

THE NOMINATION STRUGGLE

Presidential nomination campaigns are the contests through which the two major political parties in the United States select their presidential nominees. As they have done since 1832 (Democrats) and 1856 (Republicans), the delegates who are chosen to be seated at the national party conventions do the actual selecting. However, since about 1972, both parties have used public campaigns for popular support as a way of selecting and/or instructing most delegates to the convention on how they should vote. Many people think of these primary contests as formal elections, just like those in general elections in the fall. Whereas presidential primary elections are, indeed, run by the government, they are actually designed solely to help each political party select delegates to choose its presidential nominee, and that applies only to the roughly half of the states that use primary elections to select or instruct their delegates.¹ States that use the alternative means, caucus or convention procedures, instead of primaries (see what follows) do so without involving the government at all. Presidential nominations are thus a mixture of public and private selections, and they are conducted at the state level only, even though their ultimate outcome is to select the two major parties' nominees for the only national offices that Americans elect.

In this, America is nearly unique. In almost no other country have the leaders of the major political parties' leaders ceded so much control over candidate selection to the general public. While now and then there are primary elections run by political parties in other nations, they are rare, typically isolated to one or a few parties, and are often used only once or twice before being discarded. American nominations, on the other hand, have run this way for Democrats and Republicans since the 1970s and have become entrenched in the public's and the political leaderships' minds. It would be very difficult for a party to nominate someone the public did not support at near or actual majority levels in the primary season. The leadership has, in that sense, ceded its control over its own party to the general public.² In turn that has empowered the media who seek to inform the public and the many activists, supporters, and financial donors of the presidential nomination campaigns who provide the wherewithal for most candidates to have any chance of reaching the public to win their support.

The 2016 campaigns in many respects were like all of those since the 1970s, that is, in the era of the "new nomination system," as we call it. As we shall see there were perhaps a surprising number of similarities between the two campaigns of 2016 and their

predecessors. Most people, however, when they speak of 2016, talk with wonder about specific and individual aspects of the campaigns regardless of the similarities to other contests. They ask “How could someone like Donald J. Trump win the Republican nomination?” and (if they disliked the outcome) “Why couldn’t Republican leaders prevent his nomination?” On the Democratic side the question more often seemed to be “Why didn’t Hillary R. Clinton win nomination more easily and quickly instead of appearing unable to reach out to larger numbers of Democrats?” or (if the outcome was viewed as negative) “How could the party fail to nominate someone more at the heart of the Democratic Party and end up with someone who so epitomizes the ‘establishment’ in this anti-establishment year?” As we will see the answers to these questions are that the two parties’ campaigns largely unfolded in replication of the many and well-established continuities established since the empowering of the public and consequent loss of party leadership control over nominations. But it is the unique properties of the two winners, especially in comparison to their major party opponents, that made the two campaigns unlike previous ones and in sometimes very important ways.

In short, reforms in the late 1960s and early 1970s brought about a new form of nomination campaign, one that required public campaigning for resources and votes. The new nomination system has shaped many aspects of all contests from 1972 onward, and we examine the similarities that have endured over its more than forty-year existence. Each contest, of course, differs from all others because of the electoral context at the time (e.g., the state of the economy or of war and peace) and because the contenders themselves are different. And in the new nomination system, the rules change to some degree every four years as well. The changes in rules and the strategies that candidates adopt in light of those rules combine with the context and contenders to make each campaign unique.

WHO RAN

A first important regularity of the nomination campaign is that when incumbents seek renomination, only a very few candidates will contest them, and perhaps no one will at all. In 1972, although President Richard M. Nixon did face two potentially credible challengers to his renomination, they were so ineffective that he was essentially uncontested. Ronald Reagan in 1984, Bill Clinton in 1996, George W. Bush in 2004, and Barack Obama in 2012 were actually unopposed. They were so, in large part, because even a moderately successful president is virtually undefeatable for renomination. Conversely Gerald R. Ford in 1976 and Jimmy Carter in 1980 each faced a most credible challenger.³ Ford had great difficulty defeating Reagan, and Carter likewise was strongly contested by Democratic senator Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts.⁴ Of course Obama was ineligible to run for a third term in 2016, and so there was no incumbent running in either party. President Trump may well run for reelection in 2020 or perhaps join the few incumbents who chose not to run for reelection even though eligible, such as Harry S. Truman in 1952 and Lyndon B. Johnson in 1968.

The second major regularity in the nomination system concerns the contests—such as those in 2016—in which the party has no incumbent seeking renomination.

In such cases a relatively large number of candidates run for the nomination. For our purposes we count candidates as “running” if they were actively campaigning on January 1, 2016 (or entered even later, although none did this time). That definition means that there were twelve major candidates who sought the Republican Party’s nomination in 2016. There were actually quite a few more in 2015—by most counts seventeen—although that means that five were sufficiently “defeated” (or at least believed their chances of winning were too remote) so that they dropped out before January 1, 2016.⁵ By our counting procedure there were three Democratic candidates in 2016.⁶ Thus, in this section, we will be considering fifteen major party contenders. The numbers are higher on the Republican side and lower on the Democratic side than usual but not substantially out of the ordinary in either case.

Since 1980 there have been thirteen campaigns in which there was no incumbent seeking a major party’s nomination, and the number of major candidates that were in the race as the year began varied remarkably little: seven in 1980 (R); eight in 1984 (D); eight (D) and six (R) in 1988; eight in 1992 (D); eight in 1996 (R); six (R) and two (D) in 2000; nine in 2004 (D); eight in both parties’ contests in 2008; eight in 2012 (R); in addition to the twelve Republicans and three Democrats in 2016. Thus most such races featured at least six candidates. Only 2000 (D) and 2016 (D) had noticeably fewer, whereas 2016 (R) had a third more candidates running than the next most crowded field (2004, D).⁷ We will discuss why there were fewer candidates in those two races, but note that both had larger numbers of declared candidates before our January 1 date for counting (as did most other races).

The three candidates on the Democratic side were: Hillary Clinton, who most recently served as secretary of state in the Obama administration;⁸ Bernie Sanders, senator from Vermont; and Martin O’Malley, former governor of Maryland. The large number of Republicans was somewhat unusual in that the list included three candidates who had held no previous political office experience and very unusual in that such candidates (such as Ben Carson and Carly Fiorina in 2016) generally fare poorly, whereas Trump went on to win the nomination and election. There were also three incumbent senators (Ted Cruz, TX; Marco Rubio, FL; and Rand Paul, KY), two incumbent governors (John Kasich, OH; and Chris Christie, NJ); three former governors (Jim Gilmore, VA; Jeb Bush, FL; and Mike Huckabee, AR), and a former senator (Rick Santorum, PA). See Table 1-1 for these and other details we will discuss shortly. We have so far illustrated two regularities: few or no candidates will challenge incumbents, but in most cases many candidates will seek the nomination when no incumbent is running. In this 2016 is not particularly exceptional.

