Local Commons and Global Interdependence
Edited by:
- Robert O Keohane - Princeton University, USA
- Elinor Ostrom - Indiana University, Bloomington, USA
December 1994 | 272 pages | SAGE Publications Ltd
This volume offers a synthesis of what is known about very large and very small common-pool resources. Individuals using commons at the global or local level may find themselves in a similar situation. At an international level, states cannot appeal to authoritative hierarchies to enforce agreements they make to cooperate with one another. In some small-scale settings, participants may be just as helpless in calling on distant public officials to monitor and enforce their agreements. Scholars have independently discovered self-organizing regimes which rely on implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and procedures rather than the command and control of a central authority.
The contributors discuss the possibilities and dangers of scaling up and scaling down. They explore the impact of the number of actors and the degree of heterogeneity among actors on the likelihood of cooperative behaviour.
Robert O Keohane and Elinor Ostrom
Introduction
PART ONE: THEORETICAL PUZZLES
Oran R Young
The Problem of Scale in Human/Environment Relationships
Duncan Snidal
The Politics of Scope
Lisa L Martin
Heterogeneity, Linkage and Commons Problems
PART TWO: EVIDENCE FROM THE LABORATORY
Steven Hackett, Dean Dudley and James Walker
Heterogeneities, Information and Conflict Resolution
PART THREE: EVIDENCE FROM THE FIELD
Elinor Ostrom
Constituting Social Capital and Collective Action
Gary D Libecap
The Conditions for Successful Collective Action
Kenneth A Oye and James H Maxwell
Self-interest and Environmental Management
Ronald B Mitchell
Heterogeneities at Two Levels