmed from their similar experiences in the national arena. Forty-two were current or former members of Congress. Thirty had risked life and livelihood by fighting in the Revolutionary War, and nearly all of the others had been involved in the war as civilian officeholders. Eight had signed the Declaration of Independence. All were republican, at least to the extent that they opposed a hereditary monarchy and supported some form of representative government.

Collectively, the convention was young. Many of the delegates were, in the words of historians Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, “the young men of the Revolution,” who came of age during the revolutionary decade of the 1770s, when the idea of building a nation was more inspiring than traditional state loyalties. Madison, at 36, was older than eleven other delegates, including Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania (35), Edmund Randolph of Virginia (33), and Charles Pinckney of South Carolina, who was 29 but said he was 24 so he could claim to be the youngest delegate. (That distinction belonged to Jonathan Dayton of New Jersey, who was 26.) The average age of the delegates—even counting Benjamin Franklin of Pennsylvania, who, at age 81, was sixteen years older than the next-oldest delegate—was 43.

Other shared characteristics contributed to the delegates’ common outlook on many fundamental issues. All were white; all were men. Almost all lived in the long-settled coastal regions of their states; the backcountry frontier was hardly represented at the convention. Almost all were prosperous—about half were lawyers, and another quarter owned plantations or large farms. Only two delegates were small farmers, a group that accounted for 85% of the nation’s white population. The wealth of most of the delegates derived from personal property—government securities and investments in manufacturing, shipping, and land speculation. The prosperity of other delegates lay in real property, notably large farms and, in the South and elsewhere, fellow human beings. Twenty-five delegates—nearly half—were slave owners.

**Rules and Procedures**

Congress had summoned the convention to assemble on Monday, May 14, 1787. But not until Friday, May 25, were the seven state delegations needed for a quorum present in Philadelphia. Although most of the other delegations arrived within a few days, some came much later. Others left early. Never were all fifty-five delegates present at the same time.

The first order of business on May 25 was to elect a president, a word that in the usage of the day, suggested a presiding officer more than a leader.
or chief executive. Not surprisingly, Washington was the delegates’ unanimous choice. Although he spoke on only one issue during the convention, he played more than a ceremonial role. According to the Colliers, “during that long, hot summer, this gregarious man was constantly having dinner, tea, supper with people, and one must assume of course that he was actively promoting his position”—namely, a strong national government and a strong executive within that government. Even Washington’s single speech near the end of the convention was meaningful in symbolic terms. As Gordon Wood points out, “It was his way of saying to his colleagues that he favored the Constitution.”

After Washington was elected president of the convention, a secretary was chosen—Major William Jackson of Pennsylvania. Jackson kept the convention’s official journal, which was little more than a record of motions and votes. Fortunately, Madison decided to keep a more extensive record of the delegates’ debates and deliberations. Madison was frustrated in his studies of other governments by the near impossibility of determining what their founders intended when creating them. In fairness to his colleagues, Madison decided to keep his notes secret until the last delegate died. That delegate turned out to be Madison, who died in 1836, at the age of 85. Along with the rest of Madison’s papers, his notes on the Constitutional Convention were purchased by Congress in 1837 and published in 1840.

The only other business of the convention’s first day was to accept the credentials of the state delegations. In doing so, the delegates implicitly agreed to follow the then-customary procedure of having each state cast one vote. James Wilson was displeased by this arrangement (he felt the more populous states should have a greater voice), but he was persuaded by Madison and others that to alienate the small-state delegates at such an early stage could abort the entire proceeding.

On Monday, May 28, the delegates adopted additional rules and procedures. None was more important to the success of the convention than the rule of secrecy. The rule was simple: No delegate was allowed to communicate anything to anyone except a fellow delegate about the convention’s discussions and deliberations.

Jefferson, then the U.S. ambassador to France, wrote John Adams, the ambassador to Great Britain, that he was appalled by “so abominable a precedent.” But in a letter to Jefferson, Madison explained the delegates’ decision: “It was thought expedient in order to secure unbiased discussion within doors, and to prevent misconceptions & misconstructions without.” In other words, secrecy permitted the delegates to speak candidly about issues without fearing immediate public retribution as well as to change their minds without appearing weak or vacillating. It also kept opponents of a stronger national government from sensationalizing particular proposals or decisions as a means of discrediting the
whole undertaking. Years later, Madison told historian Jared Sparks that “no Constitution would ever have been adopted by the Convention if the debates had been made public.”