A third regularity is that among the candidates who are politicians, most hold or have recently held one of the highest political offices. This regularity follows from “ambition theory,” developed originally by Joseph A. Schlesinger to explain how personal ambition and the pattern and prestige of various elected offices lead candidates to emerge from those political offices that have the strongest electoral bases.⁹ This base for the presidential candidates includes the offices of vice president, senator, governor, and of course, the presidency itself. Note that even with a large number of contenders, there were no sitting members of the U.S. House who chose to run for the presidential nomination in 2016. House members do not have as strong an electoral

Table 1-1 Candidates for Nomination to the Presidency by the Democratic and Republican Parties, 2016, With Various Aspects Pertinent to Their Candidacy

	Name	Last Political Office	Withdrawal Date ^a	Campaign Expenditures (in Millions of Dollars) ^b	Independent Expenditures (in Millions of Dollars) ^c
Democrats	Clinton	Sec of State	None	\$187	\$12
	O'Malley	Gov (former)	1-Feb	\$6	\$0.40
	Sanders	Sen (current)	12-Jul	\$213	\$6
Republicans	Bush	Gov (former)	20-Feb		\$87
	Carson	None	4-Mar	\$6	\$5
	Christie	Gov (current)	10-Feb	\$8*	\$22
	Cruz	Sen (current)	3-May	\$85	\$27
	Fiorina	None	10-Feb	\$11	\$4
	Gilmore	Gov (former)	12-Feb	\$0.40	NA
	Huckabee	Gov (former)	1-Feb	\$4	\$3
	Kasich	Gov (current)	4-May	\$19	\$21
	Paul	Sen (current)	3-Feb	\$12	\$5
	Rubio	Sen (current)	15-Mar	\$52	\$49
	Santorum	Sen (former)	3-Feb	\$0.30	\$0.20
	Trump	None	None	\$62	\$44

Source: Compiled by authors.

^aInformation obtained from the *New York Times*, <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/65/election/2016-presidential-candidate>.

^bInformation obtained from the Federal Election Commission, <http://www.fec.gov/disclosure/pnational.do>—and various subpages from there; accessed March 20, 2016.

^cInformation obtained from OpenSecrets.org, <https://www.opensecrets.org/outside-spending/summary.php?cycle-2016&disp-C&type-P>.

base from which to run for the presidency, and they may well have to abandon a safe House seat to do so. As a result few House members run, and fewer still are strong contenders. The most prominent exception to the strong electoral base of ambition theory—Trump having had no experience in politics—will be at the center of our account of the unique features of his victory.

Most candidates in 2016, as in all earlier campaigns under the new nomination system, emerged from one of the strong electoral bases. Table 1-2 presents the data for 2016 and for all campaigns from 1972 to 2016 combined. More than two-thirds of the presidential candidates had already served as president, vice president, senator, or governor; another one in eight was a member of the U.S. House. In 2016 those ratios were largely true again, although no member of the House from either party was still a candidate as 2016 opened.¹⁰ Many of the presidents in the early years of the nation were chosen from the outgoing president’s cabinet (especially the sitting secretary of state) and other high level presidential appointees, but the cabinet is no longer a common source of presidential candidates, and the same is true for the nation’s many mayors.¹¹ About one in seven candidates run for president without ever holding any elective office. That percentage was a little higher in 2016 as one in four of the

Table 1-2 Current or Most Recent Office Held by Declared Candidates for President: Two Major Parties, 1972–2016

Office Held	Percentage of All Candidates Who Held That Office	Number, 1972–2016	Number, 2016
President	6	8	0
Vice President	3	4	0
U.S. Senator	36	53	5
U.S. Representative	12	18	0
Governor	24	35	6
U.S. Cabinet	3	5	1
Other	6	9	0
None	10	14	3
Total	99	146	15

Sources: 1972–1992: *Congressional Quarterly’s Guide to U.S. Elections*, 4th ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2001), 522–525, 562. 1996: Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, *Change and Continuity in the 1996 and 1998 Elections* (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1999), 13. 2000: CQ Weekly, January 1, 2000, 22. 2004: CQ Weekly, Fall 2003 Supplement, vol. 61, issue 48. The 2008–2016 results were compiled by the authors.

Republican candidates in 2016 (and no Democrats) had not held office previously. The big change, then, was not in the numbers but that one of those relatively politically untested contenders actually won the nomination in 2016, whereas few had left any visible mark at all on the contests in earlier years.

A fourth regularity, also consistent with ambition theory, is that of the many who run in nomination contests without incumbents, only a few put their current office at risk to do so. In 2016 only two senators, Paul and Rubio, were up for reelection. Paul withdrew on February 3, after the first contest of the campaign (the Iowa caucuses). Rubio said he would not run for reelection as a senator, but perhaps because the Florida senatorial primary was so late (August 30), he reentered the senatorial contest after withdrawing from the presidential race and won renomination and then reelection to the Senate.¹²

THE RULES OF THE NOMINATION SYSTEM

The method that the two major parties use for nominating presidential candidates is unique and includes an amazingly complicated set of rules. To add to the complication, the various formal rules, laws, and procedures in use are changed, sometimes in large ways and invariably in numerous small ways, every four years. As variable as the rules are, however, the nomination system of 1972 has one pair of overriding characteristics that define it as a system. The first is that whereas delegates actually choose their party's nominee, it is the general public, at least those who vote in the primaries and attend the caucuses, that chooses the delegates and often instructs them as to how to vote. The second characteristic is that the candidates, as a consequence, campaign in public and to the public for their support, mostly by heavy use of traditional media, such as television and newspapers, and, increasingly, social media, such as Facebook and Twitter. The dynamics of the technology of the media make campaigning in the media dynamic as well. Obama pioneered fund-raising and campaign contacting on social media in 2008 and 2012. Trump adroitly used the "free media" of television and newspaper coverage in lieu of buying campaign ads on them, and he pioneered the use of Twitter, especially, in 2016.

The complexity of the nomination contests is a consequence of four major factors. The first of these, federalism, defines the state as the unit of selection for national nominees and has been central to party nominations for nearly two centuries now. The second factor is the specific sets of rules governing primaries and caucus/convention procedures—established at the level of the national party in terms of general guidelines and then more specifically by state parties and/or state laws—these rules are at the heart of the nomination system of 1972. These rules govern delegate selection (and sometimes dictate instructions for delegates' presidential voting at the convention). The third factor is the set of rules about financing the campaign, which are also the oft-revised products of the reform period itself, starting in 1972. The fourth factor is the way in which candidates react to these rules and to their opponents, strategies that grow out of the keen competition for a highly valued goal. These factors are described in more detail in the sections that follow.

Federalism or State-Based Delegate Selection

National conventions to select presidential nominees were first held for the 1832 election, and for every nomination since then, the votes of delegates attending the conventions have determined the nominees. Delegates have always been allocated at the state level; whatever other particulars may apply, each state selects its parties' delegates through procedures adopted by state party organizations whether they choose to use caucuses and conventions, by state law, or the party organization wants to use a primary election, or both. Votes at the convention are cast by a state's delegation, and in general the state is the basic unit of the nomination process. Thus there are really fifty separate delegate selection contests in each party.¹³ There is no national primary, nor is there serious contemplation of one.

The fact that there are more than fifty separate contests in each party creates numerous layers of complexity, two of which are especially consequential. First, each state is free to choose delegates using any method consistent with the general rules of the national party. Many states choose to select delegates for the parties' conventions via a primary election. States not holding primaries use a combination of caucuses and conventions, which are designed and run by each political party and not by the state government. Caucuses are simply local meetings of party members. Those attending the caucuses report their preferences for the presidential nomination and choose delegates from their midst to attend higher-level conventions such as at the county, congressional district, state, and eventually national levels.

The second major consequence of federalism is that the states are free (within the bounds described as follows) to choose when to hold their primaries or caucuses. These events are thus spread out over time, although both parties now set a time period—the delegate selection “window”—during which primaries and caucuses can be held. Both parties began delegate selection on February 1, 2016, with the Iowa caucuses (a month later than in 2012), Republicans closed their delegate selection process with five states (CA, MT, NJ, NM, and SD) holding primaries on June 7, whereas Democrats in DC held a primary on June 14. The Republicans, concerned about how long the Romney nomination in 2012 took to unfold to victory, not only favored this shortening of the length of the primary season but also tried to regulate front-loading even further. In particular they required that states holding their primaries before March 15 had to use some kind of proportional allocation method so that the delegates awarded to candidates were to some degree proportionate to the votes those candidates received in the primary or caucus. It was not until March 15 that states could use the winner-take-all (WTA) rule, such that the candidate with the most votes wins all that state's delegates.¹⁴ WTA rules are often favored by GOP states, due to the larger impact that state's delegation might have on the race, concentrating their vote on a single candidate.¹⁵

The Nomination System of 1972: Delegate Selection

Through 1968 presidential nominations were won by appeals to the party leadership. To be sure public support and even primary election victories could be important in a candidate's campaign, but their importance stemmed from the credibility

they would give to the candidacy in the eyes of party leaders. The 1968 Democratic nomination, like so many events that year, was especially tumultuous.¹⁶ The result was that the Democratic Party created a committee, known as the McGovern-Fraser Commission, which proposed a series of reforms that were proposed to the Democratic National Committee between 1969 and early 1972 and then finally adopted by the party convention in 1972. The reforms were sufficiently radical in changing delegate selection procedures that they, in effect, created a new nomination system. Although it was much less aggressive in reforming its delegate selection procedures, the Republican Party did so to a certain degree. However, the most consequential results of the Democratic reforms for our purposes—the proliferation of presidential primaries and the media’s treatment of some (notably the Iowa) caucuses as essentially primary-like—spilled over to the Republican side as well.

In 1968 Democratic senators Eugene J. McCarthy of Minnesota and Robert F. Kennedy of New York ran very public, highly visible, primary-oriented campaigns in opposition to the policies of President Lyndon B. Johnson, especially with respect to the conduct of the Vietnam War. Before the second primary, held in Wisconsin, Johnson surprisingly announced, “I shall not seek and I will not accept the nomination of my party for another term as your President.”¹⁷ Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey took Johnson’s place in representing the presidential administration and the policies of the Democratic Party generally. Humphrey, however, waged no public campaign; he won the nomination without entering a single primary, thereby splitting an already deeply divided party.¹⁸ Would Humphrey have won the nomination had Robert Kennedy not been assassinated the night he defeated McCarthy in California, effectively eliminating McCarthy as a serious contender? No one will ever know. Democrats including Humphrey himself did know, however, that the chaos and violence that accompanied Humphrey’s nomination clearly indicated that the nomination process should be opened to more diverse candidacies and that public participation should be more open and more effective in determining the outcome. He thus offered a proposal to create the McGovern-Fraser Commission, as it was popularly called, which was accepted by the Democratic National Committee.

The two most significant consequences of the reforms were the public’s great influence on each state’s delegate selection proceedings and the proliferation of presidential primaries. Caucus/convention procedures, however, also became timelier, were better publicized, and in short, were more primary-like. Today the media treat Iowa’s caucuses as critical events, and the coverage of them is similar to the coverage of primaries—how many “votes” were “cast” for each candidate, for example. Indeed the party organizations formally recognized this fact. The Iowa Republican Party, for example, held a secret balloting among caucus attenders that determined how the delegates to subsequent levels of conventions were to be allocated among supporters of the candidates.¹⁹ Iowa Democrats, in their turn, conducted a standing “vote” of attenders to the same effect.

Whereas the McGovern-Fraser Commission actually recommended greater use of caucuses, many of the state party officials concluded that the easiest way to conform to the new Democratic rules in 1972 was to hold a primary election. Thus the number of states (including the District of Columbia) holding Democratic primaries increased from fifteen in 1968 to twenty-one in 1972 to twenty-seven in 1976, and the number

of Republican primaries increased comparably. The numbers peaked in 2000, when forty-three states conducted Republican primaries, and Democratic primaries were held in forty states. In 2016 there were thirty-nine primaries on each side. Thus it is fair to say that the parties' new nomination systems have become largely based on primaries or in more primary-like conventions.

The only major exception to this conclusion is that about 15 percent of delegates to the Democratic National Convention were chosen because they were elected officeholders or Democratic Party officials. Supporters of this reform of party rules (first used in 1984) wanted to ensure that the Democratic leadership would have a formal role to play at the conventions of the party. These "superdelegates" may have played a decisive role in the 1984 nomination of Walter F. Mondale, in the nomination of Obama over Clinton in 2008, and again for Clinton's nomination in 2016, when she, like Mondale and Obama, at one point had a majority of the non-superdelegates but not a majority of all delegates.²⁰ Each candidate needed only a relatively small number of additional superdelegates to commit to vote for them to win the nomination. All three received those commitments soon after the regular delegate selection process ended, and with that, they were assured the nomination.²¹

The delegate selection process has, as noted, become considerably more front-loaded.²² The rationale for front-loading was clear enough: the last time California's (actual or near) end-of-season primary had an effect on the nomination process was in the 1964 Republican and the 1972 Democratic nomination contests. Once candidates, the media, and other actors realized, and reacted to, the implications of the reformed nomination system, the action shifted to the earliest events of the season, and nomination contests, especially those involving multiple candidates, were effectively completed well before the end of the primary season. More and more state parties and legislatures (including, for a while, California's) realized the advantages of front-loading, bringing more attention from the media, more expenditures of time and money by the candidates, and more influence to their states if they held primaries sooner rather than later.


Soon, however, other factors started to affect state decisions. First, the rewards for early primaries were concentrated in a relatively small number of the very earliest primaries. And as we have noted, the national parties regulated which ones could go when and threatened to penalize states that violated the national party decisions. Indeed Michigan and Florida were actually penalized in 2008 and 2012 for holding their contests too early in the season. In addition the very early presidential primaries forced states to make an increasingly difficult choice. If they held their presidential primaries early in the year, they had to decide whether to hold the primary elections for all other offices at the same time, which was proving quite a bit earlier than made sense for candidates for local, state, and even national congressional posts, or to pay the costs of running two primaries, one for the president and one much later for all other offices.²³ Some states like California, for example, which were not able to reap the major benefits of being among the very earliest of events, chose to return to late in the season.

If the rationale for front-loading was clear by 1996, when it first became controversial, the consequences were not. Some argued that long-shot candidates could be propelled to the front of the pack by gathering momentum in Iowa and

New Hampshire and could, before the well-known candidates had a chance to react, lock up the nomination early. The alternative argument was that increasing front-loading helps those who begin the campaign with the advantages associated with being a front-runner, such as name recognition, support from state and local party or related organizations, and most of all, money. The dynamic of this adjustment, described in the following paragraphs, can be seen clearly in Figure 1-1, which reports the week in which the winning candidate was assured nomination in contested nomination campaigns since 1976.