Another important rule the convention adopted was to permit any of its decisions to be reconsidered at any time at the request of even a single delegate. Because issues could always be raised and decided again, those who were on the losing side of a crucial vote were encouraged to stay and try to persuade the other delegates to change their minds rather than to walk out and return home in protest.

An Overview of the Convention

The Constitutional Convention was not a scripted or even an especially orderly proceeding. The delegates’ decision to allow issues to be reconsidered, reinforced by their twin desires to build consensus among themselves and to create a government whose parts would mesh with one another, meant that the convention “could not, and did not, proceed in a straight line, neatly disposing of one issue after the next until all were dealt with. It moved instead in swirls and loops, again and again backtracking to pick up issues previously debated.” Historian Jack N. Rakove compared the constitution-writing process to “the solution of a complex equation with a large number of dependent variables: change the value of one, and the values shift throughout.”

Students of mathematics know that not all such equations are solved. Once the convention was called, the risk of failure was great. As Franklin wrote to Jefferson on April 19, 1787, “If it does not do good it will do harm, as it will show that we have not the wisdom among us to govern ourselves.” Nor did the delegates’ work proceed smoothly. Near the midway point, Washington wrote, “I almost despair of seeing a favourable issue to the proceedings of the Convention, and do therefore repent having had any agency in the business.” Nevertheless, from May to September, the delegates used drafts, debates, compromises, and committees to organize their deliberations and help them work through the many issues that faced them. These plans and committees structured the work of the convention into seven main stages:

- Introduction of the Virginia Plan (May 29)
- Decision by the convention to recast itself as the Committee of the Whole, originally for the purpose of considering the Virginia Plan in detail but later to evaluate the New Jersey Plan and Alexander Hamilton’s plan as well (May 30–June 19)
- Clause-by-clause debate by the delegates of their decisions when meeting as the Committee of the Whole (June 20–July 26)
• Work of the five-member Committee of Detail, which was appointed by the convention to produce a draft of the new constitution that reflected the delegates’ previous decisions on multiple issues (July 24–August 6)

• Consideration by the delegates of each provision in the report of the Committee of Detail (August 7–31)

• Recommendations to the convention by the eleven-member Committee on Postponed Matters, which was created to propose acceptable solutions to problems that continued to stalemate the delegates (August 31–September 8)

• Final adjustments, including the work of the Committee of Style, which was charged to write a polished draft of the Constitution, and last-minute tinkering by the delegates, culminating in their signing of the proposed plan of government (September 9–17)

The Virginia Plan (May 29)

The Virginia Plan, introduced on May 29 by Randolph but written mainly by Madison, offered a radical departure from the Articles of Confederation. The plan proposed to create a three-branch national government and to elevate it to clear supremacy over the states, partly by grounding its authority squarely in the sovereignty of the people.37

According to the Virginia Plan, the heart of the national government would be a bicameral legislature. The lower house would be apportioned according to some combination of wealth and population and elected by the people. Members of the upper house would be chosen for a longer term by the lower house from a list of candidates nominated by the states. The legislature’s powers would include broad authority not only to pass laws but also to conduct foreign policy and to appoint most government officials, including judges.

A national judiciary, appointed by the legislature to serve “during good behavior”—that is, with life tenure—would form the second branch. One of its broad-ranging powers was “impeachments of any National officers.”