Indeed as the primary season has become more front-loaded, the well-known, well-established, and well-financed candidates have increasingly dominated the primaries. Senator George S. McGovern of South Dakota and Carter won the Democratic nominations in 1972 and 1976, even though they began as little-known and ill-financed contenders. George H. W. Bush, successful in the 1980 Iowa Republican caucuses, climbed from being, in his words, “an asterisk in the polls” (where the asterisk is commonly used to indicate less than 1 percent support) to become Reagan’s major contender and eventual vice presidential choice and his successor to the presidency. And Colorado senator Gary Hart nearly defeated former Vice President Mondale in 1984. In 1988 the two strongest candidates at the start of the Republican race, George H. W. Bush and Bob Dole, contested vigorously, with Bush winning, while

Figure 1-1 Length of Multicandidate Campaigns: Two Major Parties, 1976–2016



Source: Compiled by authors.

their presence basically locked other lesser-known contenders out. Gov. Michael S. Dukakis of Massachusetts, the best-financed and best-organized (albeit little known) Democrat, won the nomination surprisingly easily. Bill Clinton's victory in 1992 appeared, then, to be the culmination of the trend toward an insuperable advantage for the strongest and best-financed candidates. Clinton was able to withstand scandal and defeat in the early going and eventually cruise to victory.

The campaign of former Democratic senator Paul Tsongas of Massachusetts in 1992 illustrates one important reason for Clinton's victory. Tsongas defeated the field in New Hampshire, and as usual, the victory and the media attention it drew opened doors to fund-raising possibilities unavailable to him even days earlier. Yet Tsongas faced the dilemma of whether to take time out of daily campaigning for the public's votes so that he could spend time on fund-raising or to continue campaigning in the upcoming primaries. If he campaigned in those primaries, he would not have the opportunity to raise and direct the funds he needed to be an effective competitor. Front-loading had simply squeezed too much into too short a post-New Hampshire time frame for a candidate to be able to capitalize on early victories as, say, Carter had done in winning the nomination and election in 1976. The events of 1996 supported the alternative argument—that increased front-loading benefits the front-runner—even though it took nearly all of Dole's resources to achieve his early victory that year.²⁴

This lesson was not lost on the candidates for 2000, especially George W. Bush. In particular he began his quest in 1999 (or earlier!) as a reasonably well-regarded governor but one not particularly well-known to the public outside of Texas (although, of course, sharing his father's name made him instantly recognizable). He was at that point only one of several plausible contenders, but he worked hard to receive early endorsements from party leaders and raised a great deal of money well ahead of his competition. When others sought to match Bush's early successes in this "invisible primary," they found that he had sewn up a great deal of support. Many, in fact, withdrew before the first vote was cast, suddenly realizing just how Bush's actions had lengthened the odds against them. Bush was therefore able to win the nomination at the very opening of the primary season. Incumbent Vice President Al Gore, on the other side, also benefited from the same dynamics of the invisible primary made manifest by front-loading, although in the more classical role of one who began the nomination season as the odds-on favorite and therefore the one most able to shut the door on his opposition well before it was time for most voters to cast their ballots.²⁵

In 2004 there was no strong leader of the contest before the Democratic campaign began. Howard Dean burst on the scene and rather surprisingly into a lead before dropping nearly as suddenly.²⁶ As a result there was a period of uncertainty in the shape of the contest, followed by solidifying support around long-time senator John Kerry, who thereby benefitted more from lack of anyone able to compete strongly against him than any rule.

The pre-primary period on the Republican side in 2008 was quite variable, with first McCain, then Giuliani, then Romney surging to the front. McCain's campaign was considered all but dead in the water by that point, but it regathered strength before 2007 ended. There was, then, no strong front-runner in the GOP; the campaign was wide open. In fact some pundits imagined former Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee had become a favorite to win, and so McCain's victory in the Iowa

caucuses was a genuine surprise (at least from the perspective of, say, October 2007). On the Democratic side, Hillary Clinton was a clear front-runner. In retrospect it was also clear that Obama had developed an impressive organization both by mobilizing support across the nation and by fund-raising, especially through adroit use of the Internet. Thus once his organizational strength became publicly visible, it was no surprise that he and Clinton easily defeated their rivals. Having boiled down to a two-candidate contest, each had carved out their own bases of support, and neither could decisively defeat the other. Obama did have a slight lead throughout much of the primary season, but because of the superdelegates, it was too slight a lead to be able to secure an outright majority of delegates until after the primary season ended. As heretofore unbound superdelegates determined their choices, they soon favored Obama sufficiently to put him over the top.

The 2012 Republican contest had some similarities to 2008, with Romney moving from his also-ran slot to replace McCain as the candidate who early on seemed strong, lost steam, and then resurged back to victory. One effect of the modest reversal in front-loading was that Romney, even though ahead, was not able to completely shut the door on his opposition until much later in the season. Simply too few delegates were selected as early in 2012 as in, say, 1980. This extended length of time had several effects. The most important appears to have been that the slowing of the delegate selection process, although still relatively highly front-loaded, permitted Romney's opponents to run negative campaigns against him, quite possibly hurting his ability to shape his own image and providing fodder for attacks in the general election campaign before the campaign had selected enough delegates for him to claim what proved to be a rather straightforward nomination victory.

Much the same appeared to happen again in 2016 on the Republican side. The unusual nature of someone like Trump emerging as the leading contender (even after losing the Iowa caucuses but righting his campaign and its dynamic growth in New Hampshire) led to calls for the remaining candidates (fairly soon into the season, the race reduced effectively to Trump versus Cruz, Kasich, and Rubio) and the "Republican establishment" to figure out a way to stop Trump. When that failed to happen, the divided opposition allowed Trump to build his delegate lead to victory.²⁷ On May 3, the night of the Indiana primary, his last major opponent, Ted Cruz, withdrew his candidacy, although Trump was still short of having a majority of delegates on his side. But from that night onward, he was unchallenged and thus the "presumptive nominee." Thus continued active opposition until May did yield a longer period in which Republicans were criticizing the eventual nomination, sometimes quite strenuously, in spite of a relatively straightforward and convincing win by Trump.

The slowed rate of delegate selection also affected the Clinton-Sanders contest on the Democratic side. Clinton, as she had in 2008, began her quest for nomination as a very strong front-runner, especially after those who appeared likely to be among her strongest opponents, Senator Elizabeth Warren (MA) and Vice President Biden, decided not to run. Of the remaining actual candidates, Sanders effectively had the liberal wing of the party on his own, and the race narrowed almost immediately to a two-person contest. In such races it is typically the case, as here, that both candidates have their own constituency in their party's base and are thus difficult to defeat. That is to say that these races—in 2016 like 2008 and others before them—take a long time


to resolve. Even when Clinton had secured an outright majority of delegates (which was at the end of the season anyway), Sanders failed to concede and thus continued to be able to criticize Clinton and to remain a holding place for liberal Democrats who were disenchanted with her.

These effects can be seen in Figure 1-2, which reports the cumulative selection of delegates. As can be seen there, 1976 (the first primary season defined by the rules adopted at the 1972 Democratic convention) shows a slow, gradual increase in the number of delegates selected. It is not until week thirteen, just over a month before the season ends, that 50% of the delegates were selected, and even later that a sufficiently large proportion of the delegates had been selected to make a majority likely to be held by the leading candidate, if he or she faced any opposition at all. The 2000 season was dramatically different, with the 50% mark being reached in week six (indeed reaching nearly two-thirds of the delegates selected by that week). Finally the slight retreat from such heavy front-loading in 2016 is visually apparent, but it is also apparent that it is rather slight, looking far more like the 2000 apogee than the 1976 perigee.

The final consequence—and possibly the most important for differentiating the nomination system of 1972 from its predecessors—is “momentum,” the building of success over time during the extended campaign period, such that every nomination has, so far, always been decided before the convention balloting and always going to the candidate who won the greatest support from the party’s electorate.

The most significant feature of the nomination process, from the candidates’ perspectives, is its dynamic character. This system was designed to empower the general

Figure 1-2 Front-Loading: Comparing Democratic Party Delegate Totals Weekly, 1976, 2000, and 2016



Source: Compiled by authors.

public, giving it opportunities to participate more fully in the selection of delegates to the national party conventions. The early state delegate selection contests in Iowa and New Hampshire allowed largely unknown candidates to work a small state or two using the “retail” politics of door-to-door campaigning to achieve a surprising success that would attract media attention and then money, volunteers, and greater popular support. In practice this was exactly the route Jimmy Carter followed in 1976.

John H. Aldrich developed this account of “momentum” in campaigns, using the 1976 campaigns to illustrate its effect. He first showed that there is no stable balance to this process.²⁸ In practical terms he predicted that one candidate will increasingly absorb all the money, media attention, and public support and thereby defeat all opponents before the convention. He further showed that the tendency for this process to focus rapidly on a single winner increases the *more* candidates there are. This finding was just the opposite of the original speculation and, indeed, what at the time seemed obvious: the greater the number of candidates, the longer it would take to reach victory. But commonsense was not a helpful guide in this case. Like other contests with large numbers of contenders, the Republican race of 2016 illustrates the power of momentum. Trump did not start off the campaign with a large lead in popular support, but he built that over the course of the campaign, eventually all but crushing even his strongest opponents and forcing their mostly early exits.

There is one exception to this pure “momentum” result: the possibility of an unstable but sustainable balance with two candidates locked in a nearly precise tie. Early campaigns offered two illustrations compatible with two candidates in (unstable) equipoise, the 1976 Republican and 1980 Democratic contests. In both the 1984 Democratic and 2008 Democratic contests, the campaigns began with a large number of candidates. Each featured a strong, well-financed, well-known, well-organized candidate (former Vice President Mondale and Hillary Clinton, respectively) who, it turned out, was challenged strongly by a heretofore little-known (to the public) candidate who offered a new direction for the party (Sen. Gary Hart and Sen. Barack Obama, respectively). The multicandidate contest quickly shrank to just two viable candidates. The 2016 Democratic contest fits the pattern of balanced two-party contests very nicely, with neither bloc of voters willing to move from Sanders to Clinton nor from Clinton to Sanders in any great numbers, as inevitably happens in a momentum-driven contest.

The Nomination System of 1972: Campaign Finance

Campaign finance is the third aspect of the reform of the presidential nomination process. In this case changes in law (and regulation in light of the law) and in the technology for raising money in nomination contests have made the financial context widely different from one campaign to the next. The 2016 campaign was no exception. These candidates were able to learn some of the lessons from strategies tried in 2012, which was the first run under a new (de-)regulatory environment in light of the Supreme Court case popularly known as *Citizens United* (2010), and so in 2012 candidates tried a large variety of new or modified strategies for campaign financing in response. Two major changes were the increased reliance on what are known as independent expenditures by a number of candidates, and Trump’s strategy, which

focused less on raising money but instead in getting the media to cover his campaign much more highly than those of other candidates. This was a strategy he believed to be a more effective use of “free” media than what impact higher expenditures for purchasing time on the paid media would offer.

Our story begins, however, with the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and especially amendments to that act in 1974 and 1976. The Watergate scandal during the Nixon administration included revelations of substantial abuse in raising and spending money in the 1972 presidential election (facts discovered in part in implementing the 1971 act). The resulting regulations limited contributions by individuals and groups, virtually ending the power of individual “fat cats” and requiring presidential candidates to raise money in a broad-based campaign. The federal government would match small donations for the nomination, and candidates who accepted matching funds would be bound by limits on what they could spend.

These provisions, created by the Federal Election Commission to monitor campaign financing and regulate campaign practices, altered the way nomination campaigns were funded. Still, just as candidates learned over time how to contest most effectively under the new delegate selection process, they also learned how to campaign under the new financial regulations. Perhaps most important, presidential candidates learned—although it is not as true for them as for congressional candidates—that “early money is like yeast, because it helps to raise the dough.”²⁹ They also correctly believed that a great deal of money was necessary to compete effectively.

The costs of running presidential nomination campaigns, indeed campaigns for all major offices, have escalated dramatically since 1972. But a special chain of strategic reactions has spurred the cost of campaigning for the presidential nomination. The *Citizens United* case accelerated the chain reaction by creating a much more fully deregulated environment.

When many states complied with the McGovern-Fraser Commission reforms by adopting primaries, media coverage grew, enhancing the effects of momentum, increasing the value of early victories, and raising the costs of early defeat. By 2008 very few candidates were accepting federal matching funds because doing so would bind them to spending limits in individual states and over the campaign as a whole, and these limits were no longer realistic in light of campaign realities. By 2012, only one candidate, former Louisiana Governor Buddy Roemer, applied for federal funding, and his candidacy was considered sufficiently hopeless that many debates did not even bother to include him among the contestants. No major candidates accepted matching funds in 2016.

Much money was being raised, however. Through May 2008, for example, the fund-raising totals for the three major contenders were \$296 million for Obama, \$238 million for Clinton, and \$122 million for McCain.³⁰ By the same point in 2012, Romney reported raising \$121 million, with Paul having raised \$40 million, Gingrich \$24 million, and Santorum \$22 million. See Table 1-1 for reports on campaign expenditures in 2016. Note that, for example, Clinton and Sanders spent much more than Romney raised in 2012.

The 2008 campaign also marked a dramatic expansion in the use of the Internet to raise money, following on the efforts of Democrat Howard Dean, the former governor of Vermont, in 2004 (and, to an extent, McCain in 2000). Ron Paul, for example,

raised more than \$6 million on a single day, December 6, 2007, through the Internet. But Obama's success in 2008 served as the model for future campaigns, such as the \$55 million he raised in February at a critical moment for the campaign.³¹

The *Citizens United* decision in 2010 changed the landscape dramatically. In the narrow it overturned the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act and held that corporations and unions could spend unlimited money in support of political objectives and could enjoy First Amendment free speech rights, just as individuals could. These organizations, however, continued to be banned from direct contribution to candidates and parties. The case, and especially a subsequent one decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals in light of this case, spurred the development of what are known as "super PACs," which are political action committees that can now accept unlimited contributions from individuals, corporations, and unions and spend as much as they like so long as it is not in explicit support of a candidate or party's election campaign or coordinated with their campaign organization.³²

According to data from the Center for Responsive Politics, expenditures on behalf of the three major nomination contenders were quite large. In 2012 about \$14 million was spent on behalf of Romney, \$19 million for Gingrich, and \$21 million for Santorum. Data from Open Secrets are reported in Table 1-1 for the 2016 campaign. Note that the expenditures on behalf of many candidates, especially Republicans, had as much, or even more, spent on behalf of their campaigns than they spent themselves.³³ These organizations altered the terms of the campaign in that their expenditures had to be independent of the candidates and their (and their party's) organizations. It is therefore not necessarily the case that the candidate and, in the fall, the party will retain total control over the campaign and its messages.