The new government would also have an executive branch, although it was vaguely defined in the Virginia Plan. The “national executive” (the plan left unresolved the question of whether this would be a person or group of people) was “to be chosen by the National Legislature for a term of _____ years.” Its powers were obscure: “besides a general authority to execute the National laws, it ought to enjoy the Executive rights vested in Congress by the [Articles of] Confederation.” No one knew exactly what the phrase “Executive rights” meant.
Another element of the proposed new government was a “Council of revision” consisting of “the executive and a convenient number of the National Judiciary.” The council would be empowered to veto laws passed by the legislature, subject to override if a vetoed law was passed again by an unspecified legislative majority.\(^38\)

Finally, the new government would have the power to veto state laws that were in conflict with the Constitution or with national legislation. For Madison, argues Gordon Wood, the worst thing about the Articles of Confederation was not the weakness of the national government but “vices within the several states” that produced an abundance of unjust and inconsistent laws. When the convention later rejected this provision of the Virginia Plan, Madison was for a time “convinced that the Constitution was doomed to fail.”\(^39\)

The delegates’ response to the Virginia Plan was remarkably placid, especially considering that it proposed to replace the weak national government of the Articles rather than amend the document. “So sharp a break was Virginia asking the other states to make with the American past that one wonders why at least one stunned delegate . . . did not rise up and cry havoc at the top of his lungs,” Rossiter wrote. “Instead, the delegates ended this [May 29] session by resolving to go into a ‘committee of the whole house’” on the next day to “consider the state of the American union.”\(^40\)

### Committee of the Whole (May 30–June 19)

In becoming the Committee of the Whole, the convention was, in a sense, simply giving itself a different name. The same group of delegates made up the committee as made up the convention. But as the Committee of the Whole, they could operate more informally. To symbolize this change, Washington temporarily stepped down as president, and Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts was chosen to preside. In addition, any decision made by the delegates while meeting as the committee would be in the form of a recommendation that the convention would debate and vote on at least once more.

From May 30 to June 13 the Committee of the Whole spent most of its time going over the Virginia Plan, clause by clause. Much of the plan was accepted, but parts of it were altered and some ambiguous provisions were clarified.\(^31\) The executive was defined as a unitary—that is, a one-person office. This person would be elected by the legislature for a single, seven-year term and would be subject to impeachment and removal on grounds of “malpractice or neglect of duty.” The executive alone, not a council of revision, was empowered to veto laws passed by the legislature, subject to override by a two-thirds vote of both houses. The requirement for a supermajority here and elsewhere in the new plan of government was an American innovation unknown to the British Parliament but already used widely in the states.\(^42\)
In deference to the states, the Committee of the Whole decided that members of the upper house of the national legislature (who had to be at least 30 years old) would be chosen by the state legislatures. They would serve seven-year terms and be eligible for reelection. Members of the lower house, also eligible for reelection, would serve three-year terms. All members of the national legislature would be barred from holding any other government office, mainly to prevent the emergence of conflicts of interest. As for the courts, there would be one “supreme tribunal,” and the judges who served on it or on such “inferior tribunals” as the national legislature might decide to create would be appointed by its upper house for a lifetime term.

The New Jersey Plan. One plank of the Virginia Plan was especially controversial: the provision that both houses of the national legislature would be apportioned according to population. Delegates from the states that thought of themselves as large (Virginia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and the three southern states whose populations were growing most rapidly at the time—Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina) favored the idea. They fought sharply with the delegates from the other states who feared that their constituents would be hopelessly outnumbered in the legislature and wanted to preserve the existing arrangement of equal representation in Congress for each state. A compromise plan, proposed by Roger Sherman of Connecticut on June 11, would have apportioned the lower house of the legislature according to population and the upper house on the basis of one state, one vote. But few delegates were ready yet for compromise. Instead, small-state delegates responded to the Virginia Plan with a sweeping counterproposal. It was introduced on June 15 by William Paterson of New Jersey.

The New Jersey Plan came in the form of amendments to the Articles of Confederation rather than as a new constitution. It proposed to add two branches to the one-branch national government of the Articles: a plural or committee-style executive, to be elected by Congress for a single term and “removeable by Cong[ress] on application by a majority of the Executives [governors] of the several States,” and a supreme court consisting of judges appointed by the executive for lifetime terms. The plan also declared national laws and treaties to be “the supreme law of the respective States” and authorized the executive to use force if necessary to implement them. In addition, Congress would be empowered to regulate interstate and international commerce and impose taxes. But the main purpose of the New Jersey Plan was unstated: to preserve the structure of Congress under the Articles as a unicameral legislature in which each state, regardless of size, cast one vote.43
Hamilton’s Plan. On June 18, Hamilton delivered a four- to six-hour speech to the delegates in which he urged them to consider his plan for an avowedly British-style government. He had no scruple in declaring," according to the notes kept by Madison, "supported as he was by the opinions of so many of the wise & good, that the British Government was the best in the world: and that he doubted much whether any thing short of it would do in America."  

Specifically, Hamilton proposed that, as in Great Britain, the national government would be supreme in every way to the states. State governors would be appointed by the national legislature and granted the right to veto laws passed by their own assemblies. Members of the upper house of the national legislature, similar to members of the British House of Lords, would serve for life. As for the executive, “the English model is the only good one,” Hamilton asserted. Although he did not suggest that the United States create a hereditary monarchy, Hamilton did propose that the executive be chosen by electors and granted lifetime tenure and vast powers, including “a negative on all laws about to be passed, . . . the direction of war when authorized or begun, the sole appointment of the heads of the departments, the power of pardoning all offences except Treason,” and, along with the Senate, treaty-making power. In truth, argues biographer Ron Chernow, Hamilton’s proposal was for “a new hybrid form of government that would have the continuity of a monarchy combined with the civil liberties of a republic.”  

Hamilton’s speech was dismissed by most of the delegates as being far beyond the bounds of what the people or the states would accept. Some scholars have suggested that his real purpose was to offer a plan so extreme that the Virginia Plan would seem moderate by comparison. Yet several of Hamilton’s specific proposals were adopted later in the convention, notably those concerning the president’s power to grant pardons and to negotiate treaties. As for the New Jersey Plan, it was defeated on June 19 by a vote of seven states to three. Later that day, the Virginia Plan, as already modified, was approved by the Committee of the Whole and referred to the convention for further consideration. But the conflict between the delegates from the large states and the small states over apportionment in the national legislature was far from resolved.

Convention Debate (June 20–July 26)  

On June 20, with Washington again in the chair as president of the convention, the delegates began their clause-by-clause evaluation of the plan of government they had tentatively laid out while meeting as the Committee of the Whole. Among the changes they voted in the plan were these:
Members of the lower house of the legislature would be elected for a term of two years, not three, and would have to be at least 25 years old.

Members of the upper house would serve a six-year rather than a seven-year term. Terms would be staggered so that one-third were elected every two years.

The national legislature would not have the power to veto state laws, much to Madison's dismay. But, borrowing a plank from the New Jersey Plan, national laws and treaties would be "the supreme law of the respective States."

A property-owning requirement for members of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches would be established. (This idea was later abandoned.)

Delegates expressed enough displeasure with the provision for legislative election of the president to a single, seven-year term to guarantee that it would not remain in the final document, but they failed to agree on an alternative.

More than any other issue, deciding how the legislature would be apportioned consumed the conventions time, attention, and patience during these five weeks of debate. Delegates from the small states pressed relentlessly for equal representation of the states. Large-state delegates just as adamantly insisted that representation in both houses reflect population, wealth, or some combination of the two.

A special committee, with members from every state, was appointed on July 2 to propose a compromise. On July 5, after a break to celebrate Independence Day, the committee recommended a plan of equal representation for each state in the upper house and apportionment according to population in the lower house. As a sop to delegates from the large states who feared that the small state–dominated upper house would push for spending programs that would impoverish the large states, the committee vested exclusive power in the lower house to originate all legislation dealing with money.

For more than a week, the delegates engaged in a complex and sometimes bitter debate about the proposed compromise. New questions were raised about whether states yet to be admitted to the Union should receive as much representation as the original thirteen, how often a national census should be taken to measure population changes, and whether apportionment in the lower house should reflect a state's wealth as well as its population. On July 16, the convention voted narrowly to approve the main points of the special committee's proposal, sometimes called the Connecticut Compromise in honor of its author, Roger Sherman. One week later, the
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delegates undermined the idea that the upper house would represent the states in the new government by deciding that every state would have two members, each of them free to vote independently of each other and of their state governments.