Another consequence of these changes is that what were previously dubbed "fat cats" are once again permitted. The 2012 exemplar was Sheldon Adelson, a casino magnate and a strong supporter of Israel. He contributed \$10 million to the Winning Our Future super PAC in support of Newt Gingrich, contributing about half that total before the South Carolina primary and the other half before the next primary in Florida. His public support is rare, however. Most of the super PACs are funded and led by small numbers of individuals, and we often do not know their names.

Note that in 2016, although Trump did raise and spend a good deal of money, much of his expenditures came later in the game, and he made a very public case for not spending a dime of his own money until late into the campaign. Certainly he spent much less than either of the two major Democrats, both of whom raised sums comparable to the Obama-Clinton race in 2008. But he did spend much more than his opponents, with only Rubio being at all close behind. And, of course, he eventually received a lot of support from super PACs, even though Bush also had a great deal spent on his behalf (even if ineffectually). The lessons are that money is very helpful, that early money still must be better than that raised late, that candidates are still trying to figure out the best configuration in this largely deregulated campaign finance regime, and that, as Trump's approach shows, it is not money that is important, but what it will buy. We will discuss his campaign strategy in a little while, but this also raises the final lesson for the future, that if candidates come to rely on super PACs, they risk control over their campaign, or they simply agree to adopt the stances of their party or its backers as their own. This concession to the party and its "image" is

greatly strengthened due to the dramatic increase in partisan polarization that began around 1980 and continues to increase today.

STRATEGY AND THE CANDIDATES' CAMPAIGNS IN 2016: THE ELECTORAL SETTING AND HOW THE CANDIDATES WON THEIR NOMINATIONS

The Strategic Context: One of the most dramatic changes of the last half century has been the increase in partisan polarization, which generally means an increasing similarity of attitudes and preferences within each party and a substantial increase in divergence of opinion between the two parties. The leading indicators of this increase in partisan polarization have been among the party elites and especially their elected officeholders.³⁴ What is less clear is whether the electorate has followed polarization among elites (or, even less obviously, led elite polarization), and if so, how much the electorate has followed (or led). Some argue that there has been little change for decades, especially on such key measures as issue and ideological preferences. In this view polarization in the electorate is relatively small, with the result that the electorate continues to be basically moderate in its views.³⁵ Others point to at least some increased polarization in preferences between partisan identifiers, particularly among the more attentive and engaged in politics, such as those among the most likely to participate in primaries and caucuses.³⁶


The clearest evidence of partisan polarization in the electorate lies in divergences between the two parties in other ways than their attitudes toward issues and even their ideological views. For example, Marc Hetherington and Jason Husser showed that there has been a dramatic decline in trust across party lines, whereas Shanto Iyengar and colleagues have shown that emotional responses have become much more polarized along party lines in the electorate.³⁷ Finally Gary Jacobson demonstrated that the so-called approval ratings of presidents (something we analyze in Chapter 7 in detail) went from having only a modest amount of partisan differences to becoming deeply divided by party.³⁸

Here we illustrate that the context for the 2016 presidential nomination campaign has become much more deeply polarized along party lines than it was in 1980 in terms of overall affective evaluations of the candidates running for the presidential nomination. The ANES ran nation-wide surveys in January 1980 and in January 2016.³⁹ These years turn out to be especially appropriate ones for this look at partisan polarization of candidate evaluations for two reasons. The 1980 presidential election, as it happens, was the year in which elite partisan polarization turned and began its sharp increase, and thus we have data from the beginning and (current) end points of elite polarization. In addition both parties' nominations were strongly competitive. In both years the Democrats witnessed a strong two-person contest that lasted throughout the primary season. In both years the Republicans chose over a larger number of candidates that more quickly ended with Reagan and Trump's victories, respectively, but were nonetheless hotly contested in January. Especially on the Republican side, contenders argued for their candidacy in part by claiming to be supported by Democrats.

The survey data reported in Figures 1-3 and 1-4 show an increase in partisan polarization in the electorate in two ways. The figures report data using the so-called candidate thermometers, which ask how “warmly” or “coolly” the respondent feels toward the candidate, where 100 is the warmest possible feeling, 50 is neutral (neither warm nor cool), and 0 is the coldest possible feelings toward that candidate.⁴⁰ Figure 1-3 reports the difference between how the average Democrat and average Republican evaluated that candidate.⁴¹ This is probably the most direct measure of partisan polarization of candidate evaluations. Those who are concerned about partisan polarization often point to the decline in the ability to work across party lines—the decline in bipartisanship—which is compounded by an apparent growth in emotional hostility to those on the other side of party lines. In Figure 1-4, therefore, we report the percentage of partisans who rate the relevant candidate of the opposite party positively (i.e., warmly or above 50 degrees). Even if there are large gaps in evaluations, as in Figure 1-3, the ability to see the opposition candidate positively bodes more favorably for bipartisanship.

The two figures have strong and reinforcing findings. In 1980, although each party felt more positively toward its own candidates than did those identifying with the other party, the difference between the two parties was fairly muted, with


Figure 1-3 Difference in Average Thermometer Rating: Selected Candidates, January 1980 and 2016



Source: Authors' analysis of “feeling thermometers” is from the respective ANES surveys.

Note: Data are weighted.

Figure 1-4 Warm Feelings from Opposite Partisans: Selected Candidates, January 1980 and 2016



Source: Authors' analysis of "feeling thermometers" is from the respective ANES surveys.

Note: Data are weighted.

differences typically under 20 degrees on the 100-point scale. Only evaluations of Kennedy were higher, at 27 points. None of these were as large as the smallest partisan gap in 2016, and the partisan polarization between the two eventual nominees was great—more than 40 points for Trump and more than 50 for Clinton. Perhaps even more dramatic, in 1980 *majorities* of the opposition felt warmly toward Carter and toward eventual vice presidential nominee Bush, with Reagan evaluated positively by many Democrats. Conversely, in 2016, none of the candidates were evaluated positively by a quarter of the opposition, and fewer than one in five partisans felt warmly toward the candidate who eventually won the other party's nomination. There was very little chance that either party could nominate a candidate with any appreciable support among the opposition in 2016, quite unlike Reagan's success in winning over "Reagan Democrats" in his campaigns and presidency.⁴² Even at the start of the campaign, that is, the contenders were in a strategic context that rewarded focus on one's own party with no incentive to build toward a cross-party coalition, either in open primary states or for the general election—or thereafter when in office. The public has become deeply divided emotionally over our electoral contests even before they have barely begun in a way that simply was not true a generation ago.

Whereas, therefore, it is always true that nomination politics leads candidates to focus on their party to win, this was truer in 2016 than ever before. How, then, did the candidates win? We begin with Democrats. Hillary Clinton started both the 2008 and 2016 campaigns in the enviable position of an unusually well-known candidate in the public, with many areas of support in the Democratic electorate already won and with a great deal of support from leading Democrats and those with access to funding sources. Her position was thus well-defined with appeal to moderate Democrats, women (especially older women), African Americans, and those who have long been “Clintonians.” As such if she had a vulnerability in the Democratic primary electorate, it was on the party’s left.