This happy mixture of principle and practicality was tarnished by a dreadful, if unavoidable, compromise with America’s “peculiar institution.” In one of the three constitutional clauses that protected forced servitude, each enslaved individual was counted as three-fifths of a person for purposes of representation in the lower house. These three clauses, which also included both a guarantee that slaves could continue to be imported from abroad for 20 years and a fugitive slave provision requiring states to return escaped slaves to their owners, would cast a long, dark shadow over the republic.

As terrible as these concessions were, they could have been worse. Although allowing the continuation of slavery and even abetting it by promising to help catch fugitive slaves—a Faustian bargain that most Framers feared was necessary to prevent the dissolution of the Union—the delegates refrained from providing slavery with a moral stamp of approval. Indeed, the word slavery is never used in the document; instead, the delegates resorted to euphemisms such as “persons held to service,” a tacit acknowledgment of their embarrassment. By depriving the defenders of slavery of moral ground to stand on, the Constitution’s wording also allowed later opponents of slavery, such as the abolitionist Frederick Douglass and President Abraham Lincoln, to claim that the Framers regarded it as a politically necessary evil rather than a positive good.

Committee of Detail (July 24–August 6)

As fraught as these compromises were, on July 24, the convention resolved to appoint a Committee of Detail to review all of its decisions and draft a constitution that incorporated them. The five-member committee included representatives of the three main regions of the country—Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts and Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut (a protégé of Sherman) from New England, James Wilson of Pennsylvania from the middle Atlantic states, and Edmund Randolph of Virginia and John Rutledge of South Carolina from the South. The committee worked while the rest of the convention adjourned until August 6.

One indication of the committee’s influence is that it took convention-passed resolutions amounting to 1,200 words and transformed them into a draft constitution of 3,700 words. The committee also drew from a wide range of other sources in compiling its report: the New Jersey Plan, the Articles of Confederation, the rules of Congress, some state constitutions (notably those of New York and Massachusetts), and the plan of government proposed by Charles Pinckney of South Carolina.
Most of the memorable phrases in the Constitution were written by the Committee of Detail, including “state of the Union” and “We the People.” Institutions were named. The executive became the president; the national tribunal, the Supreme Court; and the legislature, Congress, with its upper house called the Senate and its lower chamber, the House of Representatives.

For the most part, the committee, in keeping with its name, simply fleshed out the details of earlier convention decisions. It established procedures for the president’s veto, defined the jurisdiction of the courts, and adjusted certain relations among the states. In some instances, however, the committee substituted its own judgment for the convention’s. For example, it vested the power to impeach in the House and omitted the property requirement for officeholders.

Perhaps the most important decision by the Committee of Detail was to transform general grants of power for each branch into specific ones. What previously had been Congress’s broadly stated authority “to legislate in all cases for the general interests of the Union” became instead a list of 18 enumerated powers, including the power to lay and collect taxes, regulate interstate commerce, establish post offices, “make war,” elect a national treasurer, and create inferior courts—all culminating in a sweeping grant “to make all Laws that shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” these and “all other Powers vested” in the new government. The states were forbidden certain powers, notably to make treaties with other nations, to print money, and to tax imports.

The committee granted the president the authority to recommend legislation to Congress, make executive appointments, receive ambassadors from other nations, issue pardons, “take care” that the laws be executed, and command the armed forces. An oath to “faithfully execute the office” of president also was included, as was a provision that the Senate’s own elected leader would exercise the powers and duties of the presidency if the president died, resigned, or became disabled. The judiciary was given jurisdiction in cases arising under the laws of the national government as well as in controversies between states or between citizens of different states.

Finally, responding to a threat to walk out by General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina (an older cousin of fellow delegate Charles Pinckney), the committee not only forbade Congress to tax or ban the importing of slaves and the exporting of goods but also placated southern delegates’ fears that Congress might enact navigation laws requiring that American exports be transported on American ships (a financial boon to northern shipbuilders but a burden to southern agricultural exporters). The committee recommended that Congress would have to pass such laws by a two-thirds vote in both houses.
Convention Debate (August 7–31)

As they had with the Virginia Plan and the report of the Committee of the Whole, the delegates reviewed the draft constitution proposed by the Committee of Detail clause by clause. Much of the draft was approved. Some parts, however, were modified, and others became matters of serious controversy.

**Modifications.** The delegates tinkered with several provisions of the Committee of Detail’s draft:

- They enacted minimum citizenship requirements for members of Congress (seven years for members of the House, nine years for senators), along with a requirement that legislators be inhabitants of the states they represent.
- They raised the majority needed in both houses of Congress to override a president’s veto from two-thirds to three-fourths. (Near the end of the convention, the delegates restored the two-thirds requirement.)
- They judged Congress’s power to “make war” too sweeping to protect the nation if it was attacked when Congress was out of session. The clause was revised to read “declare war.”
- They forbade Congress to pass ex post facto laws (retroactive criminal laws) or bills of attainder (laws that declare an individual guilty of a crime without a trial).
- They barred the government from granting “any title of nobility” to any person and forbade government officials to receive “any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind whatever from any king, prince, or foreign state.”
- They empowered Congress to activate the militia of any state “to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.”
- They dropped the two-thirds requirement for Congress to pass navigation acts.
- They created a convention-based procedure for amending the Constitution: “on the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the states in the Union for an amendment of this Constitution, the legislature of the United States shall call a convention for that purpose.”
- They prohibited any religious test as a requirement for holding office.
They expanded the president's oath to include these words: "and will to the best of my judgment and power preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States." (Later, "to the best of my judgment and power" became "to the best of my ability.")

The Committee of Detail had proposed that the new constitution take effect when ratified by state conventions, not state legislatures that might resent the plan's dilution of their powers. The delegates agreed and then voted to set the number of states needed for ratification at nine, or two-thirds—a number "familiar to the people" from the Articles of Confederation.

**Controversies.** The draft constitution's slavery provisions came under fierce assault from several northern delegates, especially the three-fifths rule for counting enslaved people as part of the population and the prohibition against laws banning the importation of slaves. The North's concern derived less from moral considerations than from fear of slave rebellions, which might attract foreign intervention and, in any event, probably would require northern arms and money to suppress. Southern delegates not only defended the provisions to protect slavery but also confirmed that their states would not ratify any constitution that placed slavery in jeopardy.

Adopting the approach previously used to settle the controversy between the large and small states, on August 22, the convention appointed a special committee to find a compromise solution. Two days later, the committee proposed that Congress be authorized, if it so decided, to end the importation of enslaved people after 1800. In the meantime, Congress could tax imported slaves at a rate no greater than ten dollars each. Euphemisms—not "slave" but "other Persons"—were used in the Constitution. General Pinckney persuaded the convention to change 1800 to 1808. The committee's recommendation, as amended, was passed.

Controversies over two other matters caused the convention to bog down: the powers of the Senate, which delegates from the large states wanted to minimize and delegates from the small states wanted to maximize, and a cluster of issues concerning presidential selection. On August 31, nearing the end of its labors, the convention appointed a Committee on Postponed Matters, with a member from each state delegation, to propose solutions to these vexing problems.

**Committee on Postponed Matters (August 31–September 8)**

Beginning on September 4, the Committee on Postponed Matters, chaired by David Brearley of New Jersey, made several recommendations about the presidency. The committee proposed a presidential term of
four years rather than seven, with no limit on the number of terms to which a president could be elected. The president was to be chosen not by Congress but by the newly created Electoral College. To constitute the Electoral College, each state would select, by whatever means it chose, electors equal in number to its representatives and senators in Congress. The candidate who received the largest majority of electoral votes would become president. The candidate who finished second would become vice president. (This was the first mention of the vice presidency at the convention.) If no candidate received a majority, the Senate would select the president and vice president from among the five candidates who received the greatest number of electoral votes.

As a corollary to its proposal for the Electoral College, the committee recommended that certain responsibilities be assigned to the vice president: to preside over the Senate, with the right to cast tie-breaking votes, and to act as president if the office became vacant before the president’s term expired. Finally, the committee recommended that qualifications for president be stated in the Constitution. The president would have to be at least 35 years old, a natural-born citizen of the United States or a citizen at the time of the Constitution’s enactment, and a resident of the United States for at least 14 years.