Sanders was able to clearly fashion his appeal to that very constituency, even though not nearly as well-known to Democratic voters in January. He had long been on the left. Indeed his original election as mayor of Burlington, VT, was as a Socialist, and he had long served in Congress as an Independent who caucused with the Democrats but retained his independent status. Only recently had he formally and publicly affiliated as a Democrat, making his potential nomination viable. Unlike earlier nomination contests, few contested for the liberal portion of the Democratic electorate, with the apparently strongest contenders, especially Senator Elizabeth Warren (MA), declining to run. Given his late and, in some measures, begrudging entry into the Democratic Party, he lacked the close interactions and shared service to the party leadership that Clinton had with so many of them. And both his lack of seeking support from Democratic donors (Vermont did not require the same level of campaign expenditures as larger states) and his vocal stance against super PACs and other organizations that serve as sources of campaign resources, he also faced obstacles to expanding upon his electoral base. And, indeed, that is how the campaign worked out.

Perhaps the biggest surprise of the Democratic campaign was how Sanders was able to make a strong appeal, especially to younger voters on the left, and to turn college students, among others, into active supporters. As a further result, Clinton, even as she emphasized the more liberal parts of her agenda and adopted more left-wing positions on key issues, was unable to expand her base on the left, as Sanders was demonstrably a liberal (even socialist) candidate, and she was forced to publicly change her stances to try to reach Sanders’s supporters. Conversely Sanders had too little standing among Democratic leaders (such as superdelegates) or more moderate Democrats in the public, nor even among the large constituency of African Americans. Thus he too was unable to cut into Clinton’s strengths and expand his base of support.

Clinton won the Iowa caucuses (a real victory, given her loss there in 2008) and held Sanders to a relatively small victory in New Hampshire, sitting next door to Sanders’s home (see Table 1-3 for delegates won by these two candidates over the nomination campaign). Of course that meant that Sanders did reasonably well in Iowa and won New Hampshire, cementing him as a credible candidate, able to be considered by voters over the long haul. Still, his inability to shake much of her support meant that in the March 1 “Super Tuesday” primaries, most of which were in the South and thus featured two sources of Clinton strength, moderate white Democrats and African Americans, followed by her largely similar victories in the large, industrial states of the “Rust Belt,” meant that Sanders fell behind in the count of delegates won, even as he very slowly approached her standing in the public opinion polls. Because

the Democratic rules require some form of proportional selection of delegates (i.e., roughly in proportion to the percentage of votes received), Clinton's delegate lead became simply insurmountable.

As noted earlier, however, it took Clinton until June for her to win an absolute majority of the delegates and thus achieve victory, a victory strengthened by heavy support of superdelegates, those party leaders with whom she had so long worked. In short two candidates with clear and distinct appeals were able to hold their own support, but both were unable to expand into that of the opponent. As a result the early lead Clinton had in public opinion polls (8 points in the February CBS/*New York Times* [NYT] poll) held steady throughout the season (the same poll in May had her with a 7-point lead), and that relatively small lead in the national polls became a small but winning majority in the delegate count as state after state selected its delegates.

The Republican side was, of course, rather different in many ways. Still, Trump held a 17-point lead over Cruz, his closest competitor in the January (and February) CBS/NYT poll that in April, just before Cruz withdrew, stood at 13 points. Once delegate selection started, that is, all the sound and fury of Republican candidates attacking each other on increasingly personal grounds had at best minor effects on Trump's public standing and lead in the delegate count. To be sure, in 2016 or 2017, many different Republicans got their day in the sun, but none were able to close the Trump lead.

Perhaps surprisingly Trump lost to Cruz in Iowa (and nearly fell to third place there) but righted his ship in New Hampshire, South Carolina, and virtually everywhere thereafter, consistently winning most of the states with pluralities (only occasionally with actual majorities) but picking up the bulk of the delegates in state after state. Trump did lose two large states, Ohio and Texas, and with those losses in votes, he also lost even larger percentages of their delegates, but these were divided between Kasich and Cruz, respectively (each winning their home states). Even so, Trump was able to carry many other larger states (perhaps most significantly, Rubio's home state of Florida). While opponents considered ways to unite their forces to maximize leverage against Trump, no plan was able to be worked out. Further, after the earliest states had chosen, the Republican Party rules permit states to use WTA rules so that the candidate who wins more of the larger states wins a far higher percentage of the delegates needed to win nomination. Thus Trump was able to move consistently and smoothly toward victory, as can be seen in Table 1-4, which reports the results of each Republican contest.

This relatively placid and straightforward account of how Clinton and Trump won nomination belies the media frenzy that accompanied both campaigns—and especially these two candidates in particular. These circumstances are those that most remember, even though their consistent and largely unchecked (and apparently uncheckable) drives to victory are the real story of how to win nominations in the post-1972 nomination system.

Still, both were tagged with problems (quite reasonably understood as of their own doing) that would dog their campaigns throughout the spring, summer, fall, and in Trump's case, into the White House itself as we discuss in subsequent chapters. Clinton was tarnished with three charges that yielded appearances of corruption—the financing of the Clinton Foundation, the events that led to the deaths of four

Table 1-3 Democratic Nomination Results, 2016: Bound Delegates Won in State Primaries and Caucuses—Clinton and Sanders

Date	State	Clinton	Sanders
1-Feb	Iowa	23	21
9-Feb	N.H.	9	15
20-Feb	Nev.	20	15
27-Feb	S.C.	39	14
1-Mar	Ala.	44	9
	Ark.	22	10
	Colo.	25	41
	Ga.	73	29
	Mass.	46	45
	Minn.	31	46
	Okla.	17	21
	Tenn.	44	23
	Texas	147	75
	Vt.	0	16
	Va.	62	33
5-Mar	Kan.	10	23
	La.	37	14
	Neb.	10	15
6-Mar	Maine	8	17
8-Mar	Mich.	63	67
	Miss.	31	5
15-Mar	Fla.	141	73
	Ill.	79	77
	Mo.	36	35
	N.C.	60	47
	Ohio	81	62
22-Mar	Ariz.	42	33
	Idaho	5	18
	Utah	6	27

Date	State	Clinton	Sanders
26-Mar	Alaska	3	13
	Hawaii	8	17
	Wash.	27	74
5-Apr	Wis.	38	48
9-Apr	Wyo.	7	7
19-Apr	N.Y.	139	108
26-Apr	Conn.	28	27
	Del.	12	9
	Md.	60	35
	Pa.	106	83
	R.I.	11	13
3-May	Ind.	39	44
10-May	W.Va.	11	18
17-May	Ky.	28	27
	Ore.	25	36
5-Jun	P.R.	37	23
7-Jun	Calif.	254	221
	Mont.	10	11
	N.J.	79	47
	N.M.	18	16
	N.D.	5	13
	S.D.	10	10
14-Jun	D.C.	16	4

Listed numbers are for bound delegates.

Source: Kevin Schaul and Samuel Granados, "The Race to the Democratic Nomination," *Washington Post*, October 10, 2017, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/2016-election/primaries/delegate-tracker/democratic/>, accessed June 1, 2017.