For several days, the delegates carefully considered the committee’s complex proposal for presidential selection. On September 7, they passed it after making just one substantial change: the House of Representatives, not the Senate, would choose the president in the event of an Electoral College deadlock, with each state delegation casting one vote. The Senate still would choose the vice president if the electoral vote for that position was tied.

Having approved the Electoral College, the convention quickly acted to reduce the powers of the Senate, mostly in response to demands by the large states. The president was granted the authority to make treaties and to appoint ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, Supreme Court justices, federal judges, and all other officers whose selection was not otherwise provided for. Senate confirmation would be required for all of these appointments. A two-thirds vote of senators was stipulated for ratifying treaties.

On September 8, the convention approved the final proposals of the Committee on Postponed Matters. The president was to be impeached by the House on grounds of “treason or bribery or other high crimes and misdemeanors against the United States” and removed from office if convicted by the Senate. The delegates added the vice president and other civil officers to the roster of those who were subject to impeachment, but they raised the margin needed for Senate conviction from a simple majority to two-thirds. In addition, the House was empowered to originate “all bills for raising revenue.”
Having completed (or so they believed) their work on the Constitution, the delegates ended their business later that day by voting to create a five-member Committee of Style to write a polished final draft of the document for them to sign. The committee’s leading members were Madison, Hamilton, and Gouverneur Morris, who seems to have done most of its work.

**Final Adjustments (September 9–17)**

Even as the Committee of Style labored, the delegates continued to modify some of their earlier decisions. On September 10, Madison urged that special constitutional conventions not be a part of the process of amending the Constitution. Instead, he argued, amendments should be initiated by a two-thirds vote of Congress or by two-thirds of the state legislatures, with approval by three-fourths of the states needed for ratification. Two days later, Hugh Williamson of North Carolina successfully moved that the requirement for overriding a presidential veto be reduced from a three-fourths vote of each house of Congress to a two-thirds vote. The Committee of Style incorporated these changes into its draft.

Meanwhile, some delegates were expressing more fundamental reservations about the Constitution. Randolph worried that the convention had gone far beyond its original charge to propose revisions in the Articles of Confederation. He urged that the proposed constitution be approved not only by state ratifying conventions but also by Congress and the state legislatures, even if this process necessitated a second constitutional convention. His fellow Virginian, George Mason, and Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts objected to the absence of a bill of rights from the Constitution. So convinced were the other delegates that such an addition was unnecessary, observes historian Richard Beeman, that “not a single state delegation in the Convention supported the idea of a federal bill of rights.”

The Committee of Style reported to the convention on September 12. Its draft not only reduced the number of articles from 23 to seven but also included some significant innovations. The most memorable of these was the preamble:

> We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

The committee also added a provision that barred states from passing laws to impair the obligations of contracts. Finally, it wrote vesting clauses
for Congress and the president that, intentionally or not, suggested that the
president might have executive powers beyond those enumerated in the
Constitution.

The committee’s draft met with widespread approval from the dele-
gates, but they continued to tinker. Congress was stripped of its power
to choose the national treasurer in favor of the president. A provision was
added that the Constitution could not be altered to deprive a state of equal
representation in the Senate without the state’s consent. And, at the ini-
tiative of Morris and Gerry, a compromise procedure for amending the
Constitution was created that incorporated both the Committee of Detail’s
recommendation and Madison’s plan. As finally agreed, a constitutional
amendment could be proposed by either a two-thirds vote of both houses
of Congress or a convention that Congress was required to call if two-
thirds of the state legislatures requested one. In either case, three-fourths
of the states would have to ratify an amendment for it to become part of
the Constitution.

Despite these alterations, Randolph, Gerry, and Mason remained
unconvinced, expressing doubts about the magnitude of the changes that
the convention was recommending. But their motion for another constitu-
tional convention to consider any recommendations that might be offered
by the states was defeated by a vote of eleven states to none. As Jack Rakove
noted, the delegates realized from experience that “a second federal con-
vention would assemble encumbered by proposals for amendments of all
kinds and bound by instructions that would make it impossible to replicate
the process of persuasion, compromise, and bargaining from which the
completed Constitution had so laboriously emerged.”

The convention’s work finished, the delegates assembled on September
17 to sign the Constitution. Forty-two of the original fifty-five delegates
were still present in Philadelphia, and all but Randolph, Mason, and
Gerry affixed their signatures to the document. Even then, the delegates
could not resist some fine-tuning, unanimously approving a Washington-
supported motion to alter the apportionment formula for the House of
Representatives.

Speaking first before and then during the signing ceremony, Franklin
offered the convention’s most memorable benediction. To the delegates,
he presented a long speech that—as read by Wilson because of Franklin’s
frailty—said in essence that he supported “this constitution because I
expect no better, and because I am not sure it is not the best.”

Later, as the last few delegates waited to sign the Constitution, Franklin
gestured to Washington’s chair and said to those standing nearby that
although “painters have found it difficult to distinguish in their art a rising
from a setting sun. . . . I have the happiness to know that it is a rising and
not a setting sun.”
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George Washington presiding at the signing of the Constitution in Philadelphia on September 17, 1787.

Source: Library of Congress.

NOTES


17. To a large degree, British hostility to the United States was caused, or at least rationalized, by the American failure to comply with two provisions of the Treaty of Paris. One provision compelled the United States to reimburse British loyalists for property that was seized from them during the war, the other required that prewar debts to British merchants be paid. Individual states actively resisted both of these requirements and the national government was powerless to enforce them.


27. Taylor (2016). *American Revolutions*, pp. 373–375. Historian Charles A. Beard believed that the enactment of the Constitution, more than anything else, was a triumph of the “personality”—that is, financial and commercial—interests over the “realty,” or landed interests; see Beard, C. A. (1913). *An economic interpretation of the constitution*. Macmillan. A powerful critique of this once-influential theory was offered by McDonald, F. (1958). *We the people: Economic origins of the constitution*. University of Chicago Press.

28. Fearing that the new Constitution would be attacked as anti-republican, Washington rose on the last day to support a proposal requiring that each member of the House of Representatives represent at least 30,000 people rather than the previously agreed-to 40,000. The delegates approved unanimously. Washington was right: Even with the adoption of the change he prescribed, Anti-Federalist opponents of the proposed constitution attacked it severely during the ratification debates for requiring each House member to represent too many people.


32. Roche argued that the preservation of secrecy by the delegates testifies to their sense of shared enterprise. Even when they disagreed strongly about particular issues, they were sufficiently committed to the effort to keep their objections within the convention’s walls. See Roche (1961), Founding Fathers.

33. Collier & Collier (1986). *Decision in Philadelphia*, p. 120.


37. The Virginia Plan can be found in Farrand (1911). *Records* (Vol. 1), pp. 20–22.

38. The Virginia Plan was one of two that were offered to the convention on May 29. Madison recorded in his notes for that day that Charles Pinckney of South Carolina also introduced a plan. But because Madison (who had long loathed Pinckney from their days together in Congress) neither described the Pinckney Plan nor included its text, scholars have had to reconstruct it as best they could from other documents—in particular, some notes found in the papers of James Wilson. The Pinckney Plan probably resembled the Virginia Plan in many ways.


41. The resolution of the Committee of the Whole can be found in Farrand (1911). *Records* (Vol. 1), pp. 235–237.


43. The New Jersey Plan can be found in Farrand (1911). *Records* (Vol. 1), pp. 242–245.

44. Hamilton's Plan can be found in Farrand (1911). *Records* (Vol. 1), pp. 291–293.


49. The Committee of Detail report can be found in Farrand (1911). *Records* (Vol. 2), pp. 177–189.


51. Beeman, R. (2009). *Plain, honest men: The making of the American constitution*. Random House, p. 342. James Wilson of Pennsylvania also argued that any attempt to enumerate the rights of the people would necessarily be incomplete, posing the risk that "everything not expressly mentioned will be presumed to be purposely omitted" (p. 343).

52. The Committee of Style draft can be found in Farrand (1911). *Records* (Vol. 2), pp. 590–603.

53. The preamble it replaced was blander and more state centered: “We the people of the states of New Hampshire, Massachusetts,” and so on.