Americans in Benghazi, Libya, and her use of a private e-mail account while she was secretary of state (and possible misuse of classified material). The latter, of course, continued right up to election day itself. In the spring, as well as in the fall, Trump regularly referred to her as "Crooked Hillary," and his audiences chanted "Lock her up! Lock her up!" Trump made a series of what we would ordinarily have imagined

to be candidacy-ending gaffes, but (just as Clinton's poll numbers stayed fixed at a high level in the nomination campaign) no matter how vindictive (calling Cruz's wife "ugly"), mean-spirited ("Little Marco"), lascivious,⁴³ factually inaccurate, or seemingly outrageously racist his words, Trump simply marched toward victory in the spring. Or, as he put it himself, "I could stand in the middle of 5th Avenue and shoot somebody, and I wouldn't lose voters," Trump said in Sioux City, Iowa, January 24, 2016.⁴⁴ Yet these unique features of these two candidates seemed to have had little effect on their nomination campaigns.

National Party Conventions: As we noted earlier the purpose of the state primary or caucus convention procedures is to select who will be the delegates from that state to attend their national party convention and/or to instruct those delegates on how to vote for presidential nomination. The delegates are those entrusted with voting on all the convention's major pieces of business. These include resolving any remaining problems that arose in selecting one state's or another's delegations, adopting rules that will govern the party for the next four years, voting on the proposed party platform, and choosing the presidential and vice presidential nominees. Thus the delegates are entrusted with essentially all of the party's major decisions. But, as we have already seen with respect to the presidential nomination, they may cast the formal ballots—and it could well be some day that they will in fact play active roles—but their decision making is so tightly constrained that they almost invariably have no real choices to make. Their choice for presidential nominee is constrained by the vote of the public in their state.⁴⁵ The presidential nominee selects a candidate she or he would like to see serve as a running mate, and it has been a very long time since there was any real opposition to that choice.⁴⁶

Party platforms once were regularly contended, as this was the one time when the party leadership could interact and work out just what the party stood for. Although this has not been true in recent years, both parties have had protests over the platform committee's proposals on one issue or another (e.g., the change in the 1980 Republican platform from its long-held stance of endorsing an Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution for women to opposing it), whereas the last truly contended (nearly violently contended) battle over a platform plank was the debate over the Vietnam War in the 1968 Democratic Convention.

Instead of the traditional role of party conventions serving as the one time the party gathers from around the nation to debate and decide party business, the conventions have changed in recent decades to serve as major public presentations of the party to the nation. This leads the party and its leadership to seek to downplay internal divisions (although when they are really there, they are typically not able to be completely hidden) and present a united front to the public. Their other central role is to serve as the end of the intra-party competition of nominations and the transition to the general election campaign. The acceptance speeches of the nominees (and certainly of the presidential nominee) are generally used to showcase the major themes of the candidates for the general election campaign.

In 2012 the conventions were held late in August, which put the Republicans, especially, at a disadvantage as their nominee was restricted in spending in opposition

Table 1-4 Republican Nomination Results, 2016: Bound Delegates Won in State Primaries and Caucuses—Trump, Cruz, Rubio, and Kasich

		Trump	Cruz	Rubio	Kasich
1-Feb	Iowa	7	8	7	1
9-Feb	N.H.	11	3	1	4
20-Feb	S.C.	50	0	0	0
23-Feb	Nev.	14	6	7	1
1-Mar	Ala.	36	13	1	0
	Alaska	11	12	5	0
	Ark.	16	15	9	0
	Ga.	42	18	16	0
	Mass.	22	4	8	8
	Minn.	8	13	17	0
	Okla.	13	15	12	0
	Tenn.	33	16	9	0
	Texas	48	104	3	0
	Vt.	8	0	0	8
	Va.	17	8	16	5
5-Mar	Kan.	9	24	6	1
	Ky.	17	15	7	7
	La.	25	18	0	0
	Maine	9	12	0	2
6-Mar	P.R.	0	0	23	0
8-Mar	Hawaii	11	7	1	0
	Idaho	12	20	0	0
	Mich.	25	17	0	17
	Miss.	25	15	0	0
10-Mar	V.I.	1	0	0	0
12-Mar	D.C.	0	0	10	9
	Wyo.	1	23	1	0

(Continued)

Table 1-4 (Continued)

		Trump	Cruz	Rubio	Kasich
15-Mar	Fla.	99	0	0	0
	Ill.	54	9	0	6
	Mo.	37	15	0	0
	N.C.	29	27	6	9
	M.P.	9	0	0	0
	Ohio	0	0	0	66
22-Mar	Ariz.	58	0	0	0
	Utah	0	40	0	0
5-Apr	Wis.	6	36	0	0
9-Apr	Colo.	0	30	0	0
19-Apr	N.Y.	89	0	0	6
26-Apr	Conn.	28	0	0	0
	Del.	16	0	0	0
	Md.	38	0	0	0
	Pa.	17	0	0	0
	R.I.	12	2	0	5
3-May	Ind.	57	0	0	0
10-May	Neb.	36	0	0	0
	W.Va.	30	0	0	1
17-May	Ore.	18	5	0	5
24-May	Wash.	41	0	0	0
7-Jun	Calif.	172	0	0	0
	Mont.	27	0	0	0
	N.J.	51	0	0	0
	N.M.	24	0	0	0
	S.D.	29	0	0	0

Listed numbers are for bound delegates.

Source: Kevin Schaul and Samuel Granados, "The Race to the Democratic Nomination," *Washington Post*, October 10, 2017, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/2016-election/primaries/delegate-tracker/republican/>, accessed June 1, 2017.

to President Obama by the rules of the nomination season. Thus they were especially keen to hold their convention earlier in 2016. They choose to hold it in Cleveland July 18–21, whereas the Democrats held theirs in Philadelphia July 25–28.⁴⁷

Trump selected the governor of Indiana, Michael Pence, to be his running mate on July 15. Pence is as understated as Trump is flamboyant and has had considerable experience in politics to balance Trump's outsider status. He has particularly deep religious beliefs, which guide many of his policy positions and, of course, appeals strongly to the large and important religious right in the party. That he hails from a combined Rust Belt, agricultural Midwestern state balanced the ticket, as is a common tradition, counterbalancing a New York City, high-rolling businessman with little formal connections to religion. Whereas the Trump and Pence nominations (and adoption of the party platform) went smoothly enough, there were moments of contention. Perhaps the most obvious was Cruz's unwillingness (often described as "defiance") to endorse Trump's nomination on prime-time television, which resulted in loud booing and heckling. Trump, for his part, stuck pretty closely to the script of his acceptance speech, which outlined a dark vision of contemporary America, leading those who agreed to the conclusion (he hoped) that one needed to vote for him to reverse course.

Clinton, for her part, selected Senator Tim Kaine, Virginia, as her running mate. This choice had less ticket balancing as compared to selecting a candidate from the liberal wing of the party, such as Sanders or Senator Elizabeth Warren (both of whom had featured speeches—Warren gave the keynote address). Although perhaps not quite as similar as Senator Al Gore was to Bill Clinton, Kaine was less about uniting the party (although he certainly did not divide it) than about trying to win the general election. Any worries about major disruption from the left wing were unfounded, and thus the convention presented a united image to the public and allowed Clinton to use her acceptance speech to complete the uniting and begin the general election campaign.

Do not copy, post, or distribute